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Through the analysis of liberal theories of plurality and diversity –multiculturalism, 
interculturalism, nationalisms, cosmopolitanism, communitarianism-, I make a series 
of arguments regarding the positive recognition of difference. I acknowledge the 
merits and benefits of these theories in providing political recognition to minority 
groups. However, I introduce the notions of strong identity and recognition that could 
open the door for solutions to some puzzles left unsolved by the theories that 
promote political recognition, including claims of essentialism, issues on the 
categorisation of minorities and majorities, problems related to social cohesion, 
integration and liberalisation of minorities, and of course issues on recognition of 
cultural value and identity.  
 
Constant with the analysis. I portray the concept of identity from an ontological 
perspective. I argue that identity mainly refers to what we are. In the strict sense, it 
is not a property or something we can instrumentally use to deal with the issues of 
everyday life. Identity also can be understood as membership, belonging, something 
socially constructed, and the social glue in modern societies while nevertheless 
being more than that. We do not have multiple identities, but a complex unified 
identity that includes everything that we are. To develop this part of the argument, I 
draw on Charles Taylor’s theory of the modern self. Finally, I suggest that strong 
recognition is pre-dialogical, and does not lead to the direct integration of minorities 
into the main culture. Further, it fosters internal social change, supports a stronger 
idea of collective autonomy, and is not mediated by institutions.  
 
These notions of strong identity and recognition allow us to move beyond some 
limitations of the liberal theories, while at the same time valuing the benefits of 
political recognition. I argue that strong recognition does not contravene political 
recognition but, in fact, enables it. 
 
 
Keywords: identity; recognition; political plurality; liberalism; social cohesion 
 
  v 
Lay Summary 
 
This thesis explores the notions of human diversity and plurality. The aim of the text 
is to shed light on debates about cultural diversity and plurality in the context of 
liberal democracies. For this reason, it makes sense to develop a careful analysis of 
liberal theories of diversity and plurality that unveils the way we generally recognise 
difference in western societies. I centre the assessment of the theories, and later my 
alternative to them, on two concepts: identity and recognition. These two terms are 
in the middle of important struggles in the context of western democracies, 
particularly in the case of minority groups.  
 
What I claim is that liberal perspectives provide an important but incomplete picture 
of our current diversity issues. I also claim that an overemphasis on the political 
might prevent valuable forms of deeper recognition from developing. In other words, 
I try to transcend the constraints of a dominant liberal narrative and its tendency to 
place important issues in the realm of the political. 
 
In consequence, I do not argue that political recognition is irrelevant to constructing 
our identity; it does provide strong structures shaping the understanding of 
ourselves and feelings of belonging. However, other existential aspects are beyond 
its reach. It is in this context that I develop an idea of strong identity and strong 













Uno, nessuno e centomila -One, No One and One Hundred Thousand 
(1990)- is a novel written by the Italian Nobel laureate Luigi Pirandello. It tells the 
story of Vitangelo Moscarda, who one fine day while looking himself at the mirror, 
gets caught in an identity crisis after his wife points out his nose tilts to the right. This 
fact, evident for the people around him but unknown to him, triggers growing anxiety 
in Moscarda, who does not know who he is anymore. He realises that the 
understanding of himself does not coincide with the image that others have of him. 
The novel tells the story of a relentless struggle for reducing the disparity between 
how Moscarda perceives himself and the ways others perceive him. Moscarda is 
one because his individuality is still there, he has self-perception and self-
understanding; he is no one because he cannot recognise himself in any of the 
images that others impose on him; he is one hundred thousand because all the 
different understandings that others have of him seem more real than the one he 
cannot enforce on others. 
I didn’t know myself at all, for myself I had no personal reality, I 
underwent a kind of constant melting, fluid, malleable; the others knew 
me, each in his way, according to the reality they had given me; that is to 
say, each saw in me a Moscarda that wasn’t I, since I was actually no 
one for myself. All those Moscardas, and all of them more real than I who 
had for myself, as I said, no reality. (Pirandello, 1990:43)  
Pirandello’s masterpiece shows the difficulties of constructing a coherent and 
unitary identity. It denotes that our identity goes beyond the limits of ourselves and 
reaches others. Despite its being the closest, most intimate, most secure thing that 
we have our identity is importantly shaped by the recognition of the others. In more 
technical terms, the construction of our selves, the construction of our identity, who 
we are, does not depend entirely on us, but it is tightly intertwined with the 
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recognition provided by others. This is the transversal idea that goes through the 
entire text as a leitmotif. However, the ‘dependency’ on something external is not a 
notion that could find support without substantial resistance and controversy. The 
concepts we use to refer to ourselves seem to contradict such dependency on 
something external: individuality, subjectivity, personality, ego, self. I cannot address 
the problem if something individual is independent and its implications1. 
Nonetheless, we are inclined to accept that we are individuals, subjects, etc. 
because we are capable of existing independently from other objects and entities. 
Otherwise, we would be parts of something bigger but not self-sufficient unities.  
In the case of human identity, there is a dominant narrative shaping the 
current idea of the auto-sufficiency of ourselves: modern identity. In consequence, 
despite my efforts to smoothly introduce different interpretations of concepts and 
notions that are widely accepted, sometimes the text might feel antagonising to the 
reader. This is not the intent, but is caused by poor style and lack of clarity.  
In the modern world, we are all Moscarda, we all construct our own identity, 
we all have privileged and immediate access to ourselves. What others expect or 
understand us to be does not always coincide to what we think we are or want to be. 
And one more thing, the understanding of who we are is shaped by what others 
think of us. Our identity, as Taylor correctly affirms (1994), is tightly connected to its 
recognition. Therefore, the claims for recognition, particularly those of minorities and 
oppressed groups that shape an important part of the political and social landscape 
of our time, cannot be rightly addressed without considering the construction of 
identity and vice-versa.  
Pirandello’s novel helps illustrate that the construction of our identity is not 
enclosed in ourselves. However, we have to make the next step, which is what I try 
to do in this thesis. The argument moves further and describes how identity and 
recognition work in the ontological sense; it moves from problems on how others 
recognise me as an individual and/or group member, to know how we are able to 
recognise difference, particularly cultural difference. For this reason, it makes sense 
to develop a careful analysis of liberal theories of diversity and plurality that unveils 
the way we generally understand difference, recognition and identity in western 
societies. 
                                               
1 The problem of individuation can be traced to Aristotle’s principle of individuation (1989), 
Leibniz’ Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (1991) and more recently to Jung’s 





1.1 Outlining purposes and announcing present research 
 
This thesis explores the notions of human diversity and plurality. The aim of 
the text is to shed light on debates about cultural diversity and plurality in the context 
of liberal democracies. Through the analysis of liberal theories of plurality and 
diversity, particularly civic nationalism, multiculturalism and interculturalism, but also 
cosmopolitanism and communitarianism,2 I make a series of arguments regarding 
the positive recognition of cultural difference. I centre the assessment of the 
theories, and later my alternative to them, on two concepts: identity and recognition. 
These two terms are in the middle of important struggles in the context of western 
democracies, particularly in the case of minority groups. As Charles Taylor’s work 
shows, modern identity is at the core of important cultural and social conflicts; he 
also emphasises the importance of providing recognition to individuals and 
communities in order to avoid harm, oppression or a reduced mode of being 
(1989:25). Additionally, claims of identity recognition became paradigmatic demands 
for social and political justice in the twentieth century, taking that prominent place 
from the traditional struggles for redistribution (Fraser, 1997).   
What I investigate is whether the particular form of recognition offered by 
liberal theories, in the form of political recognition, is still our ‘…most promising route 
to justice in a world of deep diversity.’ (Kymlicka, 2016:76) It seems that despite the 
substantial efforts at providing recognition to individuals and groups in western 
democracies, there are puzzles left unsolved by our liberal theories. Moreover, it 
seems that some puzzles cannot be addressed from the liberal perspective. 
Consequentially, I introduce the notions of strong identity and strong recognition that 
could indicate a way forward beyond the limitations of liberal theories of diversity 
and plurality. 
In the past, much research has focused on identity and recognition in the 
political realm. The contributions of these efforts are of great importance. Despite 
dubious narratives like the multiculturalism backlash (Vertovec & Wessendorf, 
                                               
2 Through the text I argue that all these theories are liberal, thought in difference ways. The 
relation between them is complex. Civic nationalism and cosmopolitanism are usually 
considered contrary stands. However, both claim to be liberal. Some forms of 
multiculturalism are openly liberal and others try to move away from some liberal principles. 
Interculturalism claims to be liberal and blames multiculturalism for being illiberal and 
relativistic. Additionally, communitarianism is not usually associated with liberalism. Despite 
communitarianism argues there are cultural determinations, it can embrace the principle of 
individual freedom. I ask the reader to accept, until I discuss each case, that these theories 
share liberal notions. 
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2010), ineffectiveness of affirmative action (Murrell & Jones, 1996) or the anti-
democratic nature of gender quotas (Murray, 2014), it is evident that, in general 
terms, the conditions of individuals and groups claiming recognition improve when 
the state and its institutions provide political recognition -citizenship and rights- 
(Banting & Kymlicka, 2013; Johnston, Banting, Kymlicka, & Soroka, 2010). In 
consequence, I do not argue that liberal projects accommodating diversity and 
providing political recognition are wrong or should be abandoned. What I claim is 
that liberal perspectives provide an important but incomplete picture of our current 
diversity issues. To be fair, it is not only the liberal perspective but also any 
approach that focuses on political recognition that is incomplete. Although, as I will 
demonstrate, the liberal approach tends to deal with diversity issues by dragging 
them into the political arena.  
I also claim that an overemphasis on the political might prevent valuable 
forms of deeper recognition from developing. The whole aim of the text is to 
transcend the constraints of a dominant liberal narrative and its tendency to place 
important issues in the realm of the political. In other words, there is room for 
diversity outside the walls of liberalism and its politics. 
It might be thought that liberalism and approaches that focus on political 
recognition have already been successfully challenged. Indeed, two of the 
approaches considered in the thesis, multiculturalism and interculturalism, try to 
expand the limits of liberalism and of political solutions in relation to cultural diversity 
and pluralism. As a modern socio-political project, multiculturalism tries to expand 
the liberal framework without breaking it. The way I present multiculturalism in the 
text reflects the incremental efforts in challenging liberal assumptions: it starts with 
the notion of group-differentiated rights, which questions the uniform enforcement of 
laws; continues with Taylor’s criticism of social neutrality, and it finishes with the 
second wind of multiculturalism that openly denies the liberal framework as the only 
possible approach to diversity and plurality. This incremental perspective leads us to 
acknowledge that liberalism is more diverse than we might think and that different 
multicultural approaches are liberal in distinctive ways. Taking as a reference an 
orthodox form of liberalism heavily lead by procedural constrains and mechanisms, I 
will show how each multicultural theory incrementally criticises and debunks some 
liberal assumptions and principles. However, I will also show how they also keep 
others. If it is fair to say so, the three multicultural theories that I present in the text 




further. It is possible to criticise liberalism and remain liberal. 
On another front, interculturalism, in its own way, also tries to deal with 
diversity and plurality outside some confines of the political realm. It proposes 
intercultural dialogue as a way to develop positive interactions between individuals 
and to reduce prejudices between members of different groups - although, it also 
claims that the principles of liberalism should regulate these interactions. However, 
neither of these approaches can consistently move outside the reduced sphere of 
politics nor break completely with the liberal framework. In consequence, I push 
these two efforts further and place problems of recognition and identity in the 
ontological dimension.  
A contribution of this research is to place problems of recognition and identity 
within the scope of an ontological analysis and beyond confined political debates. 
Therefore, it is important to clarify what I exactly refer to when I use these terms. I 
start with the political and in the next section I clarify the ontological. For my 
purposes, the political denotes that dimension of human life where individual and 
collective actions, values, behaviours, processes and conflicts are mediated and/or 
led by the means of state institutions. When I refer particularly to political identity 
and political recognition, I underline their institutionally mediated character. 
Consequently, these notions are debated in connection with rights, policies and 
membership to a democratic polity. Clearly, there are richer ways to understand the 
political; saying otherwise implies a very narrow and restrictive idea of politics. By 
defining the political in this sense, I do not claim that other realms of human life 
overlapping social, cultural and individual affairs are automatically apolitical. There 
are many ways in which we can claim that most of our actions, behaviours, values 
and aims are unavoidably political. Sharp distinctions such as public vs private, 
individual vs collective or the political vs -in this case- the ontological are more 
analytical tools than phenomenological descriptions. However, this idea of the 
political as an institutional perspective is not arbitrary.  Such a definition aligns with 
my argument that in modern societies, the institutionalisation of conflict is the source 
of plurality.  Furthermore, it reflects the dominant understanding of recognition and 
identity, the subjects of this text. 
In general, we take “recognition” in evaluative contexts to denote 
acknowledging an object of value in a way that is appropriately 
responsive to its value and, (…) we will take political recognition to mean 
acknowledging citizens in ways that are appropriately responsive to their 




This clarification is not to deny earlier discussions of the limitations of liberal 
political recognition, for instance by scholars of identity politics (Neofotistos, 2013). 
Nevertheless, it is more an umbrella term than a systematic movement and it does 
not always go beyond the political dimension. I suggest their valuable critique is 
more accurately directed at liberal approaches rather than at the limits of political 
recognition. 
What makes identity politics a significant departure from earlier, pre-
identarian forms of the politics of recognition is its demand for recognition 
on the basis of the very grounds on which recognition has previously 
been denied: it is qua women, qua blacks, qua lesbians that groups 
demand recognition. The demand is not for inclusion within the fold of 
“universal humankind” on the basis of shared human attributes; nor is it 
for respect “in spite of” one's differences. Rather, what is demanded is 
respect for oneself as different (Kruks, 2001:85).3  
Identity politics voices the need to recognise difference, which in a way 
denotes the existential limitation of political recognition. When some individuals and 
groups ask for recognition, they do so with a deeper understanding of identity, which 
implies the need for something stronger than political recognition. As Sonia Kruks 
points out in the quotation, they demand more than inclusion within the fold of 
universal humankind, or in a less rhetorical expression, they demand more than 
inclusion in the mainstream society. When they ask for recognition, in other words, 
they ask for recognition from the other and not only from an abstract set of 
institutions. It is a more radical instance of Pirandello’s metaphor, it is ‘the other’ that 
provides a fundamental form of recognition that goes beyond the reach of political 
institutions because it is ‘the other’ who can recognise the particular value of our 
difference and help us to construct our identity as different. In consequence, I do not 
argue that political recognition is irrelevant to constructing our identity; it does 
provide meaningful structures shaping the understanding of ourselves and feelings 
of belonging. However, certain existential aspects are beyond its reach. It is in this 
context that I develop an idea of strong identity and strong recognition. In this case 
the adjective strong denotes that both, identity and recognition, go beyond the 
political sphere; in this case the adjective does not describe as much as 
differentiate. Other forms of identity and recognition are not weak per se, I talk about 
strong identity and recognition to denote that ontological, existential and historical 
features should be considered in relation to those terms. I chose the word strong, as 
it will be clearer in Chapter 8, to mirror Charles Taylor’s distinction between strong 




The challenges of trying to define and secure the conditions for a strong form 
of recognition are numerous and not easy to address. It is because of these 
difficulties that political identity and recognition tend to be emphasised in the first 
place. Modern civic societies found that dealing with problems in the political realm 
is ‘easier’ than in other contexts. I will argue that this political fix is the main idea 
behind political plurality as the basis of civic nationalism, an idea that extends to 
other liberal theories. These theories share the view that diversity, inclusion and 
belonging are issues that can be ‘better’ managed through political mediation than 
direct ethnic, religious or racial confrontation. The idea of the state and its 
institutions as able to mediate between different interests responds to this aim of 
facilitating inclusion and belonging. As I said before, it is not fair or possible to deny 
the benefits of political recognition. Nevertheless, the price we have to pay for this 
secure way of dealing with plurality is a reduced form of recognition. Therefore, we 
can reasonably inquire after alternatives. 
Strong recognition and strong identity are terms used in the text before their 
in-depth elaboration in Chapter 8. Defining strong recognition proved, in fact, 
beyond this thesis’ scope. For my purposes, strong recognition is considered a 
regulative idea in the Kantian sense: It ‘…govern[s] our theoretical activities but 
offer[s] no (constitutive) guarantees about the objects under investigation.’ (G. 
Williams, 2018) Strong recognition remains a regulative idea because it is 
impossible for me to characterise it properly, given space constraints. However, I do 
believe it is definable and real.  Detailed characterisation must be reserved for a 
future project. In this document, I can approach only strong identity with the depth 
and detail required by academic argumentation. 
However, I can offer a notion of strong recognition -without fully justifying it- 
based on what individuals and groups seem to demand from a more existential form 
of recognition. Strong recognition is not institutional -although not necessarily in 
opposition to institutions, because they might and often do coincide in their aims-, it 
is equally addressed to collectivities and individuals and goes beyond everyday 
interactions. It implies a direct recognition of the value of diverse minorities and their 
difference. Therefore, it is pre-dialogical and it does not imply the adaptation or 
modification of behaviours or practices; it does not imply any kind of pragmatic 
negotiation of identity. It should foster the aim of recognising the value of specific 
forms of diversity and not only allowing diversity within the framework of liberalism. I 
                                                                                                                                     
3 Cited in (Heyes, 2018) 
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hope the reader can successfully navigate the text with this rudimentary notion of 
strong recognition. 
Strong identity refers to our being as a whole. When I refer to strong identity, 
I do convey the idea of the organic unit of our existential context, attachments, 
values, practices, behaviours and agency. At the end of the thesis, I will be able to 
say that strong identity is an attempt to explain how external factors shape the 
construction of our self. 
 
1.2 Research objectives and principal findings 
 
The existing literature analysing liberal theories does not explain why they do 
not fully address problems of identity and recognition. I argue that it is not mainly 
because they are flawed, but because their liberal nature limits them. Of course it 
could be alleged that every theory can be gradually perfected, but, in this case, it is 
a more fundamental limitation. Particularly, the way they understand identity and 
diversity constrains their possible output. Among the theories considered here, their 
liberal framework pushes them to focus too much on integration; to believe that 
conflicts between communities are cultural disagreements, instead of instances of 
power relations; and/or to condition political recognition to the requirements of social 
cohesion.  
The aim of this thesis is to explore the limitations of liberal and politically-
oriented approaches and move towards an alternative. This effort requires relocating 
part of the analysis and debate from the political to the ontological realm. In 
consequence, in order to understand how this move towards ontology sheds light on 
the limits of political plurality, I must clarify what I mean by ontology. I use the term 
in two ways, depending if 1) I am delimiting the way I approach one topic, 
particularly identity and recognition or 2) I am developing a critical analysis of a 
liberal stand. For instance, in the first case, I use ontological to emphasise I am not 
referring to any particular form or side of identity but in general. Ontological is here a 
synonym of fundamental. In the second case, I use it to underline the assumptions 
and principles behind the liberal theories, instead of referring to policies, laws or 
instances of the theory in particular countries.   
When I affirm a liberal notion or theoretical argument has to be analysed 
from the ontological perspective, it means reviewing their inherent assumptions and 




cohesion are concepts rooted in a broader set of philosophical debates, which 
shape their use in the political realm. In other words, ‘the ontological’ refers to the 
tacit and explicit commitments of the theories I analyse here. Due to this 
understanding of ontology as concerning the assumptions, I do not focus solely on 
direct theoretical claims. Rather, I will be able to state that Bhikhu Parekh or Charles 
Taylor for instance, retain some premises of the liberalism and social contractualism 
they criticise.4 This perspective allows me to avoid rigid categorisations that falsely 
homogenise different perspectives. For example, when referring to multicultural 
theories, it allows me to explain how critiques of liberalism advance incrementally 
while we can also identify different liberal traces in each attempt. 
The ontological approach is not a novelty; some authors I extensively 
analyse in the text developed it before. Taylor, Parekh and Kymlicka engage in the 
philosophical analysis of diversity, social cohesion, identity, liberalism and 
nationalism along with reviewing particular policies and group differentiated rights in 
Canada or the UK. Parekh dealt with the consequences of monism in the liberal 
tradition and Taylor traced the deep problems of recognition to the sources of the 
modern self. Kymlicka also developed a deeper analysis by spotting the basis of 
multiculturalism in the tradition of Rawls’ new liberalism and its shift to social justice. 
My work is part of the tradition that periodically re-examines central categories, and 
its small contribution is mainly in this field.  
Every theory has ontological assumptions; any belief has ontological 
commitments that inevitably guide and limit the theoretical and pragmatic 
approaches. Ontological assumptions determine the way we apprehend the nature 
of the entities referred to by our theories. In the liberal tradition, we understand 
identity and recognition as we do because of the ontological commitments shaping 
it.5 In the western philosophical tradition, ontology analyses the construction of 
relevant categories and their properties in a given reality, as well as determining the 
conditions to define something as real (Macdonald & Laurence, 1998:1). However, 
categorisation systems are not only logical and epistemological but also ethical, 
existential and historical. Therefore, my ontological approach does not limit me to a 
                                               
4 We cannot say they are social contractualists because they openly say otherwise, but we 
can link some of their concerns to that tradition, such as securing social cohesion. Along the 
same line, they are not liberal in an ‘orthodox’ sense but some of their proposals are still 
within the cluster of liberal assumptions and aims (see Chapter 4, section 2). 
5 ‘We live in societies that have been shaped by liberal values, in which liberal values have 
been deeply internalized by most citizens, across ethnic and racial lines, and where liberal 
values provide the default vocabulary for making political claims on each other.’ (Kymlicka, 
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logical and epistemological analysis of the reality of some phenomenon. Categories 
and their related assumptions have large implications in the ethical and existential 
realms, and an ontological analysis of the categories must consider them. 
Coming back to the thesis’ particular features, I develop my ontological 
criticism to show the limits of political plurality and enable the construction of strong 
identity and recognition in the following four objectives. 
The first objective is to explore how the liberal context might prevent stronger 
forms of recognition from developing. I explain that liberal theories assume that a 
civic, western, institutional perspective provides the right conditions for fostering 
cultural diversity and plurality. I do not claim the opposite but I argue that the liberal 
perspective obstructs deeper forms of recognition. 
As the reader will grasp from the first chapters, there are powerful concerns 
that have prevented liberal scholars from pursuing more direct forms of recognition, 
including the strong recognition I will describe. The political realm, without being 
perfect, is a safer place for western societies to deal with a multiplicity of issues, 
including identity and recognition. For instance, when features of hegemonic groups 
are directly recognised as part of the community identity, particularly cultural, ethnic 
or religious features, it might lead to practices of domination against those unable to 
meet those requirements. Similarly, it is believed that providing recognition to 
minority groups outside the liberal political framework could lead to their 
ghettoisation and promote moral relativism. These are good reasons to keep identity 
and recognition within the confines the political realm. However, in the thesis I argue 
this restricted political recognition is valuable but it should not prevent us from 
venturing beyond its limits and looking for stronger forms of identity and recognition. 
There is not much controversy in saying that recognition is understood as a 
matter of equality in liberal democracies. That is to say, recognising individuals or 
minority groups as members of a larger community translates into recognising them 
as equals, particularly in terms of rights and citizenship. In this case, equality is 
understood as in most modern constitutions, that is, as the principle that forces the 
state to treat any citizen in the same manner as others in similar circumstances. 
Amongst the theories I consider in this text, civic nationalism and multiculturalism 
embrace this plausible idea. The problem is a second assumption usually attached 
to this principle of equality: there is a tendency to think political recognition would 
eventually lead to other forms of recognition and acceptance; political recognition 





supposedly generates a sort of momentum that extends equality outward. In the 
particular case of minorities, the idea is that providing political recognition would 
help to incorporate them smoothly into the larger community. In more technical 
terms, evidence of social cohesion in the larger community, in the form of strong 
national identities, would confirm that the liberal approach is on the right path to 
improving integration and securing equality. I will be arguing that this second 
assumption is not always the case. 
Alternatively, interculturalism takes the same idea of recognition as equality 
and simply refuses to provide it to minority groups.6 From its more cosmopolitan 
perspective, equality is something that can only be guaranteed if it is reserved for 
individuals. Thus, I will be arguing that multiculturalism and civic nationalism only 
secure political recognition whereas interculturalism directly prevents deep collective 
recognition. 
Determining the consequences and limits of reformist approaches like the 
liberal ones on issues of identity and recognition is the second objective. According 
to radical forms of criticism, such as critical race theory, liberal measures of political 
recognition are essentially reformist approaches that do not fight discrimination and 
inequality at the source; they just have a sort of palliative effect. In accordance with 
my own argument, the liberal perspective prevents important changes from 
happening. Institutional instruments such as anti-discrimination laws or group-
differentiated rights are instances of slow-paced reformist progress that prevent 
deeper changes.  
We cannot deny that political institutions foster positive changes in social 
interactions through the rules they introduce. Nevertheless, critical race theory 
argues that those changes never reach the structure and source of inequalities. 
Derrick Bell (2000) affirms reformist approaches such as affirmative action bring 
equality to some, but they do not challenge the fundamental assumption of white 
privilege. He argues that pursuing middle range changes instead of radical ones aim 
to calm minorities’ demands without jeopardising the benefits of elites and 
majorities. Additionally, the liberal perspective argues that the sources of conflict are 
                                               
6 Many times in this text, it will be necessary to distinguish between Québec and European 
interculturalism. However, this last affirmation is true for both. European interculturalism 
openly leaves aside recognition of the minorities in favour of a more direct interaction 
between individuals. Québec interculturalism recognises and protects the francophone 
culture as the societal base for the host community. However, the same recognition and 
protection is not extended to the minority groups. In regards to the minorities, Québec 
interculturalism also focuses on interaction. 
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not based on structural conditions, placing them instead in individual and collective 
prejudice. It is believed that reducing prejudice and improving everyday interaction is 
safer than a direct and positive recognition of people’s identity. Critical race theory is 
effective at bringing the issues of reformist approach into the spotlight. 
Nevertheless, I think we can go beyond this and develop a proposal for the 
situations denounced correctly by CRT.  
Another objective is to assess how ideas about social cohesion are 
intertwined with ideas about identity and recognition. Social cohesion is basically the 
idea that members of a group should develop strong ties. In terms of importance, 
there is a tendency in some liberal thought to consider the need for social unity in 
modern states first; only later is collective identity considered as a way to achieve it. 
This produces the impression that, in order to secure social cohesion, a form of 
social glue should be shaped through collective identity. I will argue that the 
distinction between ethnic and civic forms of nationalism draws on this idea. 
According to the latter, since modern communities are not ‘natural’, their bond can 
be culturally and politically formed. In consequence, some ways of understanding 
identity are shaped by the way liberals believe social cohesion should be achieved. 
Particularly in liberal perspectives emphasising collective identity -national identity 
for instance-, an allegiance-recognition dynamic is created in which political 
recognition is provided only in exchange for social allegiance.   
Additionally, the effort to secure enough room for a sentiment of belonging to 
minority groups, without detriment to the cohesion of the larger political community, 
is one of the main aims of multiculturalism. The same sentiment of belonging to the 
national group is argued to be possible for individuals in civic nationalism. In these 
liberal theories, individuals and members of minorities can integrate better into the 
mainstream polity if the proper sentiment of belonging is developed. They achieve 
this by constructing a civic culture outside any particular ethnicity, race or religion, 
making it accessible to everyone. Anyone can belong to a multicultural nation if they 
adopt the shared civic culture, thus fostering inclusion and diversity. However, I will 
be arguing that the civic culture is not only a collection of principles and values; it 
includes many more existential, historical and symbolic commitments that also 
determine the definition of collective identity. Scholars like Iris Marion Young (1990) 
have highlighted that privileged groups have used the idea of a neutral civic culture 





On the other side, cosmopolitan approaches also look to secure social 
cohesion and solidarity, but in contrast to the civic nationalist and multicultural 
approaches, it is not through a civic-shared identity but through mutual 
understanding. In general, from the cosmopolitan perspective, globalisation and 
liberalisation are processes pushing individuals outside the framework of collective 
identities. Individual identity should be enough to secure social cohesion. 
Interculturalism argues that social cohesion will be the result of reducing prejudice 
between members of different groups. I will argue that this particular objective 
shows, on one hand, the conditioning of diversity and plurality by some formal 
requirements and, on the other hand, the problems in considering that cohesion 
resides in the individual and their ability to tolerate the other.    
A fourth objective is to develop a notion of ontological identity and investigate 
its relationship with agency. If my argument is correct and liberal and political 
approaches prevent stronger claims for recognition, then the first step in addressing 
that problem is to develop a notion of strong identity that corresponds to those 
claims. Of course, other concepts of identity are valid in many ways. However, as 
long as they are shaped by notions of modern identity, they fall short of securing 
strong recognition. Other features are possible for other ways of understanding 
identity in specific contexts and under certain circumstances. For instance, I argue 
that strong identity is not open to pragmatic negotiation or adjustment, which does 
not mean we cannot negotiate or adapt our behaviours and practices in specific 
situations and for different reasons. 
An important source of worry for liberals, as well as post-modern scholars, is 
that defending a form of strong identity implies: first, the assumption of a 
conservative posture; second, the essentialising of something that is fluid and 
dynamic; and, third, denying identity’s constructed ‘nature’ and, therefore, denying 
agency. All these claims must be carefully addressed. However, I will argue that 
strong recognition as described here does not attempt any of these. I believe that 
supporting a strong notion of identity is not the same as claiming it is fixed or 
denying its dialogic and socially constructed character.   
Following Taylor’s definition of identity as the understanding of who we are, 
we can affirm that such understanding is shaped by our cultural framework. In a 
way, he affirms both cultural attachments and individual agency as equally important 
for identity. Therefore, it is not one or the other. We are culturally determined and, at 
the same time, able to freely construct our identity. I will argue that strong identity 
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refers to what we are, as a whole, as an organic unit. It is not a resource we have, 
nor a possession. It is neither a property nor a relation, but our being. We do not 
have an identity, nor multiple identities, but a complex unified identity that includes 
everything that we are. Finally, I will propose a humanism of the other as a way to 
go beyond the limits of agency and understanding regarding identity.  
 Taking into account the objectives of the research, our main findings resume 
in 1) political recognition does not provide a direct recognition of the value of groups 
or individuals, it provides the room for recognition 2) social cohesion in the 
ontological sense is not sharing values or practices but sharing identity as horizon, 
3) political recognition is a form of recognition without the other and, 4) strong 
identity refers to our being, to the articulation of all the things we can change or 




In Chapter 2, I present critical race theory (CRT) as a prominent critique of 
the liberal theories I analyse next. I use it to exemplify some more abstract issues 
raised in the following chapters: equal protection, neutrality and difference-
blindness. In particular, it clarifies why state institutions are a main target for 
critiques of liberal principles and notions. Liberalism cannot be reduced to the 
political institutions linked to it; however, CRT unveils how the liberal narrative finds 
its natural means of expression in state institutions. Criticising political institutions is 
an indirect but meaningful way of criticising liberalism. CRT argues through the 
notions of integrationist convergence, racial realism, differential racialisation and 
racial consciousness that inequalities are inherent in liberal structure. In more detail, 
in this chapter I describe the basic features of CRT and its fundamental notions: 
racial realism shows that discrimination is not aberrational but structural; the 
integrationist convergence thesis argues that the function of liberal institutions is to 
protect the interest of particular groups; differential racialisation unveils the way 
minority groups are defined according to other groups’ interests; and racial 
consciousness demonstrates that racism does not start with an identification in 
racial terms. Subsequently, I use these notions to build an argument that liberal 
societies are not free of uneven power relations, oppression and privilege. I also 
describe some consequences of the reformist approach assumed by liberal 




assume oppression and domination are the results of ignorance and illiberal 
ideologies, which in the vocabulary of CRT corresponds to the integrationist 
ideology. This perspective leads to an empathic fallacy that makes us believe that 
discrimination will end when the oppressor is persuaded of their mistake. Therefore, 
I particularly emphasise CRT’s effort to conceptualise racism and oppression 
outside the narratives of incidental and ignorant behaviours. Finally, I assess the 
contributions and limitations of CRT. 
In Chapter 3, I argue that contemporary ideas of shared political identity are 
closely connected to theories of nationalism. In particular, civic nationalism provides 
the ideological foundation for modern plurality, doing so by placing identity and 
recognition within the political realm. At the same time that civic nations provide 
political recognition, they demand their members’ allegiance to the values and 
institutions of the community. As a consequence, there is a dialectic of diversity in 
which members of the communities are conditioned to develop an attachment to 
political values in return for political recognition. This dialectical relation shapes two 
important notions: social cohesion and national identity. National identity is seen as 
the answer to the question of what keeps members within a nation together, that is, 
the answer to the problem of how to foster social cohesion amongst the different 
individuals. I also analyse two characteristics of civic nationalism that shape political 
recognition: liberal democracy and liberal political practices and values. At the end 
of the chapter I can affirm that political recognition is expressed by institutions, 
through legal means and encapsulated in political rights and policies, which is the 
first step to questioning the limits of this approach.  
Multicultural theories are the main topic of Chapters 4 & 5. In Chapter 4, I 
delineate the main aims of multiculturalism, its context and proposals. I then explore 
different criticisms of the approach in Chapter 5. In general terms, I portray 
multiculturalism’s efforts to expand the liberal framework in which we understand 
diversity and plurality. In order to achieve this, in Chapter 4 I describe how the 
notion of group-differentiated rights challenges the idea of uniform application of 
policies and norms, how communitarian multiculturalism argues there is no need for 
state neutrality and, the way scholars such as Parekh emphasise liberalism is just 
one option for organising social life. The other argument in Chapter 4 is that 
multiculturalism focuses on the same problem of securing social cohesion and 
collective identity as theories of nationalism. Additionally, it proposes the same 
solution: national identity should be fostered to provide the conditions for political 
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plurality and social cohesion. Multicultural national identity is more complex than its 
traditional counterpart: it tries to keep together members through a shared political 
identity while simultaneously allowing them to develop their own national identity or 
ethnic particularity. As such, I explain how multiculturalism is a form of nationalism.  
I analyse some criticisms in Chapter 5, focusing on those that are not 
addressing multiculturalism’s purported practical failure or the backlash against it. I 
mainly argue that multiculturalism has fallen short not because it is flawed, but 
because its liberal tone limits its reach. More specifically, I analyse the claim that 
multiculturalism essentialises groups. I suggest that this is not intrinsically 
problematic, as some sort of essentialisation is unavoidable in any theory; however, 
what is problematic is the essentialising of members into general categories found in 
the liberal societies in which multiculturalism operates. 
The second main idea of this chapter is that multiculturalism becomes a 
project constrained by the notion that minority groups must be integrated into the 
mainstream culture. The way this is developed reduces multiculturalism’s scope to 
secure recognition and equality into relationships of integration processes. I point 
out some problems derived from the categorisation of culture, nation and people, 
which are crucial for multiculturalism. Additionally, I argue that the majority-minority 
dichotomy is not about numbers but power. Finally, I investigate why 
multiculturalism conceptualises hierarchies and inequalities as arising from illiberal 
ideologies, leading it to assume that conflicts between majorities and minorities are 
consequences of cultural differences and not power struggles. 
Chapters 6 & 7 couple together under the same topic: interculturalism. They 
also follow the same general structure as the former ones: Chapter 6 describes the 
features, typology and proposals of interculturalism, while Chapter 7 develops a 
more critical approach. In general terms, I develop the idea that interculturalism 
neither secures a strong recognition of the other, nor deals with identity at the 
fundamental level. Additionally, it does not solve the recurrent issues of social 
cohesion and collective identity. In these chapters, I introduce some notions of 
identity that I properly justify in Chapter 8 but that help us to perceive the limits of 
modern, individualised identity in the particular context of interculturalism. I claim 
that identity is not something we can negotiate or pragmatically adjust, as 
interculturalism assumes. Identity refers to what we are, as a whole. It is not a 
resource we can use or exercise, Therefore, arguing that interculturalism has a 




In Chapter 6, I contend that interculturalism argues for the urgency of 
addressing issues of cross-cultural interactions. Then, I portray two forms of 
interculturalism: Québécois and European. Québécois interculturalism openly 
embraces the Francophone culture as the base for minorities’ integration, while 
European interculturalism insists on a neutral and universal framework. Both 
approaches propose developing skills for positive interactions, avoiding 
categorisation -fluid identity-, and reducing prejudice. I particularly pay attention to 
intercultural dialogue as a way to develop positive interactions between individuals 
and groups. This leads me to a key point of this chapter: interculturalism assumes 
that social cohesion is achieved by reducing prejudice between members of different 
groups, which implies some limitations in its understanding of recognition. I also 
analyse the claim that there is a new form of diversity, super-diversity, that appears 
along with globalisation and that this has implications for liberal theories of diversity 
and plurality. I argue that super-diversity is not a qualitatively different kind of 
diversity and it is mistaken in denying the allegiance of individuals to the 
communities. 
I analyse issues of Québécois interculturalism in the first half of Chapter 7 
and in the second half those of European interculturalism. Within these discussions, 
I develop two connected arguments. I present the premise of a principle of 
reciprocity in Québécois interculturalism and the concerns that majorities voice to 
justify it. I then argue that anxieties of minority and majority groups are qualitatively 
different. Reciprocity is essentially pragmatic and prevents a true attempt at 
understanding the other. Additionally, majorities use it to justify a form of controlled 
interventionism over minorities; they say that interventionism is okay as long it stays 
within the liberal framework and follows dialogic processes. However, I debunk this 
idea. Lastly, I follow scholars such as Iris Marion Young (1990) to argue that the 
notion of dialogue is unavoidably idealised. 
In the second half of Chapter 7, I describe the reasons why European 
interculturalism does not address strong forms of identity and consider some 
consequences. I pay attention to the problems derived from trying to develop a 
grassroots approach from a universal framework. I propose two different notions of 
community: community as togetherness and community as likeness. I justify this 
proposal by showing that recognition of collective identities is conditioned by the 
idea of community we assume. Likeness enables an idea of individual self-
sufficiency and emphasises universal features. Togetherness leads to a stronger 
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dependency on collectivities and more concrete understandings of identity. 
Subsequently, I argue that European interculturalism is based on the idea of 
likeness more than the notion of togetherness. Additionally, I investigate the 
conditions for living together in a meaningful way. Finally, I explore the fears of 
relativism in the liberal tradition, and I claim that the tendency to universalism can be 
explained by this fear, to the point that European interculturalism refuses to provide 
recognition to particular groups because from its perspective that leads to moral 
relativism. 
In Chapter 8 I develop the idea of strong identity, as an initial move beyond 
liberal approaches, engaging particularly with Taylor’s work. I argue that the 
philosophical context of liberalism explains why and how we understand diversity 
and plurality, particularly in liberal politics. Taylor’s definition of identity as the 
understanding of who we are allows him to affirm that our cultural framework is the 
foundation for human agency, for the reason that it structures our understanding. 
Moreover, he argues that our identity is shaped by the recognition or misrecognition 
of others. I take these ideas to establish that our identity is both, individual and 
collective without any contradiction; I argue that our identity is our being, which 
includes both the free and individual construction of ourselves and the attachments 
to groups. The dialectical and dialogic nature of identity construction does not 
contradict or prevent agency. Then, I insist on the existential context of our agency 
and individuality, especially when we question our goods and ends. I outline how a 
humanism of the other and the related politics of difference-identity would help us 
move beyond the limits of modern identity, which means to expand identity beyond 
the limits of agency and understanding. Even when our identity is clearly 
constructed there are ‘parts’ that are given. This implies that our construction 
becomes an endless process in which we change ‘parts’ and leave others. Finally, I 
link individual identity construction with the collective formation of history. I claim that 
constructing our identity is constructing the world as a horizon. Therefore, I argue 
that communities follow the same dynamics of adjusting in a unitary articulation but 
they do not do it because their members follow or embrace values, goods and 
practices. Instead, they are part of a community because they live the same 








Critical race theory: a radical critique of liberalism 
 
 
Like many other Mexican middle-class families in the 90s, after the prime 
time show at dinnertime, we used to watch the news before going to bed. One night 
in 1992, after the anchorman advised discretion to the viewers, I watched what 
seemed to be warehouses and stores set on fire. I particularly remember the orange 
flames contrasting with the black night, people running in the middle of the street 
throwing rocks with others carrying appliances. It was footage of the 1992 LA riots. 
Immediately afterwards, they showed a video of a black man named Rodney King 
being beaten up by white police officers outside a car, alongside a mugshot showing 
his severely disfigured face. Everything was connected, but in those few minutes of 
news coverage, it was hard to know exactly how. The riots began a few hours after 
an almost entirely white jury acquitted the police officers of assault and excessive 
force charges. That was the first time I got a vague idea of the circumstances of the 
African-American community in the US.   
During the next years, I connected the dots, one by one. I heard about 
systematic oppression, disadvantage and stereotypes from many different sources -
books, movies, music, news-, including the few words I could understand listening to 
N.W.A and Public Enemy describing black people suffering systematic police 
harassment. Then, the first day of 1994 the Zapatista Army of National Liberation 
(EZLN) rose up in arms and the systematic oppression, disadvantage and 
stereotypes directed to the indigenous communities in my country unveiled a sort of 
existential revelation. Everything else was pieces falling into place: anti-globalisation 
demonstrations, university strikes, Zapatismo, protest songs, feminism, demands for 
recognition and Rage Against the Machine. Everything made sense. Eventually, I 
found more and more theoretical support for this articulation of different notions. But 
it was already there: the certainty that oppression was not incidental but systematic, 
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an equally strong conviction that everything was established for them to win and for 
us to lose and, of course, a deep distrust in state institutions. A video of white police 
officers beating up an African-American man was not shocking anymore, it was just 
an example of the systematic oppression of minorities. Critical race theory (CRT) 
expresses in a theoretical way the concerns and suspicions of a generation that 
grew up seeing the world claiming to make progress and, at the same time, leaving 
a substantial number of us behind with empty promises of recognition and dignity. 
CRT represents an effective way to critique liberal theories of plurality and 
diversity. It is particularly useful to illustrate some ideas that I will develop later from 
a more theoretical perspective; it allows us to see historical instances of systematic 
oppression and how liberal narratives nevertheless argue for neutrality and 
universality. Additionally, it unveils how liberal efforts in fighting oppression and 
bringing equality to minority groups fail because of the nature of its institutions. 
Liberalism is not institutionalism or vice-versa. However, the particular form I call 
liberal institutionalism is a door to articulate a critique on the limits of liberalism itself. 
A radical critique of liberal institutions paves the way for a more systematic analysis 
of problems in the theoretical scaffolding of liberal ideologies. This is possible 
because CRT does not push for reform of liberal institutions; it exposes how the 
principles behind them misdirect the struggles of minority groups. Instead of neutral 
and difference-blind institutions, some minorities demand racial consciousness and 
group-differentiated rights.  
CRT and the liberal theories of plurality and diversity are similar in some 
respects, such as their positive portrayal of diversity. On the other hand, even if both 
analyse occurrences of bigotry, intolerance and discrimination directed towards 
minority groups in western democracies, their interpretation is irreconcilable in 
crucial aspects. The differences start from what each perspective understands as 
the origin of inequality and domination. 
In general, the liberal approach assumes oppression and domination are the 
results of ignorance and illiberal ideologies. In consequence, we should fight racism 
and other forms of oppression by ending ignorance and educating people in the 
principles of liberal thought. This is an idea that clearly bears a resemblance to the 
Enlightenment’s trust in reason and its key role in the realisation of freedom and 
equality, through rational, secular, neutral and difference-blind institutions. In the 




ultimately, it resides in the individuals. Referring to the way white liberal thinkers 
embraced this Enlightenment assumption, Gary Peller mentions: 
In other words, most white liberals and progressives, projecting 
themselves as the enlightened avant garde of the white community, 
automatically associated race nationalism with the repressive history of 
white supremacy, and never developed either a consciousness or a 
political practice that comprehended racial identity and power as centrally 
formative factors in American social relations. (1990:761) 
On the contrary, CRT argues through the notions of integrationist 
convergence, racial realism and racial consciousness that inequalities, especially 
racism, are part of the structure of liberal societies and its institutions.  
The chapter is divided into 6 sections before its Conclusion. It goes from 
describing fundamental CRT concepts to a brief criticism of their limitations. In the 
first three sections I portray the basic concepts. I describe how racial realism unveils 
discrimination as something experienced on a daily basis by minorities, opposing 
the integrationist ideology of the civil right movement, which assumes racial 
oppression was the result of prejudice and stereotypes. I analyse the integrationist 
convergence thesis, which argues that the real function of liberal institutions has 
been to protect the interests of particular groups. Additionally, I present some 
problems deriving from the liberal effort to prevent racial consciousness. The third 
section is devoted to portraying the notions of differential racialisation and the ad 
hoc construction of categories, which make explicit the way each minority group has 
been defined according to interests of the majority group. In Sections 4 and 5 I use 
these notions to construct my argument against systematic power, oppression and 
privilege in liberal societies; I also analyse the consequences of a reformist 
approach and the possibilities for structural change. Finally, in the last section, I 
assess the contributions and limitations of CRT, particularly its effort to place the 
debate on racism and oppression outside the discourses of incidental and ignorant 
behaviours and its recent turn to a more idealist perspective.  
At the end of the chapter, I hope we have enough elements to seriously ask 
ourselves if societies should support integrationist reforms for minority recognition 
within the framework of liberal principles, or should be pushing a paradigm shift that 
places diversity outside the boundaries of liberalism or, even better, perhaps we 
should embrace a diversity of paradigms co-existing. In other words, we can wonder 
whether reformist progress, represented by group-differentiated rights, intercultural 




2.1 Racial realism and the integrationist ideology 
 
CRT started with the work of Derrick Bell and Alan Freeman in the 1970s 
concerned with the slow pace of and backlash against the civil right movement 
achievements, facing it with the perspective of racial realism. In greater detail, Bell 
and Freeman were interested in understanding and fighting forms of racism hiding 
behind claims of colour-blindness and neutrality in American institutions, particularly 
in the legal system. Their basic hypothesis asserts that the law’s instrumental 
purpose is to protect a racial hierarchical system. Inspired by Legal Realism, 
‘…[that] challenged the classical structure of law as a formal group of common-law 
rules that, if properly applied to any given situation, lead to a right –and therefore 
just- result.’ (Derrick Bell, 1992:364), CRT generated a perspective called racial 
realism. This standpoint incorporated as a key element the fact that, in spite of the 
efforts of the civil rights movement and legal triumphs like Brown v. Board of 
Education, African-Americans had never been considered equals and probably 
never would be under the current social structure. In other words, CRT started 
denouncing an extended network of racial inequalities, including institutional racism, 
while also rejecting the impossible aim of pursuing racial equality through means 
that were intended to maintain those privileges in the first place. In the powerful 
words of the poet, Audre Lorde: ‘For the master's tools will never dismantle the 
master's house. They may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but 
they will never enable us to bring about genuine change.’ (1984b:112)  
According to CRT’s founders, the belief of racial equality within the current 
social and political structures implies a naive perspective that has negative effects 
for black communities. Scholars like Bell, Freeman and Delgado claim that racial 
equality enshrined in the law does not correspond to the reality of the US, moreover, 
it cannot be achieved without radical structural change. A rhetoric, suggest that 
equality, freedom and social justice would be achieved gradually through laws and 
policies, conceals the reality of the everyday racist behaviours in American history. 
(Wallace, 2003). Instead, CRT advocates advise African-Americans to embrace a 
realist angle to fight the oppression they suffer. As Bell affirms:  
It is time we concede that a commitment to racial equality merely 
perpetuates our disempowerment. Rather, we need a mechanism to 
make life bearable in a society where blacks are a permanent, 
subordinate class. Our empowerment lies in recognizing that Racial 





Racial realism is an attempt to unveil the factual situation of people of colour 
in the US rather than following idyllic narratives of racial equality; it is an attempt to 
look for structural changes instead of institutional reforms. However, it is worth 
mentioning that many scholars, especially liberal egalitarians,7 would argue that 
structural changes are exactly those pushed through by institutions. There is a tight 
link between structures and institutions evidenced by the fact that these terms are 
quite often used interchangeably.8 Keeping aside the debates that might take place 
in different theories on institutionalism, following Geoffrey Hodgson and ‘Without 
doing much violence to the relevant literature, we may define institutions as systems 
of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions.’ (2006:2) 
Therefore, it is normal to believe that the way to achieve structural changes finds its 
way through institutions; if institutions structure social interactions and generate 
social rules, then structural changes would be necessarily institutional. In contrast, 
CRT argues that the adjustments made by institutions such as the legal system, do 
not allow but actually avert real structural changes. Let me clarify.  
CRT does not deny that institutions can foster positive changes in social 
interactions through the social rules they introduce, that is, it is a possibility included 
in its attributes. Nevertheless, those changes never reach the structure and source 
of inequalities. They have never done so because that would be contrary to their 
real aim. The role of institutions is to maintain control of particular groups by others. 
In any event, for the purposes of this chapter, it is enough to highlight CRT’s effort to 
deny any sort of integrationist goal that ultimately would decrease the chances of 
radical social changes. As Tommy Curry sustains: ‘In its inception, CRT offered a 
withering critique of integrationism and exposed the hope of racial equality for 
Blacks in America as nothing more than a mere illusion.’ (2011:1) 
The first works that shaped the theoretical ground for the movement 
analysed the idea of the legal system as a means to construct and maintain white 
privilege. Bell’s Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in 
                                               
7 There is a tendency to emphasise institutions’ role and strength, particularly amongst 
liberal egalitarian thinkers. Following Rawl’s theory of distributive justice, they usually 
underline Rawls’s fundamental position that egalitarian distributive justice only functions at 
the state level. A further discussion of this topic can be found in (Blake & Smith, 2015) 
8 Steve Fleetwood provides a detailed description of some similarities and differences 
between the two terms, as well as their relationship. In general, the idea of a change 
produced from the structure follows the next pattern: ‘It is likely that social structures “effect”, 
“influence” or “shape” institutions (rules, conventions, norms, values and customs) which, in 
turn, cause the emergence of a habitus that, in some sense, “reflects” or “expresses” these 
social structures. Social structures have a causal role to play in generating the habitus, but 
only indirectly via institutions and, I might add, organisations.’  (2008:261) 
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School Desegregation Litigation (1976) and Brown v. Board of Education and the 
Interest Convergence Dilemma (1980), as well as Freeman’s Legitimizing Racial 
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court 
Doctrine (1978) examine the way the legal system had allowed and fostered racism 
in the US. In these influential works, Bell and Freeman questioned important 
mainstays and deep assumptions of the American legal system, like equal 
protection, neutrality and a difference-blind point-of-view. It is here where the 
connection with liberal theories of plurality and diversity describe later becomes 
more evident. As I describe in Chapter 3, the basis for political pluralism is built 
mainly on the liberal principles of equality and neutrality. Institutions establish their 
legitimacy by appealing to the idea that they are neutral and difference-blind. Only in 
such circumstances can they claim to impartially mediate different interests.    
Since the beginning of the CRT movement, equal protection, neutrality and 
difference-blind have been criticised in their standard meaning, that is, as they are 
used in the first section of the fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution. They are fundamental values founded on citizenship, which forces the 
state to treat any citizen in the same manner as others in similar circumstances. In 
other words, those values force states to govern impartially. By questioning them, 
CRT criticises both institutions’ impartiality and their effectiveness in fighting racism. 
In words of Anthony Cook, ‘Racist traditions, thought patterns, and behavior cannot 
be eliminated either with the passage of a "color-blind" statute or by a court ruling 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race under the equal protection clause of 
the fourteenth amendment.’ (1990:1041) Early CRT scholars examined particularly 
the role parts of the legal system had in maintaining the subordination of black 
people. As a result, after this inaugural impetus, CRT scholars developed their 
theories and criticisms based on two fundamental notions, known in the movement 
as race consciousness and racial realism. 
From a historical perspective, CRT expresses a frustration derived from the 
civil rights discourse. It holds that the civil right movement did not embrace a 
sufficiently radical approach to racial issues; the critique especially underlines the 
quasi-universal stance it gradually assumed. Gary Peller affirms that: ‘The 
reappearance and refinement of race consciousness in many critical race theory 
works symbolizes the break with the dominant civil rights discourse.’ (1990:758). 
Early CRT scholars admit that the traditional civil rights discourse was a collection of 




results for black communities. Nevertheless, its core belief that racism was no more 
than a prejudice based on skin colour led, in their opinion, to the de-radicalisation 
and ineffectiveness of the liberation movements based on it (Crenshaw, Gotanda, 
Peller, & Thomas, 1995:xv). Peller named this belief behind civil rights discourse 
integrationist ideology, and as far as it assumes that racial oppression is the result of 
prejudice and stereotypes based on skin colour, it also anticipated that 
discrimination would end by encouraging the transcendence of skin colour 
considerations or racial consciousness (1990:770).  
In Chapters 6 and 7 I point out that the perspective assumed by European 
interculturalism and its support of contact theory falls short of addressing issues of 
ontological identity and stronger forms of recognition, precisely because it takes for 
granted that discrimination and lack of recognition are results of ignorance and 
stereotypes. While several differences separate the institutional approach of 
European interculturalism and the civil rights movement, their conceptual structures 
also coincide in important respects: they share the same integrationist ideology. I 
argue later on those chapters that interculturalism is not enough to claim we are 
truly living together. CRT goes further in its criticism of the civil rights movement and 
unveils a deeper consequence: integrationist ideology leads to the de-radicalisation 
of social movements. It is clear that my view is in favour of more radical forms of 
identity, recognition and, consequently, social movements. However, I acknowledge 
that this is a real impasse.  
Liberals would argue that the institutional and slow pace changes behind the 
integrationist ideology are exactly what allows the peaceful coexistence of 
individuals and groups, securing democracy and political plurality. In other words, 
western societies have developed a complex political system precisely to prevent 
the risk of radicalisation, which can easily lead to violence or cleanse ethnic or 
religious diversity. Elaboration upon exactly where the thin line between a legitimate 
claim pushed in a radical way and when it is too much stands is the subject for 
another text. In this one, I argue for a more radical understanding of identity and 
recognition in an ontological sense. 
Critical Legal Studies, the predecessor of CRT, focused its critiques on what 
they called legal liberalism.9 The American legal system in particular, but mutatis 
mutandis all western democracies, assumed the perspective of legal liberalism, that 
is, the belief that the law is clearly distinct from politics and that the latter shall be 
                                               
9 For an account of the debate between legal liberalism and CRT see (Price, 1989) 
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constrained by the former. The liberal framework pretends to shield institutions from 
being contaminated with particular political or ideological interests in order to erect 
them as the proper mediators in political, racial or ideological conflicts. Therefore, 
neutrality, objectivity, and some sort of universalism are the sine qua non conditions 
for western democracies and their institutions and, as I will show in the next chapter, 
this is the same idea developed in theories of nationalism. 
In the legal system, the integrationist ideology found expression in the 
concepts of colour-blindness, equal opportunity and meritocracy. In the classical 
liberal contexts, all these categories, being neutral, impersonal, unrelated to social 
power and disconnected from racial privilege, could eliminate prejudices and racial 
discrimination by removing racial consciousness.10 Although it can be a matter of 
serious debate if the civil rights movement was indeed supporting colour-blindness 
as its core or if it misrepresents some of Martin Luther King Jr’s speeches, the 
constant criticism from other black movements served to build a case for how racial 
consciousness was not the origin of racism, but part of its solution. For instance, at 
the same time that the criticism of the civil rights discourse was developing in the 
legal system, racism was defined for practical purposes within the institutions as the 
recognition of race; the idea of racism was almost completely constructed as 
opposed to colour-blindness. In consequence, liberation movements looking for 
cultural and ethnic recognition found themselves facing a dead-end represented by 
the supposed racial and cultural neutrality of American institutions. In the words of 
Young 
If oppressed groups challenge the alleged neutrality of prevailing 
assumptions and policies and express their own experience and 
perspectives, their claims are heard as those of biased, selfish special 
interests that deviate from the impartial general interest. Commitment to 
an ideal of impartiality thus makes it difficult to expose the partiality of the 
supposedly general standpoint, and to claim a voice for the oppressed. 
(1990:116)  
On the one hand, African-Americans continued to be systematically 
oppressed but, on the other, are deprived of the possibility to use their own ethnic 
and cultural heritage to oppose that oppression. ‘History has shown that the most 
valuable political asset of the Black community has been its ability to assert a 
collective identity and to name its collective political reality. Liberal reform discourse 
                                               
10 From the liberal perspective, there is also the possibility to understand neutrality as a 
feature of the definition of race itself. As Neil Gotanda points out, formal concepts ‘…are 
seen as neutral, apolitical descriptions, reflecting merely "skin color" or country of ancestral 
origin. Formal-race is unrelated to ability, disadvantage, or moral culpability.’ (1991:4) 




must not be allowed to undermine the Black collective identity.’ (Crenshaw, 
2011:250)11 Additionally, CRT has drawn attention to the false universalism 
assumed by white people in the US, supported by the fact they do not perceive 
themselves as part of a race, but plainly as people.  
This brief account of racial realism and the integrationist ideology allows me 
to underline how CRT criticism reinforces ideas I develop in other chapters. 
Universality, neutrality and liberal politics fall short, and in this case prevent, a 
deeper recognition of African-Americans. The integrationist image of the law as 
neutral and impersonal coincides with the universal aims of liberalism. In other 
words, the integrationist ideology overlaps with the liberal tradition and it extensively 
uses the theoretical tools of liberalism to justify itself. In fact, integrationist ideology 
is an expression of liberal politics. Both believe that only when neutrality and 
objectivity are secured for the state institutions can everyone truly enjoy equal 
treatment or at least equal opportunities.  
 
2.2 Integrationist convergence and racial consciousness 
 
Early in the movement, the notion of race consciousness and the perspective 
of racial realism derived theoretically from Bell’s thesis of integrationist convergence, 
which claims that ‘The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be 
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.’ (Derrick Bell, 
1980:523) This proposition points out that, in the abstract, black and white 
integrationist liberals agree that protection for minority groups against racial 
discrimination is needed, but, in effect, any protection occurs just to the extent that 
some external circumstances labelled ‘the interest of whites’ allow it. All the more 
so, Bell’s idea of integrationist convergence suggests that any modification in race 
relations is preceded by a concern for protecting white privilege, not eradicating it. 
Bell states that an emblematic case like Brown v. Board of Education and its 
subsequent corollaries cannot be explained as a purely moral commitment to 
equality and desegregation. In other words, court decisions on racial matters did not 
                                               
11 Other issues appear when we try to foster collective identity and unity. The black 
community struggles to replicate this idea of unity within its structure. ‘Within Black 
communities where racism is a living reality, differences among us often seem dangerous 
and suspect. The need for unity is often misnamed as a need for homogeneity, and a Black 




reflect any moral shift within American society or the output of a new socio-political 
ideology, not even liberalism -as opposed to conservatism-; instead, they mainly 
look to protect the existing social configuration. As Freeman asserts: ‘The challenge 
for the law, therefore, was to develop, through the usual legal techniques of verbal 
manipulation, ways of breaking out the formal constraints of the perpetrator 
perspective while maintaining ostensible adherence to the form itself.’ (1978:1056-
57) In support of this idea, Linda Greene (1995) analyses legal cases where the 
Supreme Court uses language that seems concerned with achieving equality, but 
the reasoning seems indifferent to particular cases and the impact of court decisions 
on victims of racial discrimination. In brief, from the institutional apparatus, 
discrimination is not the main motivation behind the pursuit of anti-discrimination 
laws and policies.  
From their own perspective and through their own means, more radical 
movements such as Black Nationalism or the Black Panthers Party have had 
emphasised the same lack of confidence in the liberal nature of the legal system. 
Malcolm X says: 
He [an African American nationalist] doesn't see any progress that he 
has made since the Civil War. He sees not one iota of progress because, 
number one, if the Civil War had freed him, he wouldn't need civil-rights 
legislation today. If the Emancipation Proclamation, issued by that great 
shining liberal called Lincoln, had freed him, he wouldn't be singing "We 
Shall Overcome" today. If the amendments to the Constitution had 
solved his problem, his problem wouldn't still be here today. And if the 
Supreme Court desegregation decision of 1954 was genuinely and 
sincerely designed to solve his problem, his problem wouldn't be with us 
today. (…) He can see where every maneuver that America has made, 
supposedly to solve this problem, has been nothing but political trickery 
and treachery of the worst order. Today he doesn't have any confidence 
in these so-called liberals. (X, 1990:52-53) 
Specifically, Bell argues that Brown v. Board of Education’s sudden shift that 
for the first time modified almost one hundred years of legal defeats in fighting 
discriminatory policies can only be explained taking into account socio-historical 
situations denoting the integrationist convergence thesis. For instance, policymakers 
perceived economic and political advantages in preventing segregation. The 
urgency in stopping the discontent growing in African-American WWII veterans, or 
the perception that southern states’ industrialisation was impossible if segregation 
remained (Derrick Bell, 1980:524-526), amongst other considerations, revealing a 
complex net of political and economic interests particular to certain groups. Bell’s 
call to review legal cases from the integrationist convergence perspective can be 




political context, instead of an idealised discourse that sees the achievements in 
fighting discrimination as the natural result of western progress and enlightened 
reason. Scholars like Mary Dudziak echo this claim:   
The failure to contextualize Brown reinforces the sense that the 
movement against segregation somehow happened in spite of everything 
else that was going on. During a period when civil liberties and social 
change were repressed in other contexts, somehow, some way, Brown 
managed to happen. (1988:64) 
Additionally, the influences that can explain Brown go beyond the limits of 
the American context. From a geopolitical perspective, Brown was influenced by 
circumstances like the growing tension between the US and communist countries, 
particularly predisposed by the fear that social discomfort would result in the sprout 
of communist ideologies. Some historians and political scientists have provided 
evidence of Bell’s integrationist convergence thesis through geopolitical analyses. 
Manfred Berg mentions that 
…the global ideological confrontation between Communism and liberal 
democracy and the claim by the United States to leadership of the "free 
world" made domestic racial discrimination an international 
embarrassment, providing the civil rights movement with a potent 
discursive weapon. (…) Cold War liberals embraced racial reform as a 
national security imperative. (2007:75) 
Moving forward, the idea of an integrationist convergence can be applied 
beyond the boundaries of the American case without much trouble; it falls within 
wider critical perspectives that have denounced the problems of liberal principles in 
providing proper recognition to minority groups. Perspectives under the umbrella 
term of politics of difference have criticised liberal democracies from various 
standpoints, some of which coincide with CRT analyses. Difference blindness and 
the idea of universal humanity, allows privileged groups to ignore their own group 
specificity and create neutral standards, leading to internalised devaluations in 
individuals that cannot fulfil them (Young, 1990:164-65).  
If integrationist convergence is right, there are at least two consequences. 
First, neutrality and other liberal notions are ineffective in fighting deep 
discrimination and, more importantly, they actually prevent us from accessing these 
roots. It is difficult to argue that liberal theories on diversity and plurality are 
consciously supported by institutions to sustain the status quo for a determined 
group. However, it is not so hard to claim they could be preventing us from 
producing deeper changes. We can keep questioning if multiculturalism, 
interculturalism and nationalism are ineffective frameworks to fight structural 
oppression, but we can also question if they perpetuate inequality in a way the 
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integrationist convergence hypothesis predicts. Unfortunately, it is beyond my 
current scope and skills to construct a complete genealogy of liberal attempts to 
foster plurality that might unveil an underlying aim to protect particular interests. 
However, I can affirm liberal policies are pushed only to the extent that some groups 
do not give up their privileged status, at least majorities.  
In relation to the liberal theories I analyse in the text, the easiest case in this 
respect is nationalism, in which elites have been widely identified as a key actor in 
the formation of modern nations (Greenfeld, 1993). After all, despite the official 
discourse of enlightened liberal ideals as the foundation of modern democracies, the 
factual historical circumstances show that, like in the case of the US, ‘This was 
accomplished by 55 middle-aged white gentlemen of the highest rank and property, 
closeted together in private for two weeks in Philadelphia.’ (Mann, 2005:56) In the 
case of Québécois interculturalism, I argue in Chapter 7, how the ‘majority anxieties’ 
caused by migration are mostly fears of giving up privileges which they tried to 
theoretically justify, as any good liberal perspective would, with notions of reciprocity 
and neutrality. In the same chapter, I describe how European interculturalism 
prevents forms of diversity outside the liberal sphere in attempting to avoid 
relativism, allowing the standpoint of the privileged to appear universal. The case of 
multiculturalism is more complex because, to some extent, it challenges the idea of 
neutrality and difference-blindness with the notion of group-differentiated rights; 
here, it is harder to say multiculturalism seeks to safeguard a state of affairs 
benefitting a certain group. Again, I have no resources to demonstrate whether 
multicultural policies resulted in the perpetuation of inequality. But its emphasis on 
the political sphere and liberal principles prevents other forms of plurality.  
In the middle of this complex net of what I can question, what I can just 
suspect and what I can affirm, there are two statements I find particularly important: 
1) the liberal approaches on diversity and plurality do not seem to reflect a change in 
the moral commitment of western societies and 2) we can doubt whether plurality’s 
achievement originates in enlightened reason and liberalisation processes.12  
                                               
12 For instance, Kymlicka says: ‘After World War II, however, the world recoiled against 
Hitler’s fanatical and murderous use of such [racialist] ideologies, and the United Nations 
decisively repudiated them in favor of a new ideology of the equality of races and peoples. 
And this new assumption of human equality generated a series of political movements 
designed to contest the lingering presence or enduring effects of older hierarchies. We can 
distinguish three “waves” of such movements: 1) the struggle for decolonization, 
concentrated in the period 1948–65; 2) the struggle against racial segregation and 
discrimination, initiated and exemplified by the African-American civil-rights movement from 




In an approach analogous to the one developed by Bell, Alan Freeman 
fuelled the fledgling CRT movement by focusing his considerations on the logic and 
consequences of the legal system’s neutral attitude for racial problems. He criticised 
not just their ineffectiveness, but also their side effects; he pointed out that African-
Americans demanding more and better jobs, houses, schools, and more political 
power as a real way to overcome discrimination were prevented from doing so 
precisely by those Antidiscrimination Laws (Freeman, 1978). In a colour-blind legal 
system, any accusation of suffering discrimination required proof of a specific 
perpetrator causing at least one individual victim suffering and clearly motivated by 
racial reasons.13  
Consequently, black communities were stripped of the chance to denounce 
systematic discrimination, produced by a diffuse perpetrator and operating in subtle 
ways. Even worse, any request for racial balance or proportionality would constitute 
a form of racism itself, an instance of so-called reverse discrimination. In a word, the 
legal system required that the members of the black communities conceptualise 
their identity and denounce the injustices suffered without denoting any racial 
consciousness; in the eyes of the law, African-Americans were expected to think 
and behave like Americans. In this sense, Peller asserts there was an implicit pact 
accepting that ‘…the price of the national commitment to suppress white 
supremacists would be the rejection of race consciousness among African 
Americans.’ (1990:760) 
To think that any racial consciousness immediately implies racism, which is 
the consequence of applying a neutral and colour-blind framework to the legal 
system, leads to an interchangeable perspective between perpetrator and victim. 
This sort of reverse discrimination, in which claiming racial balance transforms the 
objects of discrimination into racists and the beneficiaries of systematic advantages 
                                                                                                                                     
the late 1960s.’ (Kymlicka, 2012b:5) -emphasis mine- It could be the phrasing, but to assume 
that it was the liberal ideology that generated the political movements to fight hierarchies is 
odd, to say the least. I believe that ideology is something that influences the world, the same 
way the world shape ideologies. I can concede that the liberal interpretation of the claims 
shaped the movements move towards the liberal political sphere, which is completely 
understandable. It is the core of the liberal theory: to assume that the disputes have to be 
solved in the political arena. But that is different to affirm that the grassroots fights for 
diversity and plurality, and in consequence their achievements, are the result of the liberal 
ideology. 
13 An analogous discussion, perhaps wider, is developed by Iris Marion Young in regards to 
oppression. ‘The systemic character of oppression implies that an oppressed group need not 
have a correlate oppressing group. While structural oppression involves relations among 
groups, these relations do not always fit the paradigm of conscious and intentional 
oppression of one group by another.’ (1990:41) 
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into victims, allows observable social phenomena like ‘…“angry white males” who, 
against all evidence, have positioned themselves as the chief “victims” of 
contemporary racial politics.’ (Crenshaw et al., 1995:xxxii) Even in logical terms, the 
non-recognition of race leads to inconsistencies, like the one denounced by Neil 
Gotanda: ‘Suppressing the recognition of a racial classification in order to act as if a 
person was not of some cognizable racial class is inherently racially premised.’ 
(1991:19) Other problems related to the way Antidiscrimination Laws were shaped 
by the liberal principle of neutrality include the way they preclude real remediation of 
certain forms of inequality, the lack of a responsible figure for factual conditions 
associated with discrimination, and the burden they place on the victim.  
The fault idea is reflected in the assertion that only "intentional" 
discrimination violates the antidiscrimination principle. In its pure form, 
intentional discrimination is conduct accompanied by a purposeful desire 
to produce discriminatory results. (…) the causation requirement serves 
to distinguish from the totality of conditions that a victim perceives to be 
associated with discrimination those that the law will address. These dual 
requirements place on the victim the nearly impossible burden of 
isolating the particular conditions of discrimination produced by and 
mechanically linked to the behavior of an identified blameworthy 
perpetrator, regardless of whether other conditions of discrimination, 
caused by other perpetrators, would have to be remedied for the 
outcome of the case to make any difference at all. (Freeman, 1978:1055-
1056) 
In Bell’s view, the legal system allows racial hierarchies because it is 
intended to protect white privilege and to procure white long-term interests. In 
Freeman’s opinion, the legal system makes it virtually impossible to fight extended 
forms of discrimination by assuming itself difference-blind. Both set the ground for 
the development of CRT by exposing a more complex view of the relations between 
law and race. Their vindication of race-consciousness and their suspicion of colour-
blindness tried to go beyond a reductionist and individualistic understanding of 
discrimination. In a certain way, they brought the complex dynamics of power 
relations to the discussion and analysis of race. The legal system, in their 
considerations, was both cause and effect of racial relations; laws shape and are 
shaped by power and racial relations. In consequence, the law maintains and 
reproduces indirect practices of racial domination. In this context, CRT appeared as 
an attempt to analyse discrimination, bigotry and inequality through the realist lens 





2.3 Differential racialisation and the ad hoc construction of categories 
 
Audrey Lorde’s words ‘For Black women as well as Black men, it is axiomatic 
that if we do not define ourselves for ourselves, we will be defined by others - for 
their use and to our detriment.’ (1984c:45) condense in a few lines the most 
fundamental form of oppression: the one that is rooted in our identity.14 Critical race 
theory is a remarkable means to show that, historically, several groups have been 
defined when deciding who should and who should not get access to some benefits. 
Delgado (2012:76) mentions that in the US, since 1790 and until 1952, 
naturalisation was only possible for white men, and for some periods of time and 
under some circumstances Jews, Irish and Italians were considered non-white. The 
fact that some terms cannot be ‘objectively’ delimited leads crits15 to denounce the 
complex interests and prejudices embedded in constructing those categories. As a 
consequence, further explanations on the historical development of the concept of 
race derived in ideas such as differential racialisation, that is, the view ‘…that each 
disfavored group in this country has been racialized in its own individual way and 
according to the needs of the majority group at particular times in its history.’ 
(Delgado & Stefancic, 2012:69)  
Race descriptions, like Prospero’s terms to Caliban, obtain their power 
not by verisimilitude, but by the extent to which they embody the 
epistemic violence of colonialism itself. In this respect the language of 
race, like all language, is centred in, and generated by, relations of 
power. (Ashcroft, 2001:312) 
CRT shed light on the prejudices and power struggles behind the 
construction of important concepts like race, gender or ethnicity. However, the same 
analysis of power and interest is expanded to other related categories that might 
seem more likely to be neutral and objective. For instance, ‘Building on the work of 
radical criminologists, one race crit shows that the disproportionate criminalization of 
African Americans is a product, in large part, of the way we define crime.’ (Delgado 
& Stefancic, 2012:113) CRT advocates conclude that ‘Categories and subgroups, 
then, are not just matters of theoretical interest. How we frame them determines 
who has power, voice, and representation and who does not.’ (Delgado & Stefancic, 
2012:55) Bill Ashcroft elaborates, through a socio-historical and linguistic analysis, 
on the idea that racial terms were not only used to describe the racial difference but 
                                               
14 Lorde’s words are a collective instance of what I presented in the introduction using 
Pirandello’s novel: the problem of others imposing on us an identity in which we are unable 
to recognise ourselves. 
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to denote an ideological distinction between chromatic terms like light and darkness, 
giving them further connotations, the distinction between them like good and evil, 
civilised and primitive. ‘Language has always ‘inscribed’ rather than ‘described’ 
human difference through such chromatic signifiers. Those signifiers have had an 
indispensable function in colonial relations and have been notoriously difficult to 
dislodge.’ (Ashcroft, 2001:314)  
Taking inspiration from Ashcroft, we can question if the contemporary notion 
of culture, prominently linked to national identity, described the unity within modern 
communities or if it was a prescriptive idea loaded with ideological assumptions, 
which have clearly not been dislodged. However, it is interesting to imagine how the 
liberal context has influenced the particular notions of culture we debate nowadays. 
Consequently, considering the historical situation when the term culture was used to 
refer to groups pretty much in the sense it is understood nowadays, I risk a very 
brief interpretation of the inscribed ideas behind the descriptive part of the concept.    
From Kant to Herder, from Wilhelm von Humbolt to Franz Boas, from Herbert 
Spencer to Edward Taylor, the concept of culture was constantly moving from the 
restrictive and normative idea of Bildung to the apparently more inclusive 
Weltanschauung. In the time these thinkers and philosophers are coining the 
modern idea of culture, they are themselves in the middle of nationalist movements, 
dealing with the tensions between the construction of a German nation and the 
decline of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. There is also the contrast between a 
colonialist perception of western progress and the uncivilised state of nature in 
which non-European natives seem to live. The chromatic terms behind the category 
of culture are somewhat visible, but confusing. Opposite ideas conflate in the same 
word. It has never been clear how we can use the same term to refer to the most 
exceptional elite human expressions, like works of art, and also to the most 
pedestrian everyday behaviours and beliefs. It is not clear at all how we can refer to 
cultures as groups sharing a particular language, history and territory, differentiating 
one from the other, but at the same time speak of a mainstream culture that seems 
the same in every western nation. However, the emphasis of one definition over 
another denotes the interests behind their construction. Words do not exist in a 
vacuum; they have their own history and socio-political context. 
In definitions of culture expressed in liberal conditions, the omissions 
connote something equally as important as the direct denotations. Kymlicka’s 
                                                                                                                                     




definition of culture represents well the liberal context I describe above. He says: ‘... 
I am using ‘a culture’ as synonymous with ‘a nation’ or ‘a people’—that is, as an 
intergenerational community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a 
given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and history.’ (1995:18) Here 
the emphasis on the national aspect and the exclusion of markers like religion shape 
our understanding of what a culture is and, respectively, of what a multi-cultural 
society should be in a liberal context. The liberal multicultural project omitted at the 
beginning categories of race and religion in its consideration of culture for the 
reason that it pretended to move from ethnic to civic citizenship. This is exactly the 
same idea I mention in Chapter 3 about the construction of civic nations and the 
origin of political plurality; it is also the reason why a culture is mostly a synonym for 
a nation or a people.  
Unfortunately, the implications of this attempt are not always positive. 
Multiculturalists like Kymlicka have acknowledged that ‘…in retrospect, it seems 
clear that early theories of multiculturalism did not adequately address the specific 
challenges that religion raises. (…) This inattention to religion has been rightly 
criticised by many scholars.’ (2015:42) Eventually, Taylor included religion in the 
equation and more recently Parekh has focused on race and religion. However, they 
had to swim against the tide. The prevalent notion is that a civic identity cannot 
include these features. Other important consequences of the way we understand 
culture in a liberal context include the fact that minorities such as African-Americans 
are not taken into account as a particular group. They do not fit in any group 
considered in the classification, they are neither a nation, an immigrant group nor 
indigenous peoples. Nevertheless, they are a cultural minority that has suffered from 
hierarchical relations, being largely excluded from the main culture due to cultural 
reasons. 
There is no way to perfectly define anything. Every time we construct a 
definition, we are trying to say what it is, which is a way to describe its identity. 
However, we can perceive that within the descriptions there is a prescriptive 
component. There is a power element in trying to set up a definition as if it were the 
true one. Every time we chose to emphasise one aspect over others in a definition, 
we do so purposefully. The problem would not be so bad if the imperfection of the 
definitions ended there but, as I said, to define something is to prescribe an identity, 
and in the case of people, our identity is always the answer to the question who am 
I? To acknowledge that definitions are not neutral, objective and purely descriptive is 
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an important step to fight the constraints upon us and liberate our identity and our 
self.  
 
2.4 Privilege, reformism and structural change 
 
The different understandings of the role of institutions in advancing plurality 
and diversity is a good way to grasp the incompatibility of the liberal approach and 
CRT. Largely, the traditions each theory uses for building their arguments explain 
the dissimilarity. In general terms, liberal theories are often considered modern. 
CRT, as a radical critique of liberal theories, is usually labelled as post-modern. A 
reductionist scheme casting liberalism and CRT as a modern vs post-modern 
dispute would have difficulties explaining the theories’ notional and aspirational 
overlaps. In fact, the lines are blurry or rather relative. For instance, Michael Dusche 
(2004) considers that an otherwise openly liberal approach such as Kymlicka’s 
multiculturalism can be too radical and go against liberal-democratic pluralism if it 
insists in considering groups and not individuals as the yardstick of justice. At the 
same time, multiculturalists such as Parekh believe that those same forms of 
multiculturalism are too liberal. 
If we assume the naiveté of trying to categorise what has no fixed margins, 
we can - for heuristic purposes - say that modern philosophers heavily influenced 
liberal theories of diversity and plurality. In consequence, they present a more 
positive side of concepts such as historical progress, certainty or meaning. On the 
other hand, CRT draws on Critical Legal Studies and Radical Feminism, on figures 
like Derrida, Gramsci, the American radical tradition of Sojourner Truth, Frederick 
Douglass, W.E.B. Du Bois, Cesar Chavez, Martin Luther King Jr., as well as the 
Black Power and Chicano movements (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012:4). Therefore, it 
positions itself closer to a more critical and destabilising perspective that 
emphasises concepts like difference and power relations. Even if liberal pluralism 
and CRT seem to coincide in the same socio-political tradition claiming equality after 
WWII in western countries, it is clear that their nature, tone and inspirational sources 
are dissimilar. At least in attitude and methods, the difference is the same as the 
between modern and post-modern standpoints, and on the practical level, between 
reformist attempts to implement institutional policies and grassroots anti-
establishment activism. I analyse this practical difference in this section. 




principles; on one hand, it advocates radical solutions or structural changes and, on 
the other hand, it builds concrete strategies to transform the situation of 
discrimination of particular groups in very specific contexts, always taking into 
account the particularities of each group and their intersectional circumstances. On 
that account, liberal proposals place themselves somewhere between these two 
extremes, exactly where it seems to be less effective; they neither push radical 
enough changes nor address a particular group’s issues. Two critiques derive from 
this middle ground of the liberal institutional approach: first, positive polices prove 
themselves ineffective, producing as many harmful side-effects as benefits and, 
secondly, the slow-pace reformist approach prevents deeper change.  
Liberal theories push wide-ranging policies that are not easily translated into 
the everyday life of individuals, or at least not easily applied outside a set of ideal 
conditions. In the case of multiculturalism, for instance, ‘It could be argued that the 
top-down policy changes which have occurred within the last decade have had little 
impact upon the ways in which people negotiate these [multicultural] differences in 
everyday environments.’ (Hardy, 2017:3) The weak impact of the policies in the 
everyday life of minority groups is also denounced by scholars outside the sphere of 
CRT such as Anne Phillips (2007), Steven Vertovec (2006) or Amanda Wise (2009). 
There is a visible gap in most liberal systems between the level of institutional 
policies and grassroots assimilation. However, in contrast with other approaches, 
CRT does not anticipate that bridging this gap will solve the problem. Neither does it 
disappear with a bottom-up perspective instead of a top-down approach. The real 
problem is that liberal attempts do not touch the root of diversity issues: privilege. 
This is the reason why policies do not positively affect the quotidian lives of 
minorities. Liberal policies and amendments are never deep enough to jeopardise 
the privilege of dominant groups.  
CRT analyses some negative consequences arising from otherwise positive 
policies to make its point about the slow pace of reformist progress, especially in the 
case of affirmative action. Even if it is evident that affirmative action has had a 
positive impact on the social progress of a significant number of African-Americans, 
just as other liberal policies did, crits have pointed the finger at its limits. In its study, 
Derrick Bell does not deny the favourable impact of policies and civil rights on 
minorities, he simply asserts it is not enough, neither at the structural level of 
institutional oppression nor in the practical aspects of social progress. He says: 
‘Certainly there are more civil rights laws on the books than ever before; yet 
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paradoxically, by every available measure of objective social and economic 
conditions, the gaps between blacks and whites remain large.’ (Derrick Bell, 
1989:13-14)  
The impact of policies and rights have been proved limited and, on top of the 
ineffectiveness, their side effects are not positive either. Amongst the side effects we 
can mention: 1) there is a tendency of individuals from minority groups to become 
guardians of the status quo once they are integrated into the mainstream culture, 2) 
measures like affirmative action has been of far more help to white privileged people 
than to oppressed minorities, 3) the passivity following policies and laws being set in 
motion. This last effect is particularly important. For instance, ‘…judicial approval of 
affirmative action in its earlier years, as ambivalent as it was, has caused advocates 
of the policy to relax. It also caused us to believe that our victories in court would 
translate automatically into acceptance in the community.’ (Derrick Bell, 2000:149) 
According to Bell, affirmative action is able to bring equality to some, but it 
never challenges the fundamental assumptions of privilege. Therefore, the reformist 
measures to fight discrimination and inequality have just a sort of palliative effect. 
There is no way to secure real equality in American society if it is not through the 
acknowledgement and renunciation of historically established white privilege, which 
is not just white, but white, male and bourgeois (Young, 1990). Moreover, if we 
expand Bell’s argument beyond the case of affirmative action, we can affirm that 
minorities’ integration does not entail equality. All the more, any true attempt to push 
equality implies a claim for a loss of privilege for members of the mainstream 
culture.  
The second problem with the middle ground of the liberal policies and laws is 
their inherent reformism bias. According to crits, this perspective prevents important 
changes from happening. Institutional instruments such as anti-discrimination laws, 
but also group-differentiated rights are instances of slow-paced reformist progress 
that prevent deeper changes. They work through a proceduralism that corresponds 
to a ‘…somewhat optimistic view of liberal anti-discrimination as already providing 
an adequate basis for challenging racism, sexism, disablism and so on.’ (A. Phillips, 
2017:7) The reformist stand assumes that the foundation suffices for subsequent 
changes and the system is perfectible. CRT questions this assumption.  
CRT takes liberalism to task for its cautious, incremental quality. When 
we are tackling a structure as deeply embedded as race, radical 
measures are required. “Everything must change at once,” otherwise the 
system merely swallows up the small improvement one has made, and 




Even if liberal institutions progress in addressing direct hierarchical relations, 
they are unable to resolve some fundamental issues at the base of western 
democratic societies. It is true that some political philosophers have looked for 
alternative perspectives beyond the classical liberal values but the approaches still 
remain reformist.16 Reformist approaches are based on a fear of radical change and 
its consequences, that is, the perception that we should not push radical changes if 
we think it would create a backlash and ultimately worsen the situation. Not asking 
too much seems a slower but safer path than radical change. The idea of a sure 
path constrains the speed of change, not too slow because minorities could become 
impatient and riot, but not too fast because elites and majorities could feel their 
benefits are jeopardised.   
It can be argued that the reformist approach has its own advantages and that 
it is a secure path. In the aftermath, asking too much would negatively affect the 
actual –if insufficient - protections for minority groups.17 This pragmatic perspective 
would explain the gradualism pursued in social and political changes, but it will also 
limit the aims of social movements. In Chapter 7, I explain that in the case of 
Québécois interculturalism, the aim of reciprocity is supported by the claim of 
majority anxieties, and this is mainly a fear of losing privileges. This also legitimates 
an ad hoc precedence and control interventionism of the host Francophone society. 
Incorporating CRT criticism, we can analyse arguments like the following:  
The principles behind ad hoc precedence can soothe majority anxieties 
that could easily turn into hostility –especially when there are social or 
political actors who readily stand to profit. (…) To conclude this point, it 
would be an error to believe that all majority cultures are basically 
menacing or harmful. Some have a remarkable history of openness and 
generosity towards minorities, while others, despite difficult 
circumstances, have managed to maintain their liberal leanings. Often 
dominant cultures are helpful agents in advancing democracy and 
individual rights. (Bouchard, 2011:455-56) 
According to Bouchard, the aim of keeping the majority culture’s privilege is 
openly acknowledged and supported, including also a warning to not poke the bear. 
Anyhow, a utilitarian calculation of what is likely to happen should not be enough to 
                                               
16 For instance, Bhikhu Parekh develops a theory of plurality and diversity outside the liberal 
constraints, but his approach is reformist and centred on political institutions. He believes 
that positive inclusive changes can be pushed through political institutions. 
17 Moderated approaches of CRT have more “acceptance” than the radical ones, which 
demonstrate that western societies are configured in a way that reformism is more suitable 
than radical change. ‘The narrative turn and storytelling scholarship seem well on their way 
toward acceptance, as does the critique of merit. More radical features, such as recognition 
that the status quo is inherently racist, rather than merely sporadically and accidentally so, 
seem less likely to win out.’ (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012:135) 
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prevent us from pushing the changes we believe in, and even less to prevent us 
from criticising the values and institutions that inhibit those changes. This is also a 
valuable CRT contribution to the debates of diversity, plurality and equality. We 
should not stop in the middle range claims and push for a radical change; we should 
also to move away from the grey area in which saying we are neutral or impartial 
just add to the oppression of those claiming justice, recognition and dignity. As Alan 
Freeman says (1978), the reformist assumes the perspective of the perpetrator, the 
radical the perspective of the victim. Let us be on the side of the victims.  
 
2.5 Systematic power and oppression  
 
The debate about the ways power is behind otherwise objective definitions 
and eventually institutions is based on two different understandings of power. CRT 
considers that power is not strictly a thing but it is primarily a configuration of 
relations that bias the behaviour of some individuals toward others. Liberal 
approaches to power are more traditional; they usually refer to direct relationships 
between two parts, and they are constrained to instances of intentional agency.18 
Therefore, it is understandable that liberal perspectives struggle to perceive 
systematic racism beyond direct bigotry and discrimination. Nevertheless, persistent 
micro-aggressions, low-grade prejudices, unconscious acceptance of a state of 
affairs or unfavourable affirmation of a status quo also evidence a lack of 
recognition.  
From the liberal perspective, there is no reason to suspect institutions and 
their policies are oppressive, but if they were, those policies or institutions must be 
supplanted. This is exactly the nature of the reformist processes of liberalisation.19 
After all, we become increasingly liberal societies by liberalising our institutions. 
Therefore, following this train of thought, in no case can a liberal institution be 
oppressive. Completely the opposite, when we say that institutions are liberal, it is 
because in every case they liberate. If we found an institution sustaining any form of 
oppression, it is not liberal, and it has to be liberalised. 
Liberal institutions democratically persuade the members of society in a way 
                                               
18 Even if scholars such as Steven Lukes (2005) have made an important effort to endorse 
a more radical view of power and show conflict is not essential to it, it is still a direct relation 
between two parts and focused on the dynamics between embodied interests. 
19 ‘But it is worth remembering that all existing liberal nations had illiberal pasts, and their 




that promotes –not restricts- their agency. Other institutions, particularly from 
cultural and/or religious minorities, can be accused of oppression exactly because of 
their illiberality. Those institutions are illiberal if they restrict their members’ freedom 
and impose a fixed identity on them. Liberal institutions impose nothing on their 
members, they democratically persuade them. Illiberal institutions force, liberal ones 
persuade (Kymlicka, 2015:238), as I discuss in Chapter 5. From the liberal 
perspective, a power relation is direct, delivered by clear means, and indicated by 
violence, intimidation or fear. Institutions cannot be the source of oppression 
because they are the means to address it. ‘In dominant political discourse, it is not 
legitimate to use the term oppression to describe our society, because oppression is 
the evil perpetrated by the Others.’ (Young, 1990:41) 
CRT is closer to post-modern ideas such as Foucault’s or Agamben’s notion 
of power. Power is not a property of groups or individuals, something they could 
have; power does not exist until the moment a power relation is enacted. In contrast 
to the violence that acts directly on bodies and things, this more surreptitious power 
does not act directly, but on possible actions. Power leads to the possibility of 
conducting and putting in order a possible outcome.   
[Power] is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible 
actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; 
in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless 
always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue 
of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other 
actions. (Foucault, 1982:789) 
Foucault also mentions that power is exercised through net-like 
organisations; it flows and functions like a chain (1980). Power relations are part of 
something more general; they are part of the social nexus. Power cannot be 
reduced to conscious and intentional oppression, actually, it is often internalised by 
the individuals avoiding the need of a visible oppressor as in the metaphor of the 
panopticon. (Foucault, 1979) And more importantly, liberal institutions exercise 
power by their practices of education, medicine, bureaucracy and so on, and not 
only through law and order institutions. As a result, we maintain and reproduce 
oppression through institutions, without the need of being conscious agents. In other 
words, all liberal institutions are at some extent disciplinary institutions, setting a 
complex structure of systematic oppression.  
It is fair to mention that liberal scholars like Judith Shklar have pointed out 
that the exact purpose of liberalism is to prevent the abuse of public powers in all 
the regimes and, therefore, to protect the weak from the powerful (1989:28). 
42 
 
Acknowledging that fear is the most common form of social control, Skhlar’s 
Liberalism of Fear advocates limited government and control of political power as 
the minimal condition for securing freedom in liberal societies. A minimum ‘amount’ 
of fear and coercion is necessary and allowed to the government in order to fulfil its 
essential functions: securing the political conditions necessary for the exercise of 
personal freedom. ‘A minimal level of fear is implied in any system of law, and the 
liberalism of fear does not dream of an end of public, coercive government.’ (Shklar, 
1989:29) Therefore, there are legitimate agents of minimal liberal coercion, which 
have the mission of preventing greater cruelty. All things considered, liberals could 
argue that a minimum amount of fear and coercion is the price we pay for the 
benefits of living in democratic, egalitarian, western democracies.  
Nevertheless, there is a foundational problem in this kind of narrative 
regarding the origins and minimal conditions for constructing modern societies. 
Returning over and over again to theories of the social contract seems inevitable. 
What is important for my purposes is to highlight the minimum coercion necessary to 
make the state work is different than a systematic form of oppression. It is 
somewhat plausible to accept that some amount of coercion over everyone is 
needed in order to ensure that agreements will be kept, that a small fear of 
punishment might help to keep a minimum order within a society. However, that is 
very different from liberal institutions inflicting systematic oppression over particular 
groups.     
As happens with some other more benign forms of liberalism, the liberalism 
of fear has positive aims and develops a theory promising to address fundamental 
issues like inequality or bigotry, even racism.   
…as do its accounts of the prevalence of racism, xenophobia, and 
systematic governmental brutality here and everywhere. I cannot see 
how any political theorist or politically alert citizen can possibly ignore 
them and fail to protest against them. Once we do that, we have moved 
toward the liberalism of fear, and away from the more exhilarating but 
less urgent forms of liberal thought. (Shklar, 1989:38) 
Nevertheless, it works on a different level than more systematic critiques 
such as CRT. It deals with direct racism, xenophobia and particularly with open 
governmental brutality, like some forms of tyranny, but it does not acknowledge 
other systematic, subtle, ways of oppression, forms that keep racism, sexism and 
other forms of discrimination as up-to-date despite the liberalism of the institutions.  
CRT denounces another misconception that we can identify at the core of 




systematic element in power relations. The empathic fallacy refers to ‘...the belief 
that one can change a narrative by merely offering another, better one—that the 
reader’s or listener’s empathy will quickly and reliably take over.’ (Delgado & 
Stefancic, 2012:28) No minority has achieved equality so far by a change of 
narrative. The empathic fallacy led us to believe that discrimination would be 
eradicated once the oppressor is persuaded of the misconception of their ideological 
background. And even if this is not a fallacy directly assumed by liberal theories of 
diversity and plurality –because they do not deal with narratives, but with policies 
and rights-, it is present in the sense it assumes the abolishment of discrimination 
and inequality must be reached by a shift towards the liberal ideology of human 
rights and civic citizenship.  
It is a pending task for political scientists, especially for the liberal ones, to 
explain why in societies that have incrementally embraced liberal and democratic 
rights and policies, there have been socio-political phenomena such as Brexit or the 
rise of the far-right parties driven, at least partially, by bigotry and xenophobia. The 
disenchantment produced by these recent instances has unveiled the 
consequences of the empathic fallacy assumed by the liberal theories fighting 
discrimination; a fallacy that perhaps has its roots in the Enlightenment and its blind 
trust in reason and moral progress. 
The same problems: racism, discrimination, bigotry or oppression in general. 
Two different ways to understand power: the liberal and the post-modern. Two -
apparently- opposite assessments of liberal institutions: from one perspective, they 
help to address direct inequality and oppression, from the other perspective, they 
reproduce and maintain the oppression of particular groups in more subtle but 
extensive ways. One important problem remains open for further debate: whether 
we believe the liberal institutions can legitimately serve the purposes of minorities 
after the proper adjustments, as liberals say, or we think institutions, as happened 
before, will keep supporting the interests of specific groups. And no easy answers. 
 
2.6 Coming back to reforms: the de-radicalisation of CRT 
 
After the initial push by Bell and Freeman, the stances, developments and 
arguments grown by different flanks of the movement established a diversity of 
topics and takes. In the CRT corpus, there are pieces referring to the American legal 
system’s role in upholding white privilege, but also studies discussing class issues 
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(D. Cole, 1999), education (Brown, 1993), housing (L. Cole & Foster, 2001), 
employment (Harris, 1993), gender roles and sexual orientation (Hutchinson, 1997), 
affirmative action (Kennedy, 1990), intersectional studies on the oppression of black 
women (Crenshaw, 1991), etc. Amongst the scholars that stood out after the 
foundational moment of the movement, we can mention Richard Delgado, Kimberly 
Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, Charles R. Lawrence and Mari Matsuda. 
They have maintained the movement by insisting on racial consciousness. Even if 
there has never been a unified program to fight racial inequality, crits have proved 
that a constellation of different issues can be questioned under the light of CRT’s 
fundamental notions of racial realism, racial consciousness and integrationist 
convergence as keys to understand and fight the black community’s oppression. In 
a certain way, they became the glue for the movement besides the activism.20  
…there is no canonical set of doctrines or methodologies to which we all 
[crits] subscribe. Although Critical Race scholarship differs in object, 
argument, accent, and emphasis, it is nevertheless unified by two 
common interest. The first is to understand how a regime of white 
supremacy and its subordination of people of color have been created 
and maintained in America, and, in particular, to examine the relationship 
between that social structure and professed ideals such as “the rule of 
law” and “equal protection.” The second is a desire not merely to 
understand the vexed bond between law and racial power but to change 
it. (Crenshaw et al., 1995:xiii) 
The diversity of takes and perspectives within the CRT movement gradually 
gave rise to another sort of issue, particularly the development of an idealist angle in 
a movement that consciously embraced racial realism as its foundational stance. 
The possible explanations for this phenomenon might include the natural 
development of a theory that progressively adjusts and corrects its points of view 
and methods to reflect the changing times (Crenshaw et al., 1995:xxx-xxxii), it could 
be also the product of various disciplines superficially adopting CRT criticism without 
embracing its core assumptions (Curry, 2011:3), or a younger and less radical 
generation of scholars with a different background and context, heavily influenced 
by European philosophers and their emphasis on categories like thought and 
discourse (Delgado, 2001:2284). 
We can distinguish two main positions: a materialist standpoint that assumes 
racism has structural components to safeguard privileges and status, and an idealist 
perspective that believes racism and discrimination are the results of categories, 
words, attitudes, emotions and discourses. As mentioned before, Bell and Freeman 
                                               





are the most important realist scholars; the idealist side is represented by Charles R. 
Lawrence III in his influential The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism (1987). The idealist perspective emphasises that race is a 
socially constructed reality, while the materialist one focuses on power relations and 
the structural means of power.   
Subsequently, there are two kinds of proposals. On one side, idealists 
believe that strategies, such as getting rid of hate speech, deconstructing 
stereotypes and increasing the fair representation of minorities in the media are the 
way to fight racism; in one word, they support approaches building favourable 
attitudes towards other communities and their members. Materialists believe that 
changing the economic, political and social circumstances of minorities is the way to 
fight racial and ethnic inequality. The materialist side is concerned with issues like 
globalisation, human rights, immigration, poverty and justice. In these problems 
related to material conditions, crits perceive the real conditions that afflict minorities. 
Idealist CRT focuses on ‘…categories by which our society constructs and 
understands race and racism. Writers in this camp are apt to emphasize issues, 
such as identity and intersectionality, that have to do with words and categories.’ 
(Delgado & Stefancic, 2012:120)  
At the core of the CRT theses, racial consciousness and racial realism have 
made room for the idealist standpoint and its emphasis on the constructionist 
character of the concept of race. Richard Delgado has reinterpreted the aims of 
CRT to include the idealist perspective in the movement’s core beliefs (2012:7). He 
affirms there are three main ideas that CRT assume as the base of its development: 
1) racism is ordinary and not aberrant, that is, it is part of the common and everyday 
experience of most of the people of colour; 2) the system of white-over-colour 
serves psychic and material purposes; 3) races are the product of social thought, 
therefore, they are social constructions that have changed according to the 
convenience of some groups and depending on the situations like the labour market. 
The third thesis, in particular, reflects the idealist perspective within the movement, 
even if it is surreptitiously complemented by a materialist twist.  
Idealist CRT became an important tool to express and denounce the 
different stories and experiences of oppression suffered by the black community in 
the US; meanwhile, the materialist side denounces the way the social construction 
of a category like race has served specific power structures. Idealist CRT provides a 
conceptual framework to help minorities make their voice heard outside the 
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framework that serves oppression but could be also a source of inspiration for more 
focused and direct political action based on the materialist side of the movement. In 
this sense, there is no contradiction, only tension between them. ‘This division in 
CRT created a tension in the study of law and the socio-political contexts that give 
rise to it.’ (Curry, 2011:3)  
At first glance, there is no clear reason why the idealist and the materialist 
views cannot complement each other and produce better and stronger arguments. 
They are glued together by the same aim and both constitute part of the same 
theoretical effort. However, there could be an important issue with the idealist 
perspective if, as some scholars like Delgado or Curry have pointed out, it 
represents emancipation of the movement and an instance of the academic 
dispositions and behaviours that the early scholars attempted to criticise (Delgado, 
1984).  
Finally, I describe important criticisms directed to CRT and some flaws that I 
think we should discuss further. Criticism includes the narrow space for no African-
American minority groups within the white-black paradigm, the limited utility of 
storytelling for deeper change, the distortion of public discourse it portrays, the lack 
of respect for concepts like truth and merit, atypical use of histories denouncing 
systematic discrimination, and lack of analytical rigour. The criticism comes from 
different sources and responds to different interests, additionally, some critiques are 
more accurate than others.21 In consequence, I briefly describe some of those 
critiques that have better reasons to stand, as well as those that might contravene 
some points I made myself during the argumentation of this chapter. 
Idealist CRT believes that, as far as race is not a ‘real’ or ‘objective’ category 
but constructed, a deconstruction is always possible. Consequently, ‘Attacking 
embedded preconceptions that marginalize others or conceal their humanity is a 
                                               
21 Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry call CRT a radical form of multiculturalism, that is, a 
political perspective opposite to the liberal principles, ‘…a broad-based attack on the 
Enlightenment foundations of democracy.’ (Farber & Sherry, 1997:5) More specifically, CRT 
as a form of radical multiculturalism leads to a perspective that advocates ‘…collective rights 
(i.e. “human rights” for groups) on the same or even on a more fundamental level as 
individual human rights.’ (Dusche, 2004:243). In order to invalidate CRT, Farber and Sherry 
point out that Jewish and Asian people are more successful in the mainstream society than 
other groups, implying that western democratic institutions are not biased against minorities 
in general. The success or failure of African Americans depend on them. This sort of 
criticism corresponds to evaluations from the classical liberal perspective, and even if they 
have some merit, they miss the point completely. The (backgrounded) assimilationist 
assumption makes it a target of criticism even within liberal circles. ‘In the conformist ideal, 
status quo institutions and norms are assumed as given, and disadvantaged groups who 




legitimate function of all fiction.’ (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012:42) Nevertheless, this 
approach seems to ignore there is a difference between identifying or denouncing a 
power relation and fighting it, even worse if the power relation is systematic and 
deeply embedded. Something constructed can be theoretically and linguistically 
deconstructed, but the deconstruction does not directly change the role of 
categories in the world. Idealist CRT help to unveil the dominant features hidden in 
narratives and concepts. In that sense, it builds some resistance, but there is 
something missing to foment the next step of challenging the current state of affairs.  
The power of deconstruction as a tool of criticism is well known and 
recognised, but its substantial impact is still debated. Ashcroft (2001) explains this 
faith in the racial and cultural emancipatory power of language as a false belief, 
inherited from the 19th-century philology, that affirms language actually embodies 
cultural difference instead of just expressing it. In consequence, it was assumed that 
by developing their own narratives and embracing their own traditions, that is, 
expressing themselves in their own voice, their cultural difference would be 
automatically placed on equal terms as a counterpart of the dominant narratives. In 
order to bring their cultural uniqueness to the table, members of a community would 
just need to find their voice. Unfortunately, it is not clear how categories can 
overcome material conditions. Conversely, it seems that the material conditions tend 
to restrict the liberating narratives to the same oppressive structures they denounce. 
We black people tried to write ourselves out of slavery, a slavery even 
more profound than mere physical bondage. Accepting the challenge of 
the great white Western tradition, black writers wrote as if their lives 
depended upon it-and, in a curious sense, their lives did, the "life of the 
race" in Western discourse. But if blacks accepted this challenge, we 
also accepted its premises, premises which perhaps concealed a trap. 
(Gates, 1985:12-13)  
CRT storytelling cannot trust that, through empathic descriptions of the 
obstacles and disadvantages that people from minority groups have to face, 
members of the dominant group could change not only their attitude but the 
systematic conditions of oppression. In that regard, it is guilty of falling into the very 
same empathic fallacy that it denounces in liberal thinking.  
As such, deconstruction has been used as the "wonder drug" by White 
authors to claim that they now think differently about their Whiteness and 
want to use their enlightenment for the betterment of the Black race, and 
by Black thinkers to claim that simply not thinking about race or 
transcending its social construct altogether will eliminate racism. (Curry, 
2011:8) 
It is a fact that the integration paradigm force minorities to talk in a voice that 
is not necessarily theirs. Giving voice is a step forward, but there is a long distance 
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to walk for giving power to the marginalised. Something interesting about CRT as a 
socio-political project is that, despite pressing for radical social changes, some of its 
more logically and empirically supported proposals are not radical enough. If racism 
is systematic and it is deeply embedded in modern societies, storytelling and 
discourse analysis seem to fall short of what we expect for a structural change. At 




If the function of CRT is to provide a critique of social institutions, then an 
interesting problem arises when it is incorporated by those institutions it once 
criticised. Particularly idealist CRT approaches, ‘…like legal storytelling and 
narrative jurisprudence, have turned into what sociologists of knowledge call normal 
science.’ (Delgado, 2011:1257) The first consequence of this normalisation is that it 
becomes, at least in the eyes of its militant supporters, more liberal than radical. In 
any case, the incorporation would not be a problem if, like it is supposed to happen 
in science, a paradigm shift precedes that incorporation. But in contrast to what 
happens in scientific change, CRT’ criticism has been absorbed without the legal 
system being organised around a new paradigm. The values and principles of 
liberal, modern, western societies still stand. Even if CRT makes strong points 
against the liberal structure of western societies, liberal institutions were gradually 
able to incorporate at least the most notable strategies from the idealist perspective. 
Anyway, the normalisation of CRT does not mean that it is serving opposite 
purposes, it just means that it could be perceived as less radical. The normalisation 
can be reversed if the materialist perspective reaffirms its more radical and 
systematic agenda.  
CRT challenges the achievements of liberal theories. Using a more radical 
notion of power relations, it explains the dynamics of small and medium-range 
achievements of minority groups and the standing structural forms of oppression. 
CRT develops a theory to analyse the problem of coincidence between reformist 
progress and elitist dominant interests. It also examines how legal and political 
measures, like affirmative action, have not been so helpful for minority groups, 
despite the positive impact they bring to some individuals. Therefore, liberal efforts 
to foster diversity and plurality have achieved some undeniable advances in relation 




major issues does not allow structural changes, nor solve particular problems of 
specific communities. It is a pending task to think further what are the conditions of 
radical change and the always sensitive question if we should do it by violent 
means. Perhaps we should start acknowledging that, as Benjamin suggest,  
…every conceivable solution to human problems, not to speak of 
deliverance from the confines of all the world-historical conditions of 
existence obtaining hitherto, remains impossible if violence is totally 
excluded in principle, the question necessarily arises as to other kinds of 
violence than all those envisaged by legal theory. It is at the same time 
the question of the truth of the basic dogma common to both theories 
[natural law and positive law]: just ends can be attained by justified 
means, justified means used for just ends. How would it be, therefore, if 
all the violence imposed by fate, using justified means, were of itself in 
irreconcilable conflict with just ends, (Benjamin, 2007:293) 
Unfortunately, this path leads to another sort of problems and reflections. In 
this text, the next step is to begin with the nationalist roots of contemporary debates 











Nationalism and the origin of political plurality 
 
 
I imagine how the reader will face what is coming next. If I were facing the 
text for the first time, I would perceive something bizarre. There is something odd in 
a text claiming to focus on diversity and plurality that, nonetheless, devotes a whole 
chapter to theories of nationalism. We usually do not couple nationalism and 
diversity, or at least we do not tend to associate nationalism with the visible and 
positive sides of diversity: open-mindedness, tolerance of difference, respect for the 
other, etc. These are not features jumping out when we think about nationalists, at 
least not those we watch every day on the news. Additionally, the most important 
historical event of the twentieth century gave nationalism a bad name. Then, the 
reader might cleverly think this is a sort of rhetorical approach in which I will support 
diversity after diminishing nationalism, a strategy that would make the chapter 
somewhat superfluous. But I can assure her this is not the case, on the contrary, the 
text starts in this way because, despite our initial impression, diversity and 
nationalism are tightly interconnected. 
How is civic nationalism related to plurality and diversity? And more 
importantly, why would an analysis of the main theories on nationalism help us to 
understand the liberal approaches on diversity and plurality? The short answer to 
the first question is that one of its forms, civic nationalism, set the basis for 
contemporary political plurality. A more cynical answer for the second question is 
that we have to scrutinise civic nationalism because western democracies have not 
advanced much in dealing with diversity since the consolidation of nation-states. In 
fact, we are still stuck with the same problems, the same categories and proposing a 
revised version of the same notions underlying the first debates on nationalism.  
Our historical understanding of plurality and diversity within the liberal 
framework is still being shaped by notions inherited from debates on nationalism: 
social cohesion, democracy, liberal rights, neutral institutions, policies, national 
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identity, citizenship, etc. In the opinion of liberal scholars, at the core, the problem of 
diversity and plurality were solved long ago. We just need to periodically update it, 
taking into account the new circumstances faced by contemporary societies, but the 
base is firm: civic, liberal, institutionally strong societies. Actually, as I explain next, 
historically, western countries have moved from ethnic forms of organising life to 
civic ones exactly because it was assumed this would provide the room for diversity 
and plurality. However, the opposite is also possible: we have not moved forward 
facing diversity issues because of the constraints held by the notion that any positive 
approach on diversity requires the basis of political liberalism.   
Before moving to the arguments and ideas, let me provide a recent 
illustration of what I have said. Last year, during Francis Fukuyama’s presentation 
for The Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, he answered a question 
on the possibility of inculcating a sense of multiple fluid identities saying:  
Obviously, that's a reality, and it's something to be promoted and so 
forth, but you've got to think about politics because politics is about 
collective action. Collective action, for better or worse, in a democratic 
society takes place at a national and then all of the different subpolitical 
levels underneath that. Unless people in a sense have a clear sense of 
belonging to this broader democratic community where they share 
certain beliefs in the legitimacy of certain very specific kinds of political 
institutions, those institutions aren't going to work very well. (…) if you 
don't think, Yes, but I'm also an American who believes in the 
Constitution and in separation of powers and the importance of an 
independent judiciary, and you don't have that pretty firmly in your mind, 
you're not going to be able to organize to resist people who want to 
undermine that. (…) You have to talk about national identity and what 
you as a citizen hold in common with fellow citizens. (2018b)22 
In this case, it does not matter if Fukuyama is a right-wing or left-wing 
oriented theorist. Both sides of the liberal spectrum have the same confidence in 
democracy, civic citizenship and political institutions as the way to solve the 
problems of identity recognition. That is exactly what makes them liberal in the first 
place. However, I do not share the same optimism. The whole aim of the text, not 
just this chapter, is to transcend the suffocating constraints of a liberal dominant 
narrative and its tendency to reduce everything to the realm of the political. There is 
room for diversity outside the wall of liberalism and its politics.  
The idea of building a community on the basis of shared political identity was 
developed during the rise of modern nations and is an attribute of civic nationalism. 
The other form, ethnic nationalism, was assumed to arise from a combination of 
aspects including language, ethnicity, culture, race and religion. The analysis of the 
                                               




theories of nationalism sheds light on the cleavage between political and other forms 
of identity and recognition. I intend to unveil that the different ways of understanding 
identity are anchored in a set of theoretical assumptions about how members of a 
group can achieve social cohesion and why they should, which also clearly 
conditions the forms of recognition. The link between who the people are and how 
they are going to organise themselves to rule on democratic terms denotes the tight 
connection between civic nationalism and liberal democracy. Concepts like 
collective identity and social unity, so important for liberal theories of diversity and 
plurality, have been forged in the discussions on nationalism. 
The chapter is divided into four sections before its Conclusion. It goes from 
the origins of nationalism, the two models that have dominated the debates, to the 
dialectics of identity and recognition supported by civic nationalism. In the first two 
sections, I briefly describe the origin, context, features and typology of nationalism, 
as well as how the idea of national identity has been used to secure social cohesion. 
After this, I will be able to characterise civic nationalism as constructed, political, 
liberal, democratic, voluntaristic and individualistic. In the last two sections, I argue 
that the emphasis on the construction of communities based on a set of liberal 
values -freedom, equality, democracy, etc.- and not based on some of their 
particular features denotes the effort to provide political identity to any individual 
despite their ethnicity, race, religion or culture. In this respect, political recognition 
opens the door for accommodating plurality and diversity within the same nation or 
state. In exchange, citizens are expected to develop allegiance to the political 
institutions, so securing a form of social solidarity towards fellow citizens, even when 
they might have opposed interests on particular issues. In other words, there is a 
recognition-allegiance dialectic within civic nations that conditions the political-social 
dynamics. At the end of the chapter, we will be able to perceive that in civic nations 
political recognition is addressed by institutions, through legal means and 
encapsulated in political rights and policies, and then we can start question 
ourselves if this is what we want when we demand our identity to be recognised. 
 
3.1 Ethnic and civic nationalism: the origins of nations 
  
The aim of my description is to unveil some assumptions in the concepts of 
nations and national identities. To reach this point I have to delineate first the way 
they actually appeared and the conditions that made them possible in the first place. 
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Nationalism is a term that can be understood in different ways. To reduce the 
chance of any confusion, by using the word I am referring to one particular idea: 
‘…the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their 
national identity.’ (Miscevic, 2014) However, as Anthony Smith affirms, for analytical 
purposes we have ‘…to distinguish the ideological movement of nationalism from 
the wider phenomenon of national identity.’ (1991:vii) I try to draw a line between 
two kinds of nationalism and, consequently, I characterise two different ways to 
understand national identity. Therefore, the description takes the form of a constant 
contrast between the two kinds of nationalism.  
The major division in the types of nationalism is between primordialist and 
modernist, or ethnic and civic as they are also known. In between these two 
dominant paradigms, scholars might identify other types invoked in the wide 
spectrum of nationalist studies: perennialism, postmodernism, ethno-symbolism, 
constructionism and instrumentalism (Smith, 1998) just to mention a few. The 
typology of nationalism is more complex than just two antithetical poles; different 
models of nationalism often overlap, they do not necessarily exclude each other and 
scholars tend to conflate them depending on what they want to emphasise or 
deny.23 For my purposes, I focus on contrasting the ethnic and civic forms while 
acknowledging factual nationalism is more complex and diverse than the analytical 
distinctions I present here. The nuances that drive the extended typology of 
nationalism reflect the efforts to understand the origins of and classify particular 
nations. Civic and ethnic approaches can be usefully located with reference to 
theories of the rise of nations and nationalism. 
Modernists, represented by Ernest Gellner, argue for an instrumentalist 
account, in which nationalism emerges in the modern era and becomes a secular 
glue holding society together. Primordialists, following the influential work of Anthony 
Smith, affirm that modern nationalism is rooted in a much older set of myths, 
symbols and cultural practices.24 The strength of the civic theory is that it explains 
the relationship between nationalism and political modernisation; its weakness is 
that it struggles to explain the cultural features of nationalism, particularly the strong 
emotional appeal that cultural and ethnic aspects can generate amongst members 
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what nations are really made up of, and not exactly two types of nations that really exist. As I 
said, in reality, these analytical categories frequently overlap. 
24 A more detailed account of modernist forms of nationalism can be found in Anthony 
Smith’s book Nationalism and Modernism, (1998) On the other hand, John Coackley (2018) 




of some communities. The strength of primordialist accounts is in describing the 
cultural weight of a nation’s history; its weakness is an inability to explain the change 
from pre-national to national communities. 
According to the civic account of nationalism, perhaps the most important 
feature of modern societies is political centralisation. Consequently, nationalism 
reflects this feature; "…nationalism is primarily a political principle which holds that 
the political and the national unit should be congruent." (Gellner, 1983:1). On the 
other side, scholars supporting the ethnic view of nationalism, like Smith, would say 
that ‘…we cannot understand nations and nationalism simply as an ideology or form 
of politics but must treat them as cultural phenomena as well.’ (1991:vii) 
Consequently, we can centre the debate in understanding whether national identity 
is a political or a cultural phenomenon, or both. 
Traditionally, the legal and political community is expressed in the concept of 
citizenship, that is, civil, legal, political and socio-economic rights. ‘Those who are 
associated in it are collectively called “a people”, and are separately called “citizens” 
(as sharing in the sovereign power) and “subjects” (as being under the state’s laws).’ 
(Rousseau, 1950:I.6) The civic idea of a nation emphasises the common political 
culture and civic ideology, that is, a set of common understandings and aspirations, 
sentiments and ideals that bind the population together. To keep using Rousseau’s 
terms, it emphasises the need for a common good or common interest that must be 
done by the general will and without which no society could exist. The common 
interest and the general will that tie people together form a sort of public civic 
culture. On the other side, the political community presupposes some common 
values and traditions that need to be expressed and symbolised. Consequently, in 
this model, the territory is proposed as the repository of historic memories. The idea 
of civic nation coincides with a community of laws and institutions with a single 
political will, in a determined territory. ‘Historic territory, legal-political community, 
legal-political equality of members, and common civic culture and ideology; these 
are the components of the standard, Western model of the nation.’ (Smith, 1991:11)  
The ethnic conception of the nation emphasises a community of birth and 
native culture. In this model, the belonging of an individual cannot be chosen. Even 
in the case of migration, people would remain members of their community of birth. 
A nation is a community of common descent. Solidarity has different sources: in the 
civic model, this corresponds to the set of common political sentiments and ideas 
binding the population together, whereas in the ethnic model it is historical 
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memories, myths, symbols and traditions that bind them together. In the ethnic 
version of nationalism, we can find negative features that have been largely 
criticised. For instance, it contributes to the constant danger of attempting to link the 
current people to great and noble ancestors in the remote past, which might easily 
become the door to open discrimination and xenophobia. Acknowledging the past is 
a serious and delicate matter, and the construction of national myths is never easy.  
Even if scholars like Coakley (2018) think that this primordialism 
emphasising the links to a remote ancestry is a component of nationalist ideology, 
rather than an explanation of nationalism, it is almost undeniable that the spread of 
shared history and national myths facilitates the emergence of a sense of 
community and identity. On the other side, this way of linking the current generation 
with its ancestors outside the restrictions of a given territory has been very useful to 
study social phenomenon like migration. Approaches such as transnationalism, 
which ‘…accents the attachments migrants maintain to families, communities, 
traditions and causes outside the boundaries of the nation-state to which they have 
moved.’(Vertovec, 2001b:574), are close to this attempt to place identity in 
something beyond the limits of a given territory and a core of political beliefs. 
‘Genealogy, demography, traditional culture, and history furnish the main resources 
for an ethnic view of the formation of nations. It is a conception of the nation that has 
found favour mainly outside the West, and often opposes civic conceptions.’ (Smith, 
1988:9)   
Another important disagreement between these two perspectives on 
nationalism is the issue of the priority of nations over nationalism or vice-versa. 
Gellner thinks that nationalism is prior to nations, that is, nationalism is the process 
that creates nations. Nations are inventions to suit historically specific economic and 
political needs: ‘…nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; 
it invents nations where they do not exist.’ (1964:168) On the other hand, Smith 
argues that nations are prior to nationalism, in other words, nations evolve from 
particular ethnic communities or ethnies.25 ‘It is, of course, possible to find historical 
examples where a strong case for some measure of continuity between pre-existing 
ethnic communities (ethnies) and modern nations can be made.’ (1998:175) 
The problem of the origin of nations is important because it heavily 
influences the understandings of national identity, and it is both theoretical and 
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historical. Political philosophers try to explain why the members of a nation might 
band together in the first place, and under what principles, which is a more 
theoretical approach. They look for the conditions without which nations and 
nationalism could not exist. This corresponds to an emphasis on the ideological 
element of nationalism. For instance, they tend to describe the modernity of nations 
but emphasise the theoretical and ideological core of modernity. In consequence, 
nations are some sort of embodiment of the Enlightenment principles of equality, 
freedom, and autonomy that bring together members of a community and shape a 
particular idea of collective identity that is both modern and liberal, and to a great 
extent rational. ‘Kedourie had argued that nationalism was a doctrine invented in 
Europe in the early nineteenth century and that it sprang from the philosophical 
tradition of the Enlightenment, notably from Kant’s doctrine that the good will can 
only be the autonomous will.26’ (Smith, 1998:99)  
Other nationalism scholars are interested in describing what the particular 
social, economic and political conditions were in the different occurrences of 
nations, which is the historical complement of the theoretical account. They might 
also refer to the modernity of nations but emphasise the fast-growing 
industrialisation of European countries, the specialised economy and education, 
territorial reshaping, elite power struggles, or development of earlier ethnic ties and 
memories. 
The argument is in effect this: as the wave of industrialisation and 
modernisation moves outward, it disrupts the previous political units. (…) 
It disrupts them both directly and by undermining the faiths and practices 
which sustained them. This by itself would already lead to the formation 
of new political units. But, more specifically, the wave creates acute 
cleavages of interest between sets of people hit by it at differing times- 
(…) If, however, the differentiating marks are available -whether through 
distance, 'race', or cultural traits such as religion, they provide a strong 
incentive and a means for the backward region or population to start 
conceiving of itself as a separate 'nation' and to seek independence. Its 
intellectuals (i.e. the small minority sharing the advanced standards of 
the other region) will exchange second-class citizenship for a first-class 
citizenship plus great privileges based on rarity: its proletarians will 
exchange hardships-with-snubs for possibly greater hardships with 
national identification. (Gellner, 1964:171-72) 
However, despite the great significance of the double origin of the nations for 
any true comprehension of the subject, I do not pursue an exhaustive elucidation of 
the nuances resulting from the debates in this matter. The objective of my 
argumentation is far more modest and I try to understand, not exactly what 
                                               
26 Kedourie defends this idea in his book Nationalism (1960) 
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happened or what was needed to come up with a nation, but what has kept them 
working, and how this has been justified. This question of cohesion led nationalism 
to conceptualise its basic problems in terms of identity. Therefore, in what follows 
there is a slight bias towards the theoretical debates on nations and nationalism, 
even though I try as far as possible not to overlook the historical dimension. The 
historical conditions for the occurrence of nations help us to understand how the 
idea of national identity was constructed de facto, but they do not necessarily unveil 
the articulation of ideas that made national identity one of the primary sources of 
collective solidarity and, at the same time, a traditional limit for everything outside 
that boundary.   
Whatever the form of nationalism proposed, national identity is always the 
answer to the question of what keeps the members of a community together. 
Therefore, the notion of national identity is what I review next. 
 
3.2 Constructing national identities 
  
The ad hoc construction of national identity is one of the first features that 
jump out in an analysis of the concept. Even before knowing its content, so to 
speak, scholars know how to deal with the idea of national identity because they 
have stipulated its function and defined its ‘nature’. National identity is an elusive 
concept, but ‘…in sociology, anthropology and the humanities, there is a general 
consensus that collective identities, such as nations, are socially constructed…’ 
(Ehala, 2017:6) This certainty that the bond between the members of the modern 
communities is not natural dates to the first theories on the social contract. 
Since modern communities were not natural, they could be culturally or 
politically bonded. How far national identities and nations are constructed is a matter 
of debate. Particularly within the modernist view, there is a realist perspective, 
exemplified by Gellner (1983). He affirms that nations were created instrumentally to 
respond to the conditions of modern capitalism but they are real. The anti-realist 
perspective, defended by Benedict Anderson (1983), also maintains that nations are 
particularly modern, but imagined -not exactly imaginary-, that is, its claims might 
not coincide with a real situation. For instance, a nation is an imagined community 
because even the members of the smallest nation will never know most of their 
fellow members and, nevertheless, they share an image of their communion.  




components; diverse features of national identity are emphasised depending on 
what is believed to provide -or should provide- the social glue of the community. 
Next, I mention some features that determine the extent, manner and nature of the 
national identity construction. I just note those features that will help me to construct 
my argument later, but there are more. 
National identity can be ethnic or civic depending if we understand the 
belonging to the nation in terms of shared ethnicity and culture or in terms of a 
shared set of political practices and values. But we can also understand this 
distinction as two different forms of a democratic organisation: a group bound by 
political governance is a product of the drive towards liberal democracy, and a group 
bound by culture and ethnicity results from the drive towards organic democracy 
(Mann, 1995). In fact, this particular way of thinking about modern democracy 
denotes that the main issue is to define who ‘the people’ are and not only how or 
why ‘the people’ should rule themselves. Nations and states are ways of organising 
people, but ways that are essentially linked to power struggles. The definition in 
each case of who constitutes ‘the people’ of a nation is not a matter outside of 
struggles for political power.  
An equally important way to classify the possible emergence of national 
identities is as voluntary or non-voluntary. The voluntaristic definition of the national 
identity denotes the chosen attachment to a core of principles and values, while the 
involuntary account emphasises attachment to a set of circumstances that cannot 
be chosen like ethnicity, inherited history, nativity, mother tongue and culture. In the 
first case, membership is voluntary because the core of principles is chosen or at 
least accepted, and in the second case, ‘…membership depends on the accident of 
origin and early socialization’. (Miscevic, 2014) In some more radical views, like the 
one asserted by Ignatieff (1993), the civic idea of a nation is close to the ideals of 
the Enlightenment and the attachment is rational. This particular distinction has an 
important impact on social cohesion.  
Considering that one of the markers to understand the unity of the 
community is loyalty, we can ask, what are the members of the society loyal to? And 
then we can find the glue of the community. If we answer that they are loyal to their 
culture, then the social glue is cultural; if they are loyal to a core of principles giving 
them the impression of being the agents of their own identity, then the social glue is 
civic; one is inherited, the other is freely chosen. This distinction leads to two 
different ideas of national identity and nations. The voluntaristic definition of a nation 
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is a group of people aspiring to a common political state-like organisation.  
There is one last perspective that I found useful in understanding the 
differences between civic and ethnic nationalisms, and it refers to their function. 
According to Smith (1991), the external functions of national identity are economic, 
territorial and political. Particularly in the political sphere, national interest presumes 
to reflect the national will. National identity also legitimates the institutions, and it 
does so because it defines the values and character, mores and customs of the 
nation. The internal functions of national identity include the socialisation of the 
members. It also bonds members and classes by providing shared values, symbols 
and traditions. Finally, it also provides individuals with a powerful way to locate 
themselves in the world. ‘This process of self-definition and location is in many ways 
the key to national identity, but it is also the element that has attracted most doubt 
and scepticism.’ (Smith, 1991:17) The external functions of national identity seem 
more important and closely related to the civic perspective and the internal functions 
seem closer to the ethnic descriptions of the nations. 
As a matter of fact, the more we move forward in the distinctions, the more 
diametrical they seem. Not because as we move forward we find bigger differences 
in factually-existing nations, but because the characterisation by opposition 
sharpens analytical features. For instance, the distinction between civic and ethnic 
nationalism is used to draw a line between west and east, between the rational and 
the emotional and, ultimately between inclusive and exclusive forms of nationalism. 
The distinction denotes a not so hidden hierarchical aim. In general terms, in a 
similar way, Edward Said describes the way ‘…European culture gained in strength 
and identity by setting itself off against the Orient…’ (1978:3), civic nationalism gains 
theoretical and moral strength by defining itself in contrast to ethnic nationalism. 
There is indeed a tendency to consider ethnic nationalism as less evolved than civic 
nationalism, which could be the result of legitimate issues, but it could also be a 
consequence of moral prejudice.  
The civic/ethnic dichotomy parallels a series of other contrasts that 
should set off alarm bells: not only Western/ Eastern, but 
rational/emotive, voluntary/inherited, good/bad, ours/theirs! Designed to 
protect us from the dangers of ethnocentric politics, the civic/ethnic 
distinction itself reflects a considerable dose of ethnocentrism ...’ (Yack, 
1996:195-96) 
It is fair to acknowledge that theories of diversity and plurality, particularly 
multiculturalism, try to mediate between the two analytical sides of nationalism and, 




possible to stress the modernity of nations whilst also acknowledging their roots. 
After all, ethnic identities are also socially constructed, since ethnic identities are not 
genetic. Therefore, the key issue is to understand the continuity of ethnic identity 
without assuming that because something has roots, it is immutable and rigid. 
Ethnic identities do not necessarily exclude outsiders, and civic ones are not 
immediately open and inclusive. It is true that political community implies at least 
some common institutions but abstract and impersonal entities struggle to justify 
national identity. Multiculturalism is indeed a form of nationalism that places itself 
somewhere in the middle, between the political and the ethnic. I will develop this 
idea in Chapter 4 but now is a good moment to locate multiculturalism in the wider 
discussion on nationalism and emphasise its merit. 
The distinctions of nationalism that I have briefly described here seem to 
denote the same relationship between individuals and the group but in opposite 
directions. There is indeed a problem trying to figure out if the group is defined by 
the members or the other way around, they lead to two different ways of 
understanding national identity. People belonging to a particular group could mean 
that they cannot be understood apart from this group, that is, they have been 
shaped by it. In contrast, we can think that a more voluntaristic way of belonging 
assumes the group is shaped to reflect its members. Do the members of a group 
provide its character? Or does the character of a group shape the individual? 
Without a doubt, the relationship between individual and collective identity has to be 
explored further, but within this dilemma, civic nationalism tends to emphasise the 
individual agency, while the ethnic stresses the way the group shapes members. 
From the different distinctions I mentioned above, we can identify the 
features that are associated with modern nations, features that have shaped the 
liberal idea of national identity and set the limits of diversity and plurality. In western 
democracies, national identity is civic, constructed, political, liberal democratic, 
voluntaristic, and oriented toward external functions -economic, territorial and 
political- through institutions. Additionally, it emphasises individual agency over 
collective determination. What I do next is to analyse how this complex notion of 






3.3 Democracy and recognition 
 
The problems of providing recognition as a form of justice have been treated 
widely in contemporary political philosophy. If we accept Nancy Fraser’s diagnosis, 
the struggle for recognition became the paradigmatic form of political conflict in the 
late twentieth century, standing over the issues of social equality and redistribution 
(1997). Even though it has only recently become the main driver of political theory, 
recognition has always been an important part of the debates on justice in western 
democracies. The liberal capitalist social order has been intrinsically founded in 
differentiated principles of recognition (Honneth, 2004). Problems of recognition are 
not new by any means but recently, groups defending themselves from cultural 
domination and claiming recognition took the spotlight in political theory. In fact, we 
can see that recognition comes along with the construction of national identity. The 
problem of recognition is so important to modern nation-states that it basically 
dictates who is and is not part of the community.  
Amongst the characteristics of civic nationalism, two that particularly shape 
recognition: liberal democracy and shared political practices and values. In civic 
nations, recognition is liberal and political. The pros and cons of a civic form of 
national identity are present in the liberal and political recognition it proposes, 
including difficulties explaining members’ ethnic or religious ties and their allegiance 
to values, myth and symbols. I am aware that recognition is an exceedingly complex 
and multidimensional concept, for that reason, I will advocate fostering deeper forms 
of recognition. For now, the political recognition that I describe is exactly where 
theories on nationalism and the liberal tradition intersect. For my argument, I want to 
pursue how the historical development of liberal democracy and civic nationalism 
determined, through paths that continuously overlap, the conditions and limits for the 
projects on diversity and plurality. I focus on liberal democracy in this section and in 
the next, I will analyse the core of shared political values and practices. 
Democratic nation-states were built on the idea that the people should rule 
themselves, which is an intellectual development expressed in the philosophical 
background of liberalism and the Enlightenment. But this general principle of 
democracy does not directly convey who the people are in each case, and how 
specifically they should rule themselves, which are two fundamental concerns 
already present in debates on nationalism. In consequence, notions such as 




the people are and how they should rule themselves. Correspondingly, national 
identity and citizenship are concepts that, from complementary perspectives, 
express the efforts to know who must be recognised as a member of the community. 
In civic nationalism, the emphasis is on the ideological ties amongst the members 
forming the core of national identity; likewise, there is an accent on citizenship as 
the way to secure recognition of members by the nation. In this regard, this 
particular notion of belonging and recognition through political citizenship and 
national identity is related to a historical movement towards democracy and the way 
the liberal tradition embraced it.  
Nations and states are ways of organising people; consequently, political 
identities and recognition exist in the context of power relations derived from 
particular organisational forms. This is in no way new or unexpected, the 
development of modern states has been historically associated with power 
struggles, and indeed we can perceive power in almost all of its main features: 1) A 
differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying it, 2) centrality in the 
sense that political relations radiate outward from a centre to periphery, 3) a 
territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises dominion, and 4) a monopoly of 
authoritative binding rule-making, the monopoly of the means of physical violence 
(Mann, 1984:188; Weber, 1978:54-56).  
However, as Michael Mann points out, in this context power is not just about 
controlling the state and radiating influences through its institutions, as some other 
scholars have rightly stressed (Breuilly, 1993); power is already present in the way 
the state organises itself, even before any particular group or elite might gain the 
means to rule. In other words, we can identify power components inherent in 
democratic forms of organisation. Furthermore, states are forms of exercising 
power, which becomes clear when we denote features such as sovereignty and 
territoriality. Organising and defining who is and is not part of the community is a 
form of exercising power with important consequences. For every democratic state, 
the definition of who the people are and the recognition that goes with it are ways of 
exercising power. 
Even if, in general terms, all forms of modern democracy move from elite 
coercion to embedded institutions, following the democratic principle did not lead to 
solving the problems of identity and recognition. In other words, democracy is not 
enough to define who belongs to the group, it helps to establish the way they will 
deal with each other, but it comes after defining the limits of community. According 
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to Mann (2005), there are two forms of democracy that follow the precept that 
people should rule themselves providing the base for two differentiated forms of 
nation-states: ethnic democracy and civil democracy, or organic and liberal as they 
are also known.  
In ethnic democracies, an ethnic majority can rule without going against the 
democratic principle. Democracy is, therefore, not an exclusive feature of civic 
groups. On the other hand, civic democracies are not necessarily more inclusive. 
They have their own definition of who does and who does not belong to the group, 
therefore, there is no guarantee its inclusiveness will be larger. For instance, 
Stephen Castles affirms that ‘Racism plays a crucial role in consolidating nation-
states (…) Racism does not contradict democracy -rather, it helps to consolidate the 
boundaries of democratic polities by defining who does not belong and can, 
therefore, be excluded from universalistic principles.’ (2000:14) Therefore, 
democracy is not enough to address the claims of recognition that might have 
individuals and groups.  
At this point, it is convenient to stop for a moment and recapitulate. After a 
dry succession of distinctions, we might lose sight of what is important. Why is 
distinguishing between forms of democracy important to issues of identity and 
recognition? It is salient because this shows that democracy and recognition are not 
univocally connected. Democracy comes after recognition is already provided.27 
Even more important, the two forms of democracy prescribe different roles for the 
state that conditions the possible means of recognition. The two forms of democracy 
assume different forms of group unity. Ethnic nationalism encouraged the aim of 
founding a democratic political community on ethnic homogeneity and, in 
consequence, to build an organic state with the goal of representing a people that 
conceives of itself as unique, integral and indivisible. For this reason, Mann also 
calls it organic democracy.  
Under this lens, conflict and sectional interests are transcended by forms of 
national unity because, to put it in proper philosophical terms, the parts are not 
greater than the whole. In other words, in order to guarantee the democratic nature 
of the community, any member of the state must be primarily conceived as part of 
an organic people. In this case, unity is the unity of a whole, members are part of 
                                               
27 We can imagine a situation in which a group vote to grant recognition of someone as a 
member of the group, exactly in the way that happens in private clubs. In this case 
democracy is previous to recognition. However, in order to vote there is already a form of 




something which transcends them. For this reason, members would trace their 
identity to some discrete community that maintains its character through ethnic 
consciousness. In contrast, liberal-civic democracies institutionalise conflict and 
clashing forces. In this case, ‘…the state’s main role is to mediate and conciliate 
among competing interest groups. [And even more important] This will tend to 
compromise differences, not try to eliminate or cleanse them.’ (Mann, 2005:55) For 
this reason, we have traditionally assumed that it is in civic democracy, and not in 
ethnic democracy, where we could find the ground to plant our efforts in diversity 
and plurality.  
In instances of democracy where the ethnic features were stressed, there 
was not much room for positive recognition of plurality and diversity, which in some 
cases led to underline inequality, racism, discrimination, bigotry, and it might 
translate in efforts of cleansing whole communities. ‘…if the people is to rule in its 
own nation-state, and if the people is defined in ethnic terms, then its ethnic unity 
may outweigh the kind of citizen diversity that is central to democracy.’ (Mann, 
2005:3) Additionally, nations founded on myths of a supposed ethnic particularity 
tend to exacerbate antagonisms in contrast to other communities. ‘The closer the 
association between unique people and historic homeland, the more exclusive 
becomes the nationalism of embattled communities,…’ (Smith, 1992:450) But at the 
same time, with an emphasis on the antagonism also comes the prominence of 
autonomy: ‘…unlike classes, ethnic communities are not so interdependent. They 
can live in their own cleansed communities with their own organic state.’ (Mann, 
2005:69) Therefore, as we can see, it is generally believed that ethnic nationalism 
tends toward the exclusion of others. Conversely, the civic form is considered an 
alternative, a solution to this issue. Moreover, the social cohesion of the ethnic 
community seems to involve less internal work to achieve and sustain it; and as long 
as the group is considered as an organic unity, it is intrinsically more stable.  
On the opposite side of ethnic democracies, nation-states moved towards 
civic and democratic forms of organisation, emphasising their liberal values over 
their ethnic ties and progressively filtering the problems of recognition through liberal 
principles. The processes towards more civic forms of social cohesion opened the 
door to the positive recognition of diversity and plurality within the same nation, that 
is, they pushed the idea of a non-organic unit in which individuals precede the 
collective and the unity is clearly constructed. This is why the idea of a civic nation 
                                                                                                                                     
definition of who belong and who do not belong to the group. 
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became useful to mitigate the dangers of ethnic nationalism, including essentialising 
the community. In other words, this move to civic forms of nationalism involved 
processes of liberalisation, ‘…resulting in greater freedom within groups, and greater 
equality between groups.’ (Kymlicka, 2015:224) The idea that the process of 
liberalisation is the key to better forms of recognition and positive perception of 
diversity is still powerful (Kymlicka, 2001b). 
So far, I argued democracy by itself does not address issues of recognition, 
but liberal democracy seems to open the door to a non-organic form of unity. 
Therefore, liberal principles seem to be the key elements allowing a diversity of 
interests at the expense of institutionalising conflict. As a means of securing justice, 
recognition of members was increasingly shaped by the principles of liberal 
democracy. Next, I investigate the features of this process of recognition and 
liberalisation; in particular, I emphasise a dialectical tension between political 
recognition and allegiance.  
 
3.4 Liberal allegiance and recognition: the dialectics of national identity 
and citizenship  
 
In general terms, recognition is understood as a matter of equality in liberal 
democracies. The fundamental assumption is that recognising individuals or groups 
as members of a larger community translates immediately into recognising them as 
equals. This is clear when we refer to individuals; as soon as they are recognised as 
citizens, they are equal in the eyes of the law. There is no formal hierarchy in terms 
of recognition, it is given as a whole. And even if there is historical evidence of non-
incidental arbitrariness and utilitarian criteria for recognising individuals in liberal 
communities -such as the case of Italians, Irish and Jewish people considered for a 
while as non-white in accordance with immigration policies in the US (Delgado, 
2001:2285; Delgado & Stefancic, 2012:77)-, at least in formal terms, once they are 
recognised as members, they are immediately and without further process 
considered as equal. Although, at the same time, recognition does not come 
unconditionally. It implies some sort of basic commitment, a commitment that every 
nation and state demand from their members: allegiance to the political values and 
practices of the community.  
In contrast to ethnic accounts in which the unity of the community is secured 




be balanced by the allegiance of the members, otherwise, the community’s unity 
would be jeopardised. In a notion that clearly resembles theories of the social 
contract, membership of the community implies responsibilities and loyalties. A 
commitment to the nation is expected in return for the protection, rights and 
recognition that it provides, a commitment that is both political and ethical.  
In traditional forms of liberalism, allegiance is essentially pragmatic and 
voluntary, as the core of the social contract might suggest: they assume that a 
possible violation of the tacit ‘clauses’ of the social contract will make it null and 
void, leading each individual to regain their natural liberty and original rights 
(Rousseau, 1950:I.6). But in the more sophisticated forms of liberalism, there is a 
more moderated-voluntaristic approach that emphasises deeper roots beyond a 
direct interchange of rights and responsibilities between the state and its members, 
including ethical relations. ‘…nations are ethical communities. In acknowledging a 
national identity, I am also acknowledging that I owe special obligations to fellow 
members of my nation which I do not owe to other human beings.’ (Miller, 1995:50) 
However, the balance between providing recognition as an equal and demanding 
commitment to the political and ethical community is biased. It requires emphasising 
similarities instead of acknowledging differences. 
Let me stop listing particular aspects of the political and ethical commitment 
to the community for a moment. We have to bear in mind this commitment’s aim is 
to produce the social glue for the community. We know this is the same aim of 
national identity. Additionally, we have characterised civic national identity as 
constructed, political, voluntaristic, liberal democratic, and concerned with individual 
agency. Therefore, it is clear that political and ethical commitment is also 
constructed -non-natural-, liberal democratic, and voluntaristic. We emphasise the 
political and ethical over the other features because they justify the 
institutionalisation of conflict, making space, first for tolerance and then for diversity 
and plurality. But how do liberal democracies achieve this? ‘The institutionalization 
of interest group struggle, and especially of class struggle, has ensured toleration 
and the restraint of cleansing by generating a stratified, not an organic, people.’ 
(Mann, 2005:55) With the stratification comes along plurality. In civic nations, 
contending interests are institutionalised in political parties and the state’s main role 
is to mediate and conciliate among these competing interests.  
At the beginning of liberal democracies and their political systems, the 
competing interests were those of different classes, but eventually, other forms of 
68 
 
identity such as gender and race have demanded recognition as contending 
interests within the people. These struggles of identity recognition have shaped the 
current political situation, which is the leitmotif of this text. However, what is 
important to highlight now is the fact that these claims of recognition have been 
conceptualised and directed by the established means, that is, claiming recognition 
is believed to be the same as demanding full political rights. In consequence, the 
struggle, means and output of identity recognition are constrained within the small 
circle of politics. Anyhow, attracting conflict to the political sphere prevents one or 
more groups from eradicating others, allowing them to co-exist, but on the other 
hand, reduces the recognition to a political phenomenon. The conflict between 
different parties cannot be transcended or abolished, allowing diverse interests and 
opinions to remain and, in that sense, to be recognised and discussed. Accordingly, 
all the components of the identity-recognition mechanism are placed in the political 
perspective, as well as the commitment demanded of the individuals to secure the 
social cohesion of the community. This is the beginning of political emphasis as the 
way to secure diversity.     
The civic conformation of the state allows anyone to achieve citizenship, 
whatever their ethnicity, religion or race, as long as they are willing to embrace the 
political principles of the larger group and to engage with the ethical community. 
However, liberal democracies subordinate recognition to integration into the 
mainstream culture; they do not represent a wider idea of diverse people interacting 
in contexts of heterogeneous relations, but individuals or groups with particular 
interests relating in a unique context, the liberal context and dealing in a unique way, 
the political way. This is the fundamental problem for liberal states in terms of 
diversity. On the one hand, the room for possible conflict of interest allows diversity 
within the larger community but, on the other hand, it necessitates further 
amendments to uphold the state’s social cohesion. National identity gets caught in 
the middle of this dialectical process of allowing conflict and ensuring cohesion. It is 
always a controlled conflict and, as a result, a controlled diversity and recognition. 
Just to say it clearly, cohesion is more important than recognition, cohesion has 
precedence over factual identities. In fact, it is in order to foster social cohesion that 
national identity is institutionally pushed; national identity, and so allegiance, 
demanded for social unity. Therefore, in civic democracies national identity is 
political.  




cohesion are condensed in the idea of national identity. 
For liberals like Mill, democracy is government ‘by the people’, but 
self‐rule is only possible if ‘the people’ are ‘a people’—a nation. The 
members of a democracy must share a sense of political allegiance, and 
common nationality was said to be a precondition of that allegiance. 
(Kymlicka, 1995:52) 
But also for contemporary nationalists, national identity is something to 
pursue.  
…for contemporary liberal nationalists, national identity offers social glue, 
one which is potentially inclusive and capable of binding people 
otherwise divided by economic and ethnic differences into a sharing 
community. (…) national identity contributes to a sense of belonging and 
solidarity that transcends economic interest and cultural 
difference.(Johnston et al., 2010:350) 
Despite liberal democracies pushing a shared political identity, this is not our 
only possible allegiance and membership, it is not even clear that these other sides 
of our identity can be translated into political terms. That is to say, identity and 
recognition tend to overflow political limits. In general, the main issue can be 
expressed, as Ami Gutmann does it (1994), asking if citizens with different identities 
can be represented as equals without recognising their particular identities or, on the 
contrary, if recognising any difference stands against the aim of social unity and 
equality pursued in liberal democracies.  
So far I have focused on the dialectic tension between recognition and 
political allegiance expressed in the notions of national identity and political values. 
However, I try to go a little bit deeper and unveil how is it possible to balance this 
tension? How can liberal democracies not just institutionalise conflict, but effectively 
mediate it? The short answer is exactly by being liberal. In a more elaborated 
explanation, western democracies can mediate conflict by postulating a set of 
institutions that are by definition neutral, and by universalising a core of values and 
practices. Although, along with this process of institutionalisation there are also 
processes of individualisation and abstraction.28 Actually, ‘…liberalism has also 
                                               
28 ‘The modern state also represents a historically unique mode of defining and relating its 
members. Unlike premodem polities which were embedded in and composed of such 
communities as castes, clans, tribes and ethnic groups, it has increasingly come to be 
defined as an association of individuals. It abstracts away their class, ethnicity, religion, 
social status. and so forth, and unites them in terms of their subscription to a common 
system of authority, which is similarly abstracted from the wider structure of social relations. 
To be a citizen is to transcend one’s ethnic, religious and other particularities, and to think 
and act as a member of the political community. Because their socially generated differences 
are abstracted away, citizens are homogenized and related to the state in an identical 
manner, enjoying equal status and possessing identical rights and obligations.’ (Parekh, 
2000:181-82) Emphasis mine. 
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taken to heart one of the cardinal experiences of modernity. It is the increasing 
awareness that reasonable people tend naturally to differ and disagree about the 
nature of the good life.’ (Larmore, 1996:122)  
An important part of the problem involves trying to understand the way 
democratic institutions can do both, on the one hand, to recognise individuals and 
groups and, on the other, to remain neutral in the public sphere. In Chapter 2 I 
introduced  CRT’s critique of neutrality, and in Chapters 4 and 7 I develop further the 
liberal principles -liberty, equality, justice, etc.-.  However, I provide just a glimpse of 
the notion of liberal principles and values in order to help us follow the argument. ‘A 
natural notion to describe the essential character of liberalism is that of neutrality. 
The principles of a liberal political order aim to be "neutral" with respect to 
controversial ideas of the good.’ (Larmore, 1996:125) In this way, the institutions 
and laws have a single political will. If we try a functional definition, the liberal values 
are those allowing us to keep the political system working and institutionalising 
conflict; the liberal values are those setting the minimal moral conception of the 
common good. In a more direct definition: 
Liberalism has been the hope that, despite this tendency toward 
disagreement about matters of ultimate significance, we can find some 
way of living together that avoids the rule of force. It has been the 
conviction that we can agree on a core morality while continuing to 
disagree about what makes life worth living.(Larmore, 1996:151)    
One more word about the dialectic of recognition-allegiance. The 
commitment demanded from any member of the community is extended to 
newcomers. Particularly in the case of immigrants, the demand for commitment is 
unveiled directly, while for the native-born citizens the conditions of allegiance might 
remain tacitly accepted. ‘…newcomers must make a visible and tangible expression 
of their willingness to join the nation, and show that they now accept the 
responsibilities that arise from membership in the nation as an ethical community.’ 
(Johnston et al., 2010:355) Liberal scholars deeply endorse the idea that immigrants 
should not be given rights and recognition without expressing their commitment to 
the ethical community they are becoming part of. It is fair to say that, even if some 
critics have denounced this as an example of colonial assimilation (Cheong, 
Edwards, Goulbourne, & Solomos, 2007; Faist, 2009; Goodin, 2006), it could be a 
legitimate attempt to secure social unity.  
Liberals usually point out that the commitment to the ethical community is 
demanded from all members, not immigrants alone. Although, it has different 




constantly and willing to be tested at any time; while most of the native-born citizens 
are released from this ceaseless public demonstration. In any case, some scholars 
have pointed out that ‘…we have seen the emergence of a social and community 
cohesion agenda and with it a renewed emphasis on strengthening a collective 
national identity, developing civic ties and prioritising immigrant assimilation.’ 
(Hardy, 2017:2-3) The social and historical context for liberal recognition resulted in 
assumptions like the assimilationist belief and the acceptance of a social contract at 
the base of nation-states. They were the price to pay for recognition and the unity of 




I have described the two types of nationalism shaping the debate: civic and 
ethnic. Their different conceptions of who the people are and how social cohesion 
should be secured lead to two different forms of constructing communities. 
However, the differences they usually construct by contrast are mainly analytical 
and in reality, they frequently overlap. Additionally, I explained that the main function 
of national identity is to provide the social glue of the community. I paid particular 
attention to civic nationalism because it is the one allowing a pluralistic community; I 
characterised it as constructed, political, liberal democratic, voluntaristic and 
individualistic. Then democracy is unveiled as necessary but not enough to enable 
plural recognition; ethnic communities can also be democratic. Therefore, for civic 
nationalists, liberal principles are the key to organise communities beyond the limits 
of organic unity. They help to construct a plural community by institutionalising 
conflict and securing social cohesion through a political core of values and practices. 
As a consequence, there is a dialectic of diversity in which members of the 
communities should develop an attachment to the political liberal values in return for 
recognition. The political commitment providing a feeling of belonging is the heart of 
the idea of national identity. At the same time, citizenship guarantees the political 
expression of recognition.  
Now we are able to affirm that, in civic nationalism the political recognition of 
a group is expressed by institutions, through legal means and encapsulated in 
political rights and policies. It is a form of recognition without the other. Naturally, the 
brief analysis I developed in this chapter left several issues unresolved. Do the 
liberal principles trigger feelings of belonging in us? If it is the case, why? Are 
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political identity and recognition the correct concepts to deal with diversity? In the 
end, we can conclude that the situation is paradoxical: civic nationalisms, liberal 
democracies, allow diversity and plurality, but it is a controlled plurality, a plurality 
that only works under one paradigm. The paradigm has merits for sure.   
The institutionalization of class conflict has been the main political 
accomplishment of the modern West, generating liberal and then social 
democratic states. Class, age, and gender remain as contending 
interests within the people, recognized as having legitimate conflicts that 
are institutionalized in multiparty systems. (Mann, 2005:57) 
However, at the same time, ‘…both nationalism and statism were restrained 
by liberalism,’ (Mann, 2005:56) More importantly, this situation has not changed a 
lot. Even if we hear about processes of liberalisation and efforts to foster diversity 
and plurality, we still placing the terms and debate exclusively in the political sphere. 
We are witnessing the constant demands for recognition of different groups, but we 
come back over and over again to the same political categories and framework. Let 
me finish this chapter the same way I started it. Francis Fukuyama, in his 
conference for The Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, said:   
I think that dignity actually lies as a basis of liberal democracies. We give 
our citizens dignity by giving them rights. (…) In the 1960s you had the 
beginning of a whole series of very important social movements 
beginning with the civil rights movement for African Americans; the 
feminist movement; the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, 
queer/questioning (LGBTQ) rights movement; movement for the 
disabled; and Native Americans. All of these groups had in common the 
fact that they were not recognized, that they were invisible to the rest of 
mainstream American society. They did not get respect, and they wanted 
it. It was a necessary act of social justice to demand recognition as equal 
and full citizens.29 (Fukuyama, 2018b).  
I cannot help feeling that behind many legitimate claims for dignity and 
recognition there is more, much more, than a claim for rights; I cannot help feeling 
that dignity frequently goes beyond institutional recognition and political 
participation, it lies in what we are, what we want to be and what we can be. Many 
requests for recognition imply a deeper understanding of identity, which in turn 
demands stronger forms of recognition. These requests are based on a call for 
recognition from the other, and not only from an abstract set of institutions. In the 
next chapters, I analyse the efforts to provide recognition from this political aspect 
and its limitations to provide stronger forms of recognition. 
                                               








Multiculturalism and the problems of modern identity 
 
  
In Episode Twelve of Joyce’s Ulysses (2010 [1922]), known as Cyclops, the 
modern hero, Leopold Bloom, faces allegations of being an outsider. His Jewish-
Hungarian roots did not seem to fit with the true Irish nature, which was essentially 
Catholic. After Bloom had mentioned that a nation is the same people living in the 
same place, a character named as ‘the citizen’ questioned him about his nationality. 
Bloom responded: Ireland -I was born here. Ireland- He also added that he was 
Jewish -I belong to a race too, says Bloom, that is hated and persecuted. Also now. 
This very moment.- The whole scene happens immediately after the citizen 
complained about Ireland’s troubles, which led him to articulate anti-Semitic 
opinions. Finally, Bloom leaves the place after saying that, in contrast to the citizen’s 
approach involving force, hatred and insults as a way of standing up against 
injustice, he prefers love and life. Of course, my very brief account cannot emulate 
the greatness of Joyce’s story. Nevertheless, it allows me to call attention to one 
thing that I find particularly interesting: before being confronted directly, Bloom’s 
reaction had been to ignore the anti-Semitic comments. However, once he is 
challenged, Leopold reaffirms his identity without hesitation, voicing the persecution 
and oppression also suffered by his people.  
This beautiful piece of literature expresses, more clearly and accurately than 
this chapter could ever dream, the situation that has led millions of people to feel 
they are outsiders in their own home. Even when Leopold Bloom was as Irish as 
anyone else in the room, we found him being considered an outsider. A standard 
analysis of the Episode Twelve would say that it is known as Cyclops in reference to 
the Book Nine of Homer’s Odyssey (2007), in which a Cyclops trapped Odysseus 
and his men in a cave. The one-eyed monster is represented by the narrow view of 
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the citizen, which stand for a xenophobic form of Irish nationalism. Let me 
complement this interpretation by developing further the parallels with Homer’s 
story.   
In Joyce’s book, Bloom is able to show his superior intellect quite easily, 
disregarding the citizen’s views without much effort and leaving when there was 
nothing else to say and the atmosphere was potentially leading to violence. In a 
similar manner, Odysseus defeated Polyphemus the Cyclops not by brute force but 
intellectually. This is very important because it denotes the long tradition that has 
linked bigotry, xenophobia and oppression to ignorance. Correspondingly, it fosters 
the idea that the best way to fight back is by intellectual means. In Homer’s work, 
when the monster asked Odysseus who they are and he expressed their identity as 
Greeks, he and his men suffered the consequences of their otherness, of being in a 
land where their gods have no influence. Very soon he realised there was no 
chance of either a direct fight or of a straightforward escape. There was no other 
way than the slow-pace intellectual tactics.  
Now I ask the reader to be kind with my pretentious interpretation. As she 
surely knows, Odysseus escaped by doing two things. First, he claimed to be 
nobody to protect himself from unwanted attention,30 which is a direct way of 
denying his identity. If identity is the answer to the question who am I? Then the only 
answer that leaves it undetermined is nobody. Second, they left the cave hiding 
underneath the goats, fooling this way Polyphemus by pretending to be part of the 
only thing he can perceive and permit. They were invisible in the middle of the 
routine by integrating smoothly into the already existing state of affairs.  
In the modern world, minorities have been forced to assimilation into the 
mainstream culture, they have been forced to hide underneath the goats and slip 
past, they have been pushed to answer they are nobody when expressing who they 
really are put them in risk. However, the same way Bloom did when he was 
confronted directly, in recent years minorities have made their voices heard, 
affirming their identity once again. Multiculturalism is a way to conceptualise the 
issues that minorities face in western, democratic societies; it is a way to protect 
their identity and claim recognition. For better or worse, just like Bloom and 
Odysseus, multiculturalism follows the tradition that keeps thinking that we should 
fight cyclops and xenophobes with cleverness and progressive enlightenment, which 
are not always as effective as our heroes made us believe. Despite the efforts, it 
                                               




seems that minorities still feel like outsiders in their own home.  
In this chapter, I portray the multicultural efforts to expand the modern liberal 
framework and the proposals of the different projects, particularly the common 
output that they reach in the idea of multicultural nationalism. The chapter is divided 
into 8 sections before its Conclusion. In the first section, I provide a brief definition of 
multiculturalism that will allow us to go deeper into the specific characteristics of the 
different multicultural proposals. I argue that there are three levels of analysis: 
philosophical, theoretical-political and the level of public policies. I then show how 
liberalism, modernity, Enlightenment and even contractarianism form the 
philosophical and historical context of multiculturalism. However, I also mention that 
it belongs to a new form of liberalism that pushes the boundaries of the old one 
further and further. The next three sections correspond to the description of the 
three principal forms of multicultural theory: liberal, communitarian and what I call 
the second wind of multiculturalism. I portray each by emphasising distinctive 
features. However, I pay particular attention to the way one by one expands the 
classic interpretation of liberalism: liberal multiculturalism, represented by Will 
Kymlicka, introduces the notion of group-differentiated rights, which tears down the 
idea of a uniformity in the application of policies and norms; communitarian 
multiculturalists, such as Charles Taylor, argue that there is no need of state 
neutrality, a community can be at the same time liberal and foster a particular idea 
of good life; finally, Bhikhu Parekh, as representative of the second wind of 
multiculturalism, emphasises that practices and not principles of reason are the 
source of morality and plurality, therefore, liberalism is just one amongst different 
options for organising plural life.  
Section 6 describes the assumptions and consequences of social unity and 
national identity. These notions explain why members of a community come and 
remain together, then I argue that the way multicultural theory solve this issue is the 
same as civic nation-states, that is, through a form of national identity that provides 
space for political plurality. Sections 7 and 8 delineate how multiculturalism is a form 
of nationalism and its main elements: realist, voluntaristic and cultural.  
After this chapter, I will be able to affirm that multiculturalism, the same way 
than civic nationalism, focus on political identity and its efforts to expand the liberal 
framework reach their limit there. In the next chapter I complement this idea by 
showing how an overemphasis on the political might hinder other forms of 
recognition expected by minorities. Political identity in modern states is not enough 
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to provide a strong form of recognition and a direct valuing of minorities. It helps the 
practical integration of minority groups into the mainstream society but it does not 
necessarily lead to a deep and genuine recognition of the value of minorities. In 
other words, the political recognition of an oppressed group does not always reach 
the strong recognition that is expected from a multicultural society. 
 
4.1 A brief definition of multiculturalism 
 
There are different ways to understand multiculturalism. In this section, I 
specify what I understand by multiculturalism and describe its main features. Firstly, 
I want to mention that multiculturalism is a liberal project. In the next section I argue 
in more detail which aspects of multicultural theory I consider liberal. I beg the 
reader to accept this for the sake of the argument until I clarify it properly. 
As far as I only review liberal forms of multiculturalism, it is necessary to 
distinguish those from other empirical instances. There are other forms of de facto 
multiculturalism that do not necessarily develop robust theories, limiting themselves 
to the peaceful coexistence of different human groups. These empirical forms of 
multiculturalism are not the subject of this text and they are not considered here 
under the term multiculturalism because they do not translate their peaceful 
coexistence into democratic rights and individual freedoms. In fact, we can take this 
chance to highlight another very important feature of liberal multiculturalism, namely, 
it assumes that achievements in bringing down hierarchical relations and improving 
equality, democracy and individual freedom are expressed in terms of rights, 
policies and liberties. 
LMC is a distinctly liberal democratic form of multiculturalism, grounded 
in core liberal values of freedom, equality and democracy, and to be 
evaluated for its effects on these values. It therefore differs from non-
liberal or illiberal forms of multiculturalism, of which there are many 
historic examples, in which groups agree to terms of peaceful 
coexistence while remaining indifferent to the freedoms or democratic 
rights of individuals. (Kymlicka, 2015:213)31  
Another way to describe this difference is by referring to strong and weak 
multiculturalism.32 Strong multiculturalism denotes a commitment to the defence of 
                                               
31 The reader will notice that I mostly draw on Kymlicka’s definition of multiculturalism. This 
is because it directly presents itself as liberal, therefore, it is easier to perceive the features I 
want to emphasise. Additionally, it is simpler to sign post the discrepancies with other 
multicultural approaches taking liberal multiculturalism as a reference. 




civil rights for minorities based on their cultures; weak multiculturalism does not seek 
citizenship rights, only recognition of cultural diversity in the private sphere. (O'Neill, 
1999:222) Therefore, the public and the private spheres serve as a boundary 
between strong and weak multiculturalism. In most instances, especially in political 
philosophy, when we refer to multiculturalism, we refer to strong and liberal 
multiculturalism, even though strong and weak multiculturalism do not necessarily 
exclude each other and can be complementary.  
The solution proposed by strong multiculturalism is moving forward in 
guaranteeing citizenship within the framework of liberal democracies. Citizenship is 
basically understood as a concept composed by at least three dimensions: 1) 
citizenship as a legal status –rights and obligations-, 2) citizens as political agents, 
and 3) citizenship as membership of a political community –identity- (Leydet, 2014). 
Strong multiculturalism considers that a citizen should be more than simply a 
member of a political community, entitled to certain rights, and indebted to fulfil 
some duties. Its concept of citizenship is not completely descriptive, but also 
prescriptive. It moves back and forward between what is considered de facto a 
citizen in western democracies and what should be the case considering social 
phenomena as immigration, indigenous settlements and national independence 
movements. 
A significant contribution of multiculturalism to liberal theory is the idea of 
group-differentiated rights and policies within the general democratic framework of 
western nation-states. Kymlicka affirms that 
…it is legitimate, and indeed unavoidable, to supplement traditional 
human rights with minority rights. A comprehensive theory of justice in a 
multicultural state will include both universal rights, assigned to 
individuals regardless of group membership, and certain group-
differentiated rights or ‘special status’ for minority cultures. (1995:6) 
Subsequently, multiculturalists define what groups are legitimate candidates 
for differentiated rights, always keeping in mind the main criteria of equality and 
abolishment of hierarchical relations. In general terms, they are labelled minorities; 
more specifically Kymlicka defines the three minority groups taken as the standard 
objects of multiculturalism: indigenous peoples, national minorities and immigrant 
groups (1995:11-14). In the case of Taylor, multiculturalism refers to minorities in a 
more general way but he usually uses the same examples of national minorities, 
migrant groups and indigenous peoples. Parekh prefers the term cultural 
communities, which usually includes religious groups, however, they usually are 
                                                                                                                                     
multiculturalism instead of strong and weak, but in essence they are equivalent. 
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migrant groups. Broadly speaking, according to the multicultural liberal theory, these 
three groups look for different pathways to recognition and accommodation within 
the framework of western democracies: indigenous peoples look for land and self-
government rights; national minorities look for regional autonomy, including official 
language recognition, and immigrant groups look for accommodation rights.  
In relation to minority groups and their claims, Kymlicka has developed an 
index to measure how far western democratic states have implemented 
differentiated minority rights through multicultural policies.33 For my present 
purposes, it is enough to mention its indicators to evaluate the multicultural policies, 
since I just want to convey a general idea of what multiculturalism thinks should be 
group-differentiated rights for minorities. 
For indigenous minorities, there are at least nine indicators: recognition of 
land rights, recognition of self-government, upholding or signing of treaties, 
recognition of cultural rights (language, hunting/fishing, religion), recognition of 
customary laws, guarantees of representation in the central government, 
constitutional affirmation of their status of indigenous peoples, support of 
international instruments of indigenous rights, and affirmative action. For national 
minorities, there are six indicators: federal or quasi-federal territorial autonomy, 
official language status, a guarantee of representation in the central government, 
public funding of minority language, constitutional affirmation of multinationalism, 
and autonomous international personality in the international bodies. Finally, for 
immigrants, there are eight indicators: constitutional affirmation of multiculturalism 
and a government ministry to implement policies, the adoption of multiculturalism in 
school curriculum, ethnic representation in public media, exemptions for dress code, 
dual citizenship, funding for ethnic organisations, funding for bilingual education, and 
affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups.  
Through these indicators, it is possible to distinguish some classic concepts 
of political philosophy like recognition, the Other, the right of autonomy, self-
determination, cultural and national identity, as well as social and political 
representation, accommodation, ethnicity and citizenship. Other concepts better fit 
the sphere of politics and social policy such as school curriculum, bilingual 
education and dress codes. These are only some problems and issues 
multiculturalism deals with, which are intertwine at different levels.  
I believe it is possible to distinguish at least three different levels in 
                                               




multicultural theory. The first level is ontological, represented by the premises of 
liberal political theory, contractualism, modernity, and any other intellectual tradition 
in which its core concepts make sense. The second level, the theoretical, 
corresponds to the specific construction of each multicultural theory, which 
permanently disputes the perspectives and theories at the first level. In this sense, 
different constructions of multiculturalism are possible when we emphasise or deny 
premises of liberalism, contractualism or even communitarianism. Lastly, the third 
level refers to practical implementation through particular policies and procedures in 
specific places. At the ontological level, categories get drawn into theories by Taylor, 
Parekh and Kymlicka, not necessarily to endorse them but also to criticise them. 
The philosophical context provides fundamental concepts used in the theoretical 
level but also a rich tradition of questions and issues that has to be faced.  
Certainly, the three levels overlap and are clearly interconnected. The 
distinction is purely analytical and does not divide multiculturalism into sharp realms 
or refer to definite properties. I do not claim that the philosophical level is not 
theoretical in its nature; I say we can trace the concept and issues driving 
multiculturalism to older and more general issues.    However, this analytical 
distinction provides more clarity in the portrayal of multicultural theory and for its 
critical evaluation. We can ask, is it possible to shape a multicultural theory outside 
the limits of liberalism? Are western democracies the only ones who can develop 
multicultural societies? Are multicultural policies reproducing some sort of 
hierarchical order themselves? Is multicultural theory changing fundamental power 
relations and therefore hierarchical ideologies or just providing superficial solutions? 
These questions are important for my project and depend on the analysis of the 
three dimensions and their interrelations. 
In the next sections, I describe the particularities of the first two levels.34 First 
I argue that liberalism, the Enlightenment and modernity are the foundations of 
multiculturalism at the philosophical and historical levels. Then I present a typology 
of multiculturalism where we can better perceive the different approaches that 
Kymlicka, Taylor and Parekh adopt by assuming different stances in reference to the 
philosophical concepts of liberalism and modernity. Finally, I analyse further the 
assumptions underlying the concepts of social unity and national identity, and their 
convergence in what I call multicultural nationalism. If we have to summarise the 
                                               
34 I do not disregard the importance of the third level. Multicultural policies are very 
important, however, there are beyond the objectives of my text. 
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brief definition I just crafted as a sort of mantra to be repeated throughout the rest of 
the chapter, we can say that multiculturalism is a liberal programme, centred in 
group-differentiated rights and institutional oriented way to protect minorities and 
their culture. 
 
4.2 The philosophical and historical contexts: liberalism, modernity and 
political plurality 
 
Multiculturalism is theoretically rooted in political philosophy and deals with 
some of its key concepts -such as identity, difference, recognition, social justice, 
liberty, equality and citizenship-, as well as the rejection of homogeneous and 
monocultural nation-states. As a whole, what characterises it is a commitment to 
‘…recognizing rights to cultural maintenance and community formation, and linking 
these to social equality and protection from discrimination (Castles, 2000:5).35 
Different versions of multiculturalism are possible by emphasising or ignoring 
particular aspects of any of these concepts. Nevertheless, the diversity of 
approaches considered multicultural never goes beyond a unitary modern 
perspective. In other words, they all subscribe, explicitly or implicitly, to the same 
philosophical tradition.   
Moving one fathom deeper, multiculturalism is not just rooted in political 
philosophy as a discipline but in one particular theoretical perspective: liberalism. 
Liberalism is itself diverse and a source of debate. However, it can be broadly 
understood as a perspective where liberty, equality, democracy, individual freedom 
and universal human rights are the core values (Dworkin, 1978; Gaus, Courtland, & 
Schmidtz, 2015). The diversity of both approaches, liberalism and multiculturalism, 
makes generalisation difficult. Nonetheless, I argue the three forms of 
multiculturalism are liberal in different ways while keeping their own character; all 
are modern socio-political projects that trust state institutions to push positive 
policies. I do not claim that liberalism can be reduced to institutionalism or to simply 
pushing progressive policies through those means. Yet there is a ‘minimum’ liberal 
base in each multicultural approach.36 As I said before, the multicultural theories I 
                                               
35 Cited in (Vertovec, 2001a) and (Meer & Modood, 2018:35) 
36 It can be argued that the ‘minimum’ liberal referred here is a ‘phantom’ concept, that is, it 
does not really exist as a form of liberal thought. However, I do not deal with a particular 
liberal configuration. I am interested in the assumptions and commitments that the 




analyse here incrementally criticise a core of liberal assumptions. In consequence, 
they have different understandings of they own place within the liberal tradition. 
However, in their theoretical articulation they keep some inherited liberal 
assumptions. Even if communitarians and the second wind of multiculturalism 
pretend to take distance from more canonical forms of liberal thought, they face the 
same problems as the liberal tradition and they solve them sometimes in very similar 
ways. In other words, even if they criticise liberalism, they are not radical 
approaches able to completely break the liberal structure. They remain within the 
limits of notions such as national identity, citizenship and human rights. 
In a closer look at the two definitions, the reader can notice a flagrant 
discrepancy between individual rights supported by liberalism and the community 
formation rights supported by multiculturalism. This inconsistency, along with the 
non-universalistic character of group-differentiated rights, seems enough to perceive 
two fundamentally dissimilar perspectives. In fact, this difference has led to debate 
whether multiculturalism can be truly liberal (Barry, 2001). A point I later extensively 
develop. In fact, this debate, translated as group-differentiated rights versus 
individual rights, consumes much of multiculturalism’s theoretical energies. Leaving 
this point aside for a moment, we can affirm that in general terms multiculturalism 
can be fairly characterised as rooted in liberalism.  
In turn, we can distinguish at least two forms of liberalism: the classical or 
‘old’ liberalism and the ‘new’ or social justice centred model (Gaus et al., 2015). The 
main difference between old and new liberalism is reflected in how they consider 
liberty, private property and their relation. In a few words, in old liberalism private 
property and liberty are intimately related, while for new liberals there is not an 
inviolable relation between freedom and property. 
Along with this shift in the perspective, political philosophers such as John 
Rawls, in his influential work A Theory of Justice (1999 [1971]), focused on 
developing theories of social justice within the framework of this new liberalism. 
Even though new liberalism does not necessarily lead to the development of 
multicultural theory, multicultural theorists use new liberal standpoints as a base for 
their projects and expand it, particularly those who follow Kymlicka’s work. 
‘Group‐differentiated measures that secure and promote this access [to information, 
freedom of expression and association] may, therefore, have a legitimate role to 
play in a liberal theory of justice.’ (Kymlicka, 1995:84) Multiculturalism is a fuller 
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theory of justice in state-minority relations that ask different questions (Kymlicka, 
2018b), a theory particularly concerned with minority rights and minorities’ place in 
larger societies. It is a liberal theory of social justice for contemporary plural 
societies that highlights how liberal principles cannot plainly follow processes of 
majoritarian decision-making, but they have to make special amendments for 
minorities. By stressing their shared principles and values, I insist that Kymlicka’s 
multiculturalism is a liberal project.  
The case of communitarian multiculturalism has to be argued differently. 
Communitarianism and liberalism are not always considered compatible. However, 
communitarian multiculturalists still embrace liberty, social justice, democracy, 
equality and other values of the new liberalism, as well as the basic idea of 
supporting minority rights (Taylor, 1994:59). On the other hand, they do not believe 
minority rights should be limited by individual liberty. This rejection of individual 
welfare in favour of collective interest results in a different development of 
multicultural theory and liberalism. In contrast to the classical form of liberalism that 
insists on the uniform application of rules and does not support collective goals, 
communitarian liberalism endorses cultural survival over equal treatment (Taylor, 
1994:60-61). Steven Rockefeller calls this ‘Taylor’s Quebec brand of liberalism’ 
(1992:89); and Michael Walzer (1992) names it Liberalism 2. Communitarian 
thinkers like Taylor and Walzer identify themselves as liberal thinkers, therefore, it is 
not so hard to argue that communitarian multiculturalism is part of the liberal 
tradition, although in a new form. On the other hand, communitarian multiculturalism 
enriches the analysis of plurality and diversity in western societies with other 
traditions. Liberal and communitarian multiculturalism adopt different standpoints on 
the pre-eminence of individual liberty and some other issues but both are within the 
limits of liberalism. Even Charles Taylor, being one of the most prominent 
communitarian theorists, can be considered liberal in this broader sense. As O’Neill 
asserts:  
Taylor argues for a type of liberalism "grounded very much on judgments 
about what makes a good life-judgments in which the integrity of cultures 
has an important place.” Taylor's preferred version of multicultural 
liberalism is therefore willing to allow for collective goals. (1999:240)    
Parekh embarked in a critical revision of some of multiculturalism’s most 
relevant ideas, trying to unveil their presuppositions and suggesting changes where 
he thought appropriate. He supports fundamental ideas that shape multiculturalism, 




advocated by Taylor. However, Parekh’s place in multicultural theory is not easy to 
assess because of the dialectical nature of some of his stands. For instance, as 
Paul Kelly points out, Parekh ‘…rejects liberalism as a universal applicable 
philosophy of politics and as a domestic political ideology, but he is not “illiberal”, 
and he defends many liberal values.’ (2015:31) Parekh’s multiculturalism is 
egalitarian, but differs from Kymlicka’s post-Rawlsian egalitarianism. In the same 
vein, Parekh is a communitarian thinker, close to Taylor’s approach but not exactly 
in the same way. Kelly would suggest that Parekh is closer to Walzer’s political 
philosophy and his idea of complex equality developed in Spheres of Justice (1983). 
Additionally, Parekh also introduces his interest in partition and Gandhi’s philosophy 
as examples of non-liberal traditions dealing with diversity and plurality (Parekh, 
1989). While in a different way, the second wind of multiculturalism is still liberal, 
especially in relation to institutions and civic national identity, which leads to notions 
such as intercultural dialogue and minimal universalism. 
From a historical perspective, multiculturalism follows a long tradition 
inaugurated by Enlightenment ideals and historical events that were the basis for 
modern, republican, and constitutional democracies, especially the American and 
French revolutions (Kymlicka, 2001b). These historical events are closely connected 
to liberal principles and they eventually led to modern theories of justice. The 
Enlightenment represents the change from a medieval hierarchical order to a society 
knitted together by the ideals of human reason, freedom and equality. This is the 
same idea that gave rise first to civic forms of nationalism37 and now supports forms 
of minority political plurality. As a result, multiculturalism can be considered an idea 
developed in the context of western, democratic nation-states as part of post-
Enlightenment modernity. It is situated alongside the social and political movements 
in the aftermath of WWII and in the midst of very complex phenomena of diversity, 
migration and globalisation (Kymlicka, 2012b). For that reason, a little further 
explanation is needed to situate multiculturalism in more particular circumstances. 
From a very particular perspective, Brian Barry (2001) argues that 
multiculturalism is an anti-Enlightenment movement, therefore, it is neither 
compatible with egalitarian liberalism nor with Rawls’ theory of justice. I believe this 
description is mistaken and it has already been refuted (Parekh, 2002; Tully, 2002). 
                                               
37 ‘The civic nation, Ignatieff argues, is a community created by the choice of individuals to 
honor a particular political creed. As such, it is relatively compatible with the Enlightenment 
legacy of rationalism and individualism, since it turns "national belonging [into] a form of 
rational attachment."’ (Yack, 1996) 
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Completely the opposite: ‘These third-generation universal cultural rights, which 
protect minorities from the tyranny of democratic majorities, also derive from the 
Enlightenment (among other sources)’ (Tully, 2002:105) Multiculturalism is an 
enlightened modern theory adapted to a new context of plural societies, a third-
generation that keeps one tradition alive.  
The consideration of multiculturalism as a modern project becomes 
increasingly important because some general critiques of modernity apply to 
multiculturalism. Issues like the cognitive-instrumental rationality -pragmatism-, 
universalism, essentialism, structural power relations, overemphasis on institutions, 
blind faith in progress, bureaucracy and unsatisfactory application of policies form 
the criticism that multiculturalism has to face. It inherited not only values and 
principles, but also some unfortunate practices: some came from hardcore 
Enlightenment’s theoretical assumptions, some others from concrete instances of 
nation-states dealing with forms of civic plurality. For instance, the social and 
historical context for the liberal and modern principles and values resulted in 
assumptions like the assimilationist belief and the social contract acceptance of 
nation-state origins.  
From the late eighteenth century, countries such as France and the 
United States shared the Enlightenment assumption that nations were 
composed of individuals with common ideals who engaged in a mutually 
agreeable contract to form a mutually beneficial society. This 
Gesellschaft view of the nation as an ‘association’ of like‐minded people, 
which others who accepted their political, social, and cultural principles 
could join without much difficulty, assumed that newcomers could be 
absorbed, or assimilated. (Grillo, 1998:15) 
Some of the modern foundations that allowed the rise of liberalism and 
multiculturalism as positive and desirable projects are, to some extent, the same 
ones preventing their success. Multiculturalism is caught in the same position as 
modernity itself, that is, good intentions misled by wrong assumptions. For instance, 
Kymlicka often describes the multicultural aims as an attempt to fight traditional 
hierarchies and social injustice. He asserts that: 
Prior to World War II, ethnocultural and religious diversity in the West 
was characterized by a range of illiberal and undemocratic relationships 
of hierarchy, justified by racialist ideologies that explicitly propounded the 
superiority of some peoples and cultures and their right to rule over 
others. These ideologies were widely accepted throughout the Western 
world and underpinned both domestic laws (e.g., racially biased 
immigration and citizenship policies) and foreign policies (e.g. in relation 
to overseas colonies.) (2012b:5)     
However, the origins of those illiberal and undemocratic relations of 




was also the outcome of some of the principles and values conforming modern 
societies and nation-states. In modern societies, as Grillo affirms (1998:14), the 
state is interested in social relations and identities, but at the foundational level, it 
pushes homogeneity because the basic construction of a nation-state is built upon 
the idea of a common culture and identity. Intellectual traditions like the Frankfurt 
School criticised modern and Enlightenment assumptions in the most Kantian 
manner, by trying to show their limits. Enlightenment ideas had a positive impact on 
history and they allowed us to move from medieval political and social structures to 
democratic, republican and constitutional nation-states. However, at the same time 
the liberation promised by the Enlightenment is built upon the domination of nature 
and it has extended to the domination of otherness in general. Modern progress was 
made possible only by imposing an instrumental reason (Horkheimer, 1985) and the 
consequential standardisation of people (Marcuse, 1991). Modernity as a whole and 
Enlightenment as its theoretical foundation have substantial limits and questionable 
assumptions.   
…efforts to develop objective science, universal morality and law, and 
autonomous art, according to their inner logic. (…) the extravagant 
expectation that the arts and the sciences would promote not only the 
control of natural forces, but would also further understanding of the 
world and of the self, would promote moral progress, the justice of 
institutions, and even the happiness of human beings. (Habermas & Ben-
Habib, 1981:9)  
As mentioned by Habermas, the implications of modern and Enlightened 
assumptions expands to important dimensions of our life. Now that I have outlined to 
the intersection of Enlightenment, modernity and multiculturalism. I can briefly 
mention another important factor in multicultural theory:38  social contract theory. 
John Rawls’ work is a good example of how liberalism and social contract theory 
converge. Despite the different perspectives allowed under social contract theory, 
mostly Hobbesian or Kantian versions, ‘the contractual tradition expresses the 
Fundamental Liberal Principle.’ (Gaus et al., 2015), that is, any restriction on liberty 
must be justified. Social contract theory also deals with the issue of what could 
motivate a group of persons to live together and build larger societies, under what 
terms do they come to an agreement and how this concord guarantees morality and 
justice. The answers to these problems are the theories developed by liberals and 
social contractarians. Their views on these issues converge on key ideas such as 
individual liberty. ‘Contractarian social contract theories take individuals to be the 
                                               
38 There is another foundation I treat in a later section: nationalism. 
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best judges of their interests and the means to satisfy their desires. For this reason, 
there is a close connection between liberalism and contractarianism.’ (Cudd, 2018) 
Liberal multiculturalism parallels this idea. Just to mention one instance, there is an 
over-emphasis on the idea that ‘…immigration entails accepting the legitimacy of 
state enforcement of liberal principles, so long as immigrants know this in advance, 
and none the less voluntarily choose to come.’ (Kymlicka, 1995:170) On the other 
hand, Taylor rejects social contract theories when he criticises atomism (1985a), 
and Parekh does so when he analyse moral monism (Parekh, 2000). Therefore, 
they do not develop a positive view of social contract and, yet they keep facing 
some of its fundamental problems. Social contract theory is an important factor of 
multicultural theories, not because they always endorse their ideas, but because it 
forces them to face fundamental problems that demand a stand, like how are social 
cohesion and freedom compatible. 
Liberalism, the Enlightenment, modernity, and conctractualism are, I have 
argued, the building blocks of multicultural theories. Each theory deals with this 
heritage differently, assembling an alternative mosaic out of these same pieces – 
leading us to the second level. 
 
4.3 Liberal multiculturalism 
 
There are different expressions of multicultural theory. Liberal 
multiculturalism39 (LMC) is the most hegemonic, although communitarian and new 
multiculturalism40 (Vertovec, 2001a) are also relevant. All these expressions are 
strong forms of multiculturalism; they are compatible with the implementation of 
minority cultural rights, in terms of autonomy, language, self-determination and 
accommodation. Next, I portray the particularities of each of these approaches: 
liberal, communitarian and new multiculturalism. I present LMC in this section and 
communitarian and new multiculturalism subsequently. 
Liberal multiculturalism develops a dual commitment, on one hand to the 
                                               
39 Liberal refers in this case to that kind of multiculturalism that openly declares itself such. 
Clearly, I refer mostly to Kymlicka’s approach, but it goes further and includes all the 
multicultural perspectives that define themselves in direct connection to theories of justice, 
and emphasise the liberal context as the proper one to deal with diversity issues. 
40 I mentioned the label new multiculturalism because it has become a relatively well-known 
term, although I think second wind describe it better. Geoffrey Brahm proposed to name it 
the Bristol School of multiculturalism (Brahm Levey, 2019) but Kymlicka has recently argued 




cultural rights of minority groups, and on the other to a core of liberal principles, 
particularly the principle of individual autonomy. Most of the difficulties and criticisms 
come from the tension between these two stances. However, Kymlicka argues there 
is not a real tension between societal culture41 and liberal theory, on the contrary, 
culture is a value for liberalism. ‘…group‐differentiated rights that protect minority 
cultures can be seen, not only as consistent with liberal values, but as actually 
promoting them.’ (Kymlicka, 1995:106) According to Kymlicka, individual rights do 
not lead to atomism or instrumental relationships between people. On the contrary, 
they are a sine qua non for building healthy social relationships. In general, LMC is a 
way to address the justice of minority rights claims and consequently shows itself 
useful and necessary for liberal democracies. Despite modern states’ claimed 
foundation of democracy and equality, they are not neutral with respect to culture, 
they tend to support and sometimes impose a mainstream culture over minorities 
and, therefore, special rights for groups are needed. LMC, as a theory of special 
rights for minorities, is a way to improve social justice in western democracies, 
where sometimes the laws are not yet developed to embrace multiple cultural 
expressions.  
As O’Neill asserts (1999), for Kymlicka culture means cultural structure and it 
fundamentally functions as a context of choice. Even when he criticises Dworkin’s 
idea of a cultural structure (Kymlicka, 1995) exposed in A Matter of Principle (1985) 
for being rigid and formal, Kymlicka thinks a cultural structure, considered as an 
understanding of history, language and societal culture, is necessary to make 
meaningful choices. Therefore, the cultural structure is in accordance with individual 
liberty. ‘…individual freedom is tied in some important way to membership in one's 
national group; and that group‐specific rights can promote equality between the 
minority and majority.’ (Kymlicka, 1995:52)  
Culture is important because our choices and by extension our freedom are 
determined by our cultural heritage; culture is the context for individual choices and, 
thus, it is also relevant for liberal theory. O’Neill (1999) claims that according to 
Kymlicka, culture should be included as a primary good in the sense of Rawls’ 
                                               
41 ‘By a societal culture, I mean a territorially‐concentrated culture, centred on a shared 
language which is used in a wide range of societal institutions, in both public and private 
life—schools, media, law, economy, government, etc.—covering the full range of human 
activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life. I call it a 
societal culture to emphasize that it involves a common language and social institutions, 




theory of justice, that is, a good which people need, no matter their particular way of 
life. In consequence, multiculturalism is eventually translated into seeking rights as 
the main artery to modern justice. As I said above, referring to Castles’ words, 
multiculturalism wants rights to cultural maintenance and cultural formation. The 
moral aim of social equality and protection for vulnerable groups become, from the 
LMC perspective, the need for cultural rights. ‘Some groups are unfairly 
disadvantaged in the cultural market‐place, and political recognition and support 
rectify this disadvantage.’ (Kymlicka, 1995:109) 
Despite it seems paradoxical, within the LMC perspective, cultural rights for 
minorities are limited by principles of individual liberty, democracy, and social justice 
because their function is to secure these principles. ‘[L]iberals can and should 
accept a wide range of group‐differentiated rights for national minorities and ethnic 
groups, without sacrificing their core commitments to individual freedom and social 
equality.’ (Kymlicka, 1995:126) As a result, cultural rights are complements of 
traditional human rights. With the intention of clearly drawing that limit, Kymlicka 
distinguishes between external protections and internal restrictions.   
External protections refer to a community’s rights to limit economic or 
political power embodied by a larger group; an internal restriction is a limit that a 
group imposes on any of its members. External protections are the mechanisms to 
legitimately develop differentiated rights for minorities because they protect the 
group’s existence and identity. They allow people to maintain their way of life if they 
decide to do so. In other words, it does not imply a particular imposition but secures 
an existent societal culture that is just one amongst a range of possibilities. 
Therefore, individuals still have to choose whether they follow the practices and 
institutions of a particular societal culture or adopt new ones. External protections 
only secure the possibility of societal cultures, they do not impose them. On the 
other hand, internal restrictions suppose the imposition of a particular societal 
culture that forces and represses individuals refusing partially or completely to follow 
its practices, institutions or values. Fostering external protections and preventing 
internal restrictions, liberal societies guarantee that group rights do not overshadow 
individual autonomy. In LMC as defended by Kymlicka, the main effort is to support 
both, individual autonomy and equality between cultural groups.  
Group-differentiated rights are shaped by the necessities of the particular 
group. In order to understand the conditions for each minority group to incorporate 




that different groups might ask for different things. In general, the claims of 
accommodation and recognition of minorities can be expressed in three distinct 
group-differentiated rights: self-government rights, polyethnic rights and special 
representation rights (Kymlicka, 1995). 
Following from the differentiation of minority groups is a second distinction in 
multicultural theories, between different types of multicultural states particularly 
between ‘…”multination” states (where cultural diversity arises from the 
incorporation of previously self‐governing, territorially concentrated cultures into a 
larger state) and ‘polyethnic’ states (where cultural diversity arises from individual 
and familial immigration).’ (Kymlicka, 1995:6) The term multiculturalism could refer 
to multinational or polyethnic perspectives depending on the kind of minority taken 
into account. As their names denote, multinational states bring together in the same 
political community groups that already have existing national identities; polyethnic 
states do the same but with ethnic groups resulting from immigration.  
According to Kymlicka (1995), multiculturalism is often invoked without 
making a clear distinction between nations and ethnic groups, obscuring the limits 
and aims behind the idea of multicultural States. Therefore, a country could 
embrace polyethnic policies and not necessarily multinational ones, or vice versa, 
leading to different multicultural claims. It could happen that one state can 
successfully incorporate national minorities, but not immigrant groups or indigenous 
peoples or any of the other possible combinations. This sort of nuances confirms 
that multicultural theory shall clearly distinguish the ‘nature’ of the minority groups 
looking for integration and their demands, but it also denotes that the lines between 
them are not always easy to draw. 
Several criticisms could be made about this perspective, but one is the most 
frequent and important is the paradox resulting from the idea that particular cultures 
can defend themselves from assimilation only on the grounds of liberal individualism 
(O'Neill, 1999); in other words, colonial and postcolonial assimilation can only be 
fought by liberal integration. Consequently, despite the efforts, they seem just two 
ways leading to the very same place. In that case, the line that Kymlicka tries to 
draw becomes blurry.  
Even if in the expression liberal multiculturalism, liberal is the adjective and 
multiculturalism the noun, in the theory built around this concept, liberalism is more 
fundamental than multiculturalism. Liberal multiculturalism is indeed multicultural 
liberalism. This hierarchy is evident in Kymlicka; he suggests that multiculturalism is 
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a tool for different cultures to move forward into more liberal societies. ‘So, as a 
general rule, liberals should not prevent illiberal nations from maintaining their 
societal culture, but should promote the liberalization of these cultures.’ (Kymlicka, 
1995:95) Multiculturalism is a way to liberalise cultures without ‘harm’ to them. 
National minorities, immigrant groups and indigenous peoples are subjects of 
protection solely to enter into a larger process of liberalisation. For liberal 
multiculturalism, the ideal world is not where all cultures can live together despite 
their differences, but where all the cultures are liberalised keeping just enough of its 
flavour. 
 
4.4 Communitarian multiculturalism 
 
Apparently the opposite of liberal multiculturalism, communitarian 
multiculturalism rejects the idea that individuals are prior to the community. In 
consequence, individual rights are not more important than social concerns. For 
communitarian multiculturalism, like the iteration defended by Taylor and Walzer, 
minority groups need differentiated rights. It establishes that any judgement 
depends on the particular framework of the community, including those that have 
historically configured the liberal societies as just and democratic. ‘…the standards 
of justice must be found in forms of life and traditions of particular societies and 
hence can vary from context to context.’ (Daniel Bell, 2016) In other words, 
communitarian multiculturalism denies the universalism of classical liberalism. In 
consequence, just as there are voices claiming LMC is not a liberal project, so do 
other forms of liberalism claim that communitarianism, in general, is not liberal. 
Usually this debate is portrayed as communitarianism versus cosmopolitanism, the 
latter clearly being liberal and communitarianism relativistic. However, I already 
mentioned in what sense communitarian multiculturalism is liberal. In Chapter 6 I 
elaborate some features of this debate. It is enough to mention now that the debate 
develops on two intertwined dimensions. On one hand, there is discussion on 
whether there are universal principles or all what we have believed to be universal 
principles are only historical assumptions; on the other hand, the problem is knowing 
if individual rights are prior to any collective context.   
More importantly, communitarian multiculturalism shows that the principles of 
individuality are not something beyond any possible negotiation, as LMC somehow 




differentiated rights as a means to secure real possibilities for individual ones. In the 
case of communitarian multiculturalism, collective goods are neither a mean for the 
individual nor less fundamental. When tensions between cultural issues and 
individual affairs come to the surface, sometimes collective goals can be imposed 
over individual ones. And similarly to Kymlicka, Taylor articulates a criterion to know 
under what circumstances it is possible and desirable to choose cultural needs -
cultural survival, in his terms- over individual rights. But first we must differentiate 
fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities. 
Taylor believes in a core of liberal values that express fundamental liberties. 
He says, 
But now the rights in question are conceived to be the fundamental and 
crucial ones that have been recognized as such from the very beginning 
of the liberal tradition: rights to life, liberty, due process, free speech, free 
practice of religion, and so on. On this model, there is a dangerous 
overlooking of an essential boundary in speaking of fundamental rights to 
things like commercial signage in the language of one’s choice. One has 
to distinguish the fundamental liberties, those that should never be 
infringed and therefore ought to be unassailably entrenched, on one 
hand, from privileges and immunities that are important, but that can be 
revoked or restricted for reasons of public policy—although one would 
need a strong reason to do this—on the other. (Taylor, 1994:59) 
Nevertheless, those values depend on the context and have their limits. We 
can try to find a foundation for the principles and say, for instance, that most of 
these assume the idea of no harm to others. Despite that, this idea is neither 
individual nor universal in any way, but cultural and collective. What is considered 
harmful may vary from culture to culture and understood in different ways. Contrary 
to classic liberalism, its perspective is not and cannot be neutral. Michael Walzer 
says that even the idea of justice itself is embedded in particular cultural 
constructions.  
Justice is relative to social meanings. Indeed, the relativity of justice 
follows from the classic non-relative definition, giving each person his 
due, as much as it does from my own proposal, distributing goods for 
“internal" reasons. These are formal definitions that require, as l have 
tried to show, historical completion. (…) There cannot be a just society 
until there is a society; and the adjective just doesn’t determine, it only 
modifies, the substantive life of the societies it describes. (1983:312-13) 
Any concept and value, being determined by the particular system in which it 
makes sense, implies relativism: in this case cultural and moral relativism. In its 
simplest form, relativism is the opposite of uniformity, but in the sense I use it here is 
more as contextual or situational, historical if you prefer. Most of the time, cultural 
relativism is defined indirectly, as keeping in mind the consequences it seems to 
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imply. Therefore, cultural relativism is believed to be the same as 
incommensurability of values or something lacking uniformity or neutrality. In the 
case of communitarianism, cultural relativism means that ‘…standard schedules of 
rights might apply differently in one cultural context than they do in another, that 
their application might have to take account of different collective goals,’ (Taylor, 
1994:52) This possibility opens another series of important problems. One thing is 
evident, for most liberals, cultural relativism, understood as incommensurability, is 
as an undesirable option. 
In more detail, communitarian multiculturalism rejects one basic notion of 
classical liberalism: the idea that a liberal society is the one that remains neutral on 
particular ideas of a good life.42 This idea is foundational for civic societies in 
general. As I described in Chapter 3, this is the base for political pluralism in modern 
nations. Only if the state and its institutions keep themselves neutral can they 
mediate between the different interests of individuals and groups. However, 
communitarians do not see any contradiction between supporting liberal values and 
a particular good, as in Québec. ‘On their view, a society can be organized around a 
definition of the good life, without this being seen as a depreciation of those who do 
not personally share this definition.’ (Taylor, 1994:59) What makes society liberal is 
not its neutrality, but the commitment to respect diversity, especially of those who do 
not share the collective goals. The fundamental rights enabling the communitarian 
liberal society are those that fulfil the conditions to respect diversity. In contrast to 
these fundamental rights that secure the respect to diversity despite a fixed 
collective goal, there are privileges and immunities of uniform treatment, which 
make difference inhospitable (Taylor, 1994).   
Communitarian multiculturalism endorses a form of cultural relativism and, at 
the same time, it is a form of liberalism. As Taylor affirms, it is a form of liberalism 
that is hospitable to difference, which does not support the uniform application of 
                                               
42 Taylor draws on Dworkin’s distinction between liberalism and goods to build his argument 
and refute it. Dworkin says: ‘I do not suppose that I have made liberalism more attractive by 
arguing that its constitutive morality is a theory of equality that requires official neutrality 
amongst theories of what is valuable in life. (…) Liberalism cannot be based on scepticism. 
Its constitutive morality provides that human beings must be treated as equals by their 
government, not because there is no right and wrong in political morality, but because that is 
what is right. Liberalism does not rest on any special theory of personality, nor does it deny 
that most human beings will think that what is good for them is that they be active in society. 
Liberalism is not self-contradictory: the liberal conception of equality is a principle of political 
organization that is required by justice, not a way of life for individuals, and liberals, as such, 
are indifferent as to whether people choose to speak out on political matters, or to lead 




rights; it is a form of liberalism that takes into account communities’ cultural context 
and the collective goals. In more technical terms, communitarian multiculturalism is 
not a form of procedural liberalism.43 In other words, communitarian multiculturalism 
questions the assumption of neutrality of classical liberalism. In the case of LMC, 
western democracies should secure the survival of minority cultures because their 
members need the societal culture to choose if they want to keep in that particular 
group or if they move away from it. In that case it is just a kind of background that 
functions as a context of choice. With respect to communitarian multiculturalism, 
there is a particular good fostered by the collective goals to secure the survival of 
the culture, but they equally respect the diversity of those who disagree with such 
goods and goals.  
If we see it from the outcome, we have two theories that support group-
differentiated rights, that allow individuals to dissent and chose, but that one openly 
and the other tacitly fosters a particular culture. In these cases, the particular 
minorities do not need even to be considered to construct a picture of diversity and 
plurality, all we need are the liberal communities and to analyse how they 
understand, support and deal with diversity. From these liberal perspectives, 
diversity is all about how the majority culture or the liberal community deal within 
themselves to accept, reject, integrate or whatever perspective they have towards 
the other! The second wind of multiculturalism, which I describe in the next section 
brings a little hope to this liberal self-absorption. 
There is another fundamental feature of communitarian multiculturalism that I 
will save for future chapters. In order to avoid pointless repetitions, I very briefly 
mention the fundamentals of communitarian dialogue. I critically present this notion 
in Chapters 6 and 7. For communitarian multiculturalists, especially Taylor, dialogue 
is important because that is the way identities are formed. Therefore, there are 
significant others that are more important than being part of the otherness we deal 
with on daily basis: they are essential for our own formation and self-understanding. 
‘My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others.’ (1994:34) 
However, before delving deeper into the criticism of communitarian 
                                                                                                                                     
1978:142-43) 
43 Bell affirms: ‘For the communitarian critique of liberal universalism to have any lasting 
credibility, thinkers need to provide compelling counter-examples to modern-day liberal-
democratic regimes and 1980s communitarians came up short.’ (2016) I think that 
communitarianism achieves this by differentiating between procedural and other forms of 
liberalism. In other words, the metapolitical level of due process has no primacy over the 
legitimate political ends. 
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multiculturalism in the next chapter, we can advance some ideas to keep in mind. 
There is an unbalance between the critique communitarian multiculturalism is 
capable of building and its own proposal. Communitarianism, in general, can 
elaborate accurate and strong critiques on the universalist and neutral aims of liberal 
theory, but they fall a little bit short of developing concrete proposals. At least Taylor 
overemphasises the case of Québec, but as I will argue in Chapter 7 there are 
several problems derived from this particular case of being a minority in respect of 
Anglophone Canada and a majority regarding the minorities within the province. 
Communitarian multiculturalism is important at a theoretical level, but it has not been 
reflected in policies. In that respect, liberal multiculturalism is more relevant.  
 
4.5 The second wind of multiculturalism  
 
Even if the other two main figures in the multicultural theory are also 
philosophers –Kymlicka and Taylor-, Parekh had the merit to bring back an 
important part of the debate to the ground of philosophy. Parekh’s approach 
represents a reinvigorated second wind.44 His place and time in the development of 
the multicultural theory were different from Kymlicka and Taylor’s in that he dealt 
with a socio-political project firmly established, at least theoretically, and that had 
already translated some of its ideas into policies and rights in a good number of 
countries.45 At the time he published his major work on multiculturalism, Rethinking 
Multiculturalism (2000), the debate was already taking place on different levels, but 
there was not, sensu stricto, enough philosophical self-criticism dealing 
systematically with the deepest assumptions of the theory.  
Influenced by Michael Oakeshott’s thought, Parekh’s effort focus on 
analysing and minimising the presuppositions of the current multicultural theories. 
Rethinking Multiculturalism (2000) introduced a reinvigorated approach to projects of 
diversity and plurality, advocating the idea of intercultural debate and cultural 
diversity as something valuable, but within a framework that does not overvalue 
liberalism. However, despite drawing on different traditions and his incisive criticism 
of liberalism, this enterprise showed itself harder than it seems. Parekh’s 
multiculturalism is liberal in the sense that it keeps some of its assumptions, but not 
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because his criticism is inaccurate or invalid. If we start from the end and go directly 
to his proposal, at least in the case of Britain, Parekh refers to the necessity of being 
a community of communities, which in his opinion implies moving from being a 
multicultural society to a multiculturalist one. ‘The state need not consist of a single 
people and could be a community of communities, each enjoying different degrees 
of autonomy but all held together by shared legal and political bonds.’ (Parekh, 
2000:194) In other words, a society where cultural difference is valued and 
welcomed. 
However, Parekh’s approach is not so different from Kymlicka and Taylor’s 
multiculturalism. In a generous reading, all go beyond the simple purpose of 
securing formal recognition of minority groups and try to value and welcome 
difference. In other words, they are confident that a multicultural society gradually 
becomes a multiculturalist one. Kymlicka believes that the acceptance of cultural 
difference brought by multiculturalism is something that must be visible in the 
identity of citizens,46 and Taylor promotes recognition as something embedded in 
the inner-self of individuals.47 The particularity of Parekh’s conception is that he 
approaches the political institutions in a different way, which is characterised by the 
focus on their cultural constitution. Institutions are not neutral but culturally shaped. 
Therefore, he debunks the ideal of neutral institutions at the core of liberalism. He 
believes that the constitution of the state’s political institutions is negotiated between 
cultural communities.     
[Culture] influences major social institutions in several ways. The manner 
in which a society organizes its economic and political life depends on 
how it defines, legitimizes and regulates, and what meaning and 
significance it assigns to, the pursuit of wealth and the exercise of power, 
respectively. (Parekh, 2000:151)  
The ethical principles embedded in the institutions derive from the moral 
practices and not necessarily from some principles of reason. There is not a plurality 
of practices as a result of the plurality of values in different societies, at least no 
                                                                                                                                     
Multiculturalism (2000), comes after Kymlicka and Taylor’s. 
46 When national identity is multicultural ‘by definition’ then it does become a 
multiculturalism community. He says: ‘But in Canada, which has officially defined itself as a 
multicultural nation, multiculturalism serves as a source of shared national identity and pride 
for native-born citizens and immigrants alike. Studies show that in the absence of 
multiculturalism, national identity is more likely to lead to intolerance and xenophobia. 
Indeed, Canada may be the only Western country where strength of national identity is 
positively correlated with support for immigration, a finding that is difficult to explain except 
by reference to multiculturalism.’ (Kymlicka, 2012b:10-11) 




more than there is a plurality of values as a result of different practices. In other 
words, there is a tight relation between practices and morality; there is a plural 
nature of what is good according to different communities and then the institutions 
are shaped by this different idea of what is good. In other words, they are not 
neutral. ‘A morally and culturally neutral state which makes no moral demands on its 
citizens and is equally hospitable to all cultures and conceptions of the good is 
logically impossible.’ (Parekh, 2000:201-2) In a slightly different way than Taylor, 
Parekh shows that ‘Liberalism is also a fighting creed.’ (Taylor, 1994:62) Liberalism 
is just another cultural practice.  
The liberal way to organise diversity is just one in a collection of possibilities. 
Having said that, Parekh goes further and affirms that even if the liberal practices 
were the closest we can get to universal norms of inclusion, there is no formal 
reason to choose them over the norms of any other community. This idea separates 
his approach from previous multicultural theorists. Kymlicka openly addresses 
liberalism as the main way to address issues of diversity and plurality; Taylor 
believes that ‘liberalism 2’ is a plausible way to deal with plurality and recognition, 
especially considering that being liberal in this new sense means respecting 
diversity. Parekh pushes it further, liberalism is just one amongst the other forms to 
deal with diversity issues. Still more, inspired by the communitarian objection to 
moral universalism, Parekh points out that any abstract moral principle has to be 
actualised in a concrete form, and there is no interpretation that can claim to be 
better than other. In other words, he unveils the monism behind the liberal tradition. 
Parekh draws on two ideas as conditions to achieve the community of 
communities he proposes: 1) to deny liberal universalism and along with it its 
dominant position in cultural interactions, and 2) to engage in intercultural dialogue. 
Parekh’s explanation of the origin of liberal universalism affirms that liberalism tends 
to assume moral monist presuppositions. The monist basic presupposition asserts 
there is only one way of life that is truly human. There are important consequences 
of the moral monist perspective: it fosters a judgemental approach to other ways of 
life, considers differences as deviations, prevents contact to what is outside the 
assumed way of life and seeks to peacefully or violently assimilate those other forms 
of life. This last consequence is particularly important because it unveils the link with 
liberal societies.  
Christians, liberals and Marxists favoured the second approach 
[assimilation] because they thought that the divinely revealed or rationally 




these and other groups have justified or condoned egregious violence 
against alternative ways of life, often in the name of human equality and 
universal love, should alert us to the dangers of all forms of monism. 
(Parekh, 2000:49) 
As Parekh explains, even if it tends to seem neutral and objective, the liberal 
understanding of its own way of life shapes the idea of human nature that is 
supposed to objectively represent.  
Take their account of autonomy. As they understand it, culture helps 
individuals develop their capacity for autonomy, which then transcends it 
and views it and the wider world untainted by its provenance. This is a 
misleading account of the relation between the two. (…) Far from being 
purely formal and culturally neutral, their capacity for autonomy is 
structured in a particular way, functions within flexible but determinate 
limits, and defines and assesses options in certain ways. (Parekh, 
2000:110)  
In other words, the understanding that any culture has of its own and other 
ways of life as a representative of any human nature is culturally and socially 
shaped. We can indeed question the idea of human nature48 as something that 
maybe has no real referent. But even if there is such a thing as ‘human nature’, 
Parekh’s argument is strong enough to strike at the foundations of liberal pluralism. 
On the other hand, in his attempt to deny universalism, Parekh thinks he is able to 
dodge also its opposite: relativism. In his opinion, both imply essentialist 
conceptions of culture. However, in this last part some liberal assumptions or ideas 
close to liberal assumptions might sneak into his argument. He says:   
Relativism ignores the cross-culturally shared human properties and is 
mistaken in its beliefs that a culture is a tightly integrated and self-
contained whole, can be neatly individuated, and determines its 
members. Monism rests on an untenably substantive view of human 
nature, ignores the impossibility of deriving moral values from human 
nature alone, fails to appreciate its cultural mediation and reconstitution, 
and so on. (Parekh, 2000:127) 
More important than the certitude that only within the same culture we can 
justify beliefs and practices is the fact that it is impossible to delegitimise the beliefs 
and practices of others. On one hand, multiculturalism should avoid privileging the 
liberal ideals of social justice over other different conceptions of justice, but on the 
other, it should find some norms of inclusion that are not completely arbitrary. Now, 
this apparent impasse is not a reason for different cultures to avoid interaction. 
There is a solution according to Parekh, a perspective that escapes the essentialism 
of monism and relativism: ‘It would seem that a dialectical and pluralist form of 
minimum universalism offers the most coherent response to moral and cultural 
                                               
48 Parekh does believe in a human nature and defines it as all those features that are not 
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diversity.’ (Parekh, 2000:127) This approach leads the argument to the idea of 
intercultural dialogue. 
The aim of intercultural dialogue is to find a balance. Initially, people should 
be willing to learn about their culture to the point at which they feel confident enough 
to openly try to learn from other cultures. In order to secure intercultural dialogue, 
multiculturalist societies need a political structure that simultaneously legitimises 
differences and fosters unity. In a continuous process, first, legitimating difference 
would provide the base for an attitude of openness, then, a strong unity would erase 
the fear of otherness. Perhaps the first part of legitimating difference is not as 
problematic as the second: securing unity. Here Parekh’s argument again inches 
closer to liberal stands, including the notion of minimum universalism. In any case, if 
this dialectical tension is possible, then we would be moving from multicultural 
societies to multiculturalist ones.     
Parekh believes that the unity of modern multiculturalist societies must rely 
on two pillars: equal treatment and national identity. Equal treatment should not be 
understood as a sort of uniformity, but as differentiated legal and political 
requirements that reflect the diversity of cultures, in terms of the most classical 
multicultural theory, equal treatment is close to the idea of group-differentiated 
rights. Similarly to Kymlicka’s stance and his effort to show how group-differentiated 
rights are compatible with liberalism, Parekh would affirm they do not threaten social 
unity, but foster it, even outside the framework of liberalism. The liberal assumption 
of the State as a constitutional community presupposed a sort of imaginary 
homogeneity. Although homogeneity must not be the condition for unity, completely 
the opposite, the state need not consist in a single people, but a community of 
communities, that means that there is no need of a unitarian system of authority. 
(Parekh, 2000:194) 
It is clear that Parekh tries to find common ground between minorities and 
majorities and, as a consequence, he focuses his efforts on political institutions. 
Again, like other liberal multiculturalists, Parekh has faith in institutions. 
Unfortunately, political institutions are not placed under the microscope as other 
parts of multicultural theory are. A more radical criticism of the liberal structure and 
its institutions, like that developed by CRT, would unveil what happens when 
institutions have the mission to foster the unity amongst citizens. 
Parekh knows that the multicultural integration that he proposes has to 
                                                                                                                                     




address the problem of social unity. In order to achieve this, he introduces the idea 
of Operative Public Values (OPVs) (2000:267). These values are defined as those 
without which it is impossible to achieve any sort of social cohesion; they are the 
public moral and political rules that bind together a group into a larger society. The 
OPVs have no authority beyond the fact they are part of current social relations, 
therefore, their authority is limited to their acceptance and acknowledgement in a 
community. OPVs are not the structures or goals of particular communities, that is, 
values, but just terms of common practices. With this definition, Parekh leaves the 
door open to incorporate and explain change into the practices; also, he clearly 
brings back the cultural dialogue to the heart of politics. In accordance with Parekh, 
doing politics is engaged in the dialogue between different parts, in this case, 
between different cultural communities. If OPVs are at the same time the glue of 
social cohesion and they allow the change of practices, it is understandable why 
they become the basis for the intercultural dialogue proposed by Parekh. 
OPVs are the means to negotiate multicultural inclusion. ‘Since the operative 
public values represent the shared moral structure of society’s public life, they 
provide the only widely acceptable starting point for a debate on minority practices.’ 
(Parekh, 2000:270) For instance, Parekh believes that when a minority claims 
recognition within the wider society, minorities and majorities assert their respective 
OPVs, then through dialogue, a reasoned process of revision takes place. Minorities 
often try to defend their practices and the majorities question why those practices 
offend them. In the dialogical process, ideally, both sides would learn from each 
other. The political negotiation advocated by Parekh is no different from classical 
politics since Aristotle; the negotiation through OPVs becomes political persuasion. 
Parekh is able to dodge the naive perception of institutions as neutral but some 
problems are also visible in this idea of politics, particularly the assumption of 
negotiation as a rational dialogue, which I develop further in Chapters 6 and 7. This 
trust in dialogue and negotiation place his stands a little bit closer to the liberal 
structure of western societies. Using CRT, Chapter 2 argued how reformist and mild 
approaches leave structural issues untouched. On the other hand, Parekh 
introduces a change in the politics, in that not the values or the ideas, but the 
practices are always the beginning of any negotiation and are always open to 
interpretation. 
After describing the three main forms of multiculturalism I can delineate three 
important concepts where all converge: the need for social unity, the usefulness of 
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national identity and the translation of the multicultural aims into a form of 
multicultural nationalism. 
 
4.6 Social cohesion and national identity: towards an idea of 
multicultural nationalism  
 
The incorporation of any of the three subjects of multicultural theory -national 
minorities, ethnic groups and indigenous peoples- into mainstream society depends 
on the way collective identity is understood, particularly, national and cultural 
identity. Modern, western societies, including multicultural ones, share the 
assumption that no state can exist if its members do not feel linked to the larger 
community, if the members do not develop a strong collective identity that expresses 
their belonging. (Miller, 1995, 2000; Tamir, 1993) The idea behind this assumption is 
simple: groups are formed from individuals and they would disappear if those 
individuals cease to identify with them, in the opposite case, the closer the 
identification with the features of a group, the stronger the glue that holds the parts 
together. The same train of thought can be extended beyond individuals and it also 
works for collectivities within larger groups.  
If national minorities, immigrants or indigenous peoples do not feel linked to 
the state, serious issues would arise for the cohesion, unity and, consequently, the 
stability of the larger community. Consequentially, national and/or cultural identity 
are terms used to refer to the conditions for communities’ social cohesion. ‘The 
shared view of national identity has a particularly important role in a multicultural 
society because of its greater need to cultivate a common sense of belonging 
among its diverse communities.’ (Parekh, 2000:231) Even if we cannot affirm that 
social cohesion and collective identity are equivalent in all circumstances, it is clear 
that identity has been a predominant idea to explain the social unity of modern 
states. ‘In macro-level studies, the search for the national character has been one of 
the leitmotifs from the beginning, long before the term identity, was even coined. (…) 
In general, emotional attachment to a collective identity is what makes members 
loyal to a group.’  (Ehala, 2017:5&13) 
Identity and unity are key concepts for those seeking to explain the reasons 
why and ways members of a community come and remain together. Taking this into 
consideration, what I argue here is that the social glue in a multicultural state is not 




aims are not different. In this respect, both theories are aligned. In Chapter 3 I 
described how civic nations are built on the basis of a shared identity. Therefore, 
some of the same issues faced by the nationalism theories in explaining the social 
cohesion of a community are present in multiculturalism. The multicultural project 
does not move beyond these limits without acknowledging and proposing alternative 
ways of analysing social cohesion. 
Let me draw the simplest schematic of the relationship between individual 
understandings of human nature used in liberal theories and the quest for social 
cohesion. In order to defend the possibility of multicultural states within the 
framework of western, modern societies, they must provide all the conditions for 
individuals and groups that make life within a society worthwhile. Otherwise, the 
members of the communities could not find enough reasons to belong to the larger 
state. This notion corresponds in its purest form to the main issue unveiled by social 
contract theory. As political philosophers argued, especially Rousseau (1950:I), if 
the members of a community remain united they do not do so naturally, but 
voluntarily. In other words, they are not going to give up their natural liberty without 
getting something in return. The gap between ‘voluntary’ integration to a group -or at 
least non-natural integration- and the conditions for making it worthwhile is 
considerable. Nevertheless, it seems to be widely accepted that failure to provide 
some basic benefits for the members of a community leads to social disintegration. 
Even if communitarians and the second wind of multiculturalism openly criticise the 
idea of a social contract, they do need to find a way to secure social cohesion and in 
some bits, they retain contractarian assumptions.   
What I want to emphasise now is the base on which multicultural theory is 
built upon and the directionality of the argument: nation-states foster social cohesion 
through the idea of a collective identity -national or civic-, and in turn collective 
identity requires the provision of some fundamental conditions to keep together an 
unnaturally bonded community that otherwise might disaggregate. From this base, 
theories on what those fundamental conditions must be and how securing them 
would lead to justice and equality have taken many forms. Predominantly the liberal 
tradition has focused on these conditions, from John Rawls’s theory of justice (1999 
[1971]) to Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach (2000, 2011), but also a more 
communitarian view takes the same foundation for its development, from Michael 
Walzer (1983) to Charles Taylor’s irreducibly social goods (1995). 
The aims and key concepts of multiculturalism express the fundamental 
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claim of developing and respecting national and ethnic identities of minorities, 
thereby responding to the requirement implied in the contractual assumption: the 
need to foster the bond amongst members and strengthen social unity. In other 
words, the assumption inherited from the contractual argument for social unity is 
present in the multicultural theory as a problem to solve. However, the answer is not 
so different to civic nationalism, only expanding it. A right to express membership to 
national or/and ethnic minorities and all that goes with it becomes a basic condition 
for bonding to the state. The right of any particular group or individual to express 
membership would result in a stronger and more cohesive larger society. For 
instance, ‘Members of immigrant minorities will be more likely to identify with a new 
national identity if they feel their ethnic identity is publicly respected.’ (Kymlicka, 
2012b:12)  
Summarising, states could only gather members of different national and 
ethnic groups, and achieve social unity, if they allow them to develop at the same 
time and within some limits their own national identity or ethnic particularity. 
Therefore, social unity confines the possible outcomes of the multicultural project; 
the idea that modern, liberal societies need a form of glue imposes a limit on 
multicultural theory. In regard to this issue, multicultural societies are built on the 
basis of nation-state models. Multicultural projects might develop some internal 
debate on the identification of the conditions that lead different minorities to want to 
be part of the ‘host’ state, and the circumstances for the larger community to 
positively incorporate the minorities, as well as their limits, but the model is the 
same. 
Different notions come into play in the attempt to delineate the formal and 
practical conditions for developing a collective identity and, consequently, social 
cohesion. The diversity of notions increases the complexity of the argumentation. 
Nation, culture, people and ethnic groups are defined in terms of each other. 
Nonetheless, they are not exactly interchangeable. Some national communities 
might be the ‘natural’ evolution of particular ethnic groups, as ethnic nationalism 
affirms, but not all the national groups are made by one particular ethnic community, 
as civic nationalism describes. Every nation fosters a culture, the same for every 
ethnic group and indigenous people, for this reason, supporting rights of 
membership to any of these groups is to advocate a culture. Nation, people, ethnic 
group and indigenous people are not the same although they partially coincide. As 




different and at the same time all of them foster their own culture that quite often 
conflates ingredients of the others, nor is it a minor issue when we realise that the 
idea of collective identity replicates this. Multiculturalism has not just inherited a 
conceptual framework from the theories of nation-states and the contractarian 
tradition, but also some of its most important issues and, of course, limits. 
 
4.7 Multicultural nationalism 
 
I have argued that despite important differences the main figures of 
multicultural theory -Kymlicka, Taylor and Parekh- support some liberal views. They 
also share a similar conception of civic nations and, in consequence, they advocate 
national and cultural identity. All these shared features lead them to push slightly 
different versions of multicultural nationalism, that is, the idea that national identity is 
the key to providing the social glue needed for keeping together the different groups.   
The notion of multicultural nationalism might ‘…seem counterintuitive. After 
all, multiculturalism (as an embrace of diversity) and nationalism (as a quest for 
unity and identity) are often depicted as contradictory ideas,’ (Kernerman, 2005:5) 
Yet, if we look closer, multiculturalism aims to protect the cultural identity of national 
minorities, it can be broadly considered a pro-nationalist stand. But then again, 
some may argue that it cannot be entirely identified as a form of nationalism 
because national minorities are only one possible beneficiary of group-differentiated 
rights, along with indigenous peoples and immigrants. Even if we pay attention 
exclusively to the type of multiculturalism corresponding to multinationalism, putting 
aside for a moment indigenous peoples and polyethnic forms,‘…a “multinational 
nationalist” movement is certainly an oxymoron; and a “multicultural nationalist” 
movement comes very close to being one.’ (Hussain & Miller, 2006:3) In principle, 
nationalist movements, along with the larger states hosting them, might claim the 
rights of self-determination and sovereignty, which seem in many respects to lead to 
fundamental incompatibilities and to distrust the idea of a possible multinational 
state. The situation is indeed complex. Several clarifications are needed, but there is 
one way in which we can affirm multiculturalism is indeed a form of nationalism. I try 
to describe this way in the next paragraphs. 
To shed light on the way I am claiming multiculturalism is a form of 
nationalism, it is useful to clarify: I am not asserting there is one or more de facto 
multicultural nation or multicultural state, even when I strongly believe it. In contrast, 
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I am saying that, if any liberal multicultural society exists they necessarily do so 
within the limits of the conceptual framework of civic nationalism. Essentially, 
multiculturalism is a project pursuing unity of the larger group, which is always a 
nation or a state. In other words, for better or worse, the multicultural theory does 
not in any significant way contest the legitimacy of the modern state and its 
organisation. Attending to the way multiculturalism develops its theoretical features, 
especially the idea of what collective identity a multicultural state should achieve, we 
can say it corresponds to the general form of civic nationalism. The kind of 
citizenship fostered by multiculturalism is built around the concept of national 
identity; pursuing accommodation of minorities in multicultural societies leads to a 
boost for the national identity of the larger society (Kymlicka, 1995). Or maybe, to 
say it properly, any sort of accommodation is determined by the goal of developing a 
strong national identity.  
There is a wide and fascinating body of literature, not entirely free of 
controversy, on different instances of multicultural nationalism, including the cases 
of Quebec and Canada (Kernerman, 2005), Scotland and Britain (Bond, 2017; Bond 
& Rosie, 2002; Hussain & Miller, 2006; Maxwell, 2006), Catalonia and Spain 
(MacInnes, 2006; Moreno, 2001), and Swiss federalism (Dardanelli & Stojanovia, 
2011; Reinhardt, 2011). However, I am not addressing this debate on the factual 
accommodation of national minorities or immigrants within larger societies, I do not 
try to demonstrate the success or failure of any form of multicultural nationalism, just 
its conceptual limits. I do not even try to move beyond the categories of multinational 
and mononational, as scholars such as Nenad Stojanovic (2011) or Michael Keating 
(2001) might invite us to do. I focus instead on the criteria on which all these 
empirical studies contrast their findings: the existence of a strong national 
identification to the larger group amongst the members of the minorities and the 
liberalisation of the mainstream society. Both lead, according to the modern liberal 
perspective, to trust in our fellow citizens.   
Claims for recognition made during the last decades by some national 
minorities shaped the way the whole multicultural project was understood. ‘New’ 
liberal nationalist movements, like the Québécois, set the model for national 
minorities to push cultural claims in the framework of western democracies. 
Quebec’s nationalism demonstrated that collective goals can be liberal and are 
capable of respecting fundamental rights (Taylor, 1994:59). The case of Quebec 




Kymlicka, who affirms ‘…my account of societal culture was intended to explain and 
evaluate the claims of sub-state national groups like the Québécois to autonomy 
and official language rights. In my view, the case of Québécois nationalism clearly 
exemplifies the goals of LMC.’ (2015:222).   
Particularly Charles Taylor (1993) and Will Kymlicka (1995) often refer to 
Quebec’s nationalism in their argumentations, not just because they are Canadian, 
but because it is an important instance of how nationalist claims can be compatible 
with liberal principles of civil rights and equality. Even Bhikhu Parekh spent some 
time analysing the case of Quebec (1994, 2000). Very quickly other instances, such 
as Catalonia, Scotland and Switzerland, expanded the set of liberal nationalist and 
multinationalist movements analysed by multicultural theory. The emphasis on 
Canada, Australia, Britain or Switzerland is undeniable, and the empirical evidence 
is always important in any possible theory. Nevertheless, in this case, to know if any 
of these countries are in fact multinational does not help us in understanding the 
structural scope of the multicultural project, and it does not express the way in which 
I claim multiculturalism is a form of nationalism.  
Multiculturalism is limited by the frame of nationalism because it retains the 
fundamental assumption that a strong collective identity is favourable to bringing 
together the members of a group: ‘…National identities are controversial when used 
to justify secession, dangerous when equated with race, but valuable when used to 
foster unity among citizens otherwise unknown to one another.’ (Uberoi, 2015:75) In 
consequence, similarly to the theories of nationalism, multicultural theorists believe 
that a strong identification with the larger country becomes an important way to 
share a sentiment leading to social cohesion. Like any state, multicultural states 
develop their own collective identity, which breaks through the different groups 
forming it and at the same time fosters the particular identities of smaller 
communities. In fact,   
…if there is a viable way to promote a sense of solidarity and common 
purpose in a multination state, it will involve accommodating, rather than 
subordinating, national identities. People from different national groups 
will only share an allegiance to the larger polity if they see it as the 
context within which their national identity is nurtured, rather than 
subordinated. (Kymlicka, 1995:189) 
From the perspective of multicultural theory, the political recognition of 
minority groups is fully compatible with the general form of civic nationalism, and it 
must be framed considering the obligation to identify with the larger state. From the 
other side, the relation is also possible, but more complex; despite the fact that most 
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accounts of nationalism would not deny that strong national identities lead to more 
cohesive societies, not every form of nationalism is compatible with the binary 
identity implied by the multicultural project. From the perspective of some theories 
on nationalism, the political recognition of minorities does not necessarily contribute 
to a stronger national identity for the larger polity. On the contrary, it might lead to a 
more fragmented society and to weaker bonds between different groups, which is an 
argument against multiculturalism endorsed by different perspectives. Nationalists, 
conservatives, liberals, cosmopolitanists, and transnationalists, amongst others, 
have subscribed to variations of this criticism (Kymlicka, 2015). A strong attachment 
to the culture, ethnicity and/or religion of the minority group might prevent individuals 
from embracing the identity of the larger society, and this becomes a key issue to 
deal with for the multicultural project.   
It is only some theoretical frameworks, those with a particular understanding 
of social cohesion, which accept the idea that members of a community can, 
simultaneously, develop a bond with a minority group and the larger polity. Even 
more, only a certain kind of nationalism would accept that providing room for the 
identity of minorities is a condition to secure the unity of the larger society, which is 
by far a more ambitious claim made by multiculturalism. This form of multicultural 
nationalism exists only at the intersection of different features that traditionally have 
formed the typology of nationalism; it partially overlaps features of civic, liberal, 
voluntaristic and cultural nationalism. It is close to what Miscevic would name 
sophisticated pro-nationalism (2014), represented by scholars such as David Miller 
(1995) and Yael Tamir (1993). Sophisticated pro-nationalists would agree that a 
strong overarching national identity is needed to spread solidarity amongst the 
different groups, but, at the same time, this identity should be inclusive in order to 
fulfil the liberal aims of social justice.    
Cultural differences do create barriers to trust – there is no question 
about that – but given the right pattern of interaction these barriers can 
be overcome. (…) One way to tackle this problem might be to look for 
connections at the individual level between sense of national identity, 
generalised trust in one’s fellow citizens and willingness to support 
socially just policies.’ (Miller, 2013:90-91)   
Multiculturalism is compatible with forms of liberal nationalism (Johnston et 
al., 2010; Kymlicka, 1995; Uberoi, 2008). They share fundamental principles and the 
same structure. Multicultural nationalism is in the first instance a liberal form of 
nationalism because it is grounded in the canonical liberal values of freedom, 




circumstance. Those who argue that multicultural policies are possible without 
eroding core liberal-democratic values, which we can name the liberal multicultural 
hypothesis (Kymlicka, 2010:258), are accepting the traditional framework of civic 
national-states. The idea that the inclusion of minority groups becomes part of the 
national identity for the larger society denotes the civic component of this form of 
nationalism49, especially because it emphasises the fact that the features of national 
identity derive from liberal practices and values. 
As mentioned above, according to the typology of nationalism, the civic idea 
of a nation tends to draw attention in the common political ground and the ideology 
behind it, acknowledging these as the glue for the group. In other words, what brings 
together the different groups within a multinational state corresponds to a shared 
civic culture, the liberal civic culture to be more specific. Multicultural nationalism 
also satisfies the tendency to place the community of identity in laws and 
institutions, which is another hallmark of civic forms of nationalism. ‘The identity of a 
political community lies in what all its members share not individually but collectively, 
not privately but publicly, and has an inescapable institutional focus.’ (Parekh, 
1994:502) Additionally, if the community is built on political ground, then the 
institutions are in charge of recognising and accommodating the identity and 
practice in the larger state. They are actually in charge of defining and spreading the 
idea of what national identity is in any case: 
Politicians and officials thus use the state to suggest what history, 
homeland, public culture and so on members of the nation share and in 
doing so they shape the summary of what members of the nation share 
that a national identity offers. (Uberoi, 2008:408) 
The particularities of the recognition and accommodation are a matter of 
debate, but the proposals are limited by the necessity to go through institutional 
instances; if federalism is the best system of government for the multicultural states 
or what particular multicultural policies should be supported are concerns beyond 
my purpose in this text. For what matters now, following Smith’s definition (1991:11), 
five out of five attributes of standard civic-liberal nationalism are included and 
discussed in the multicultural theory: historic territory, legal-political community, 
legal-political equality, and common civic culture and ideology. In regard to other 
                                               
49 Assertions highlighting the ideological content of national identity are always open to 
discussion. But then again, what matters for my argumentation here is not exactly if these 
claims are the case; when Kymlicka repeatedly says that ‘Canadians view immigrants and 
demographic diversity as key parts of their own Canadian identity.’ (2010:273), the 




features I have emphasised in my brief account of the typology of nationalism, I 
have to say that the identification is not so immediate; multicultural nationalism is 
also realist, voluntaristic and cultural, but for these features, some further 
clarification is needed. 
 
4.8 The civic features of multicultural nationalism 
 
In order to see in more detail how multicultural nationalism follows the same 
pattern of civic nationalism, we have to contrast it with the features mentioned in 
Chapter 3 for civic forms of nationalism: realist, voluntarist, and cultural. As we will 
see next, the arguments to describe how multicultural nationalism is realist and 
voluntarist complement each other. Multicultural nationalism is realist because it 
agrees that, despite the fact that national identities are constructed, the political ties 
in that social construction are real. They respond to particular historical, economic, 
political and even geographical conditions, and are not only a product of an 
ideological image of what is shared amongst the members of the community. 
National identities are not natural, there is no fixed substance behind them, instead, 
they are historically constructed. However, they are also historically constrained. In 
other words, even if it is a construction, national identity is not strictly a matter of 
collective choice, on the contrary, it embodies a sort of continuity through history 
that emphasises the past in the present.  
In Chapter 3, I mentioned the ad hoc nature of national identity. This feature 
denotes that the particularities of each community should be taken into account in a 
realist manner. However, there is also a general aim of national identity that 
transcends the particularities: fostering solidarity beyond the limited interaction that 
the members of a community can actually develop. In other words, national identity 
does not just preserve the social cohesion within a specific community but also 
helps to extend it.  
…nationality answers one of the most pressing needs of the modern 
world, namely how to maintain solidarity among the populations of states 
that are large and anonymous, such that their citizens cannot possibly 
enjoy the kind of community that relies on kinship or face-to-face 
interaction.’  (Miller, 1993:9)  
The assertion that multicultural nationalism is voluntarist has two parts 
closely connected to the realist nature of national identity. First, the fact that civic 




sense of the term, that is, it is not natural. Second, national identity’s continuity 
through history denotes that it is shaped by notions of inherited ways of life.  
The past is not a passive storehouse of material from which each 
generation chooses whatever it likes for the reconstruction of its national 
identity. (…) A coherent view of national identity must grow out of a 
constant dialogue between the past and the present.’ (Parekh, 
1994:504).  
To say it properly, multicultural nationalism is moderated-voluntarist, or if 
preferred realist-voluntarist. In this sense, it is far from radical civic nationalisms like 
the one defended by Ignatieff (1993) or Habermas’ constitutional patriotism, even 
from Gellner’s idea of nationalism as a political principle. Without going further, we 
can say it seems like a new variant of civic nationalism that tries to combine two 
important characteristics the reality of the circumstances shaping the groups and 
their ability to build an identity from them. Civic nations are indeed groups of people 
capable of organising themselves in a common political framework, just like its 
voluntarist quality dictates, however, this capability of organising has historical 
requirements, including cultural ones.   
In a certain way, this moderated-voluntarist nationalism tries to avoid the two 
myths on which nations have traditionally justified, or if preferred, it mixes them. The 
myth of the ethnic nation suggests that we do not have a choice in making of our 
national identity, it is completely determined by factors outside our intervention; the 
myth of the civic nation suggest that our national identity is nothing but a matter of 
choice. In the ethnic nation, members are together because they belong to the same 
ethnicity, religion or cultural group; in the civic nation, the members of the society 
are together because they are like-minded. However, neither of these answers 
alone seems enough. A realist-voluntarist stand on this matter seems more 
plausible and better describes the issue’s nuances. National identity, as the core of 
civic nationalism, seems to allow and demand a constant reaffirmation from each 
member of the community, denoting that it is essentially a matter of choice, but the 
object of the reaffirmation is not necessarily a matter of choice.    
A nation is, therefore, large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of 
the sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is 
prepared to make in the future. It presupposes a past; it is summarized, 
however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely, consent, the clearly 
expressed desire to continue a common life. A nation's existence is if you 
will pardon the metaphor, a daily plebiscite, just as an individual's 
existence is a perpetual affirmation of life. (Renan, 1990:19) 
The third feature is the cultural aspect. Multicultural nationalism clearly 
moves forward in emphasising the cultural features already present in crafting a 
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civic nation. The idea that the membership of a nation is based on allegiance to 
political principles, which is backed by any form of liberal nationalism should not be 
misunderstood as a lack of cultural elements, this is an achievement of cultural 
nationalism. 
The point is that all nationalisms have a cultural and historical 
component. Of course, the way culture and history is interpreted varies 
from nation to nation. Some nations define their culture in racial and 
religious terms, others do not. These variations are crucial to 
understanding why some nationalisms are xenophobic, authoritarian and 
expansionist, while others peaceful, liberal, and democratic. (Kymlicka, 
2001c:247) 
Multiculturalism proposes a solution that does not disrupt radically the 
established balance: including cultural recognition in the list of primary goods, which 
are sine qua non for a good life. In that way, ‘This requirement of political recognition 
of cultural particularity —extended to all individuals— is compatible with a form of 
universalism that counts the culture and cultural context valued by individuals as 
among their basic interests.’ (Gutmann, 1994:5) A significant amount of theoretical 
work was developed to justify the idea that every traditional culture has the value of 
a primary good. For instance, Taylor develops a thoughtful reflection to show that 
culture is not only instrumentally valuable, but it must be considered an irreducibly 
social good (1995), for that purpose he deeply criticises the fundamental assumption 
of the utilitarian theory. In the same direction, O’Neill (1999:224) and Song (2017) 
claim that Kymlicka’s multicultural theory could be understood as an attempt to 
consider culture as a primary good in the sense of Rawls’ theory of justice. In other 
words, a good which people need, no matter their particular way of life, because 
without it there would not be a context to make meaningful choices. If culture is 
indeed a primary good, it immediately reached the status of a thing that every 
rational person is presumed to want and which is necessary for pursuing personal 
goals, like Rawls defines it (1999 [1971]:62). 
This is a good moment to recapitulate. Multiculturalism, as a response to 
minorities demanding recognition of their identities, is only able to provide the room 
for that recognition, not the recognition itself. In that respect, it falls short. Second, 
this is a limit that has inherited from a robust tradition of liberal nationalism, its form 
of organising society, and from the role and attributes it provides to the state. These 
inherited features lead to an important methodological problem: there is no point to 
maintain these assumptions and at the same time keep asking multiculturalism for 
something that is beyond its scope. Multiculturalism is not able to provide direct 




sometimes it is not enough.   
Finally, we briefly analyse this description of multicultural nationalism in at 
least one important case, so we can perceive some issues with the theory. 
According to scholars like Kymlicka, Quebec is emblematic of multicultural 
nationalism because it brings together the aims of consolidating their societal culture 
and also liberalising and democratising its society. And even if this is true, it seems 
that at some moment during this process things turned upside down. A fight for 
cultural recognition ended up again in a case where, putting aside for a moment all 
the positive consequences of it, the political prevails over the cultural. It is true that 
there is no reason why the political and the cultural cannot converge in the same 
nationalist movement, but in the big picture, Quebec’s case became the perfect 
example of how cultural mobilisation is not necessarily opposed to liberal and 
democratic values, and not the perfect example of how a group of people claiming 
recognition should be valued for what they are, for their identity and basically for the 
content of their culture. This reduction of the cultural dimension to political tolerance 
is what limits recognition of minority groups in the scope of the multicultural theory. 
Perhaps Charles Taylor is a better example of how they try to push the limits of 
political recognition a little bit further but unluckily not enough. In regards to Quebec, 
he says that  
It is not just a matter of having the French language available for those 
who might choose it [which is what Kymlicka’s societal culture would 
support]. (…) But it also involves making sure that there is a community 
of people here in the future that will want to avail itself of the opportunity 
to use the French language. Policies aimed at survival actively seek to 
create members of the community,…(1994:57-58)  
Unfortunately, even if he is closer, there is still a gap between a full 
recognition of cultural claims and their survival. The survival of a culture is not the 
same as the full recognition that a community might demand. Keeping the 
Francophone culture alive is not the same as others valuing it as a valid and 




I presented a minimum definition of multiculturalism as an institutionally-
oriented liberal perspective centred in group-differentiated rights. I also distinguished 
between three levels of analysis; I went further into the philosophical and political 
arguments. In this way we could see that behind multiculturalism there are traditions 
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of liberalism, the Enlightenment, contractarianism and modernity, which leads to the 
construction of the same idea of political plurality found in those approaches. I 
delineated the three main forms of multicultural theory: liberal, communitarian and 
the second wind of multiculturalism. I particularly tried to emphasise that each 
expanded the limits of the most traditional liberalism; the path goes from group-
differentiated rights, to deny neutrality of the state, to finally dismiss other features of 
traditional liberalism. Finally, I portrayed the convergence of the three forms of 
multiculturalism in the idea of civic national identity, which addresses the problems 
of social cohesion and political plurality. I explained that the three forms support 
instances of multicultural nationalism. Unfortunately, this multicultural nationalism 
and its related political plurality is not enough for a strong form of identity and 
recognition. In the next chapter I develop further the criticism, so it is possible to 








The limits of multiculturalism 
 
 
What follows is an account of some criticisms addressed to multicultural 
theory. Considering the diversity of perspectives and issues that can be criticised in 
multicultural theory, I follow the attempts of Will Kymlicka and Ralph Grillo to 
organise the criticism. Moreover, I point out that it is unusual to find critical 
evaluations of multicultural theory that systematise the problems and connect the 
different issues. Therefore, it is useful to build a more robust critique that 
consistently follows a train of thought. What I propose in this chapter is that such a 
dogged unification of these critiques will reveal the shared constraints faced by all 
forms of multiculturalism.  
The chapter is divided into 6 sections before its Conclusion. The first one is 
devoted to situating the review outside the debate about the backlash against 
multiculturalism. It is very important to discuss why multiculturalism has not worked 
in the way some people expected, including advocates and critics. However, I 
propose that multiculturalism has fallen short not because it is an essentially flawed 
socio-political project but because its liberal and modern assumptions limit its reach. 
I propose a systematic approach, which means uniting the critics under one 
paradigm. 
The next 5 sections follow the same train of thought and they move from the 
critique of essentialism to the way multiculturalism conceptualises the sources of 
inequality, discrimination and bigotry. In Section 2, I describe one of the most 
common criticisms directed at multiculturalism: essentialism. The critique claims 
multiculturalism is an essentialist approach because it reifies cultures and identities. 
Behind this claim there is a fear that the efforts at cultural preservation preclude 
individual agency. However, some sort of essentialisation is unavoidable. Liberal 
democracies also essentialise some of its subjects but this usually remains 
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unnoticed. Section 3 carries this last idea further, arguing liberal societies tend to 
essentialise their members in the search for social cohesion. This notion of societal 
unity determines what kind of diversity is fostered. This leads us to question, is 
collective identity possible without unity? Additionally, I explain how national identity 
is the royal road to social cohesion. Civic forms of identity were an attempt to avoid 
ethnic and racial essentialism. Unfortunately, they cannot help impose other 
conceptualisations of fellow citizens. In Section 4, I describe how the categorisation 
of culture, nation and people and their articulation set some limits on 
multiculturalism. I pay particular attention to the problems derived from defining 
culture in terms of shared language and history. Section 5 is devoted to showing 
how the majority-minority dichotomy is more about unbalanced power relations than 
proportions. In other words, it is not clear that a quantitative category reflects a 
qualitative issue. The conflicts between majorities and minorities are not only 
cultural but power struggles. Finally, in Section 6, I further investigate the reasons 
why multiculturalism conceptualises hierarchies and inequalities as an outcome of 
illiberal ideologies. Then I analyse its consequences: even if some part of the power 
relations can be framed as psychological dislike, or prejudice, the material side of 
power is equally important. At the end of this chapter, I will be able to affirm that, in 
the multicultural theory, the Other is only recognised in the process of integration, 
outside there is no recognition. 
 
5.1 Moving from failure and backlash to systematic criticism. 
 
The current debate on multiculturalism has centred around its supposed 
failure and backlash. Therefore, the main concern is that multicultural policies are 
not working as expected. The failure is usually explained as a mixture of theoretical 
and practical issues, including inconsistencies, misinterpretations, and 
misunderstandings. The criticism of the multicultural theory is itself very diverse in its 
nature and in how it is expressed. For instance, Daniel O’Neill (1999) argues that 
important multicultural scholars, including liberals -Kymlicka-, communitarians -
Taylor- and conventionalists -Walzer-, are inconsistent in their theories when 
handling specific cases like Salman Rushdie’s publication of The Satanic Verses.50 
                                               
50 The controversy refers to the publication of Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses and 
the satire of Islam portrayed there. British Muslims campaigned to prevent its publication and 




Multicultural proposals like external protections, cultural relativism, or justice as 
relative to social meanings do not seem to find the expected congruency. The 
abstract theory supports special protections for vulnerable cultural minorities from 
the mainstream culture, but in paradigmatic instances like the Rushdie affair, they 
revert to universal and non-contextualised principles. 
I believe the difficulties stem from an unresolved (and perhaps 
unresolvable) tension at the heart of each thinker's attempt to synthesize 
strong multiculturalism and individual rights-based liberalism. The 
particular nature of this tension differs, given the different theoretical 
presuppositions underpinning the theories of Kymlicka, Taylor, and 
Walzer, respectively; nevertheless, it remains, and makes one skeptical 
about the project of multicultural liberalism as defended in all three 
instances. (O'Neill, 1999:223) 
Yasmin Alibhai-Brown (2000) argues that the liberal multicultural model of 
representation only deals with elites, does not consider change, does not solve 
inequalities, builds walls between communities and, furthermore, it is not up to the 
challenge of new identities and participation in the globalised world. This criticism is 
paradigmatic of post-multiculturalist perspectives, which believe that multiculturalism 
was an idea relevant to a time that no longer exists and we need to direct our efforts 
to new approaches.  
On some other specific issues between the theory and the empirical 
evidence, Karin Reinhardt claims: 
Kymlicka aims to formulate a metatheory, with empirical examples 
supporting theoretical assumptions. In the end, this approach leads to the 
failure of his theory. The strict contrast between mononational and 
multinational states does not exist in reality and therefore the theoretical 
concept is unsupported. (2011:791) 
The various critiques to multiculturalism can go on and on. Just in the few 
examples I mentioned there are claims of inconsistency, obsolescence and 
empirically unsupported concepts. Moreover, there is no easy way to organise such 
a diversity of issues. 
My aim is to consider the multicultural debate outside the framework of its 
alleged failure and approach its limits, theoretical assumptions and derived issues 
instead. What I try to convey is that the impasse reached in the multicultural debate 
could be explained as a consequence of its principles and values, which limit the 
aims and potentials of the project. This is my attempt to achieve a more systematic 
                                                                                                                                     
opposition to Islam or fatwa. The multicultural aspect is visible because there was an attempt 
to extend the blasphemy law to include Rushdie’s book, but that conflicted with the 
commitment to individual autonomy and free speech supported in liberal societies. The 
particular side that each multiculturalist took on this controversy is what O’Neill analyses. 
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and methodical approach to deal with some of the central issues of multicultural 
theory, paying attention especially to criticisms of essentialism, systems of 
categorisation, the unity of multicultural states and some ideological assumptions. In 
any case, a further justification for adopting this perspective is needed before 
starting the analysis. 
The idea of limits is not completely unknown to the supporters and detractors 
of multiculturalism. For instance, Kymlicka has recently acknowledged some limits of 
his multicultural theory that were not so clear at its early stage, or that at some 
moment during its development were taken-for-granted.  
It is far from clear, in either theory or practice, what sort of 
multiculturalism is appropriate in contexts other than permanent 
settlement. (…) some of the preconditions of LMC are eroding. LMC, I 
would argue, was theorised for situations in which immigrants were seen 
as legally authorised, permanently settled, and presumptively loyal. In an 
age of securitisation and super-diversity, these assumptions are put into 
question. (Kymlicka, 2015:241-42) 
These limits mentioned by Kymlicka have been unveiled by the shifting 
circumstances. However, if the success of a socio-political project depends on the 
fact that some initial and constant circumstances are immutable, then every project 
is doomed to fail before even it starts. Circumstances will always change over time, 
and to some extent, mutatis mutandis, the general project should adapt to different 
conditions. In any case, those preconditions that Kymlicka mentions are accidental 
and not essential to multicultural theory, abusing the Aristotelian terminology. The 
fundamental circumstances for multiculturalism persist, namely, modern, 
democratic, plural multinational states, where elementary human-rights and liberal 
principles are embraced and fostered by its institutions. As Kymlicka himself tries to 
demonstrate with his Multicultural Index, despite the backlash discourse, western 
democracies are moving forward with developing stronger multicultural programs. In 
consequence, the ‘structural’ preconditions for the multicultural project are not 
eroding, they are as stable as before. 
The limits I try to unveil are not in the context, though it is clear that it has 
changed and obliges some adaptations that multiculturalism perhaps was not ready 
to implement. If my hypothesis holds, and I have chosen the appropriate perspective 
to identify the limits of the multicultural theory, at the end of the chapter I will be able 
to affirm that multiculturalism has not succeeded as expected because it is a 
western, liberal, democratic theory of social justice unable to consider diversity 
outside that reduced framework. In other words, we can ask, can multiculturalism 




suitable for western societies? Finally, we can inquire, is the kind of diversity it 
promotes the sort of diversity that we want to support? 
Multiculturalism has been criticised over a considerable period of time and 
from different angles. Will Kymlicka, a regular recipient of reproaches of multicultural 
theory, categorises the critiques into anti-multiculturalist and post-multiculturalist. 
Anti-multiculturalists argue that multiculturalism is illiberal and contrary to modern 
values of individual freedom and democratic citizenship. On the other hand, post-
multiculturalists accept multiculturalism is rooted in liberal principles, but they insist it 
has failed to address minorities’ problems and has created new ones. (Kymlicka, 
2015:211). Kymlicka himself has dedicated considerable effort to battle on both 
fronts. Since his first works such as Liberalism, Community and Culture (1989) and 
particularly Multicultural Citizenship (1995), he advocated differentiated minority 
rights as compatible with liberal principles, responding that way to the anti-
multiculturalists. It is understandable why some of the most orthodox liberals might 
believe otherwise, after all, the different approaches do try to expand the limits of 
classical liberalism. Despite that, they never go beyond it. On the other hand, he has 
also answered the post-multiculturalist critique associated with the idea of a 
multicultural backlash. Some of his recent scholarly pieces respond to the post-
multiculturalist perspective, particularly Multiculturalism: Success, Failure and Future 
(2012b) and The Essentialist Critique of Multiculturalism (2015). However, post-
multiculturalist criticism is a more challenging enterprise. The state of the current 
debate leads to a curious paradox that keeps is not easy to explain: post-
multiculturalists critics often sympathise with the aims of the multicultural project but 
they keep proclaiming its failure.  
So, unlike anti-multiculturalists, these theorists are not out simply to 
score points against multiculturalism, or to ridicule or caricature it. In 
many ways their instincts are to sympathise with multiculturalist 
struggles. And yet they have all come to the conclusion that 
multiculturalism needs a radical overhaul, and in particular an overhaul of 
its essentialist tendencies. (Kymlicka, 2015:220-21) 
Post-multiculturalism represents, in a broader sense, critiques centred on the 
idea of multicultural failure. Nevertheless, this claim can be sustained from very 
different perspectives and at different levels. As Kymlicka says: ‘…the post-
multiculturalist critique conflates different potential targets, jumping from critiques of 
academic theories of liberal multiculturalism to critiques of government policies of 
multiculturalism to critiques of everyday street-level discourses or enactments of 
ethnic difference.’ (2015:209) Also, such diverse topics rarely achieve a significant 
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impact on the theoretical framework or policymaking. ‘While all of the authors begin 
with a strong rhetorical commitment to a radical overhaul of multiculturalism, by the 
end of their analysis, they have all backed away from making any radical proposals 
for change.’ (2015:239) I think Kymlicka is right. The criticism usually is not so 
radical because they do not systematically organise the information, and because it 
does not always dig as deep as the theoretical principles or assumptions. 
Systematic here does not mean all-inclusive; a systematic critique of 
multiculturalism is not the one that catalogues every possible mistake but the one 
that articulates the attempts under the same paradigm. 
Perhaps the first step to organise the critiques is by pointing out the main 
issues they cover, as Grillo does: 
There are six principal areas of controversy, problems with 
multiculturalist theory and practice: (1) multiculturalism's implicit 
essentialism; (2) the system of categorization which underpins it; (3) the 
form that multicultural politics takes; (4) the ritualization of ethnicity often 
associated with it; (5) the elision of race (and class) that it appears to 
entail; and (6) the attack on the ‘common core’ which it represents. 
(Grillo, 1998:195) 
These six considerations are the topics that frequently arise in the critiques 
of multiculturalism, regardless of the fact there is no analysis of these issues that 
have been successfully established as an unavoidable reference. Most of the 
criticism is partial and does not connect systematically with other questions, besides 
they are usually far from being conclusive.  
Most of the time, the questions are on the table but are incautiously 
developed. Several authors make insightful critiques, but they become just hints, 
that is to say, taken to their full logical and consequential bloom. Next, I analyse the 
problems of essentialism, flawed categorisation, social unity and some ideological 
assumptions and I consider them as limits on the multicultural theory. Clearly, they 
are just the beginning of something that will need further development. However, 
this text is a piece of that larger puzzle. What I describe next points out in that 
direction. 
 
5.2 Essentialism  
 
Before moving to analyse the critiques on multiculturalism as an essentialist 
theory, I need to go further in explaining my approach to dealing with the limits and 




is, the legitimate extent of something. Kant refers to the limits of knowledge as the 
extent of what can be legitimately known: for my purposes, the limits of 
multiculturalism correspond to the extent of what multiculturalism as a socio-political 
project can legitimately achieve. In other words, instead of trying to demonstrate 
supposed essentialism as a cause of the multicultural backlash, we can consider it 
as a limit and investigate what restrictions set to the project. 
The narrative of the backlash assumes causal connections between the 
theory and the failure that are not easy to demonstrate. One of the problems with 
the causal perspective is that many of the criticisms directed to the multicultural 
theory cannot be treated properly. For instance, it is virtually impossible to 
demonstrate -and in that case also to deny- essentialism as a cause or effect of 
anything, merely because there is no direct connexion between essentialism, 
howsoever it is considered, and social processes. That is why multiculturalism’s 
supporters like Kymlicka can take the Reductio ad absurdum argument a bit far and 
include doses of irony: 
According to critics, multiculturalism actively 'encourages' people to think 
in essentialist terms, 'pressuring' people to act in essentialist ways, even 
'forcing' and 'imposing' essentialist identities and practices on people. But 
all this talk of multiculturalism doing things out there in the world is 
hopelessly reified. (…) The post-multiculturalist literature is full of 
agentless processes. According to post-multiculturalists, there is this 
thing called multiculturalism that is telling people, encouraging people, 
pressuring people, forcing people -but it is never specified who is doing 
this talking, encouraging, pressuring or forcing. (Kymlicka, 2015:240) 
Since the multicultural project’s beginning, the issue of essentialism has 
been a recurrent component in the debates. However, as Grillo affirms: ‘The charge 
of essentialism is frequently made, but rarely argued persuasively. “In the present 
deconstructive moment,” says Werbner, “any unitary conception of a “bounded” 
culture is pejoratively labelled naturalistic and essentialist”.’ (Grillo, 1998:196)51 The 
same opinion is backed by Kymlicka, who asserts that ‘…what appears to be an 
overwhelming consensus on LMC's essentialist flaws starts to dissolve into a more 
disparate and disjointed series of largely unsupported speculations and assertions.’ 
(Kymlicka, 2015:221) The claims that essentialism is an issue for multiculturalism 
are not clearly developed, working on different levels and not clearly relating to each 
other. There is a hazy notion that cultural essentialism refers to ‘…the idea that a 
population may be defined by its presumed cultural specificity,’ (Grillo, 1998:25) or 
that ethnic groups possess cultural specificities and distinctiveness. Other times the 
                                               
51 Werbner’s reference corresponds to (1997b:3-4) 
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reproach of essentialism is motivated more by possible consequences than the 
accurate identification of a theoretical assumption. 
The positing of minority or immigrant cultures, which need to be 
respected, defended, publicly supported and so on, is said to appeal to 
the view that cultures are discrete, frozen in time, impervious to external 
influences, homogeneous and without internal dissent; that people of 
certain family, ethnic or geographical origins are always to be defined by 
them and indeed are supposed to be behaviourally determined by them. 
(Modood, 1998:378) 
In more detail, the post-multicultural critique of essentialism is directed into 
two terms: culture and identity.52 According to this critique, the essentialisation of 
culture and identity implies they are singular, simple, independent of its instances, 
fixed, beyond any possible change or criticism, homogeneous, uniform, and 
reductionist. In other words, they go against most of the values related to diversity 
such as multiplicity, complexity and, especially, agency. In Chapter 8, I will develop 
this issue further because it is a proper ontological assumption that must be 
addressed in that dimension. For now, it is enough to say that post-multiculturalists 
are afraid of cultural preservation because they believe it opposes to individual 
autonomy; they think that to essentialise minorities’ identity leads us to consider 
their members as prisoners of their own cultures. 
Each instance of multicultural theory I describe in this text shows fair 
concerns about this delicate balance between cultural preservation and human 
agency.53 Kymlicka proposes to distinguish between external protections and 
internal restrictions to overcome this problem of suppressing individual freedom as a 
consequence of cultural preservation. Similarly, Taylor argues that a community can 
embrace a particular idea of the good and at the same time be liberal, that is, it can 
respect and foster diversity, difference and the right to disagree even if it openly 
embrace a particular cultural perspective. Parekh denies the universalism -monism- 
of any culture and proposes intercultural dialogue based on deliberation, which also 
preserves individual agency above the possible impositions of a culture over its 
individuals. The important question for my argument now is if preserving a culture 
always leads to a form of essentialism. I think the answer is yes and no.  
Cultures and identities are constructed and determined, which means that 
they can be guided and changed but only within the already given determinations. 
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interventionism and precedence in the context of Québec interculturalism, which is another 




As I said, I will justify this argument in Chapter 8; still, the tendencies to essentialise 
culture or identity are ontologically unavoidable. Essentialisation is part of a dialectic 
relation in which the opposite tendency is also present, that is, the constant change 
of the current state of affairs. We are culturally shaped and, at the same time, we 
are able to exercise our agency even against these determinations. I beg the reader 
to accept, for the sake of the argument and until I treat this properly, that at the 
fundamental level there is no way to avoid a form of essentialism in relation to 
identity.   
The post-multicultural critique of essentialism is usually addressed to 
minorities for various reasons. I suspect that most of the times critiques believe 
essentialism in the case of minorities prevent the liberalisation that is pursued54 in 
the process of integration and development of civic forms of identity. ‘…examples of 
illiberal cultures do exist, and an important question is whether or not what makes 
them distinctive could, in all cases, withstand the process of liberalization.’ 
(McDonald, 1996:303) Additionally, critiques hardly consider that the mainstream 
culture also has the same structure and demands forms of social unity. This means 
there is an implicit essentialisation of the liberal culture that remains unnoticed. It is 
only when notions such as uniformity, neutrality or universality are questioned, that 
the same essentialisation of the mainstream culture in nation-states becomes 
evident in the liberal context. ‘Both nations and ethnic groups are bodies of people 
bound together by common cultural characteristics and mutual recognition; 
moreover, there is no sharp dividing line between them.’ (Miller, 1995:20) In 
consequence, the criticism that multiculturalism exaggerates internal unity of 
cultures can be equally applied to forms of -civic- culture already existing, including 
the liberal ones. 
Critiques can emphasise fluidity within the groups, and this is possible 
pointing out the constructed nature of identity. However, when they do this, attention 
is directed at knowing to what extent identity is constructed and voluntary, though as 
soon as they turn back to the issue of social cohesion, they find themselves in the 
cycle of essentialisation. In this sense, we can affirm that multiculturalism is 
essentialist, not because it opposes itself to non-essentialist forms of collective 
identity, but because there is no way to affirm a form of identity that is not 
                                               
54 This idea of a process of liberalisation of minorities is clearer in the case of Kymlicka 
(2001b) and it has been already assimilated. For instance, Brian Walker affirms that, 
‘Perhaps we might understand Kymlicka as advocating just this sort of development when he 
mentions that we should seek to promote liberalization in ethnic communities rather than see 
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essentialist to some extent. Nonetheless, it does not mean there is no internal 
movement at the core of collective identities or that they are unable to change. I 
pause here and save these arguments for Chapter 8. This is clearly a philosophical 
problem as old as western philosophy and maybe more so: the problem of identity. 
How is it possible that what constantly changes at the same time remains itself; or 
the other way round, how is possible that what remains still constantly changes. 
(Gallois, 2016).  
Essentialism sets a limit to multiculturalism in particular, and other liberal 
approaches of diversity and plurality in general, even if they try to avoid it. 
Essentialism is usually hidden behind the problem of social cohesion, a problem that 
comes back over and over again, pushing multiculturalism to return to the idea of 
national identity. It is also hidden in the notion of citizenship, which is understood by 
multiculturalist thinkers, mainly, as a way to achieve social integration in modern 
communities. Citizenship is supposed to serve an integrative function and help 
social unity (Kymlicka, 1995:Ch9). But before moving to the critical analysis of social 
cohesion there are a few more things to say about essentialism. 
What we can do next is to ask why in some case essentialisation is 
considered problematic and others not, that is, why in the case of minorities it seems 
automatically wrong, but in the case of liberal mainstream societies it is not even 
spotted. Most of the time scholars set agency and will as the criteria. If something is 
chosen, not imposed, then it is not problematic. This is the difference between the 
essentialism of mainstream society and of the minorities. The first one is believed to 
permit and promote agency, the second one to restrict it. Majorities also operate on 
cultural motivations, but as long as they are democratic and liberal it is not 
considered a problem. In Chapter 8, I argue that at least on the ontological level, 
agency is never completely jeopardised, even in the case of restrictive communities; 
the same way, it is not absolutely guaranteed in liberal regimes. It is always part of a 
dialectical and historical process of choosing from what is available to us as real and 
objective determinations.  
Especially Taylor (1994) and Modood (2015), seem to suggest that 
minorities have the right to essentialise their identity when they pursue their 
preservation and freedom. However, it is clear that any tendency of essentialisation 
implies the parallel internal struggle of reorganising, affirming or rejecting those 
pragmatically essentialised practices and values. In reality, we always have both 
                                                                                                                                     




processes running in tandem. If we want to see it in logical terms, every struggle for 
breaking some limits require the imposition of those limits in the first place. 
Essentialised identities always find their own internal criticism, which is qualitatively 
different from the one that can be made from the outside.  
If we try to understand the whole process, we can say that multiculturalism is 
possible in the first place because it has denied essentialist conceptions of 
nationhood that exclude minorities. Then it is bizarre that it can be blamed for being 
essentialist when it starts trying to overcome one form of essentialism. The same 
happens to the post-multiculturalist critique of essentialism ‘…which is itself guilty of 
reification. According to critics, multiculturalism reifies ethnic groups as unified 
agents who speak and act with one unified voice. I would argue that this critique 
itself involves a reification of multiculturalism,’ (Kymlicka, 2015:239) But this is not 
new, it is a phenomenon shared with civic nationalism, which already tried to move 
from essentialist ethnic forms of citizenship to civic ones, hoping that move would 
evade essentialism. However, as history proved, that was not always the case and 
for a long time, forms of civic national identity have excluded and misrecognised 
individuals. This is an important idea to develop, but unfortunately, I cannot do it in 
this text. I will save it for another time but I truly believe that the wrong assumption in 
all these matters can be expressed in this way: we tend to believe that if something 
is inclusive, then it cannot essentialise. Nonetheless I do not think this is the case, 
groups can essentialise and be inclusive. 
 
5.3 Social cohesion 
 
Let us keep in mind that multiculturalism fights the particular forms of 
essentialism preventing minorities from participation in the mainstream culture and 
national identity. However, it cannot avoid some sort of essentialisation when it 
deals with social cohesion. I reflect on this now.  
My premise is that liberal societies, through political processes, shape and 
reproduce the limits of difference. Considering the unbreakable relation between 
plurality and unity, the way diversity is legitimately allowed within a liberal state is 
determined by its assumed notion of unity. The idea that institutions can organise 
and mediate in the case of a cross-cultural clash hides the fact that the state is not 
neutral. I argue that the state tends to create, impose and reproduce a civic form of 
uniformity in the communities, limiting in that sense the difference to what is in 
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correspondence to that minimum required for the mediation. In other words, not all 
forms of diversity are allowed in an inclusive liberal framework. It cannot be inclusive 
with illiberal practices and values. The most divisive debates in the multicultural 
theory refer to the practices and values that liberal societies are entitled to reject 
because of their supposed illiberality. ‘…for liberals the multicultural question is how 
is liberalism to cope with non-liberal groups (in American political theory usually and 
quite unselfconsciously referred to as ‘illiberal groups’). (Modood, 2001:247) 
The State, through multicultural citizenship, fosters diversity in a way that 
provides a context of choice for people, encouraging respect for others and 
facilitating political negotiation. However, it does not necessarily fight all dominant 
narratives. In a double movement, the state allows individuals to make their own 
choices, including keeping their culture and, at the same time, it promotes and 
usually imposes a particular culture that is condensed in the idea of the liberal 
national identity. And perhaps there is nothing wrong with this process in the sense 
that the content of that national identity could be positive and fulfil all its aims of unity 
and cohesion. Right now, I am just paying attention to the structure of the process. 
The question is why at some point do we have to come back to an essentialist form 
of identity? The answer is to secure social cohesion for the community. And this is 
an extremely difficult task. For instance, referring to Kymlicka’s theory, Grillo says: 
‘...his suggestion that “shared identity” will provide the basis for unity in multinational 
states (1995a: 187ff.) seems to beg all the questions of what and how’55 (Grillo, 
1998:236).  
I try to avoid the causal perspective, as I mentioned in the last section. 
However, it is useful to go deeper into the debate as it has developed because it 
unmasks the basic concern: the possibility that liberal approaches also impose 
essentialist forms of identity in its search for social cohesion. For instance, Kymlicka 
is aware of the problems of trying to push a particular form of identity even if it is 
liberal and positive. 
What is the nature of this 'forcing' and 'imposing an identity on someone, 
and how do we distinguish it from, say, 'democratically persuading' 
someone to adopt an identity? Fraser says that multiculturalism enables 
group leaders to exercise 'moral pressure' on group members, and that 
this is how identities are 'imposed'. But what distinguishes moral 
pressure from moral persuasion? What criteria do we use to distinguish 
legitimate forms of argumentation and mobilisation from illegitimate 
'moral pressure', 'force' and 'imposition', and how can we address these 
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latter problems without restricting basic civil and political liberties? 
(Kymlicka, 2015:237) 
The possibility that multiculturalism allows the imposition of identity on 
minority individuals quickly expands to the sphere of the larger community. In this 
case, the distinction of internal restrictions and external protections does not seem 
suitable. Nevertheless, what is important now is that it remains unclear how the 
institutions of liberal societies can foster values in the majority culture without 
enforcing them. In other words, how can the structure of the modern states pressure 
and persuade its members to adopt liberal practices, values, and identities, gluing 
societies in the process, without imposing them, which would clearly be an internal 
restriction. And even further, it is not clear what is the fundamental difference 
between persuasion made by the liberal state and by minority groups. 
We can follow Kymlicka and try to explain what ‘democratically persuading’ 
means and how a shared, persuaded identity would provide the basis for social unity 
in the case of liberal multinational states. Perhaps this is a very important clue to 
understanding further the mechanisms of social, cultural and political belonging.56 
We can try to fight the idea that every sort of collective representation is a form of 
essentialism. ‘…this indiscriminate accusation of essentialism, applied uncritically to 
all objectifications of collective agents, has tended, (…) to obscure processes of 
collective representation and self-representation which are not essentialist.’ 
(Werbner, 1997a:228) or identify between some more plausible ways of 
essentialising. ‘Bureaucratic fictions of unity essentialise, but they do so by 
objectifying communities situationally and pragmatically, in relation to notions of 
redistributive justice. This objectification is quite different from the violent 
essentialising of racism, or the mobilising, strategic essentialising of self-
representation.’ (Werbner, 1997a:247-48) I wish I had the time and room to explore 
these issues further but I can only flag them as possible topics for future research. 
For my current purposes, it is enough to mention the difficulties of the matter and 
how we can move forward with an ontological perspective.  
The unity-diversity dialectic is a well-known problem in philosophy and so far, 
the proposals are not exactly positive; there is no easy way to achieve the unity of 
what is diverse. Kymlicka acknowledges this in asking ‘What then are the possible 
sources of unity in a multination state which affirms, rather than denies, its national 
                                               
56 Without being able to provide any evidence. This democratic persuasion seems to be the 
model for political diversity and unity. However, it is not clear that the political model can be 
replicated in other spheres. 
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differences? I do not have a clear answer to this question. Indeed, I doubt that there 
are any obvious or easy answers available.’ (Kymlicka, 1995:187)57 I think the 
debate bares a fundamental difference between developing social cohesion, 
solidarity and loyalty -political identity- and recognising what we are -strong identity-. 
There is a leap in trying to provide different groups with an equal context to 
develop themselves, through group-differentiated rights and proposing a theory of 
unity for these different groups in the same society. And again, this is not a 
malicious criticism; my aim is to spot a boundary that multiculturalism -and any other 
theories of plurality and diversity- will find over and over again. Some imposition is 
unavoidable and multicultural theorists should start their developments with an up-
front clarification.  
Scholars know quite well that plurality is related to unity and at some extent 
determined by it. Grillo argues, through a comparative socio-anthropological 
analysis, that the different configurations of political order -unity- constrain the 
manner in which plurality is embraced or denied in different societies.  
Pluralism is both a political philosophy and an analytical category, though 
in each guise it has many forms. All varieties, says Nicholls, share a 
common concern with ‘the degree of unity and the type of unity which 
actually exist in particular states, or which ought to exist’ (1974: 1), but 
there are different intellectual and theoretical traditions of pluralism which 
address different aspects of this common concern in different ways. 
(Grillo, 1998:5)58 
In other words, diverse political and social configurations necessarily develop 
their own mechanisms for promoting and imposing unity within societies. In modern 
western states, plurality is restricted by the way communities organise life around 
some principles that work as social glue. If this is accurate, we would have a rich 
lode to assay not just about diversity and plurality in the western democracies but, 
about the unity of those multicultural western democracies. We have to deal with the 
possibility that our efforts to promote cross-cultural interaction and tolerance could 
be limited, and perhaps prevented, by the modern ambition to glue together 
communities through shared identities. It seems somewhat clear that liberal 
societies in their modern configuration tend to choose unity over diversity when the 
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shared conception of justice. But he argues that only shared identity can secure the unity. 
Unfortunately, he cannot suggest any content to this shared identity leaving the door open to 
proposals. ‘A fundamental challenge facing liberal theorists, therefore, is to identify the 
sources of unity in a democratic multination state. (1995:192) 




tension between these two terms demands some resolution. ‘Under modernity, the 
state acknowledged it had such an interventionist role, though usually it intervened 
to suppress rather than promote difference.’ (Grillo, 1998:236) 
The classical problem of unity and diversity gained renewed importance 
when modern western states faced the complexity of reconstituting themselves as 
multinational and/or polyethnic. However, in these days of far-right governments and 
anti-immigrant sentiments, fostering the communities’ unity becomes dangerous, 
especially when it takes the need for loyalty, allegiance and solidarity too far. We are 
witnessing new forms of ‘bad’ nationalism that are not easily distinguishable than the 
‘good’ one, especially because they seem to pose the same questions. In any case, 
this claim for unity preaches that it is only possible amongst members sharing the 
same nationality, which is not an unheard of idea. For the most orthodox political 
theory, social unity is only possible if members share a core of common ideas that 
make them agree to be part of a given community.  
For liberals like Mill, democracy is government ‘by the people’, but 
self‐rule is only possible if ‘the people’ are ‘a people’—a nation. The 
members of a democracy must share a sense of political allegiance, and 
common nationality was said to be a precondition of that allegiance. 
(Kymlicka, 1995:52) 
In other words, social cohesion could only be achieved by developing and 
spreading one culture, the culture that brought together those members in the first 
place. Beyond equality, freedom, democracy, and all the liberal principles, 
multicultural theory should explain how multicultural states achieve social cohesion 
and how this social cohesion is qualitatively different than the far-right, conservative 
one. 
 
5.4 Categorisation of culture, nation and people 
 
Critics often see the seeds of essentialism in the categories used in a theory. 
This is not different in the case of multiculturalism, particularly its notion of culture 
seems to be an instance of what Seyla Benhabib (2002:4) calls the reductionist 
sociology of culture, that is, the assumption that cultures are delineable wholes 
congruent with population groups. I think this particular criticism goes a little bit too 
far, however, it draws attention to the importance of better comprehending the 
categories of multicultural theory. Categories and their articulation set some limits on 
what the multicultural project can and cannot achieve.  
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As I said in Chapter 4, in multicultural theory, several concepts are related 
but not necessarily equivalent. Nation, culture, people and ethnic group are defined 
in terms of each other. The mutual implications denote the tight connections and 
overlaps between the groups, as well as the difficulties of drawing a clean line to 
differentiate them. Consequently, this complexity opens the door to important 
questions. For instance, it is not clear if the definitions have a utilitarian perspective 
or an ontological one. That is to say, it is unclear if the groups are co-defined in that 
way to organise the theory in such a manner that they might achieve recognition, or 
if they are defined thusly because it reflects their ontological distinctiveness. As 
soon as the concepts show their similitudes and relations, it becomes clearer that 
linking nations, peoples and ethnic groups by considering them instances of cultures 
leads to issues that demand further investigation. 
First, let me try to understand the connections. In the way they are defined 
by Kymlicka for example, every nation corresponds to a culture, the same way every 
ethnic group and indigenous people can be considered part of a culture. The 
definition of the objects of multiculturalism gets more intricate when the aims and 
characteristics of every group surface. Theoretically, indigenous peoples can form a 
nation even if they are not formally considered one. However, in that case, they 
become a different kind of minority, they become a national minority59, which might 
lead them to develop slightly different claims. In contrast to this, ethnic groups in the 
context of immigration do not seek a particular territory in the host state or to 
develop their particular institutions. Therefore, they tend to express their 
distinctiveness in the private sphere, not public life. Immigrant groups look for 
institutional integration. Most of the time, national minorities and indigenous peoples 
seek instead to have their own institutions. The definitions show this issues in more 
detail. 
A nation is defined as: 
…a historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying 
a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture. A 
“nation” in this sociological sense is closely related to the idea of a 
“people” or a “culture”—indeed, these concepts are often defined in 
terms of each other. A country which contains more than one nation is, 
therefore, not a nation‐state but a multination state, and the smaller 
cultures form “national minorities.” (Kymlicka, 1995:11) 
A culture is understood as: 
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…synonymous with “a nation” or “a people” –that is, as an 
intergenerational community, more or less institutionally complete, 
occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and 
history. And a State is multicultural if its members either belong to 
different nations (a multination state) or have emigrated from different 
nations (a polyethnic state). (Kymlicka, 1995:18) 
There is an aspect of the definitions that allows multiculturalism to move 
forward with some of its aims; positive consequences could derive from this net of 
self-referential definitions. From this perspective, nations and their members are 
glued together by a shared culture, which is not necessarily reduced to racial or 
ethnic features but based in language and history. This insight allows liberal 
communities to develop political plurality within the same state without giving up the 
idea of social cohesion. In other words, by the means of these definitions, we can 
achieve both political plurality and social cohesion. Political plurality is possible 
because the same culture includes a diversity of interests and ideas of the good; 
social cohesion is attained through allegiance to a shared civic culture. However, the 
definition of culture as an intergenerational community sharing language and history 
makes it hard to imagine how newcomers can fulfil these requirements to integrate 
into the mainstream community. 
Liberal scholars try to reduce this wider shared culture to purely formal, 
political and institutional allegiance to some principles but, in that case, it is not clear 
if the larger liberal society also needs a shared language and history to remain 
together in the first place. The most radical forms of cosmopolitanism would argue 
that there is not need of any allegiance, an idea I analyse further in Chapter 6. In the 
case of multiculturalism, it seems to imply both, it claims that liberal societies are 
glued together, like any other culture, by language and shared history but also by 
the liberal  principles. What I find important to mention here is that the theory’s 
emphasis oscillates in according to what scholars want to argue in each moment. 
When they deal with plurality, they emphasise language, history and other features 
that deserve to be protected; usually in the case of plurality what matters most is 
cultural preservation. On the other hand, if they emphasise the larger community’s 
unity, they draw on more abstract political principles and impersonal institutions, that 
is, they emphasise the liberal ‘nature’ of the western societies. As a result, there are 
two different ways to glue communities, language and history for the small group, 
and liberal principles for the larger one. But given the definition of culture and the 
need for cohesion, large group solidarity cannot be reduced solely to allegiance to 
liberal principles.   
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Such states have a national identity that is not reducible to universal laws 
and norms or even to a legal -political framework, and also have a 
cultural aspect- such as a language(s), a specific history, a religion or set 
of religions, national memories and an official calendar, ceremonies, 
memorials and other symbols, marked by these religions and histories; 
and this culture is central to what state-funded schools are required to 
teach. While this national identities should be common to all citizens they 
are inevitably deeply shaped by 'the majority culture', parts of which may 
sometimes even be indistiguishable from the ‘national culture’. (Modood, 
2015:356) 
 And we are once again back to square one. Anyone can be integrated into a 
multicultural nation if she can adopt the shared civic culture, but this is not just a set 
of principles and values. It includes a plethora of existential, historical and symbolic 
commitments. The majority is -by definition- not neutral and its culture includes hard-
to-swallow requirements, particularly shared language and history.60 Let me clarify. 
It is not the case that individuals integrating into a liberal society are unable to learn 
the language and history of the host society. However, it is not their history and 
oftentimes not their language; these are matters that go beyond the pragmatic 
acquisition of knowledge and skills.61 The opposite case seems more plausible. 
Those integrating into the larger community want to find ways to preserve their 
language and history and not just adopt a ‘foreign’ one. Kymlicka is right when he 
identifies them as essential for any culture. Therefore, in order to be the base for the 
social unity of culture, language and history have to be much more than just 
pragmatic acquisitions. Modood unveils the importance of this issue when he 
suggests that the national history  
…must seek to include aspects of the presence of minorities and their 
contribution to the ongoing development of the country. (…) The national 
history will therefore not be simply a history of the majority; indeed it will 
show how compositions of the majority are themselves a feature of 
historical evolution. (Modood, 2015:361-62)  
                                               
60 This limitation is something that scholars like Kymlicka are aware of. ‘Immigrants are no 
longer expected to assimilate entirely to the norms and customs of the dominant culture, and 
indeed are encouraged to maintain some aspects of their ethnic particularity. But this 
commitment to ‘multiculturalism’ or ‘polyethnicity’ is a shift in how immigrants integrate into 
the dominant culture, not whether they integrate.’ (Kymlicka, 1995:78) 
61 Kymlicka says: ‘…for a culture to survive and develop in the modern world, given the 
pressures towards the creation of a single common culture in each country, it must be a 
societal culture. Given the enormous significance of social institutions in our lives, and in 
determining our options, any culture which is not a societal culture will be reduced to 
ever‐decreasing marginalization. The capacity and motivation to form and maintain such a 
distinct culture is characteristic of ‘nations’ or ‘peoples’ (i.e. culturally distinct, geographically 
concentrated, and institutionally complete societies). Societal cultures, then, tend to be 
national cultures.’ (1995:80) If the language and history of the mainstream culture do not 
coincide with the those of the national minority and the immigrant groups, then it is not clear 
how these groups, trying to protect exactly language and history, can integrate in the 




Opposite to what we might expect, multiculturalism is not an idea of different 
peoples or cultures interacting one with another in the context of positive relations 
but specific groups dealing with larger societies during integration processes. Taylor 
and later Parekh tried a gentler approach to the problem. In Taylor’s account, 
identity has a dialogic character (1994:32). Therefore, the cultural identity that brings 
the different groups together should by dialogically established. However, this 
dialogue never reaches the core of the mainstream values and practices, those 
remain untouched. The dialogue proposed by Taylor has historically also been a 
process of integration. His account of the conditions necessary to develop identity 
says little or nothing about the power relations involved in that ‘dialogue’ between 
cultures -a topic dealt with extensively in Chapters 6 and 7-. It is indeed a complex 
matter that we need to understand also in its implications and limits. 
 
5.5 Minorities, majorities and power relations 
 
There is another way the analysis of central categories to the multicultural 
theory discloses a limit. In this case, I refer to the concepts of minority and majority. 
These are designed to denote the disadvantaged situation of particular groups. 
However, it is not clear that categories like minorities and majorities are the best 
way to aim for diversity, respect, and tolerance. It seems that, from the three objects 
of multiculturalism, this could suit immigrants, but not particularly national and 
indigenous groups. If it is true that ‘Most countries in the Americas are both 
multinational and poly-ethnic, as are most countries in the world.’ (Kymlicka, 
1995:22) then it becomes less clear that groups suffering from hierarchical relations, 
intolerance or racism could be considered minorities. In the case of Canada or the 
United States it is easier to label the groups suffering from some hierarchical 
behaviour as minorities, but in Latin-American countries, being a great source of 
cultural diversity, indigenous and national peoples are not necessarily minorities.62 
According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
((ECLAC), 2019), in countries like Bolivia indigenous population reached 62% in the 
year 2000 and 41% in Guatemala. Discrimination, intolerance, and bigotry are 
sometimes directed against a sizeable proportion of the population.   
The same phenomenon can be found in gender issues: women could be 
                                               
62 South Africa and many other examples could be included in this category. 
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considered a minority in the sense they suffer from hierarchical and uneven 
relationships in respect to men, but they are not strictly speaking a minority group. 
Criticising Taylor’s concept of recognition, Susan Wolf affirms that ‘The predominant 
problem for women as women is not that the larger or more powerful sector of the 
community fails to notice or be interested in preserving women’s gendered identity, 
but that this identity is put to the service of oppression and exploitation.’ (1992:76) 
Other important feminists such as Nancy Fraser (1989) and Iris Young (1990) have 
developed this criticism further. It is evident that the minority-majority framework 
tries to reflect the uneven power relationships between two or more groups, but it is 
not equally evident that a quantitative concept could represent accurately a 
qualitative circumstance. 
If we consider uneven relationships in terms of minorities and majorities, it 
would seem that the oppression suffered by a group is the result of the culture of the 
few not being recognised by the many, therefore, a pragmatic approach to reduce 
those numbers seems plausible. However, the important problem is that power 
relations subsume some groups in relationships of oppression and persecution, 
despite the proportions. In other words, it is perhaps more important to have a 
deeper recognition than a larger but superficial one. 
Within the majority and minority groups, there are struggles to break free 
from hegemonic values. This is the same power relation that might lead us to talk 
about a majority within the minorities and vice-versa, usually referred to as elite. 
However, it seems that quantifying members, instead of the strength of the power 
relation partially mislead the effort. A conceptual duo like minority-majority is not 
about numbers but about power. It is not about some cultural values that seem 
incompatible with those supported by most people; it is about the impositions of 
some hegemonic values over others no matter how many people endorse them. 
Actually, the processes of liberalisation do take this idea and engage in dynamics to 
challenge archaic belief systems even if they are supported by most of the 
population. Sadly, there is a limit where it ceases questioning them: the moment 
where the hegemonic notions are already liberal.  
Along with the misleading quantitative perspective, multiculturalists assume 
that the conflicts between majorities and minorities are consequences of cultural 
differences and not power struggles which I suspect is a significant mistake. I am 
not saying there are no cultural ingredients involved in the conflicts, but usually they 




Multicultural theory assumes that illiberal and undemocratic hierarchies are 
the result of racialist ideologies and, therefore, that conflicts are built upon ethnic 
differences, instead of more complex power relations. Leaving Parekh aside on this 
point, most multiculturalists do not seem to realise liberal societies are also 
oppressive in their own ways. They believe that in western democracies the liberal 
principles of equality, individual freedom, and social justice would eventually 
address oppression and inequality, or at least not make it worse. Therefore, the best 
way to spread diversity is by spreading liberal ideals. Additionally, as said in the last 
section, recognition of the Other is determined by a process of the minority 
incorporation into larger societies. Due to those boundaries, any other sort of 
inequality is beyond the reach of multicultural theory. The only kind of power 
relationships it is able to directly address are those coming from the integration 
process and illiberal ideologies.    
For instance, the inequality that multiculturalism mostly wants to address 
with the idea of group-differentiated rights is the mode of incorporation of minority 
groups in larger societies, but that does not necessarily elucidate the problem of 
fundamental hierarchical relations. John MacInnes argues that identities do not 
always generate societies, but sometimes, certain social groups legitimise identities, 
trying to disguise hegemonic values as shared principles (2006:680&687). Quite 
often, the conflicts are not between majorities and minorities, but between elites and 
groups challenging the hegemonic values. 
Homogenisation, exactly which multiculturalism fights against, is a result of 
power relations, material and ideological conditions, and not necessarily a problem 
of majorities oppressing minorities. We can affirm, referring to scholars such as 
Adorno (2012), that modern majorities can also be the result of processes of 
ideological homogenisation that convey the ideas of the status quo. In that sense, it 
seems multiculturalism walks halfway towards its proposal of fighting hierarchical 
relationships; it tries to protect minorities from an unfair imposition of the majority’s 
culture and individuals from restrictions in their communities, but it does not provide 
protection from impositions within the liberal framework. In practical terms this 
means that within the multicultural framework, a woman from a minority group could 
be protected from illiberal and uneven cultural practices carried on by her 
community, only to suffer other kinds of unequal cultural practices and relationships 
imposed by the mainstream culture (Crenshaw, 1995; Volpp, 2001). She might go 
from one hierarchical relation to another. In other words, the liberal framework is not 
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free of uneven relationships.  
Even if liberals argue that a proper application of liberalism must end the 
internal hierarchical relations in western democracies, the idea of a mainstream 
culture denotes some homogenisation. Despite that, I am not saying that 
multiculturalism must come up with a holistic solution to the hierarchical relations, I 
am saying that because of the way it is configured and its assumptions, 
multiculturalism reaches its limit in the uneven relationships of integration 
processes, leaving deeper power relations potentially untouched.  
Multiculturalism assumes that liberal societies are the only fit judge of 
hierarchical relations. Paradoxically, this assumption cements a hierarchy, while 
also ignoring that some -if not all- hierarchical relations make sense only within the 
minority group’s cultural practices. As Robert Goodin asserts, ‘Kymlicka is perfectly 
prepared to say that some cultures are better than others. In agreeing to 
countenance liberalizing reforms, Kymlicka has conceded the superiority of cultures 
that are more liberal, that facilitate choice and expand choices.’ (2006:294) And 
more importantly, allowing, facilitating and expanding choices is without a doubt a 
great improvement in many ways. However, they do not necessarily lead to the 
abolishment of hierarchical and uneven relationships. We have to go further and 
unveil the idea behind the way multiculturalism understands and deals with 
hierarchical relationships. I do this in the next section. 
 
5.6 Ideology and the internal source of inequality and oppression 
 
I have mentioned before that some important part of multiculturalism 
assumes that discrimination and oppression over others is mainly a consequence of 
archaic belief systems. That is to say, the problem resides in the different 
dimensions of an embedded ignorance expressed by ‘…the imposition of some 
cultures on others, and (…) the assumed superiority that powers this imposition.’ 
(Taylor, 1994:63) Alternatively, discrimination is understood also as the result of the 
fear of difference and intolerance.  
…there is always the danger that one’s slightest difference or past 
background might be made the basis of discrimination by the whole or a 
section of the wider society. The demand for total assimilation springs 
from intolerance of differences, and for the intolerant even the smallest 
differences are sources of deep unease. (Parekh, 2000:198)  




to emphasise the problem’s ideological dimension. Even if it might accept some 
material base for the hierarchical ideologies, it focuses on understanding 
discrimination, inequality and racism as a set of thoughts, beliefs and behaviours 
shaped by illiberal ideologies. In consequence, implementation of a liberal ideology 
supported by principles of human rights, civil liberties and democratic citizenship is 
the solution to the problems of discrimination and inequality. Both the mainstream 
society and minorities must be liberalised (Kymlicka, 2001b, 2015). Liberal laws and 
policies generated through state institutions and an embrace of the ideological 
change they imply define anti-discrimination efforts. In this account of hierarchical 
ideologies, the progressive historical process gradually has gotten rid of irrational 
stands to replace them with a formal and ideological liberal framework of 
enlightened values.   
In order to find the limitations of this stand, we can contrast it to other 
approaches. More materialist perspectives of ideology, inspired by - for instance - 
Marx’s philosophy, would tend to emphasise the material conditions supporting any 
ideology and the structural reasons for their existence. Instead of assuming a 
progressive process towards a world ruled by enlightened values, the materialist 
view of ideology points out the interests of particular groups and systematic power 
relations. Multiculturalism fights the idea of superiority as a form of ideology. 
However, this idea of superiority finds its explanation in the mixture of external and 
institutionalised conditions and not only in the complex crossings of people’s beliefs, 
opinions, knowledge, values and emotions that we name ideology. 
A classical term related to discrimination like Xenophobia, from the Greek 
xenos -foreigner- and phobos -fear-, clearly illustrates the historical tendency to 
consider discrimination and some related issues as part of individual psyches. 
Multiculturalism follows an important body of literature that ascribes an internal 
source to discrimination and an unconscious source to racist beliefs: 
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which 
racism has played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this shared 
experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs 
that attach significance to an individual's race and induce negative 
feelings and opinions about nonwhites. To the extent that this cultural 
belief system has influenced all of us, we are all racists. At the same 
time, most of us are unaware of our racism. We do not recognize the 
ways in which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about 
race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions. In other 
words, a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is 
influenced by unconscious racial motivation. (Lawrence, 1987:322)  
The materialist perspective on hierarchies and discrimination is not enough 
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to deny or contradict the idealist take, which has substantial evidence to support it. 
Nevertheless, it shows that the latter must be complemented and to some extent 
contested. Even if racism and bigotry partially rest on a psychological dislike of the 
unfamiliar or different, this is a partial explanation, a psychological dimension of 
something that also has political and social roots, even philosophical roots 
expressed by the way we deal with otherness in general. 
It is instructive to mention that along with the identification of the source of 
the problem comes necessarily paired a proposal to revert the negative effects. If in 
the eyes of multicultural theory the problem corresponds to the adoption of 
unjustified and illiberal ideologies, then the solution embraces the development of 
social and political changes on the basis of liberalisation processes. More 
specifically, ‘…turning the earlier catalogue of hierarchical relations into relationships 
of liberal-democratic citizenship.‘ (Kymlicka, 1995:6) 
In the same way, the identification of the problems also suggest the means 
to achieve their possible solution. Multiculturalism is developed under the 
overarching ideology of liberalism and it trusts that the way to fight the old-fashioned 
hierarchies is through its greatest achievement: political institutions, citizenship, laws 
and policies. Through liberal-democratic citizenship and institutions, the progress of 
western societies will eventually erase prejudices directed at minority groups. 
According to an old formula, the Enlightenment foundation of modern States would 
make increasingly evident that the more liberal and democratic a society gets, the 
more equal and fair it becomes. In consequence, what we need is to fully embrace 
the values of equality, freedom and fraternity set theoretically by the Enlightenment 
and expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
It is true that through liberalism we can find various takes on and 
understandings of different issues, but it seems to exist unanimous support to state 
institutions. I mention just one instance that is particularly lucid in defining the key 
role of institutions in liberal ideology but, that in essence, repeats countless times.  
The moral meaning of democracy is found in reconstructing all 
institutions so that they become instruments of human growth and 
liberation. (…) Liberal democracy is a social strategy for enabling 
individuals to live the good life. It is unalterably opposed to ignorance. It 
trusts that knowledge and understanding have the power to set people 
free. Its lifeblood is free communication building on freedom of inquiry, 
speech, and assembly. (…) The idea of moral absolutes and a fixed 
hierarchy of values is rejected. No idea of the good is above criticism, but 
this does not lead to a directionless relativism. (Rockefeller, 1992:91-92)  




approaches such as critical race theory calls integrationist ideology. I developed this 
idea extensively in Chapter 2. However, it was necessary to describe at least some 
of its assumptions and limitations that can be spotted in multiculturalism. I think the 
most worrying conclusion that we can derive from this emphasis on the internal 
source of oppression is that important efforts can be lead away from material, 
systematic sources of inequality and discrimination. Particularly alarming to me are 




In this chapter, I argued that the way multiculturalism is constructed sets 
some limits to its efforts. I intended to move away from usual criticisms and go 
further into the assumptions behind them. I proposed what we can call a limits 
approach. In consequence, I tried to develop my own assessment of some 
criticisms. For instance, I do believe that the liberal framework can be too formal, too 
rigid, and tends to be rapidly quasi-naturalised. However, I drew attention to the fact 
this is unavoidable. It is a natural consequence of any sort of categorisation. It 
seems to me that despite the categorisation, multiculturalism is able to recognise 
that the inequality suffered by different communities is a consequence of political 
and social processes. It is this clarity what allows it to claim that minorities 
sometimes need protection from majorities advocating group-differentiated rights as 
a result. Multiculturalism is not a theoretical edifice erected without attention to 
current social and political circumstances, completely the opposite; it is a theoretical 
effort moved by concrete inequality issues. It might get lost in the middle of its own 
categorisations and assumptions, but its aims and efforts try to reach and improve 
the real circumstances of particular groups. 
This is important to mention because, like any other possible approach, 
multicultural theory assumes a formal perspective to define its objects, one that can 
be challenged in different ways. When concepts like culture, people, nation or 
identity are defined, multiculturalists cannot avoid fixed markers because this cannot 
be done without assuming something is shared more or less uniformly. However, 
this is not the most problematic set of issues. The fundamental concerns rest on the 
assumptions behind the particular categorisations. In the definitions of a people or a 
cultural community, we frequently find reference to a shared language, history, a 
given territory and common institutions. (Kymlicka, 1995:18) We know these 
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particular definitions are not unique and could be constructed in a different way. 
However, what I find more crucial is why those categories were constructed in that 
particular way, to investigate its possible intentions and draw its limits. 
In more particular terms, in this chapter, I argued that there is a dialectical 
tension between the aim of cultural preservation and individual agency. One of 
multiculturalism’s main drivers to define categories the way they do and leading to 
some forms of essentialisation is the need for social cohesion. However, this results 
in a paradox: civic forms of social cohesion were intended to fight essentialist forms 
of identity. Additionally, I claimed that the majority-minority dichotomy is more about 
power than numbers and that cultural conflicts are most of the times power 
struggles. Finally, I analysed the tendency to consider discrimination and bigotry as 
a result of ideological processes and not material or philosophical ones.  
After this detour through some criticisms of multiculturalism, we are able to 
affirm that it has not been as successful as expected not because it is flawed. On 
the contrary, it has not been as successful because, at the end of the day, it is a 
solid instance of a western, liberal, democratic theory of justice that is unable to 
consider diversity outside its confines. As a socio-political movement, 
multiculturalism is the attempt to expand that framework without breaking it. 
Therefore, we can rethink the aims of the multicultural project, its limits and its 
assumptions. We cannot continue on the same track in which, our modern heroes 
have made us believe, this cyclops that keeps millions of people feeling like 
outsiders in their own home, can be defeated only with cleverness, open-










Overcoming multiculturalism? Interculturalism and 
diversity in the new century 
 
 
In Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote (1999 [1944]), Jorge Luis Borges 
relates the story of a fictional 20th-century French author who tried to write, word by 
word, line by line, the Quixote. He intended neither to copy the original, nor to write 
a new version; he wanted to write the exact same book in a different context and a 
different time. He did not aspire to think, believe, talk or live like Cervantes; he did 
not wish to be a 17th-century writer in the 20th-century. He wanted to be himself, 
Pierre Menard, keeping his context, beliefs, and everything else that make him who 
he was and, nevertheless, to write the same book Cervantes did. The narrator 
remarks that Menard wrote chapters IX, XXXVIII and a fragment of XXII and they 
coincide word by word with Cervantes’ original. However, this is not the most striking 
part of the story, and here is Borges’ brilliance, the very same words in Menard’s 
version had a completely different meaning, making it far better than the original. 
Beyond the greatness of Borges’ short story, it reminds me of the tension between 
interculturalism and multiculturalism.  
Interculturalism, like Pierre Menard, tried to build its own liberal proposal on 
diversity and plurality from and for the new century; a century marked by 
globalisation, waves of migration and liberal progress. Even if we can say that it 
shares the same aims as multiculturalism and other liberal theories of diversity and 
plurality, it claims to face them from a completely different perspective, opposite in 
some respects. After facing this endeavour, interculturalists did not end up with a 
word by word version of multiculturalism, but they propose something quite similar. 
So similar that the rest of us struggle to spot the difference. Although it tried to come 




Particularly eye-catching is the place interculturalism claims for itself in the 
pantheon of pluralist theorists. Accounts promoting interculturalism have an almost 
obsessive tendency to place themselves in contrast to multiculturalism. Theories 
abound as to why: perhaps because multiculturalism has, during the last decades, 
been the dominant narrative on cultural diversity, perhaps because interculturalism 
has been primarily promoted from the policy-making sphere, or simply because of 
the sort of dynamics that often occur between two competing theories63; but the fact 
remains that interculturalists frequently present its approach as criticising and 
correcting mistakes made by multicultural theory. ‘Academic and public debates go 
through cycles, and one of the current fashions is to defend a (new, innovative, 
realistic) “interculturalism” against a (tired, discredited, naive) “multiculturalism”.’ 
(Kymlicka, 2012a:211)  
The contrast is kept in such hazy terms, that it is hard to draw clear lines 
between the two approaches. Despite the efforts of scholars and policymakers 
advocating interculturalism to distance it from multiculturalism, the differences are 
not clear enough. The situation is such that scholars have devoted equal or more 
effort to discussing the distinction as to its own intellectual content. The difficulties 
separating one perspective from the other have encouraged some scholars to deny 
that there is a significant difference between them. The reasons for this include 
claims of mis-characterisation of multiculturalism (Kymlicka, 2012a; Meer & Modood, 
2018; Taylor, 2012), ‘…to relabel some multicultural measures as intercultural 
politics.’ (Loobuyck, 2018:225), or claims that contrasting both approaches is a form 
of political rhetoric instead of a substantial differentiation (Kymlicka, 2018a). For 
now, it is enough to keep in mind that interculturalism usually presents itself in 
opposition to multiculturalism, even though they share, if not the same, at least 
similar aims. 
This Chapter and the next are closely related, being mainly devoted to 
analysing the assumptions on identity and recognition in the main intercultural 
theories. I investigate whether interculturalism is explicitly or implicitly dealing with 
the kind of complex identity and strong recognition I assert is lacking in other liberal 
theories of diversity and plurality. Ultimately, I will argue that the intercultural 
                                               
63 It is fair to mention that in Latin America the dominant narrative has been interculturalidad 
-a particular form of interculturalism- and multiculturalism is the challenging approach. In 
consequence, in these countries interculturalidad has not been an alternative or reaction to 




perspective is far from being the way to secure deep recognition of the other and to 
deal with identity at the most fundamental level. However, even if not all the claims 
and criticisms interculturalism presents are accurate and valid, altogether they 
allude to some limitations of other liberal theories and their inability to deal with 
strong forms of recognition and identity. The use of contrast and the tone 
intercultural scholars deploy can be questioned, but overall, their criticism does 
emphasise social features of diversity other liberal theories may not always address 
effectively. I do not believe issues such as a lack of interaction, ghettoisation, 
positive communication between members of different groups, or discrimination, are 
consequences of the multicultural policies, as some advocates of interculturalism 
suggest, but they certainly point out problems deserving further discussion.  
Intercultural claims unveil a dissonance between the institutional and political 
weight of policies, the theoretical framework to justify group-differentiated rights and 
their not so equally large impact in many cross-cultural interactions. As I argue in 
this chapter, if interculturalism has achieved a large amount of support it is not 
precisely because of its theoretical advantages over other pluralist perspectives, but 
because of the urgency of addressing the issues of cross-cultural interactions. The 
widespread perception (Bouchard & Taylor, 2008; Cantle, 2012; Grillo, 2018; 
Guidikova, 2014; Wood, 2015) that something has to be done to foster the bonds 
between different groups is evidence of the lack of a strong recognition at both 
levels, in the real world and in theoretical accounts addressing diversity and 
pluralism. 
The chapter is divided into four sections before its Conclusion. In the first, I 
explain the two forms of interculturalism: Québécois and European. Both of them 
are founded in the particularities of their respective cases, not a unified theoretical 
framework. In the next part, I analyse the idea of intercultural dialogue as a key 
proposal for positive interaction between individuals and groups. I emphasise that 
the intercultural proposal focuses on pursuing positive contact, instead of securing 
recognition: that is, it refuses to categorise the individuals, pushing a cosmopolitan 
understanding of identity. The third section is devoted to examining a new form of 
diversity, a super-diversity, that appeared along with the process of globalisation. I 
particularly argue that this new form of diversity does not represent a qualitative 
change in the way we form our identity and, therefore, even in super-diverse cities, 
individuals still develop an allegiance to particular groups. Finally, I suggest that 




interculturalism, although not radically different than multiculturalism, points out 
important issues that the liberal theories of diversity and plurality have been unable 
to address. 
 
6.1 Two forms of interculturalism  
 
There are two forms of interculturalism: the first kind blossoming in Québec 
as an alternative to Canadian multiculturalism, and the other form, European 
interculturalism, being developed taking into account the particular circumstances of 
migration in Europe. Gérard Bouchard (2011, 2018), Charles Taylor (2012), Alain 
Gagnon and Raffaele Iacovino (2007) have developed the clearest accounts of 
Québécois interculturalism. On the other hand, Ted Cantle (2012, 2018), Ricard 
Zapata-Barrero (2015, 2018), and Irena Guidikova (2015, 2018) have made 
important contributions to intercultural theory in Europe. Both places, Québec and 
Europe, share an unsuitability to or prior failed attempts at multiculturalism. Both 
were also firstly expressed in public policy documents, which is an important fact to 
keep in mind because in contrast to multiculturalism, which simultaneously adopted 
particular policies and developed a theoretical structure, interculturalism does not 
have such a robust theoretical scaffolding. In fact, as we will see, when scholars of 
interculturalism move from the descriptive aspects of their own ideas and policies to 
theoretical justification, they find themselves very close to multicultural notions.  
That is to say that while advocates of interculturalism wish to emphasise 
its positive qualities in terms of encouraging communication, recognising 
dynamic identities, promoting unity and challenging illiberality, each of 
these qualities already feature (and are on occasion foundational) to 
multiculturalism too. (Meer & Modood, 2012:192)  
In most cases, intercultural proposals do not find legitimacy in the strength of 
their theoretical considerations, but in the particularities of the European and 
Québécois cases. This procedure is not wrong as a public policy practice but makes 
it hard to reveal the underlying theoretical ground. It could be for this reason that 
interculturalists overemphasise the particularities of each circumstance. Another 
potential reason is interculturalism’s reliance on negative -i.e. the failure and 
inadequacy of multicultural policies- rather than positive argumentation. In other 
words, if we do not accept the inadequacy of multiculturalism in these cases, there 
would not be any legitimate reason to switch to the intercultural formulation. If we 




by the failure of the existing one to solve important anomalies.64 This would explain 
the emphasis on the insolvency of multiculturalism in the first place. But to further 
elaborate the analogy, interculturalism would have to convey at least two additional 
points: 1) how and why it would better solve the diversity puzzles that 
multiculturalism cannot, whilst also retaining its more important achievements; and, 
2) how the intercultural proposal is radically different from the multicultural one, 
making it impossible for the latter to reach the same results.65  
Both of these conditions are still debated. Constant overlap seems to be the 
case, denoting a lack of paradigm differentiation between inter- and multi-
culturalism.66 
 Interculturalism in Québec was described in a report made by the 
Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural 
Differences, chaired by Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, entitled Building the 
Future: A Time for Reconciliation (2008). In the case of European interculturalism, 
The Council of Europe (COE) has published Living Together As Equals in Dignity, 
better known as the White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue (2008); and Intercultural 
Cities: Towards a Model for Intercultural Integration (2010). 
Québécois interculturalism a) institutes French as the common language of 
intercultural relations; b) cultivates a pluralistic orientation that is concerned with the 
protection of rights; c) preserves the necessary creative tension between diversity, 
on the one hand, and the continuity of the French-speaking core and the social link, 
on the other hand; d) places special emphasis on integration and participation; and 
e) advocates interaction. (Bouchard & Taylor, 2008:21)  
Contrastingly, European interculturalism argued that.  
                                               
64 ‘If awareness of anomaly plays a role in the emergence of new sorts of phenomena, it 
should surprise no one that a similar but more profound awareness is prerequisite to all 
acceptable changes of theory.’ (Kuhn, 2012:67) 
65 ‘First, the new candidate must seem to resolve some outstanding and generally 
recognized problem that can be met in no other way. Second, the new paradigm must 
promise to preserve a relatively large part of the concrete problem-solving ability that has 
accrued to science through its predecessors. Novelty for its own sake is not a desideratum in 
the sciences as it is in so many other creative fields. As a result, though new paradigms 
seldom or never possess all the capabilities of their predecessors, they usually preserve a 
great deal of the most concrete parts of past achievement and they always permit additional 
concrete problem-solutions besides.’ (Kuhn, 2012:169) 
66 Bouchard (2011) believes the two models do not belong to the same paradigm. 
Multiculturalism works on a paradigm of diversity -which is understood as a denial of a 
majority culture- and interculturalism does it on a paradigm of duality -acceptance of a 
majority culture-. However, this chapter ventures to prove that this difference is insufficient to 
claim them as substantially divergent paradigms. 
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Intercultural dialogue is understood as an open and respectful exchange 
of views between individuals, groups with different ethnic, cultural, 
religious and linguistic backgrounds and heritage on the basis of mutual 
understanding and respect. It operates at all levels – within societies, 
between the societies of Europe and between Europe and the wider 
world. (Europe & Ministers, 2008:10-11) 
From these broad definitions, we can notice the common goals of integration 
and active participation. However, there are also important differences between 
these two kinds of interculturalism. The most notable contrast is Québécois 
interculturalism’s open protection of the Francophone culture. In this respect, 
interculturalism in Québec is closer to multiculturalism. Ted Cantle says  
The Canadian/Québec Province use of interculturalism (…) mirrors much 
of the reified, static and defensive form of identity management found in 
European forms of Multiculturalism, whereas the Canadian government 
form of “multiculturalism” is a little closer to the European idea of 
interculturalism. (2018:140)  
Cantle considers Québécois interculturalism is closer to European forms of 
multiculturalism because protecting of the Francophone culture implies, in his 
opinion, a sort of essentialisation of the Québécois identity. In consequence, 
protecting an essentialist form of identity is also a feature of European 
multiculturalism. Conversely, Canadian multiculturalism’s unwillingness to privilege 
the Francophone community places it closer to European interculturalism and its 
neutral approach. The criteria to judge what belongs to multiculturalism and what to 
interculturalism are diverse and they frequently overlap. The relations and 
differences between the two forms of interculturalism are intricate indeed, which 
does not help to draw clear boundaries in relation to other approaches like the 
multicultural one. The case of Québec interculturalism is a sort of hybrid. From one 
perspective, it assumes itself as a host society that has decided to push integration 
and interaction as its policy on diversity -interculturalism-, but at the same time, it is 
a national minority looking for the recognition and protection of their own 
Francophone culture -multiculturalism-.  
Because they themselves constitute a minority, Québec Francophones 
instinctively fear forms of socio-cultural fragmentation, marginalisation 
and ghettoisation likely to weaken the nation. This accounts for the 
particular emphasis that Québec interculturalism places on integration. 
(Bouchard, 2018:94)  
Because its peculiar position, it is understandable Québec tries to benefit 
from features of both approaches at different levels. This possibility of combining 
features from both theories denotes they are not essentially different. In fact, 




and interculturalism are not substantial. Consequently, ‘Bouchard does not 
distinguish IC-Q [Québec Interculturalism] from MC [Multiculturalism] at a 
conceptual level.’ (2015:353) On the other hand, Charles Taylor, who is 
acknowledged as a key figure in both theories, asserts there is no significant 
variation between intercultural and multicultural policies, the difference between the 
two approaches is more a matter of emphasis: multiculturalism places an emphasis 
on political recognition, and interculturalism underlines integration as well as 
stressing dialogue.  
In Québec, being both a host society for immigrants and a national minority, 
integration is a more complex issue than in the rest of Canada (Taylor, 2012:417); in 
this case integration has to be based on Francophone culture in order to protect the 
host minority that perceives itself as at risk. An external-internal distinction helps to 
understand better the complexities. Externally -in relation to the rest of Canada-, in 
order to support the aim of protecting the Francophone culture the arguments get 
closer to multiculturalism; internally -within the Québec province- intercultural ideas 
would also help to protect its culture by preventing social fragmentation. Another 
way to express this same idea in more specific terms is by referring to the hopes 
and fears driving Québec’s interculturalism.  
The hopes connected with that are that people coming from outside will 
contribute new ideas, new skills, new insights which will enrich our 
society. The obverse of this expectation is the fear that somehow what 
are considered essential features of our identity will be lost. In the 
Quebec case, these essential features include, understandably, the 
French language. (…) But beyond the language and these basic 
principles, there is an indefinite zone of customs, common enthusiasms 
(hockey), common reference points, modes of humour, and so on, each 
cherished to varying degrees, and more by some than by others, whose 
weakening, abandonment or demise may be feared. The degree of 
acceptance of the intercultural story depends on the balance between 
these hopes and fears, and the public debate centres around them. 
(Taylor, 2012:419)  
European interculturalism shares the same hopes, but not the same fears, at 
least not in the same way. In fact, it denounces the fear of losing the essential 
features of the Francophone culture as another failure inherited from the 
multicultural perspective and its advocacy on the majority-minority scheme. 
European interculturalism insists on a universal framework in which diversity should 
be embedded. From its standpoint, to acknowledge there is a majority culture which 
provides the societal foundation might easily lead to practices of assimilation. 
Similarly, to provide political recognition -group-differentiated rights- to minorities 
could lead to the ghettoisation of groups and moral relativism. Therefore, it tries to 
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dodge these issues by focusing on neutrality and intercultural dialogue. I will discuss 
each of these in turn    
Unlike assimilation, it [European interculturalism] recognises that public 
authorities must be impartial, rather than accepting a majority ethos only, 
if communalist tensions are to be avoided. Unlike multiculturalism, 
however, it vindicates a common core which leaves no room for moral 
relativism. Unlike both, it recognises a key role for the associational 
sphere of civic society where, premised on reciprocal recognition, 
intercultural dialogue can resolve the problems of daily life in a way that 
governments alone cannot. (Europe & Ministers, 2008:20) 
According to the intercultural perspective, universal principles and 
impartiality of authorities are conditions fostering cultural diversity. Democracy, 
pluralism, inclusiveness, and equality amongst other liberal principles work as both 
source and limit for intercultural efforts. In that regard, even if interculturalism tries to 
move away from any sort of essentialist understanding of society, it shares the same 
general framework that supports other liberal approaches such as multiculturalism 
and civic nationalism. In other words, at least at the fundamental level, the 
intercultural society would be as liberal as the nationalist and multicultural societies 
it is trying to replace.  
The tendency to underline the universality of principles places 
interculturalism in the group of liberal, cosmopolitan perspectives. It is quite 
challenging, to say the least, to explain how the same set of liberal principles make 
possible two antagonistic postures such as cosmopolitanism and nationalism.67 The 
two forms of interculturalism also follow this bifurcation of the liberal base: 
Québécois interculturalism is nationalist; European interculturalism is cosmopolitan. 
The difference lies in how each of these approaches understands the implications of 
the liberal principles and the processes of liberalisation within societies. 
Cosmopolitanism emphasises that liberalisation and modernisation are 
progressively relegating the sense of national identity; while these processes take 
place, the members of communities would feel less and less attached to the 
parochial values and practices of their decreasingly ostracised communities, and 
closer to the ‘universal’ values shared by any liberal society. In contrast, liberal 
                                               
67 In Chapter 3 I described nationalism, but a brief definition of cosmopolitanism is useful. 
Thomas Pogge mentions that ‘Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions. 
First, individualism: the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons -rather than, 
say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, religious communities, nations, or states. (…) Second, 
universality: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being 
equally -not merely to some subset, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims. 
Third, generality: this special status has global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern 




nationalisms, including multicultural nationalism, believe that liberalisation is 
compatible with an increased sense of nationhood. (Kymlicka, 1995:88) The debate 
is interesting and of utmost importance68; I can set forward there are good reasons 
to believe that belonging to a societal culture is necessary for the construction of 
identity and, therefore, I believe that in this case, the multicultural nationalism is 
right.  
It is true that European interculturalism and other cosmopolitan perspectives 
assert that a project such as multiculturalism is not truly liberal, and they do so by 
dissociating ethnic, racial and national consciousness from the liberal principles. 
Critiques of the illiberality of multiculturalism base an important part of their claims 
on the subordination of individual freedom to forms of collective identity, particularly 
ethnicity and nationality. In a mild version of this perspective, a liberal society could 
keep working as a nation but only if it does not go deeper in supporting or promoting 
ethnic or religious particularities. In other words, it is not possible to build a truly civic 
nation unless references to ethnicity are left behind. In this first approach, liberal 
citizenship can be national, but post-ethnic (Hollinger, 2005). In a more radical view 
of the same perspective, the global and fluid situation of societies in the new century 
imposes not only a post-ethnic take but a post-national model (Abizadeh, 2004). 
Therefore, multiculturalism or nationalism are considered illiberal because they 
overemphasise the cultural and ethnic features of minorities, jeopardising individual 
rights. But it could be also illiberal if it stands in the way liberalisation operates in the 
new century, that is, if it insists on using an old-fashioned national framework to 
make sense of fundamental social categories -identity, memory, way of life, power- 
that cannot be understood any longer in national terms (Beck, 2002).  
As mentioned before, the claim of illiberality directed to the multicultural 
theory has been extensively debated, and almost fully discredited (Kymlicka, 1995, 
2015; Parekh, 2002; Tully, 2002). European interculturalism tries to keep its 
distance from multiculturalism by digging deeper the opposition between 
cosmopolitanism and nationalism. However, despite the factual differences they 
have, they share the same liberal foundation. Both are liberal projects, with liberal 
principles and they focus on the freedoms and democratic rights of individuals. It is 
                                               
68 I apologise for not devoting some more time and effort to clarify further a ‘typology of 
liberalism’, specifying at least the major connections and discrepancies between national 
liberalism, universal liberalism and plural liberalism, which are the kind of liberal forms 
relevant for my argument. I hope my discussion on the wide range of liberal theories -
multiculturalism, interculturalism, communitarianism, nationalism and cosmopolitanism- is 
enough to at least have a basic notion of the connections and disjunctions. 
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becoming increasingly clearer that the intercultural approach does not propose a 
radically different foundation. However, interculturalism still can claim to be different 
because of its focus on intercultural dialogue and its adequacy to deal with super-
diversity in a globalised world, which is what I analyse next.  
 
6.2 Intercultural spaces and cosmopolitan cohesion 
  
A central concept of interculturalism as a socio-political project on diversity 
and plurality in modern democracies is that of intercultural dialogue. From the public 
policy perspective, more clearly in the case of European interculturalism but easily 
extended to Québec, there are at least five crucial recommendations to achieve the 
conditions needed for intercultural dialogue: democratic governance of cultural 
diversity, democratic citizenship and participation, learning and teaching intercultural 
competences, spaces for intercultural dialogue, and intercultural dialogue in 
international relations (Europe & Ministers, 2008). The directive on spaces for 
intercultural dialogue is surely the most distinctive one of the turn intended by this 
conceptualisation, as the other four are shared by almost any other liberal pluralist 
perspective, even if they do not use the adjective ‘intercultural’. Democratic 
governance, citizenship-participation, teaching diversity competencies, and dialogue 
between communities are policy pillars in all liberal pluralist approaches. Therefore, I 
focus here on the spaces for intercultural dialogue.  
The basic idea behind the spaces for intercultural action is that interaction, 
communication, and intercultural dialogue take place in public places. Intercultural 
policies are particularly concerned with developing spaces in a way that promote 
mixing, desegregation and interaction amongst members of different communities. 
In consequence, ‘…the policy question arises: what kind of forums, spaces and 
networks should be created and supported to stimulate inter-relationships of 
newcomers and settled communities?’ (Vertovec, 2006:30) The Intercultural Cities 
Programme (Europe, 2010), which is in the vanguard of intercultural projects in 
Europe, exemplifies the aim of creating spaces for positive interaction. Processes 
such as intercultural place-making, look for the ‘…creation of spaces which make it 
attractive for people of different backgrounds to encounter others, and to minimise 
avoidance, apprehension or xenophobia.’ (Guidikova, 2014:6) In the case of 
Québec, Gagnon and Iacovino (2007) express their support for interculturalism 




space is the point of departure for the intercultural theory. The key feature of 
interculturalism is cross-cultural dialogue, but this is not possible without a suitable 
space to carry it out. In more detail, interculturalism 
…promotes contact zones among people who share certain 
characteristics (reinforcing bonds) and facilitates relations between 
individuals from different backgrounds (building bridges), such as when it 
promotes interaction between people across different religions, 
languages and so on… (Zapata-Barrero, 2018:57) 
A discussion of particular policies is beyond the scope of my thesis. Instead, 
I try to discern the implications and assumptions behind the aim of the policies, 
depicting what I consider to be the core of the intercultural project. It seems, for 
instance, that the interaction promoted by the intercultural approach should be of a 
very particular kind, of a nature that allows individuals to build their identity flowing 
freely through different configurations, almost as if it were something constructed 
purely as a matter of will or, at least, pragmatically adjustable. As cited in (Grillo, 
2018:111), Gabriella Battaini-Dragoni, member of the Council of Europe, affirmed 
that interculturalism 
…shifts the focus from the relationship between the individual or 
community and the state to the necessity for dialogue across communal 
barriers. It is also marked by a culture of broad-mindedness, which 
recognises the fluidity of identities and the need for openness to change 
in a globalising context.  
The rigidity resulting from embedding individuals in groups could hinder the 
fluidity required for intercultural interaction. Québec Interculturalism also aims to 
‘…strik[e] a balance in intercultural dynamics between fluidity and identities and 
boundaries (recognising difference is necessary, enclosing it in boxes is wrong).’ 
(Bouchard, 2013:102) Consequentially, categories, attributes and group markers are 
not required or useful for pushing forward the intercultural theory. Instead,  
It incorporates all people (without exception, including nationals), without 
any view of society based on group and ethnic division. For IC, difference 
is based on various categories of diversity that are not necessarily linked 
to ethnicity, nationality or even race…’ (Zapata-Barrero, 2018:58)  
Although it is not easy to see what those categories Zapata-Barrero refers 
would be. Rather, it seems more a call for considering individuals without further 
reference to any category.  
While diversity is generally seen as inherent in individuals, there is a 
difference. Here it is individual’s competencies -e.g. to avoid discrimination, develop 
sensitivity to characteristics of others or foster communication-, rather than their 
group memberships, which matter. ‘Correspondingly, there is a semantic shift from 
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the recognition of collective identities to that of individual competences. This 
facilitates a connection both to the individualization discourse and to notions of 
individual entrepreneurial spirit.’ (Faist, 2009:177) I will further develop the 
consequences of this idea in the next sections, where I form the second part of this 
argument. For the moment, it is enough to assert that the emphasis on building 
positive spaces for interaction entails the rejection of preconceived categorisations 
of diversity. In the context of interculturalism, dismissing collective categories aligns 
with liberal notions of individual autonomy. 
Just as interculturalism’s pursuit of a flexible identity pushes it towards 
avoiding the rigid categorisation of individuals, the specific challenges it attempts to 
overcome also shape its approach. According to Zapata-Barrero, there are three 
strategies that interculturalism pushes forward: positive interaction, anti-
discrimination and diversity advantage (2018:63-65). These proposals try to 
overcome the main issues associated with diversity in modern societies. He 
mentions that in the social realm the challenges include segregation, exclusion, and 
reduction of social capital. In consequence, the three strategies mentioned above 
look to improve social cohesion through equality policies. The same occurs in the 
political domain, where the problems include instability and lack of citizens’ loyalty, 
both caused by changes in traditional values and relations. In this case, 
interculturalism would propose to keep control over those changes in the values, 
always considering the stability and loyalty of citizens (Zapata-Barrero, 2018:64-65), 
which does not seem a move so different than the integrationist perspective it tries 
to avoid.  
Behind the policies, proposals and problems, we can find the ethos justifying 
the efforts: the pursuit of social cohesion and stability.69 Interculturalism proposes to 
achieve them through positive contact of individuals, but in essence, they are not 
different problems to those troubling nationalism, multiculturalism and the other 
liberal theories of diversity. Even more important, because they are essentially the 
same problems, in the same liberal framework and with the same emphasis on 
policies, norms and institutional design, the output is unavoidably similar. 
                                               
69 Cantle describes this searching for social cohesion and stability mostly in the case of the 
UK, referring to the concept and programs of community cohesion. (Cantle, 2001, 2008) 
However, he tries to generalise it as a new framework for diverse societies. He says, ‘…, it 
should be noted that community cohesion programmes in the UK at least, have largely been 
conceptualised and implemented on a localised and contextualised basis. A new paradigm, 
or metanarrative, of interculturalism would develop a new national and international 




Another important postulate undergirds the intercultural approach: the kind of 
social glue and identity its proponents advocate. If the ethos of the issues is social 
cohesion and political stability, then we cannot avoid questions about what should 
bring and keep people together, and what kind of identity would fulfil those 
requirements. Cantle identifies the social glue as ‘community cohesion’ (2008). In 
this case, social cohesion is not extended beyond the limits of reducing prejudice 
amongst the members of different groups, and it is based on Gordon Allport’s 
contact theory (1954).70 This perspective moves the sources of conflict away from 
structural conditions and places them in individual and collective prejudice, which 
gives me the chance to clarify something important. It is not the case that 
intercultural spaces, interaction and dialogue aim to improve recognition; nor is it is 
the case they move recognition from collective differences to individual attributes. 
Instead, they function in a negative way, wherein reducing prejudice and improving 
everyday interaction is more important than a direct and positive recognition of 
people’s identity, which is always attached to their group memberships. Groups 
benefit through contact in that they become less prejudiced and build more positive 
relationships.  
The context of globalisation would set the premises for the new social glue in 
a world where there is no more need of myths on common origins, traditions, 
ethnicity, race or religion to build an identity; a world in which interaction would be 
enough. In other words, in the globalised world, identity should reflect the fact that 
the dominant role of groups in shaping identity is being eroded. ‘It is not just 
migration that makes global citizenship necessary. The autonomy of the nation-state 
and its ability to protect its citizens against outside influences are declining.’ 
(Castles, 2000:131-132) This global citizenship requires ‘…the development of 
common bonds on the basis of a more universal conception of humankind,’ (Cantle, 
2012:143).  
In consequence, interculturalism is a perspective that step by step gets 
closer to what is referred as Cultural Cosmopolitanism, which in its mild version  
…acknowledge[s] the importance of (at least some kinds of) cultural 
attachments for the good human life (at least within certain limits), while 
denying that this implies that a person's cultural identity should be 
defined by any bounded or homogeneous subset of the cultural 
resources available in the world.’ (Kleingeld & Brown, 2014).  
The intercultural form of identity is cosmopolitan in nature (Modood, 
                                               
70 A detailed account on how the contact theory would work in the context of intercultural 
relations is provided by (Cantle, 2012:145-152) 
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2015:349), and intercultural cohesion is the result of the normalisation of diversity 
within the context of cosmopolitan spaces (Nava, 2007). Likewise, the particular 
skills and competences that should be developed by modern citizens to achieve 
positive interactions are cosmopolitan.  
The features mentioned above relate to and support each other. In the 
intercultural perspective, fostering skills for positive interaction, avoiding 
categorisation, reducing prejudice, knowing ‘the other’, and building a fluid identity 
are features expressing a) the current situation of globalisation, b) an adequate 
identity for it in the form of cultural cosmopolitanism, and c) the basic challenge to 
achieve social cohesion.  
Cosmopolitan practices and skills are related to the adoption of cultural 
skills that facilitate communication and interaction with others, a 
phenomenon also described as “multiple cultural competence” (…) 
Cosmopolitan practices refer more specifically to interactions across 
cultural differences. Such multiple cultural competences are especially 
relevant when it comes to transactions between traders and customers, 
and I therefore describe this phenomenon as ‘corner-shop 
cosmopolitanism’. It takes place locally, and is characterized by the 
versatile intercultural skills of those involved in transactions. 
(Wessendorf, 2014:68) 
If we step back, it is possible to see the general framework that provides the 
unity amongst the cosmopolitan practices and competences: modern liberalism, the 
very same framework that facilitated the alternative approach that interculturalism 
now wants to avoid. Take one step forward, and we can perceive that 
interculturalism comes to deal with similar assumptions about social cohesion, 
identity and sources of diversity in the context of modern liberalism. There are 
indeed slight differences between the intercultural and the multicultural perspectives, 
but they cannot be understood as opposed. Cantle’s perspective perhaps is the 
most accurate about the relation between them. Nationalism in general, and 
multicultural nationalism in particular, as with global cosmopolitanism, are responses 
to the modern issues that do differ but are not opposed.  
The response to globalisation and super diversity has generally been one 
of trying to reassert nationalistic concepts of identity and to strengthen 
national solidarity, with the credibility and influence of the political elite 
very much at stake. This has been understandable, and will no doubt 
continue while the nation-state is regarded as the only viable instrument 
of a political community. But the opposite is also needed –to prepare for 
the future of increasingly globalised identities– and not simply prop up a 
past conception of ourselves which will be increasingly subject to 
pressure and change in a globalised world. Globalised and national 
identities are not opposed and should be regarded as complementary. 
(Cantle, 2012:171) 




interculturalism and its relation with other theories of diversity and plurality: a form of 
super-diversity produced by the process of globalisation that demands a different 
approach than those of multiculturalism and nationalism. ‘Globalisation has created 
an era of “super-diversity” in which most Western societies have become far more 
dynamic and complex.’ (Cantle, 2013) This complexity would differentiate and justify 
the intercultural project. 
 
6.3 Globalisation, super-diversity and social allegiance 
 
European interculturalism and recent forms of cosmopolitanism, generally 
advocate the idea that globalisation brought a qualitative change in contemporary 
diversity; a new form known as super-diversity that has made the allegiance to local 
groups and communities obsolete. Underlying the process of globalisation is an 
assumption that in our current historical situation, identity no longer needs any 
reference to a myth of common origin, tradition or ethnicity. This liberation from the 
constraints of particular forms of organising life is essential to support 
cosmopolitanism and global citizenship. ‘If this possibility is to be consolidated, each 
citizen of a state must learn to become a cosmopolitan citizen -a person capable of 
mediating between national traditions, communities and alternative forms of life.’ 
(Held, 1999:44) In fact, the process of globalisation has allowed and supported 
critical views of otherwise strong theoretical approaches such as liberal nationalism.  
The bonds between individuals in the global cosmopolitan framework, if any, 
are built using an idea of generic humankind that denies the need of any parochial 
attachment. Super-diversity is a sort of unstructured diversity in which new migration 
has brought ‘…a transformative “diversification of diversity” not just in terms of 
ethnicities and countries of origin, but also with respect to a variety of significant 
variables that affect where, how and with whom people live.’ (Vertovec, 2006:1) 
Therefore, if we concede that super-diversity and globalisation represent a 
qualitative change in the forms of contemporary plurality, then cosmopolitan 
approaches such as European interculturalism seems to be the suitable way to 
address the new issues on diversity.  
Globalisation and cosmopolitanism are so closely related that what we call 
cosmopolitanisation is nothing but an internalisation of the process of globalisation 
(Beck, 2002). Additionally, the process of cosmopolitanisation is considered an 
expression of the progressive process towards more liberal societies. In this century 
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of a globalised world, the process of liberalisation emphasising individual rights and 
principles would find its way through the cosmopolitan approaches. The process of 
globalisation is too broad a phenomenon to be covered here. In consequence, for 
the purposes of my argument, I focus only on the idea of a qualitative change in 
modern diversity and if this is enough to claim that individuals in western societies 
can build their identity without a strong attachment to collective identities.  
The idea of super-diversity is closely tied to migration waves happening in 
the last decades. The fact of massive migration results in what Stephen Castles 
refer as the first hypothesis of global migration: ‘The world is entering a new phase 
of mass population moments, in which migration to Europe and the situation of 
ethnic minorities in Europe can be fully understood only in a global context.’ 
(2000:79) He also mentions that the new migration corresponds with the 
restructuring of the economy and labour markets during the last years, as well as, 
new characteristics of migrants -polarisation of skills and qualifications-, and new 
forms of migration -family migration and refugee movements instead guest-worker 
systems-. The evidence to support these claims is quite strong. However, the 
consequence of these well-documented changes is not necessarily accurately 
understood in relation to the collective identity of communities.  
The economic way of organising the world has changed, as have modes of 
migration and policies and laws; nonetheless, the way we build identity does not 
seem to be qualitatively different from what happened before. There are differences 
indeed, for instance, greater reflexivity is required to navigate within globalised 
conditions of rapid change and increased choice. However, if we correctly grasp the 
core of the proposition, we would realise that super-diversity, new migration and 
globalisation are not fostering a change in traditional forms of collective identity, but 
an alternative form of identity in which strong collective allegiance is not necessary. 
In other words, super-diversity is neither supplanting collective identities nor 
competing with them. Actually, they do not contradict each other. 
Cosmopolitanism suggests, we should focus on individual identity and leave 
behind the restrictive, fixed categories that are nothing but old-fashioned 
attachments. ‘Nussbaum and other extreme cosmopolitans, and to a lesser extent 
many of the moderates, present cosmopolitanism first and foremost as a kind of 
virtuous deracination, a liberation from the possibly illegitimate, and in any case 





Super-diversity tries to advocate an autonomous and personal 
understanding of our identity. In the new global context, the emphasis is on the 
particular circumstance of every individual and not on the situation of the group or 
community. As I mentioned before, the core assumption of super-diversity is that 
collectivities are not genuine social actors. ‘For theorists seeking to draw broad 
brush pictures of global social change, globalization is linked to the social process of 
individualization, although the mechanisms remain sketchy.’ (Jamieson, 2013:214) 
Agency in the globalised world is concentrated in the individual. In this case, 
globalisation pushes to the individualisation, and individualisation in a liberal context 
suits cosmopolitanism. 
There are two notions we can mention to challenge the core assumption of 
super-diversity: first, we could dispute the notion that collective categories are not 
appropriate conceptual tools to understand diversity in the global context; or second, 
we could affirm that individuals still develop strong attachments to particular groups 
or communities.71 In the first sense, we usually find premises such as  
We believe that this super-diversity presents a fundamental challenge to 
the way we categorise people. And if the groupings that we often use 
(black, Christian, gay, and so on) to identify people who are 
disadvantaged or being discriminated against are not sound, then the 
whole process of promoting equality is undermined. (Fanshawe & 
Dhananjayan, 2010:11)  
A common claim is that traditional categories for labelling difference, in the 
context of super-diversity, are not enough, which might be true. However, this does 
not imply a qualitative change in the nature of identity or the way we construct it, 
therefore, the attachments to groups are as necessary as always. Globalisation 
does not inevitably entail a straightforward form of individualisation. Relations with 
others are still of great importance. The individualisation thesis, which is at the core 
of the cosmopolitan argument, is more complex than scholars believed in the first 
place. In Chapter 8 I introduce the distinction between self-sufficiency and 
completeness in constructing our identity, which clarifies what I affirm here. We can 
concede that traditional categories such as  
‘National identity’ does not therefore coincide with an affinity or emotional 
attachment to the state in which people happen to reside, except perhaps 
                                               
71 The way I understand this strong attachment to particular groups and communities is 
significantly different from the usual idea of attachment to a collective identity. I think of this 
attachment as an ontological feature of our being, and not only as a perception of belonging. 
For instance, the attachment is equally present in an individual that feels it belongs to a 
particular nation-state, as in an individual that does not feel that belonging, as long as they 
share the same horizon from which they make sense of their own existence. I develop this 
idea further in Chapter 8. 
156 
 
in the case of coherent nation-states, with clear borders and relatively 
homogeneous populations. Such states are clearly becoming fewer in 
number as patterns of migration impact on all continents.’ (Cantle, 
2012:25) 
Again, at least in the way and level I refer to it, identity is not just a matter of 
affinity or preference, not mainly an emotional attachment. Identity is more than 
belonging. Our identity is our being. The new form of diversity, derived by the 
processes of globalisation, judges identity using the same framework as other liberal 
approaches. This tendency is understandable because identity has been 
traditionally linked to important concepts in the political realm, particularly social 
cohesion and solidarity. In political models such as nationalism, there is the opinion 
of promoting ways of belonging would be enough to develop a sense of shared 
identity. However, promoting ways of belonging is not the same that promoting ways 
of being, of being together.  
As said above, in the intercultural paradigm, bonding is also the way to 
secure social cohesion and solidarity, but in contrast to the nationalist approach, it is 
achieved through mutual understanding. In consequence, there is no need for a 
particular and shared identity. However, despite the innovative perspective 
interculturalism brings to the debate, we should not advocate weaker roles for 
identity. Completely the opposite, we have to link diversity with a stronger idea of 
identity and recognition. If we are interested, not in the political features to secure 
cohesion and solidarity, but in the factual way we construct our identity, then 
categories and collectivities are still significant.  
At this moment it is useful to bring into play the second thought I mentioned 
before: the strong attachment to groups and communities which remains, despite 
the globalisation process, as a necessary feature of identity construction. This is not 
a new debate. We find ourselves again in front of two opposed forms of 
understanding the bonds between individuals; an opposition that brings us back to 
the debate between communitarianism and cosmopolitanism. Of their several 
disagreements, I focus on one central dispute: the necessity of allegiance to 
particular groups or communities in the process of identity construction.  
Cosmopolitan approaches emphasising a qualitative change derived from 
migration such as super-diversity clearly advocate the idea that traditional forms of 
identity, such as national identity are on the decline.  
Castells (1997/2010) supports the view that the state has been bypassed 
by networks of wealth, power and information and lost much of its 
sovereignty. Barber (2013) agrees and believes that nation-states might 




are more capable of responding to cross-border challenges than states.72 
(Cantle, 2013)  
Even if mild cosmopolitanisms do not suggest national identity should be 
downplayed, they take this decline as evidence of the inessential nature of bonds 
between individuals and communities ‘The same -if the cosmopolitan alternative can 
be sustained- is true for immersion in the culture of a particular community. Such 
immersion may be something that particular people like and enjoy. But they no 
longer can claim that it is something that they need.’ (Waldron, 1992:762) Therefore, 
the dispute between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism can be schematically 
summed up in trying to find at least one attachment that cannot be denied. ‘Perhaps 
we are able to reexamine some attachments, but the problem for liberalism arises if 
there are others so fundamental to our identity that they cannot be set aside and 
that any attempt to do so will result in serious and perhaps irreparable psychological 
damage.’ (Daniel Bell, 2016) 
In contrast, there are perspectives supporting people’s legitimate 
expectations to have access and remain bonded to their culture, for instance, 
multiculturalism and civic nationalism; and at the same time, they endorse a process 
of liberalisation. In times of globalisation, collective identity can simultaneously 
become stronger and follow the processes of liberalisation. Kymlicka, taking Québec 
as an example, affirms that both tendencies are happening in the same historical 
process: communities that are liberalising their members at the same time still value 
their membership in the community. ‘Far from displacing national identity, 
liberalization has in fact gone hand in hand with an increased sense of nationhood.’ 
(1995:88) In fact, this convergence of liberalisation processes and nationalist 
allegiances is nothing unexpected as, at the end of the day, it is completely possible 
to have liberal nationalisms.  
I believe the puzzle does not vanish by finding an attachment that cannot be 
denied without irrevocably harming the construction of identity. Indeed no singular 
attachment, no matter how important, can be said to be ingrained in our identity. 
Similarly, we cannot deny the importance of attachments because some people are 
choosing to move away from traditional ways of life. On the contrary, we have to 
assert the articulation of almost countless attachments as the core of our identity, 
including both, the chosen and unchosen ones. The attachments do not necessarily 
need to be positive or conscious to be part of our being, in other words, they are not 
                                               
72 The references mentioned by Cantle in this quote are Castells’ The Power of Identity 
158 
 
necessarily chosen. I will argue this point in Chapter 8.  
Our identity is a whole. In consequence, even if we do not feel a link to 
certain aspects or features of a group, it does not mean we are not related to them 
or under their influence. Scholars such as Kymlicka (1995), Taylor (1994) or Tamir 
(1993) are right in believing the main reason people keep and foster attachments is 
because this allows them to make sense of their world. However, it is not so clear 
they could accept that what helps us to make sense of the world cannot be reduced 
to what we consciously and openly accept, but it also includes that other universe of 
issues, ideas and notions which with we engage in a dialectical struggle. Directly, by 
contrast, or as an open opposition, collective identities are necessary to make sense 
of what we are.  
It would be a grave mistake to underestimate the weight or deny the 
legitimacy of collective identities. It is often said, and rightly so, that they 
are arbitrarily constructed or even invented, but that does not prevent 
them from being lived as profoundly authentic by the large majority of 
individuals who need them to make sense of their life and to ground 
themselves. Finally, they come to acquire a level of substance that keeps 
them from being entirely arbitrary or artificial. Largely driven by emotion, 
they arouse suspicion the consummate rationalists. And like all myths 
that they feed on, they partake in a universal mechanism that is acting in 
the history of all societies and weighs strongly on the direction of their 
future. Unpredictable and irrepressible, they can be linked both to the 
most noble and the most vile endeavours. In any case, they fulfil an 
essential function of unification, stabilization, and mobilization. 
(Bouchard, 2011:456-57) 
 
6.4 The intercultural assessment of multiculturalism 
 
As I said above, in general terms intercultural policies claim to address the 
issues multiculturalism generates and/or cannot solve. These general issues include 
communal segregation, mutual incomprehension, undermining the rights of women, 
moral relativism, (Europe & Ministers, 2008:19-20); prevention of positive 
interaction, rigid categorisation of individuals, static identity, ethnic, racial and 
national substantialism (Zapata-Barrero, 2018); and reified notions of culture (A. 
Phillips, 2007) amongst the most important ones. Other problems brought up from 
the particular circumstances of the Québécois and European contexts, include the 
non-recognition of a majority culture and non-protection of a national language in 
Québec (Bouchard, 2011), and its obsolete structure for the context of super-
diversity in Europe (Guidikova, 2018). These more particular critiques are not 
                                                                                                                                     




shared between both forms of interculturalism, but they complete a sketch of issues 
scholars claim interculturalism can confront. 
In Multiculturalism and Interculturalism: debating the dividing lines (2018a), 
Nasar Meer, Tariq Modood and Ricard Zapata-Barrero have made the most recent 
effort to draw the coincidences and divergences between multiculturalism and 
interculturalism in the clearest possible way. They affirm that both approaches: a) 
consider cultural pluralism an asset, b) oppose assimilationist and liberal 
perspectives that do not take into account culture and identity, and c) both try to 
achieve equal treatment through the inclusion of cultural difference. On the other 
hand, they contest on i) the status of dialogue and interpersonal relations, ii) the role 
of the majority-minority scheme, iii) the significance of recognising groups in addition 
to individual citizenship, and iv) the status of minority religious communities and 
organisations. (Meer, Modood, & Zapata-Barrero, 2018b:9).  
I consider it a fair account that sums up the complex relationship between 
the theories. However, if I might claim a modest contribution to this issue, it can be 
found in my effort to place some assumptions that demand further debate from an 
ontological perspective, such as super-diversity and social allegiance, under the 
spotlight.    
In the intercultural approach, diversity from national minorities or indigenous 
peoples is not taken into account, or if it does, it does not require any particular 
change or adaptation to deal with them. It does not emphasise the injustices 
suffered by minorities in contrast to mainstream society; indeed, any kind of 
discrimination seems to be reduced to an instance of ignorance directed to 
individuals. Furthermore, it is not eager to recognise any sort of cultural, ethnic or 
religious collectivity as a social actor. Despite Ted Cantle’s claim that 
interculturalism is inaccurate when it downplays economic disparities as an 
important factor in discrimination (2012:61-62), there is clear stress on prejudice and 
ignorance as principal sources of conflicts between communities. In consequence, 
there is a prioritisation of individual solutions over collective ones.73  
As I mentioned above, on fundamental issues, interculturalism is closer to 
individualistic perspectives such as cosmopolitanism than it is to communitarian 
perspectives. Correspondingly, this difference in understanding diversity as based 
                                               
73 As Cantle mentions, poverty alone is not responsible for conflicts between communities. 
Racism is not attributable to poverty. Prejudice and discrimination do not always have an 
economic origin, and instead they have socio-psychological roots. However, it is important 
not to jump straight to the opposite conclusion and to assume there are no structural issues 
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on the individuals and not groups explains the disagreements mentioned by Meer, 
Modood and Zapata-Barrero. The assumption underlying super-diversity is that the 
plurality of affiliations of every individual renders ethnic collectivities – or any group- 
impotent as social actors. In this case, diversity pushes towards individualisation, 
and individualisation in liberal context better suits notions of cosmopolitanism.    
Behind the struggles to differentiate multiculturalism and interculturalism, 
there is something deeper than an incidental inability to draw clear attributes and 
goals. For that reason, it is important to find the cause for this dissonance between 
the claims and the stands, between the direct criticism of multiculturalism and the 
failure of interculturalism in building a radically distinctive alternative. In the first 
place, we have to assume that interculturalism holds the legitimate aim of supporting 
diversity and improving pluralist theories in western democracies. It is not a post-
multicultural perspective of the same nature as right-wing stands, but a positive 
effort toward inclusiveness.  
It is clear that interculturalism and multiculturalism share a common ground; 
both are pluralist theories in liberal contexts. In Taylor’s opinion, the only difference 
is in the level of the ‘over-all story of what they are trying to do.’ (2012:492) It is a 
matter of emphasis. Multiculturalism places emphasis on recognition,74 
interculturalism on integration. ‘…one possible semantic distinction between the 
“multi-” and the “inter-” was that, within the dual goal of recognizing difference and 
achieving integration, “inter” places a greater emphasis on the latter.’ (2012:417) 
Bouchard would go further and assert that, despite the common ground, they are 
diverse forms of liberal pluralism representing different paradigms: multiculturalism 
refers to a paradigm of diversity not recognising a majority culture; meanwhile, 
interculturalism denotes a duality paradigm in which the majority is equally 
important. (2018:93) However, despite the tone, the coincidences of both 
approaches are the rule and not the exception.  
We can perceive that interculturalism reuses criticism made from different 
‘post’ and ‘anti’ multicultural perspectives, such as claims of illiberality and 
                                                                                                                                     
contributing to cultural conflicts. 
74 In the case of Taylor’s multiculturalism, the concept of recognition moves between the 
ontological dimension of dialogical construction of identity and particular group-differentiated 
rights adopted especially in Canada. Throughout the text I have denounced the multicultural 
overemphasis on political recognition, but in this case it should not be mistaken for the 
emphasis on recognition that Taylor mentions as characteristic of multiculturalism. In this 
case, recognition refers simply to acknowledging the cultural difference of cultural 




essentialisation of groups,75 but tries at the same time to keep an identical liberal 
framework to provide a positive perspective on diversity. To summarise, there is 
something very suspicious about a theory that claims to bring a completely different 
approach to modern diversity, but in the end, has a very similar output to the old-
fashioned approach that it was supposed to replace. Perhaps there is no more 
space within this paradigm to move forward to more radical ways of plural life. In 




The particular proposals that interculturalism has for public space can be 
criticised in different ways, from being not different enough to the multicultural ones 
to underestimating the complex ways power shapes the tensions between groups 
and individuals. However, the aim behind them is to deal with a fundamental 
unsolved issue: the lack of positive relations between members of different ethnic, 
religious and ideological communities. Let me be particularly clear about this 
because here is where I found the support for the first part of my argument. The 
criticism of the lack of positive intercultural dialogue is valid. It denotes a social 
phenomenon present in modern societies, despite the best efforts of pluralist 
approaches to tackle it. This is not to deny the steps forward that projects such as 
multiculturalism have made in pursuing more cohesive and interactive diverse 
societies, it is simply an acknowledgement of the long way we still have ahead. 
Even if I have not presented an exhaustive description of interculturalism, it 
seems enough for advancing my argument. Beyond the debates on interculturalism 
replacing multiculturalism, promising to succeed where the latter has failed before, 
the problems providing the fuel to the intercultural narrative are enough evidence 
that more work on the issue of diversity and recognition has to be done. It is not a 
matter of whether multiculturalism is no longer adequate as an approach to cultural 
diversity, or if it has to be complemented by an intercultural perspective. The 
criticism -sometimes unfairly directed to multiculturalism- shows clearly that there 
are issues beyond its reach, at least in its current liberal configuration. Can we 
conceive of some kind of multiculturalism that is not necessarily liberal? Perhaps, at 
                                               
75 An account of these claims of illiberality and essentialism from ‘anti’ and ‘post’ 
multicultural perspectives can be seen in (Kymlicka, 2015), The same claims from the 
perspective of interculturalism are available in (Meer & Modood, 2018). 
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least one that is less close to the institutional side and closer to more meaningful 
engagement between individuals and communities.76 On the other hand, we can be 
sure that the difficulties in diverse societies are not the result of accommodating and 
integrating minority groups, as well as recognising them as units and legitimate 
social actors, as interculturalism suggests. Even if it is an interesting phenomenon to 
witness multiculturalism being blamed for what it tries to fight, we cannot believe the 
segregation of minorities or the enforcement of cultural stereotypes is caused by 
multiculturalism when it is actually a strategy to fight them (Kymlicka, 2015).  
Multiculturalism, in the same way as other liberal perspectives, is a strategy 
that falls short because of its emphasis on the political aspects when the problems 
demand more fundamental solutions on other levels. The issues of diversity we can 
mention do not persist because multiculturalism is wrong, but because it is limited. 
Interculturalism does help to point out some of these important issues. A different 
matter is whether it can actually replace multiculturalism; so far, it is not even clear 
that its key features -communicative and interactive- are in fact missing in the 
multicultural project (Meer & Modood, 2018). Interculturalism does not solve the 
limitations of multiculturalism. Again, a little more development is needed to achieve 
the conclusion that interculturalism also falls short on addressing most of the issues 
it claims to tackle. 
 
                                               













In this chapter, I analyse further the nuances of the intercultural proposal. I 
focus my argumentation on the issues of strong identity and recognition. To keep 
the same distinction used before, I separately consider European and Québec 
interculturalism to convey the particular reasons for each case, but I am going to 
suggest that neither European nor Québécois interculturalism leads to the kind of 
strong identity and recognition I propose in this text.77 
In Québécois interculturalism’s conceptions of identity and recognition 
strongly resemble their counterparts in multicultural theory. The only relevant 
difference here is the emphasis on a principle of reciprocity delineated by Bouchard 
(2011), in which minority recognition should be necessarily mirrored by majority 
recognition. He affirms that ‘…interculturalism is sensitive to the problems and 
needs of the majority culture and the challenge of reconciling majority and minority 
rights and expectations. Multiculturalism does not show these concerns, once again 
because it does not recognise the existence of the duality.’ (2018:96-97) Through 
the first three sections, I outline a path from the principle of reciprocity to the 
majority’s worries of not benefiting equally from policies as their minority 
                                               
77 A clarification is needed here. Québec interculturalism tries to provide recognition to the 
Francophone culture, that is the whole aim of the project, at least from the socio-political 
perspective, but it does not extend this aim to minorities within Québec. In other words, 
Québec interculturalism does not provide recognition in general. It is quite interesting to see 
the way in which the same social recognition demanded in respect to the larger Canadian 
society is denied to the minority groups within the Québécois society. But it is even more 
interesting to see how, the same reasons and fears of lacking cohesion and social 
fragmentation are used to reduce minority recognition within Québec to the dimension of the 
political. In other words, Quebéc tries to protect their monopoly of recognition by the same 
means it does the larger multicultural Canadian society. 
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counterparts. In reality, however, the causality appears to flow in the opposite 
direction: these anxieties seem to trigger and existentially justify reciprocity and 
mutual adjustment. I pay particular attention to the idea of controlled interventionism 
as a sort of precedence that majorities can exercise under some circumstances; 
consequently, I examine the circumstances and criteria typically adducing such an 
idea. 
In a nutshell, the principle of reciprocity allows mild interventionism so long 
as it has a liberal nature. With that in mind, I suggest that the anxieties of minorities 
and majorities are qualitatively different, and the troubles that legitimately worry 
minorities cannot always be mirrored by majority’s concerns. Therefore, a 
fundamental asymmetry inheres in the idea of adjusted reciprocity. I push the 
consequences further and I maintain that, at least in regard to identity and 
recognition, adjusted reciprocity is neither justified nor feasible. The adjustments are 
pragmatic but identity cannot adjust pragmatically. In order to support this idea of 
identity, I sketch it as something more complex than just the beliefs and practices 
that we willingly accept or reject. Finally, I discuss some shortcomings with the idea 
of mutual adjustment through dialogue.  
The last three parts of the chapter are devoted to further analysing European 
interculturalism. I define the reasons why it does not address strong forms of 
identity, and what implications this reluctance to grant recognition of social groups 
has. Driven by its liberal cosmopolitan nature, and a hard rejection of relativism and 
its possible consequences, European interculturalism aligns itself with a particular 
understanding of the concept of community that significantly restricts its scope. 
Subsequently, I focus on delineating two different notions of community: 
togetherness and likeness; I investigate the conditions which affirm that members of 
a community are living together in a meaningful way, drawing on the fears of 
relativism in the liberal tradition. Following this distinction, the claim of 
interculturalism to foster ways and spaces to live together acquires a different 
meaning, moving closer to likeness than togetherness. European interculturalism 
inverts the directionality and proposes universal values for grassroots and everyday 
interactions. I argue that contact theory does not provide neither a conceptual basis 
to say that we can truly live together nor social cohesion. Finally, I locate the source 
of interculturalism’s tendency to universalism in a fear of relativism and its 
presupposed consequences. The fundamental question then becomes: Are we 




7.1 Reciprocity and pragmatic accommodations 
  
I have mentioned the particularities of Québec’s circumstances which led 
interculturalists to look for the external and internal protection of the Francophone 
culture. We can call this a process of double protection. In relation to the larger 
Canadian society, the Francophone culture demands to be recognised as a minority 
in need of protection to preserve their identity. Responding to the minorities within 
the province, they advocate their own recognition as the host -majority- culture. In 
particular, this second designation as the host culture is intended to prevent any 
fragmentation of the Francophone society. In other words, Québec is protected from 
external pressures of the larger Canadian society that might jeopardise the 
continuity of Francophone culture and also protected internally by standing as the 
official culture and language of social cohesion and everyday business. As could be 
expected, the principle of reciprocity is ingrained in this double protection. Some 
problems of this approach will become visible as we more closely inspect the 
complexities of how the double protection is compatible with a reciprocal recognition 
between minorities and majorities.  
My argument targets, not double protection itself, but its underlying 
understanding of recognition. In consequence, I do not venture to demonstrate if 
reciprocity and double recognition do or do not justify the Québec double protection; 
for my present purposes, it is enough to unveil some misunderstandings of the 
adjusted recognition assumed by the intercultural theory. In order to provide 
evidence for my claim, I start by referring to Bouchard’s understanding of the way 
reciprocity and recognition support this double protection of Québec’s Francophone 
culture.   
Part of the answer to this criticism [interventionism of the majority culture] 
lies in the principle of double recognition, already mentioned, and the 
reciprocity that it entails: cultural interventionism can be seen as a 
reasonable accommodation, this time in favour of the majority rather than 
minorities. Again, this arrangement is justified by the fact that the 
maintenance of the majority culture, by ensuring the reproduction of the 
symbolic foundation, will also serve the minorities. Here we are very 
much in the spirit of interculturalism, which advocates a logic of 
harmonisation through mutual adjustments. (2018:84) 
The notion of reciprocity used in Québec interculturalism is conceived as the 
base for promoting harmonising practices, especially for reasonable accommodation 
and concerted adjustments.78 We can affirm without much trouble that reciprocity 
                                               
78 The concept of reciprocity in Québec interculturalism is very close to the standard 
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can work when it is directed to actions and practices. In this vein, it seems to be a 
justified principle for dealing with the political aspects and everyday affairs of 
integration; under the right circumstances, I cannot see why reciprocity and 
intercultural harmonisation would not nurture the shared responsibility of majorities 
and minorities in processes of integration. Nevertheless, when it is a matter of 
identity recognition, this idea of reciprocity emphasising harmonisation leads to other 
kinds of disparities and limits. 
Identity, in the strict sense of the term, is not something open to negotiation 
or adjustments. I am aware there are robust bodies of work supporting notions of 
identity negotiation, fluidity of boundaries and others of the same nature, from Erving 
Goffman (1973) to Judith Butler (1999). For my present purpose, I beg the reader to 
let me briefly present a notion of identity needed to advance my argument. The 
following affirmations, differentiations and nuances will be justified in Chapter 8, 
suffice it to make some positive and negative assertions about identity. I do not 
argue that identity is fixed, cannot change, is not socially constructed, or is not 
dialogic or dialectically shaped. I say it is not open to negotiation or adjustments, 
ideas located in a pragmatic understanding of phenomena. In other words, in the 
sense I consider it, identity refers to what we are, as a whole. It is not a resource 
people can actually use or do. Behind this subtle difference there is more than just a 
linguistic or semantic premise. Just as Merleau-Ponty embarked on showing that it 
is misleading to say we have bodies, we have minds or we have selves, I will argue 
in Chapter 8 that it is misleading to say we have an identity, even worse to say we 
have multiple identities. Merleau-Ponty would say that it is better to say we are 
minds, selves and bodies, I similarly affirm it is better to say identity is nothing but 
what we are. To say it in technical philosophical terms: identity is neither a property 
nor a relation, but our being. The same thought applies to collective identity. Even 
when there is an evident link between what we do and what we are as communities 
and individuals, that is, between our practices and identity, the latter cannot be 
reduced to the first.  
Identity is more complex than the practices and behaviours we endorse or 
reject. Negotiation and adaptation of particular practices are not of the same kind as 
                                                                                                                                     
meaning of the term. ‘Reciprocity is a principle that demands of the parties that they show or 
demonstrate through their acts what they expect of others. For example, respect for others, 
open-mindedness, good faith and the ability to compromise are dispositions that we would 
like our interlocutors to display and that, consequently, we must also put into practice. 
Reciprocity is essential for the institution of a culture of dialogue that fosters the coordination 




recognition of communities’ identity. Long story short, it is important to emphasise 
that dealing with the practices does not condition the recognition of individual or 
collective identity. The same way that banning specific practices does not 
necessarily destroy or significantly modify the identity of a community, allowing them 
does not imply its recognition. To return to the particular case I am describing, it is 
peculiar, to say the least, that in a socio-political endeavour seeking identity 
preservation, notions such as negotiation and mutual adjustments could be applied 
to the identity of the communities. The aim behind pluralist projects like Québec 
interculturalism is to preserve identities, in this case, the Francophone identity. 
In Québec interculturalism, the same way multicultural theory anticipates, 
adjustments and accommodations are mostly dealt in the institutional sphere and at 
the political level. Both approaches work on the assumption that political endeavours 
should reflect and shape social life. And even if this is true in many respects, 
political accommodations are not influential enough to assume that they lead to 
modifications in or recognitions of identity. To say it properly, political adjustments 
and accommodations can reflect the mutual recognition -or the lack thereof- 
between two or more communities, however, they will not directly produce it.79 This 
is not to say the political sphere has no influence on the social sphere or even the 
ontological; I am saying that in the particular case of identity, the political dimension 
always comes second.  
Adjusted reciprocity in the Québécois interculturalism is pragmatic, not 
fundamental; it deals with practices, not with identities. It is true that every individual 
and every community changes over time, and we can interpret this as evidence of 
continual adjustments. However, individuals and communities also persist over time, 
and they do it because they are unable to change some aspects of themselves 
without feeling they are losing an important part of their identity, no matter what the 
pragmatic benefit could be. Pragmatic adjustments are possible as political 
negotiations only to the extent they do not reach that depth where identity as a 
whole remains. In other words, I cannot change myself in a way that I stop being 
who I am. Pragmatic adjustments are impossible in the realm of identity, which is not 
to say our identity does not change, what is impossible is to do so in a pragmatic 
manner. Furthermore, I am not saying that collective identity is a sort of substance 
                                               
79 It is because of this gap between the political and the social that approaches such as 
everyday multiculturalism or European interculturalism claim any top-down approach runs 
the risk of being out of touch with everyday, grassroots forms of diversity encounters and 
negotiations. (Hardy, 2017) 
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or essence, it does change, but at the slow rate of historical processes and only as 
an internal self-generated effect. 
We have to be particularly careful not to mistake Québec’s double protection 
for a symmetrical form of ‘recognition’, even if it were just the kind referred to as 
pragmatic harmonisation. It is not only that double protection does not rest on real 
recognition of the other, but it is not even symmetrical; a symmetrical relation would 
be indeed a more suitable way to address a significant amount of the underlying 
problems. Notwithstanding Bouchard’s assertion that the majority-minority 
framework unavoidably leads to a dualistic perspective, this dualism is not 
symmetrical in the context of Québec interculturalism. It does distinguish between 
majorities and minorities, but then the protections are unequally directed to one of 
the groups: the provincial majority. To be clear, I am not denying minorities and 
majorities can engage in more or less balanced interactions, adjustments and 
adaptations in everyday life, as well as in the political realm; I am not denying a 
possible quasi-harmonisation of both sides of the dialectic.  
Symmetry, understood as equal distribution of power, cannot prevail if the 
aim shifts to primarily protect the symbolic foundations of the host society, and only 
as a side effect would benefit to the minority groups. The double protection does not 
lead to an equal distribution of recognition if I am allowed to say it this way; or if we 
want to say it properly, it does not come from a real notion of equal recognition. 
Arguably this is a key to understanding the issues behind the sort of reciprocity 
implied in Québec interculturalism. Instead of pushing a symmetrical reciprocity on 
the basis of acknowledging others by reversing perspectives and judging from their 
point of view (Benhabib, 1992), intercultural reciprocity is mostly pragmatic and it 
implies mutual adjustments without any deeper engagement in understanding the 
other. 
 
7.2 Interventionism and precedence 
 
Problems of unbalance and asymmetry become evident when we spot that 
the concerns of Québec interculturalism gradually moves from securing the 
conditions for minorities to integrate successfully into the mainstream culture, to 
concerns about the necessity of defining criteria and settings limits to the possible 
abuse on the part of the majority, what Bouchard calls ‘controlled majority 




interventionism is the same as in the multicultural project: majorities are less likely to 
abuse from their interventionism as long as they stay within the liberal framework.80 
Actually, this sort of interventionism is nothing but a form of liberalisation. ‘Liberals 
need to think more deeply about how to promote the liberalization of societal 
cultures, and about the role of coercive and non‐coercive third‐party intervention in 
that process.’ (Kymlicka, 1995:172) 
However, even if this sounds plausible in many respects, a major paradox 
quickly emerges: it does not seem very liberal to impose liberalism on others. 
Nonetheless, liberals find themselves inconsistently justifying such impositions, 
despite their own awareness that by doing so they are following the letter but not the 
spirit of the law. In Québec interculturalism, this happens when they push the 
precedence of the Francophone culture as the societal context in which reciprocity 
and harmonisation should happen, instead of pursuing the harmonisation of different 
societal contexts. In the case of European interculturalism, it happens when they 
assume a cosmopolitan framework as precondition for the contact theory. And it 
happens also in liberal multiculturalism, which recognises that  
Liberals have no automatic right to impose their views on non‐liberal 
national minorities. (…) Relations between national groups should be 
determined by dialogue. (Kymlicka, 1995:171) 
 
[and yet] ‘The legitimacy of imposing liberal principles on illiberal national 
groups depends on a number of factors (…) Cases involving newly 
arriving immigrant groups are very different. In these cases, it is more 
legitimate to compel respect for liberal principles, (…) I do not think it is 
wrong for liberal states to insist that immigration entails accepting the 
legitimacy of state enforcement of liberal principles, so long as 
immigrants know this in advance, and none the less voluntarily choose to 
come. (1995:170)81 
                                               
80 As far as I know, Bouchard does not directly acknowledge liberalism as criteria for 
preventing abuses of interventionism. However, he suggests it. The justification lies on the 
assumption that interventionism is not just a tool serving the majority, but also the minority. 
Additionally, controlled interventionism should happen in a context in which minorities can 
protect themselves against abuses by majorities, and this is more likely to be the case in the 
legal and political system of liberalism. 
81 This quotation, at least in the tone, resonates with old assimilationist ideas. It seems to 
suggest that if migration is voluntary, then the enforcement is legitimate, no matter its 
content. Let us try a though experiment. Instead of thinking the case of an individual or group 
moving to a western, liberal country. Let us imagine a western family moving to a non-liberal 
state where other kind of principles rule, perhaps strict hierarchical, and patriarchal 
principles. I am not sure that just because they are willingly aim to move there, their 
enforcement be legitimately justified. I do not see enough difference to claim that in the first 
case is an instance of integration and the second a case of assimilation. At least, it does not 
seem to be a qualitative difference. Anyhow, there is a gap between claiming immigrants 
should not disregard the principles and societal culture of the host society and claiming it can 
170 
 
Another problem of Québec interculturalism is related to the idea that internal 
protections of the Francophone societal culture make sense because they help to 
secure the cohesion of the extended community. To secure conditions such as a 
symbolic foundation, solidarity, fraternity and a sense of shared identity for holding 
members of society together is an unavoidable issue in any theory of diversity. 
However, the intercultural proposal on this fundamental issue seems to fall short. 
Securing the symbolic foundation for the larger society does not seem to lead to its 
cohesion.  
Mutual harmonisation and reciprocity are terms adduced when it comes to 
calming majority anxieties appearing in increasingly diverse societies. Though they 
can be real anxieties, they do not always result in fair claims, at least not in a 
context in which majorities have tipped the scale in their favour by default. In 
Chapter 2, I portrayed similar stratagems from the perspective of ‘race’ but easily 
extended to ethnicity, class or gender, in which beneficiaries of systematic 
advantages place themselves in the role of victims. In fact, the anxieties of an 
advantaged group in relation to a disadvantaged one can be evidence that 
recognition is far from being achieved; they can be considered ways to maintain 
hegemony. This shows that, as in many other struggles for social justice, real 
recognition cannot happen if communities and groups enjoying advantages do not 
acknowledge their own privileged position. Recognition cannot come incidentally or 
derivatively from looking to protect themselves. In any case, Bouchard 
acknowledges the fear and anxieties from some members of the Francophone 
community as a legitimate concern in the case of Québec and, consequently, as a 
reason for advocating first the recognition and then the precedence of its majority 
culture.  
According to them [members of the Francophone majority] the 
[Bouchard-Taylor] Report granted a great deal to minorities and 
immigrants but very little to the majority –a forceful reminder that 
because francophone Quebec was also a minority, it too needed 
protections; so, there was a need for balance. The elements of ad hoc 
precedence are conceived in this spirit. (2011:454)82  
This is an instance of the way relations are not consistently treated in 
Québec interculturalism. On the one hand, the notion that Francophone Québec is 
                                                                                                                                     
legitimately be enforced as long as migration is voluntary. 
82 In this quote Bouchard seems to revise an earlier position in which majority anxieties 
were not taken into account, however, it is more a matter of degree than a substantive 
correction. Reciprocity, precedence and harmonisation are notions included in the first 




entitled to protections comes from the fact it is a minority. On the other hand, the 
doubts are not directed to the Anglophone majority which can supposedly jeopardise 
its continuity, but to groups within Québec which, in so far as minorities, are in need 
of protections themselves. If the fear is that through the minority groups Anglophone 
Canada could overwhelm the Francophone culture, then the consequential step is 
not balancing the protections granted to those minority groups with privileges for the 
Francophone society, but to defend those same minority groups in order not to 
become means for the Anglophone hegemony.  
Even granting that internally protecting the Francophone culture could 
incidentally benefit minorities, it is not enough to justify claiming it as the symbolic 
foundation in which diversity should root itself. The anxieties might be partially 
justified, but the solution is uneven. Reciprocity and internal protection might help to 
assist Québec in reproducing and extending its culture, which is a legitimate aim, 
but we should find a way of leaving behind the idea that we need a unified symbolic 
foundation to accommodate diversity and, consequently, trying to pick one over the 
other. Québec interculturalism, particularly Bouchard’s approach, is caught in a false 
dilemma between encouraging the controlled interventionism that comes with the 
internal protection of the host community and the cultural neutrality of the social 
space. (Bouchard, 2018:87) However, some alternatives are possible, such as the 
one supported by European Interculturalism, or my own proposal of a more radical 
form of identity and its recognition. 
The pursuit for internal protection of the host culture leads people to 
postulate its ad hoc precedence. Notions of reciprocity and ad hoc precedence are 
important to understand the framework and context of the discussion on Québec 
interculturalism. I present the reasons developed by Bouchard to support these 
concepts, and then briefly assess some of the criticism he has faced. He provides at 
least seven good reasons to support ad hoc precedence: 1) contextual precedence 
is based on seniority or history of a group, 2) elements of precedence can be found 
in all societies and they are unavoidable even in the most liberal ones, 3) it helps to 
harmonise reciprocity and to accommodate minorities, 4) the law recognises the 
value of antecedence, 5) majority groups can be diversity bastions in a globalised 
world that tends to homogenisation, 6) from the sociological perspective, identity, 
memory, belonging, and other shared reference points provide solidarity and 
cohesion, and, 7) from a pragmatic perspective, it can soothe majority anxieties and 
reduce hostility towards minority groups (Bouchard, 2011:451-455).  
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The notion of precedence is somewhat ambiguous. Precedence slides 
between two definitions: that of place -we have precedence because we were here 
first-, and simplicity - social cohesion is eased by a focus on majority needs and 
values. Reasons 1, 2, and 4 seems to be closer to the former meaning of 
precedence, while reasons 3, 5, 6 and 7 seem to adjust better to the latter. In order 
to avoid any kind of confusion, I consider precedence only in the second sense, that 
is, expressing the aim that the majority’s culture should come first in order to secure 
a symbolic foundation. 
Bouchard knows well precedence is not universally justifiable and must be 
carefully supported. It is true he asserts elements of precedence can be found in all 
societies, but this is not enough to acknowledge them as legitimate in all cases. 
Majority precedence is only possible as an ad hoc approach ‘because it is out of the 
question to formalize or establish this idea as a general legal principle, which would 
lead to the creation of two classes of citizens.’ (2011:451) The fact that precedence 
is stipulated as ad hoc obliges to justify it referring mostly to the particularities of 
every specific case. Separately or combined, the seven good reasons I have 
mentioned above are the basic support for precedence in Québec. 
Scholars such as Tariq Modood (2015) have tried to find a solution to the 
tension between reciprocity and precedence. He suggests that Québec 
interculturalism is not necessarily wrong in looking to preserve the Francophone 
culture, but it loses its way when it tries to push the idea of an ad hoc precedence. In 
other words, liberal societies could support reciprocity without overemphasising 
precedence. Modood demonstrates that criteria such as seniority and history of a 
group are not exactly good reasons for supporting precedence (2015). From his 
perspective, the possible abuses of minorities by majorities would be prevented or 
reduced by a dialogic process of identity construction and the inclusion of minorities 
in the national culture. He says, ‘It is a story in which the white or ethnic majority is 
central but it is a developing story, and one in which new minorities too are 
characters and not just replicas of the majority or mere “add-ons”.’ (2015:361) His 
proposal of dialogic identity construction and reciprocity is further analysed in the 
next section but, even if Modood introduces an important distinction between 
dialogic construction and precedence, helping to release part of the moral burden 
trapped in the notion of a majority culture, the main problems persist.  
Despite Modood’s effort, it is not clear if we can have reciprocity without 




reciprocity between a majority and minorities can happen without eventually -or 
initially- assuming and emphasising the majority’s concerns. Reciprocity leads to 
precedence, not because logically or analytically we cannot have one without the 
other, but because in the western liberal context the dichotomy between minorities 
and majorities always has a fixed directionality in which the majority group seems to 
demand some major adjustments from minorities without giving up many of their 
privileges. 
 
7.3 From majority anxieties to intercultural dialogue 
  
The argumentation has led us to acknowledge the connection between the 
legitimate aims of cultural preservation, reciprocity, dialogue and the not-so 
legitimate majority anxieties in the intercultural context. I devote this section to its 
description. There are no evident obstacles in admitting recognition should not be an 
exclusive benefit for minorities. Aims of cultural preservation are not undesirable per 
se. ‘If, however, minorities do have a right to identity preservation, then such a right 
depends not on “seniority or history”, but on being a group that is not harming 
anyone. In which case, the majority does have this (qualified) right, but so do the 
minorities.’ (Modood, 2015:357) As far as both groups develop legitimate anxieties 
on the continuity of their identity, both are entitled to embrace an identity 
preservation principle. Nonetheless, the nature of those anxieties is qualitatively 
different. Majorities possess a social privilege that secures its power to reproduce 
and extend their culture (Modood, 2015:356), which is not a privilege minorities 
enjoy. Therefore, the source of the anxieties is quite different.  
If minorities were in a position to jeopardise the continuity of a majority 
culture, then there would not be such integration problems in the first place, and 
their constant denouncement of being victims of systematic disadvantage had been 
already disproven. It is hard to see how cultural minorities could jeopardise the 
continuity of a majority culture as such, but they might and should jeopardise some 
different spheres of privilege on which part of the majority culture flourish. It seems 
to me that most of the anxieties expressed by majority groups are nothing but fears 
of giving up their privileges, including the privilege of assuming that their ways of 
being and doing should be the norm. It is that taken-for-grantedness which 
minorities threaten.  
Following a classical scheme of power, the oppressed group is more likely to 
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have a legitimate fear of being systematically disadvantaged or wiped out, while the 
dominant group generally covers with fussy anxieties and claims of reciprocity and 
neutrality its efforts to maintain its status quo.83 In other instances of power relations 
such as race, gender and class, we can more readily perceive this search for 
privilege behind claims of reciprocity or neutrality. I cannot help but find resonances 
in other instances when reciprocity or neutrality are invoked. It is there every time 
someone affirms ‘all lives matter’ to turn down the legitimate claim behind ‘black 
lives matter’; it is there every time that meritocracy is used to deny any systematic 
gender or class gap.  
Additionally, along with scholars who are sceptical of democratic deliberative 
processes (Fraser, 1989; Young, 1990, 2007), I suspect that the context in which 
reciprocal recognition and dialogue are supposed to happen is unavoidably 
idealised. Modood amongst others correctly demonstrates there is no neutral public 
space, not even in liberal societies. ‘Liberal states may aspire to be culturally neutral 
but all societies must have a symbolic-normative core that acts as an integrative 
mechanism, and liberal states are no exception.’ (2015:356) However, when he 
considers the dialogic construction of identity, he seems to do it from an abstract 
perspective in which the particular social and political situation of the parties 
involved in the dialogue is not clear. Following Charles Taylor (1994) and Bhikhu 
Parekh (2000), dialogue is understood as a key element in the process of identity 
formation, individually and collectively. Despite that, it is not clear how dialogue 
works outside the abstract sphere of identity and within the socio-political framework 
of conflict. For instance, ‘…the claim that participants in dialogue implicitly aim at 
consensus is reminiscent of the ideal unity of the civic public.’ (Young, 1990:118) 
Even if advocates of dialogic recognition usually attempt the leap from the abstract 
to the social, dialogue seems to remain somewhat idealised -or, to be more precise, 
formalised.  
Instead of describing the real conditions for two or more unbalanced power 
groups to engage in dialogue, they focus on the formal ones. ‘[T]he dialogue 
                                               
83 I am not claiming that anxieties cannot be real; people from majority groups can have 
concerns about their cultural continuity that are as real as any other fear. I am saying that 
most of the time those concerns do not have real content or they lack a clear referent. For 
example, some European citizens might feel a true anxiety about what they consider the 
Islamisation of Europe, however, such claims do not find real evidence to support them. 
They refer more to a feeling of losing traditional hegemony than to real situations of 
disadvantage. Connected to the same example, Nasar Meer (2013:393-94) provides a 
helpful list of influential literature unveiling a presumed ongoing western decline at the hands 




requires certain institutional preconditions such as freedom of expression, agreed 
procedures and basic ethical norms, participatory public spaces, equal rights, a 
responsive and popularly accountable structure of authority, and empowerment of 
citizens,’ (Parekh, 2000:340) What is assumed never starts from the factual 
conditions, usually linked to power imbalances. In this abstract dialogue, the actual 
unbalanced setup between the different actors is veiled by the ideal conditions in 
which it should happen, as if securing the formal requirements of dialogue would 
preclude the factual inequality between the interlocutors. In any case, this leads to a 
fundamental paradox: dialogue is supposed to be the key for fixing unbalanced 
power relations in the context of democratic liberal societies; however, in the way it 
is portrayed, it does not fix this but assumes it as a condition for successful 
dialogue. Let me go a little further on this.  
Following Iris Marion Young’s definition, we can say dialogic recognition 
belongs to the realm of deliberative democracy, that is, a form of democracy in 
which  
…participants aim to persuade one another of the rightness of their 
positions (…) Through dialogue others test and challenge these 
proposals and arguments. Because they have not stood up to dialogic 
examination, the deliberating public rejects or refines some proposals. 
Participants arrive at a decision not by determining what preferences 
have greatest numerical support, but by determining which proposals the 
collective agrees are supported by the best reasons (Young, 2000:22-
23).  
However, as with other forms of dialogue and deliberative democracy, 
dialogic recognition perhaps is not fully aware of the normative and moral conditions 
entailed in its proposal. Young mentions four requirements: inclusion, equality, 
reasonableness and publicity (2000), but there could be more. I will not further 
discuss the consequences of this. It is enough for my purposes to point out that the 
object that ought to be the output of dialogue, in this case recognition, is already a 
condition of dialogue itself in the form of inclusion and equality. It is important to 
clarify that I am not saying intercultural dialogue or dialogic recognition are useless 
or wrong. Nor am I saying that dialogue is entirely impossible, it is clear that it works 
on many levels and forms. Neither am I saying that we should relinquish dialogue in 
favour of other forms of dealing with our issues on diversity and plurality.84 I am 
                                                                                                                                     
anxieties are usually presented on doubtful immigration demographics and projections. 
84 I can summing the attitude I find plausible using Grillo’s words: ‘It certainly must be 
recognised that intercultural dialogue is sometimes, perhaps often, impossible in a social or 
political sense - dialogue may be asymmetrical or otherwise distorted - and that language 
and culturally contexted linguistic practice mean that intercultural dialogue is often extremely 
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saying that in some difficult cases, the fundamental ones, such as dialogue on 
inclusion and recognition, the conditions and results seem to coincide.  
Therefore, we need a form of strong recognition that is pre-dialogic and on 
which dialogue and deliberative democracy are possible, not the other way round. 
This is also a good chance to denounce the tendency to overemphasise the right 
conditions to perform dialogue. ‘Ideal processes of deliberative democracy lead to 
substantively just outcomes because the deliberation begins from a starting‐point of 
justice.’ (Young, 2000:34) Dialogue is just one part of more complex dealings 
between groups. If diversity issues could be solved by dialogue, if it really could 
dissolve inequality, there would not be so many problems to reach it in the first 
place.  
It is interesting to think that it is almost impossible for attempts at dialogue to 
fail -in the idealised conditions that scholars describe. Dialogue seems to happen 
only between moderate, reasonable and civil participants. It is equally interesting to 
think that despite the appropriate stress on the lack of neutrality of cultural groups, 
this is not clearly incorporated into the conditions for dialogue. ‘On the dialogic view, 
members of different cultural groups within a society often influence one another 
and engage in productive cultural exchange, and this interaction ought to be 
mobilized to resolve intercultural conflict.’ (Young, 2007:78) The idea of dialogue is 
still rooted in the context of the neutral mediation between different interests. In 
other words, behind the principle of dialogic recognition, there is a notion of liberal 
impartiality.  
Despite efforts such as those of Modood and Parekh to go deeper on cultural 
preservation without endorsing neutrality or impartiality,85 the liberal assumptions 
sneak in, reproducing relations of domination ‘…by justifying them or by obscuring 
possible more emancipatory social relations.’ (Young, 1990:112) As Geoffrey Brahm 
Levey argues, they are closer to liberalism than they claim (2019:210) On the one 
hand, the right to preservation is by default extended to any group, but on the other 
hand, it is quickly restricted to some particular conditions, coincidentally liberal 
conditions.  
One way liberalism sneaks in, besides the aforementioned, is by setting 
                                                                                                                                     
difficult and poses huge problems of understanding and (mis)-interpretation. Nonetheless, I 
wish at all costs to avoid falling into the trap of cultural solipsism. Thus, my answer to the 
question: “Is intercultural dialogue possible?”, must be: “Yes, but…” (2018:44-45) 
85 The proposal is that minorities and majorities, through dialogue, can develop a common 
national identity that reflects and includes them all. In this sense, it is an alternative to the 




conditions for allowing cultural preservation and recognition of groups, that is, by 
judging groups with liberal criteria that do not necessarily belong to the communities. 
It is hard to see how recognition can be based on the philosophical principle of 
dialogic or relational construction of identity and, at the same time, have liberal 
requirements to work properly. Even Modood, who tries to push the philosophical 
principle further, affirms that ‘Every group and not just a majority should have a 
prima facie right to identity preservation (as long as the rights and interest of others -
groups and individuals- are taken into account, the cost is not too high, and so on)’. 
(2015:358)   
The words between parentheses in the last quote, falsely suggest that they 
are extraneous to the argument. The emphasis in conditioning identity preservation 
results in attention being deflected to why, how and when a group might have 
legitimate anxieties about their identity, and not on identity itself. Modood concludes 
that, ‘…where appropriate, emphasising mutual recognition, or as Bouchard puts it, 
reciprocity, and not merely minority accommodation may be a political adjustment 
but is not a philosophical difficulty, for multiculturalists.’ (2015:358) And this is an 
idea I want to underline: reciprocity and majority precedence are not issues for other 
liberal theories on diversity and plurality because they have already assumed them, 
not for the theoretical reasons Modood adduces, but for the political ones he found 
secondary. It is not the case that multiculturalism and interculturalism follow strictly 
the philosophical precept of the dialogic production of identity, but they do so only 
when the liberal framework is present. Majorities do have precedence de facto 
because they are already liberal, therefore, they are always legitimate subjects of 
dialogic recognition, and they become the context in which integration should take 
place. In other words: 
…national-cultural identity, because of its linkage with national 
citizenship, has some political and normative significance but is only 
acceptable as such if interpreted in a very liberal way: for example, if 
racist or intolerant aspects of the national culture get dropped. Individuals 
and groups have some freedom in emphasising different aspects of the 
national identity, which are differently and freely interpreted and allowed 
to change over time and through the inclusion of new groups. (Modood, 
2015:359) 
The real principle is that majorities are recognised, not when the group has 
developed legitimate anxieties about the preservation of their identity, but when they 
are liberal. The same happens to minorities, which in principle must be protected in 
the case their identity is threatened, but they are only politically recognised to the 
extent they are already in line with the liberal principles. Here Québec is again 
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paradigmatic. As I mentioned before, Kymlicka already knew that Québec is a 
perfect example of how a minority gets closer to the multicultural ideal, not because 
it is a prototypical instance of a minority securing its cultural distinctiveness, but 
because of the opposite, it is a case of a national minority that is liberalising itself. 
Moreover, the process of liberalization has also meant that the 
Québécois have become much more like English Canadians in their 
basic values. Liberalization in Quebec over the last thirty years has been 
accompanied by a pronounced convergence in personal and political 
values between English‐ and French‐speaking Canadians, (…) 
liberalization in Quebec has meant both an increase in differences 
amongst the Québécois, in terms of their conceptions of the good, and a 
reduction in differences between the Québécois and the members of 
other liberal cultures. (Kymlicka, 1995:88) 
Summing up, Québec interculturalism points out the need for recognition, 
and it does so through a principle of reciprocity, which establishes a footing for the 
mutual adjustments between a host majority and minorities. Without denying the 
benefits of this approach, I argued that identity cannot be an object of adjustments in 
the same way as everyday practices and behaviours. The pragmatic nature of 
adjusted reciprocity works at a different level than identity. I also called attention to 
some issues derived from this principle in the case of Québec interculturalism, 
denoting it is not founded in deep notions of identity and recognition: lack of 
symmetry, unbalanced adjustments, controlled interventionism, ad hoc precedence, 
and qualitatively different identity anxieties. Moreover, I contrasted Québec 
interculturalism with Modood’s dialogic approach, which advocates cultural 
preservation and claims it is possible to achieve it without endorsing precedence 
and controlled interventionism from the majority culture. Finally, I assessed the idea 
of dialogic recognition and mentioned some issues that should be discussed further; 
first and foremost, I noted we should seriously consider a pre-dialogic form of 
recognition; I also describe how the liberal context furtively impose the real 
conditions for intercultural and multicultural dialogue. In fact, I drew some limits of 
Québec interculturalism and dialogic recognition, opening the door for pushing more 
radical forms of recognition and identity. More radical forms of recognition, beyond 
liberalism, we require a further distinction between togetherness and likeness as the 







7.4 Two ideas of community: togetherness and likeness 
     
While Québec interculturalism is openly involved in securing recognition for 
the Francophone culture, European interculturalism is closer to a form of 
cosmopolitanism in which individuals are considered as citizens of the world -
kosmo/politês-.86 Consequently, European interculturalism assumes a perspective 
whereupon members of communities do not need to develop strong attachments to 
national, ethnic, religious or racial frames. Such attachments are contraindicated as 
possibly preventing positive interaction with other individuals. ‘The underlying 
assumption seems to be that too much positive recognition of cultural differences 
will encourage a retreat into ghettos, and a refusal to accept the political ethic of 
liberal democracy itself.’ (Taylor, 2012:414). Scholars are still debating the limits of 
political recognition that cosmopolitanism should endorse, particularly national 
allegiance (Beck, 2002; Kleingeld & Brown, 2014; Kymlicka, 2001b; Waldron, 1992). 
Despite this debate’s importance and interest, it is outside my remit. For my 
purposes, it is enough to say that in a mild version, cosmopolitanism is compatible 
with the national-state organisation of political life, in a quite similar fashion to the 
way Kant portrays his cosmopolitanism as an international legal order (1991 [1795]). 
To make my argument watertight, it is not enough to claim that European 
interculturalism simply does not deal with strong recognition and move on. Instead, it 
is important to understand some possible consequences of this approach. In 
essence, it calls into question the necessity and/or the desirability of strong 
recognition, by questioning cultural attachments to groups. This criticism on the 
persistence of local social attachments in the context of modern societies is 
expressed from a wide range of standpoints, so wide that some of them could be 
indeed contradictory.  
Some forms of cosmopolitanism would tend to universalise the idea of 
belonging, that is, every single individual belongs to a universal community, we 
literally belong to a cosmo-polis.87 Still, other forms of cosmopolitanism would affirm 
                                               
86 I mentioned a provisional definition of cosmopolitanism following Thomas Pogge (1992). 
It is useful to bring to mind the three main features described there: individualism, 
universality and generality. 
87 Samuel Scheffler’s distinction between extreme and moderate cosmopolitanisms 
expresses in more detail the typology that I briefly refer to here. He affirms that ‘The extreme 
view denies that there are [norms that apply only within an individual society and not to the 
global population as a whole], at least at the level of fundamental principle, although its 
proponents may concede that some distinction between social and global norms is justified 
on practical or instrumental grounds. The moderate view, by contrast, treats such a 
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there is no such thing as a universal community and the only certain thing is the 
ability of individuals to adapt and auto-preserve themselves in different social and 
cultural circumstances,88 which is the idea behind cosmopolitanism as an elite 
phenomenon.89 European interculturalism is halfway between these two radical 
forms. Both extremes might lead to simplistic understandings of cosmopolitanism’s 
complex core; neither absolute universalism nor radical individualism adequately 
explain this position. 
European interculturalism is a mild version of cosmopolitanism, and in a way, 
this fact places it beyond any simplistic views. However, this is less purposive and 
more accidental. I argue that to convey a proper notion of community, part of the 
solution is consciously avoiding absolute universalism and radical individualism. By 
doing this, we will be able to judge and understand attachments to particular 
cultures and groups. The idea of recognition of collective identities rests on what the 
word community denotes. To offer an apparently obvious definition, a community is 
nothing but the organisation around what a group of individuals have in common, 
and what we have in common is what we share. Here the problems begin because 
there are at least two different ways to understand what we share. One emphasises 
a notion of togetherness, anchoring the idea in more concrete instances of sharing; 
the other one underlines the issues of belonging and it is more concerned in 
verifying whether individuals possess certain properties, without necessarily 
involving a notion of togetherness. We can refer to this second notion as likeness. I 
                                                                                                                                     
distinction as fundamental; it denies that global justice takes the place of social justice, even 
at the level of basic principle, and it accepts that the members of an individual society owe 
each other some things, as a matter of justice, that they do not owe to non-members.’ 
(1999:260) 
88 We can explain this wide range of stances as a matter of perspectives, methodological 
approaches or even more fundamental disciplinary understandings of cosmopolitanism. `We 
may discern that in scholarship concerned with cosmopolitanism, different disciplines tend to 
focus on top-down or bottom-up phenomena. Political scientists, political philosophers and 
legal scholars tend to focus variously on issues of global governance and the construction of 
a cosmopolitan democratic order. Anthropologists, ethnologists, and sociologists at least in 
their more empirical work, on the other hand, tend to find bottom-up orientations to 
cosmopolitanism more in line with their established research interests. Yet such a division of 
research labor does not work out altogether neatly.’ (Hannerz, 2006a:196-97) 
89 Ulf Hannerz identifies this idea as an attempt to root cosmopolitanism in a particular 
social structure. ‘It has been a longstanding assumption, whether implicit or explicit, that 
cosmopolitanism has been a privilege that often goes with other privileges; more or less an 
elite characteristic. Certainly this is not to say that all elites are cosmopolitans. Historically at 
least, however, a cosmopolitan cultural orientation in this view has gone with more formal 
education, more travel, more leisure as well as material resources to allow the acquisition of 
knowledge of the diversity of cultural forms. Moreover, taking a Bourdieuan perspective, we 
could find cosmopolitan tastes and knowledge serving as symbolic capital in elite competitive 




beg the reader to allow me to wander away from the particular case of European 
interculturalism for just a little while in order to further explicate these terms.  
To begin, I want to call attention to the fact that the prefix co- or com- usually 
refers to what in English is understood as together. In this way, co-authors are those 
producing something together, co-habitants are those living together, to com-pound 
is simply putting together and, -closer to community- to communicate is to share or 
to make common. Accordingly, a community is, depending on its nature, a way of 
behaving, doing or experiencing together. This is the first way to understand the 
notion of community, but it is not the only one. The notion of community can also 
move closer to the affairs related to belonging, which I am going to refer to as 
likeness. 
The notion of what we share can easily move between concrete instances of 
organised groups and more abstract notions of properties, qualities and attributes 
shared by different individuals. From here, two ways are possible: we can 
emphasise the concrete or the abstract. The more abstract the features, the more 
universal the community defined by them becomes; but more importantly, the more 
abstract the features, the weaker the notion of togetherness behind the defined 
community, until we eventually reach the extreme case: the pure individual. As 
Miguel de Unamuno said: ‘There is nothing more universal than the individual, for 
what is the property of each is the property of all.’ (1921:45)   
In a closer connection with cosmopolitanism, features shared by all 
individuals, particularly the faculty of reason and its related agency, would suggest a 
community of all human beings. Strictly speaking, there is a community of all 
humans based on what we all have in common. In this case, what we have in 
common relies less and less on our factual interaction with others and more on the 
attributes residing in each individual.90 In this case, following Aristotle, instead of the 
notion of togetherness, what we share is better expressed -in English- by the one of 
likeness.  
Things are called "like" which have the same attributes in all respects; or 
more of those attributes the same than different; or whose quality is one. 
Also that which has a majority or the more important of those attributes of 
something else in respect of which change is possible (i.e. the contraries) 
is like that thing. And “unlike” is used in the opposite senses to “like”. 
(Aristotle, 1989:1018a) 
The different notions behind our understanding of commonness and 
                                               
90 A similar issue on the impossibility of actual interaction between members of the same 
community inspired Benedict Anderson to develop his seminal work: Imagined Communities 
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community are very important because they imbue an indelible character to the 
following debates. On the one hand, the idea of commonness as likeness pairs an 
impression of individual self-sufficiency to the more abstract and universalist stance. 
At the same time, togetherness casts a shadow of dependency on collectivities in 
more concrete understandings of community. An important part of this distinction is 
already incorporated in debates on universalism vs particularism, or 
cosmopolitanism vs communitarianism. However, despite it being true that if we 
emphasise the concrete we will probably find ourselves in the domains of 
communitarianism, and similarly if we emphasise the abstract we are likely to be in 
the realm of cosmopolitanism, the key idea is not a predilection for the concrete or 
the abstract, but the idea of community as togetherness or likeness.  
I firmly believe that portraying this tension in a more fundamental way could 
help us to understand the core of the debate. European interculturalism, as with 
most cosmopolitan theories, faces this debate by emphasising the apparent self-
sufficiency of individuals and small groups to engage in cross-cultural interactions, 
without any further need to overstate a particular form of cultural attachment. But if 
my argument has developed sufficiently so far, then we are in a good position to 
understand that this stance is in accordance with the idea of a community based on 
likeness. From this starting-point it is easier to perceive that the idea of a global 
community as referring not to something that everyone experiences together, but as 
the potentiality of a set of properties present in each of us. 
Let me clear up how this more abstract reflection is related to the particular 
case of European interculturalism. A first and obvious objection to my line of 
reasoning could assert that European interculturalism, contrary to what I avowed, is 
closer to the idea of togetherness than to likeness. After all, one merit of 
interculturalism is to push the idea of positive interaction between groups and 
individuals. There is an overwhelming abundance of references to the idea of 
pursuing living together as one of the main aims of European interculturalism. No 
need to go further than the main document developing its foundations, entitled 
Living Together as Equals in Dignity (Europe & Ministers, 2008). They can even 
argue that in contrast to other pluralist approaches emphasising differences 
between groups or essentialising their identities, instances of interculturalism are 
closer to notions of grassroots cohesion. Therefore, they are based on ‘…the sense 
of shared futures which we believe is at the heart of our model and our 





recommendations– an emphasis on articulating what binds communities together 
rather than what differences divide them, and prioritising a shared future over 
divided legacies.’ ((CIC), 2007:7) Furthermore, they can mention the plan of 
enriching spaces for intercultural dialogue as a key proposal for promoting the most 
positive interaction between people from different backgrounds. ‘It is essential to 
engender spaces for dialogue that are open to all. Successful intercultural 
governance, at any level, is largely a matter of cultivating such spaces’ (Europe & 
Ministers, 2008:33). Ultimately, what could convey better the aim of building the 
community together than intercultural dialogue? 
As Robert Putnam (2000) has outlined, shared places and spaces can 
play an important role in building strong community ties and networks of 
social support and reciprocity and while the debate about social capital in 
this context rightly emphasises ‘bridging’ social capital between different 
groups, it is the ‘linking’ social capital which connects individuals to wider 
opportunities and is more crucial for equalising life opportunities. (Cantle, 
2012:196)91 
It is hopefully clear that in the pluralist setting of this debate, European 
interculturalism indeed tries to push better ways for bringing people together, both, 
individuals and groups. However, I still believe European interculturalism is based 
on the idea of likeness more than in the notion of togetherness. In order to 
demonstrate this, we have to understand what living together means in the context I 
am developing my argument. 
 
7.5 The difficulties of living together 
 
The question of whether living together produces meaningful togetherness is 
important in public life, but it is also debatable in the sphere of the intimate, as the 
sociology of emotions has shown.92 European interculturalism’s idea of living 
together is based mostly on reinterpretations of Allport’s contact theory (1954). 
However, it seems insufficient to knit a meaningful shared experience. It is beyond 
my plan to discuss in detail Allport’s theory, but there is enough evidence to support 
it or at least to consider it a plausible solution for important issues in dealing with 
                                               
91 The reference to Putnam (2000) mentioned in the quotation corresponds to his book 
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. 
92 ‘…being there often involves doing, which both constitutes and is shaped by intimate 
(embodied) knowledge. (…) we need to widen our lens to include these other forms of action 




Instead, I argue that contact theory is indeed an effective way to mitigate 
barriers predicated on prejudices and stereotypes, but it does not necessarily lead 
us to build our lives together, at least not in the meaningful way most of us expect. 
Alternatively stated, I accept that contact theory and, by extension, European 
interculturalism have the potential to dilute an important part of bigotry and 
discrimination coming from ignorance. Nonetheless, the inequalities beneath 
intolerant behaviours are not necessarily a matter of ignorance, but a matter of 
structural dissonance. In a few words, European interculturalism helps, to some 
extent, to understand the other, but it does not necessarily lead us to live with the 
other.    
The programmes attempted to build understanding between different 
groups and to create mutual trust and respect by breaking down 
stereotypes and misconceptions about the “other”. Community cohesion 
thus rehabilitated the concept of “contact theory”, building on the earlier 
work of Allport (1954) and others. New models based on this approach 
clearly demonstrated that prejudice and intolerance can be reduced by 
direct contact and interaction… (Cantle, 2013:80) 
Reducing prejudice and intolerance, i.e. understanding the other, are 
definitely major steps forward in dealing with diversity in increasingly plural societies. 
This being said, on their own, they do not necessarily lead us to the kind of deep 
interaction that I find desirable. A crucial part of my argument affirms that the 
directionality of the process goes the other way round: understanding the other is 
more likely to happen when we already have a strong form of recognition because 
this allows suspension of judgement on something that is outside our existential 
framework. In any case, European interculturalism erases and questions the need 
for social recognition by focusing on the self-sufficiency of individuals and their 
everyday interactions. Unfortunately, by doing so, it prevents itself from building 
more meaningful relations between individuals and groups, relations which 
correspond to truly living together and that rely on something deeper than the 
everyday interaction.     
                                               
93 There is an interesting debate on the clash between contact theory and conflict theory, 
particularly on grounds of the empirical evidence to support each in different contexts. 
‘Contact theory suggests that diversity erodes the in-group/out-group distinction and 
enhances out-group solidarity or bridging social capital, thus lowering ethnocentrism. Conflict 
theory suggests that diversity enhances the in-group/out-group distinction and strengthens 
in-group solidarity or bonding social capital, thus increasing ethnocentrism.’ (Putnam, 
2007:144). In the same text, Putnam provides a splendid account on this debate. For the 
purposes of my argument, I can concede that contact theory is effective to reduce 
ethnocentrism, and argue that even in that case it does not lead to people building their lives 




The difficulties in achieving meaningful modes of contact between members 
of different groups are evident. There is no doubt that simply placing people in close 
proximity does not imply they will positively engage or experience things together. 
For instance, Robert Putnam (2007) affirms that immigration and diversity, in the 
short to medium run, foster social isolation.94 Similarly, the accurate criticism of 
some forms of segregation that interculturalism tries to overcome makes visible the 
fact that communities and individuals do not easily engage in positive interaction 
simply by sharing the same space.  
Living together in the same area does not entail that people truly live 
together, that is, they do not necessarily engage in a meaningful construction of their 
respective beings. -This idea will be fully justified in the next chapter.- However, 
without advancing further let me state that I understand living together as building, 
making sense of, and sometimes rejecting the beliefs and values shaping our being. 
In other words, living together is not only a topological feature. Not even everyday 
engagement with the other is enough to claim that we are living together. It is about 
meaningful interaction rather than role relations. What I am trying to push is a notion 
of togetherness that is rooted in our complete identity, an idea close to Emmanuel 
Levinas’ concept of vulnerability (1972), a notion that starts from realising that 
getting closer to the other is not representing her, nor even the consciousness of the 
proximity, but something deeper.      
The idea of contact space and intercultural dialogue follows the logic that 
relations between different groups and individuals will improve by encouraging 
contact. Beyond the simplistic view, contact theory is more than just an optimistic 
claim about people living in the same place. Nevertheless, it lacks something to 
properly understand the idea of living together. We have to emphasise that 
European interculturalism considers that if we have more contact with people of 
other backgrounds, we will learn to trust one another, but only if we do it in the right 
circumstances. Therefore, its efforts focus on securing those circumstances and 
                                               
94 Putnam’s larger argument is interesting. He affirms that ‘My argument here is that in the 
short run there is a tradeoff between diversity and community, but that over time wise 
policies (public and private) can ameliorate that tradeoff.’ (Putnam, 2007:164) In my opinion, 
this argument is suggestive because at the same time that it acknowledges the challenges of 
positive contact, he still believes that western democracies are on the right progressive path 
to achieving it. Literally, it is a matter of time. In contrast to what Putman believes, I think it is 
not an issue of gradual improvement of policies. The opposite, it is a fundamental issue. It is 
the framework behind this progressive notion preventing us from bypassing these processes 
of individualisation. In other words, individualisation and isolation are not the result of a 
trade-off between diversity and community, but the fundamental setting used to cement this 
dichotomy in the first place. 
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creating positive spaces for cross-cultural interaction. The process of intercultural 
placemaking is an important example of these efforts (Guidikova, 2014).   
Interculturalism aims especially to generate a strong sense of a cohesive 
society based on shared universal values. (…) from the perspective of 
the Council of Europe, the universal values upon which interculturalism is 
based are human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the recognition 
that all human beings have equal dignity and are entitled to equal 
respect. When based on the latter approach, interculturalism rejects 
moral relativism on the grounds of ‘cultural difference’ and instead adopts 
a critical stance on illiberal cultural practices which violate these universal 
values. (Barrett, 2013:26) 
However, the particular proposal of European interculturalism, by dint of its 
cosmopolitan nature, establishes a framework, a heavy institutional framework, that 
inverts the supposedly grassroots approach that gave birth to its emphasis on living 
together. ‘Interculturalism proposes that intercultural dialogue requires a culturally 
neutral legal and institutional framework, as well as institutional structures that 
actively support and encourage intercultural dialogue.’ (Barrett, 2013:27) It is in this 
paradox that I find support for my impression on how European interculturalism is 
closer to an idea of community as likeness than togetherness. Even when the 
narrative emphasises individuals and groups getting in contact and living together, 
all this happen in the context of liberal neutrality in which the significant notions, 
practices or behaviours influencing and constructing meaning are prevented from 
being deeply shared.  
As I will argue in Chapter 8, truly share and engage in meaning construction 
is to modify the context. Without intervening the context, which is in fact what we 
can truly share together, we cannot mutually engage. European interculturalism is 
the kind of cosmopolitanism in which  
[t]hey identify modes of social and cultural relations that may be of 
political as well as intrinsic importance. But though tolerance, interest in 
others, and openness to change may all be political virtues, they are not 
in themselves bases for constituting polities; they do not explain patterns 
of allegiance. (Calhoun, 2003:541)  
When thinking about the framework in which meaningful interaction should 
happen, the intercultural proposal becomes abstract and quasi-universal, following 
to the letter the ideals of liberal thought. It heavily underlines the shared universal 
values that must prevail and it prevents any particularity of the actors to conflict with 
the liberal aseptic environment. In consequence, there is indeed a gap, or at least 
an unclear issue, between a grassroots and everyday approach that is, at the same 
time, founded on universal principles. 




values then we can ask, what do people share in a cosmopolitan perspective such 
as the intercultural? Everything and nothing; we share the abstract form of being 
humans -almost in the platonic sense of the eidos- and a set of liberal universal 
values that comes along with this abstract human being. We share nothing concrete 
or particular. Is this abstract foundation more likely to promote meaningful 
interactions, cooperative forms of identity construction or a strong sense of cohesive 
society? I honestly doubt it. Could it help individuals to become more tolerant and 
respectful? Yes. But this is not what we mean by living together, securing social 
cohesion or developing a shared identity.   
The kind of everyday togetherness promoted by interculturalism, even if it is 
affable and civilised, could not be enough to assert that we are living together. It is a 
way of being together without being together, a way of engaging with “the other” in 
the everyday level without engaging in the deep level where the construction of our 
collective identity could happen, that is, without engaging with her otherness. From 
being a proposal focused on the everyday construction of a shared life, European 
interculturalism finds itself supporting an abstract framework regulating these 
interactions through a core of features and values not clearly connected to the 
actual issues of social reality. Although one might argue that the supposedly 
universal values being promoted are actually the values of a specific community, 
this is not enough for claiming a true engagement with otherness. On the contrary, it 
seems to be an obstacle.95 One thing is sure, individuals and groups do not 
articulate the meaning of their identity from abstractions, but from the concrete, 
using Ortega y Gasset’s famous words: ‘I am I and my circumstances’ (2000 
[1914]). Values and behaviours are meaningful because of the context in which they 
exist.  
Summing up, regarding the idea of community, at the surface European 
interculturalism advocates an idea of togetherness, but underneath it is more 
aligned with an idea of likeness. The principles of European interculturalism, as far 
as they pretend to be universal lead necessarily to a mild version of 
cosmopolitanism. Other instances of cosmopolitanism are too universal, and 
paradoxically too individualistic, to provide the basis for a strong notion of 
community and subsequent matters such as cohesion and solidarity. The 
                                               
95 Taylor mentions that ‘The charge levelled by the most radical forms of the politics of 
difference is that “blind” liberalisms are themselves the reflection of particular cultures. And 
the worrying thought is that this bias might not just be a contingent weakness of all hitherto 
proposed theories, that the very idea of such a liberalism may be a kind of pragmatic 
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cosmopolitan notion of individual self-sufficiency is in accordance with universal 
principles, but it is hard to see how a strong collective identity might arise from them. 
Hopefully, this digression is sufficient to show that, in our understanding of the two 
notions behind the concept of community, European interculturalism focuses more 
on shared liberal attributes -likeness- than shared life -togetherness-. There is an 
inconsistency in claiming a grassroots approach and proposing a universal base for 
it. We can explain the attempt to have the best of both worlds because of the fear of 
relativism that pushes liberal efforts to look for a universal context for interactions. 
This is what I analyse in the next section. 
 
7.6 The fear of relativism 
 
Taking a closer look at the issues faced by European interculturalism and the 
solutions it offers, we can better perceive the reasons for this dissonance between 
grassroots everyday interactions and a universal base for their promotion. Following 
the characterisation that I developed, there are three principal beliefs behind the 
idea of a positive space of interaction in European interculturalism: fluid identity, no 
categorisation of collective identity, and development of dialogic competences. 
These presumptions work as ad hoc adaptations to prevent important problems 
related to diversity such as substantiation of identity, stereotypes and discrimination. 
In terms of social justice, European interculturalism tries to overcome segregation, 
exclusion and reduction of social capital, all forms of social inequality. Its positive 
aspect attempts to promote social cohesion through equality practices. In the 
political sphere, it makes an effort to prevent the lack of citizen loyalty and instability, 
produced mainly by changes in traditional values and relations; its response is to 
channel those changes in values. In the cultural realm, the problems are understood 
as a sort of incompleteness of cultural capabilities, almost in the same way that 
Nussbaum (2000) proposes, and the solution consists in advancing liberal 
conditions.  
While we could carry on digging and enumerating problems almost 
indefinitely, a single spectre looms and motivates this universalism: relativism. 
‘Moreover, such a conceptual shift from multicultural co-existence to intercultural 
dialogue may avoid the trap of cultural relativism and provide the basis of a true 
                                                                                                                                     




living together.’ (Bekemans, 2013:171) In the same way, Barret (2013:26) pinpoints 
that universal values intentionally oppose what is considered the undesirable 
consequence of diversity: moral relativism. As I argue here, this rejection of 
relativism and the attempt to introduce intercultural dialogue follows more an aim of 
persuading members of minorities to renounce illiberal beliefs and practices, than a 
real dialogue between two different perspectives.  
We can be certain that European interculturalism refuses to deal with 
recognition due to the unbearable fear that providing recognition to particular groups 
would lead to and support moral relativism; which is not exactly an animadversion of 
relativism itself, but of illiberality. Relativism is okay if it happens within the liberal 
framework’s wiggle room but it is not acceptable outside it. In other words, the 
particular form of relativism that occurs within the liberal framework is conveniently 
labelled as pluralism and it has been traditionally encouraged and supported. 
However, the other forms of relativism that go beyond the limits of the liberal 
principles produce noteworthy animadversion. In Chapter 3 I pointed out the 
assumption that a civic State is able to embrace cultural and ethnic diversity, 
allowing a plurality of interests, as long as the neutral and impartial institutions are 
the mediator between those different interests. ‘The state stands above society, 
apart and detached, overseeing and refereeing the competition and conflict that 
arises in individuals' private pursuit of their private gain.’ (Young, 1990:112) This is 
another instance of how the liberal framework pushes pluralism out while trying to 
prevent relativism. Isaiah Berlin exemplifies this emphasis on plurality instead of 
relativism. 
The fact that the values of a culture may be incompatible with those of 
another, or that they are in conflict within one culture or group or in a 
single human being at different times -or, for that matter, at one and the 
same time- does not entail relativism of values, only the notion of a 
plurality of values not structured hierarchically; which, of course, entails 
the permanent possibility of inescapable conflict between the outlooks of 
different civilisations or of stages of the same civilisation. (1991:80) 
 We can criticise European interculturalism in the same spirit as other 
cosmopolitan perspectives: ‘…cosmopolitan liberals often fail to recognize the social 
conditions of their own discourse, presenting it as freedom from social belonging 
rather than a special sort of belonging, a view from nowhere or everywhere rather 
than from particular social spaces.’ (Calhoun, 2003:532) Even worse,  
The ideal of impartiality legitimates hierarchical decisionmaking and 
allows the standpoint of the privileged to appear as universal. The 
combination of these functions often leads to concrete decisions that 
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perpetuate the oppression and disadvantage of some groups and the 
privilege of others. (Young, 1990:116) 
European interculturalism tends to emphasise its most universal side when it 
faces the risk of relativism, which is not an exclusive tendency, multiculturalism does 
this too. It is quite thought-provoking to realise that both approaches fight relativism, 
from different perspectives -cosmopolitanism and nationalism- emphasising the 
same idea of liberality. 
The fear of relativism is important for my argument because it is a limitation 
for a deeper form of recognition related to identity. In other words, the form of 
recognition that I propose tries to go beyond the plurality within a unique liberal 
framework, but it refers to the diversity of frameworks. I affirmed before that 
European interculturalism is a kind of cosmopolitanism that allows some allegiance 
to national institutions and it does not completely deny the idea that individuals can 
develop loyalty to particular groups. However, when it is time to deal with relativism, 
its perspective tends to radicalise in line with the universal principles of liberalism. I 
am not going to discuss again the issue of the possible illiberality of imposing a 
liberal framework, but a radical version of cosmopolitan liberalism can be illiberal if it 
insists in enforcing an impartial, blind law under every possible circumstance (Allen, 
2007).  
What is important for my purposes is that the tendency of permitting a unique 
framework is reductionist in regard to the factual forms of diversity, thus preventing 
their proper recognition. Advocates of cosmopolitanism are aware of the paradoxes 
of liberal imposition. Accordingly, European interculturalism has a solution to avoid 
the imposition that comes from enforcing a unique framework: dialogue. Illiberal 
practices should not be simply banned, instead they have to be challenged and 
adjusted dialogically. In this way, imposition is prevented. For instance, discussing 
the banning of the burqa in public places in France and Belgium, Robin Wilson 
affirms that ‘Such bans have been given some progressive legitimacy on the claim 
that the covering of women has always reflected patriarchal control of their bodies. 
But this substantive liberal argument does not justify the illiberal resort to coercion, 
rather than public political dialogue,’ (2013:55). In a similar manner, Michael 
Dusche’s proposal of internal universalism is particularly interesting.  
I propose internal universalism, which is a form of meta-ethical relativism 
(to be explained below). Internal universalism does not rule out the 
possibility of universal norms but insists that these are attained through a 





In Dusche’s internal universalism, dialogue might indeed prevent the tone of 
imposition of a unique framework, however, it does not stop the reductionism that 
comes with a unique framework. Additionally, I have shared my thoughts on how the 
conditions of dialogue are more difficult to achieve than is usually assumed.  
…there are very high expectations of intercultural dialogue entertained by 
political theorists and by practitioners (and not least by some politicians), 
accompanied by limited understanding of how those expectations might 
be achieved. Nonetheless, while the idea that intercultural dialogue is a 
“good thing” largely prevails, some observers see it as a snare and a 
delusion and are deeply skeptical about what it is meant to do. (Grillo, 
2018:78)   
Some important questions come up from the liberal efforts to stop relativism: 
what is the content of that diversity which fits completely within the confines of 
liberalism? If we liberalise everything, are we truly defending diversity? Or are we 
reducing real forms of otherness? The paradoxical situation of promoting diversity 
within a framework that is held to be uniquely valuable can lead us to question the 
place of diversity in modern societies in a more general way. Let me refer to a 
influential study on the totalitarian mannerisms disguised as democracy and 
liberalism. Using Marcuse’s words: 
The rule of law, no matter how restricted, is still infinitely safer than rule 
above or without law. However, in view of prevailing tendencies, the 
question must be raised whether this form of pluralism does not 
accelerate the destruction of pluralism. (…) The reality of pluralism 
becomes ideological, deceptive. It seems to extend rather than reduce 
manipulation and coordination, to promote rather than counteract the 
fateful integration. (1991:54-55) 
Therefore, the key question is whether we are going to prevent relativism, at 
the expense of inhibiting diversity, or whether we are going to deal positively with 
relativism to truly embrace diversity. This second option is the one that I will develop 




Neither Québécois interculturalism nor European deals with strong identity 
and recognition. The road taken by Québécois interculturalism of pushing a 
reciprocity principle, controlled interventionism and majority precedence is hard. It 
seems to create more problems than it solves. However, that is just the tip of the 
iceberg. Digging further we can even question the idea that dialogue or a liberal 
framework would help to move us forward in pursuing more positive relations 
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between individuals and communities. In the case of strong identity and recognition, 
adjusted reciprocity is not even possible. We have suggested, without yet justifying 
it, that recognition at this level should be pre-dialogic, and that identity is more 
complex than what is emphasised from the political and social dimensions. In the 
case of European interculturalism, I emphasised the contradictions of a grassroots 
approach founded on universal principles. The contradiction denotes an aim to build 
communities under a paradigm of togetherness, but also on the basis of a universal 
approach closer to likeness. The emphasis on the neutrality prevents us from living 
together in a meaningful way and, unfortunately, contact theory is not enough to 
solve this issue. And attached to neutrality, as the other side of the same coin, there 
is the fear of relativism and its consequences. This fear has always stopped the 
most well-intended liberal efforts on diversity and plurality; this is the very same fear 
of being called: illiberal.  
Although interculturalism claims to address the limitations of multiculturalism, 
it faces many of the same problems in that it can recognise differences only in ways 
that fail to see cultural diversity and collective identity. In its attempt to write a new 
theory of diversity and plurality for the new century, interculturalism wrote again 











In the Life of Theseus, Plutarch mentions that the hero’s ship was preserved 
by the Athenians for a long time after his death. However, ‘They took away the old 
timbers from time to time, and put new and sound ones in their places, so that the 
vessel became a standing illustration for the philosophers in the mooted question of 
growth, some declaring that it remained the same, others that it was not the same 
vessel.’ (1914:XXIII) This philosophical problem is known as the ship of Theseus or 
Theseus’ paradox. The complexity of the matter unveils some of the most important 
problems of identity. If something changes its parts, can we still claim it to be the 
same? What secures the unity of a physical object or of any entity? What does it 
mean for something to be that particular something and not something else? Is it 
possible to change in such a way that something stops being what it is and 
transforms into something different? What properties make something what it is? 
And perhaps most interesting; how do things stay the same despite the fact they 
change? Any attempt to tackle just one of these questions would take a lifetime. 
However, one thing is sure: the persistence of the questions denotes the problem’s 
importance.  
Things get particularly interesting when we focus on human identity, both 
individual and collective. It is evident that every person changes over time, so we 
can question what we have in common with ourselves 10, 15 or 20 years ago. Are 
we the same person? Similar problems and questions can be addressed to 
collective identity. Also, in that case, there is one certitude: communities change 
over time. However, how is it possible that collective identities persist if they change 
their members? Why do we claim a community, a nation for instance, is the same 
even if its members, values and practices shifted over the past century?   
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Slowly we can see that some of these questions move closer to our topic. If 
we change our practices and behaviours, are we still the same community? If we 
want to preserve our identity, should we oppose any possible change? Which 
changes are allowed without surrendering our identity? Which changes are too 
much? In the case of human identity, the problem is more complex because we 
have to consider agency, which means we do not necessarily change as other 
entities do, but we can do it as a result of our will and reason. In other words, human 
identity is more complex because it is not natural but constructed, and its particular 
identity and associated property of change are qualitatively different than the identity 
and change of natural entities.  
Identity is a problem that resists, as the fundamental ones always do, any 
final solution. It is a notion that leads to more paradoxes instead of solutions as we 
try to advance. In the context of modern diversity and plurality there is a basic 
paradox besides the one about identity-change: identity-diversity. This paradox is 
clearly spotted by Parekh when he affirms: ‘Paradoxical as it may seem, the greater 
and deeper the diversity in a society, the greater the unity and cohesion it requires 
to hold itself together and nurture its diversity.’ (2000:196) Even more important, the 
paradox does not fade away in the solution proposed: ‘A shared sense of national 
identity is necessary but also potentially dangerous, a force for both unity and 
division, a condition for the community’s cohesion and reproduction which can also 
alienate large sections of its citizens and become a cause of its fragmentation.’ 
(2000:231). 
In this context, I present my proposal: to understand identity as being. It is 
part of a tradition that tries to deal with these fundamental issues, which also 
denotes its utter unoriginality. It is merely another attempt to think through identity 
that takes previous ideas and tries to articulate them in a different way. The novelty 
of the proposal, if any, lies in trying to expand the debate beyond the political to the 
ontological sphere. However, just like other ideas dealing with identity, it is far from 
being a definite answer and it could be criticised in many aspects. I hope it provides 
some possible solutions to the problems of identity and recognition in the context of 
our time, but it is clear that more work needs to be done. I do not deny the most 
influential properties and definitions of identity; it can be understood as membership 
(Goodin, 1996:362), belonging (Modood, 2001:249), something socially constructed 
(Bonnett, 1997), and the social glue in modern societies (Ehala, 2017:11). However, 




they are considered in the organic unit in which they make sense; different parts of 
our self can be analytically considered for different purposes but it is the whole that 
provides meaning and coherence. In the same way, in Theseus’s paradox, it is the 
ship as a whole and not the particular timbers that provides identity. This is the 
fundamental notion behind what I call strong identity: the unity that remains after the 
particular changes we can enact in different parts of our self.  
Strong identity mainly refers to what we are. It is not a property or something 
we can instrumentally use to deal with the issues of everyday life, which is not to 
deny the adaptations that we are in fact able to make in different circumstances -we 
can change the timbers of the ship as many times as we want. Nor does it deny that 
these adaptations are part of what can change our identity, ultimately, our identity 
includes it all; it denies the claim that our whole identity can immediately change 
through adaptations as if it was a sort of chameleonic entity. We do not have an 
identity, nor multiple identities, but a complex unified identity that includes everything 
that we are. Otherwise we are not able to explain how we change over time, or how 
we can construct ourselves or how we can question our deepest values and beliefs. 
All of these are important matters that can possibly be addressed by identity as 
being. 
Any notion of identity proposed, including the one developed here, must be 
in accordance with the current state of affairs. It is clear that intense waves of 
migration, the extinction of an antagonistic, parallel economical system, the complex 
geopolitical arrangements of a post-cold war world, globalisation, liberalisation and 
other important social, political and historical phenomena have shaped the way we 
understand identity nowadays. I portrayed all of them in the previous chapters as the 
context in which liberal and critical theories understand identity and recognition. In 
fact, the issues derived from these diverse affairs unveil the urgency of a functional 
concept of identity. The philosophical approach I assume does not ignore the actual 
historical world, but tries to emphasise the ontological significance of it. In fact, the 
limits and issues I collected in my analysis of currently dominant theories of diversity 
urge us to take a step towards philosophical discussion. As can be perceived, my 
attempt implies that the idea of identity has a pre-eminence within the history of 
philosophy and within history itself. In any case, I assume that the philosophical and 
social, political, cultural, historical and even economic aspects of reality are not 
detached, completely the opposite, they are closely intertwined; otherwise, my own 
proposal would be unrelated to the issues I analysed before. 
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The chapter has 5 sections before its Conclusion. In the first section, I argue 
that the context of modern philosophy helps us to comprehend how and why we 
deal with diversity and plurality the way we do, particularly in liberal politics. Through 
the modern vs post-modern, humanist vs anti-humanist debates we can unveil 
conceptions shaping our understanding of the current world, in this case through 
support for, or criticism of, modern identity. The next section explains Taylor’s 
definition of identity as an understanding of who we are. It also emphasises his 
contribution in linking identity and agency, as well as including the recognition 
offered by others as part of our identity construction. The third section shows that 
despite identity including the understanding of who we are, how we are and where 
we stand, it cannot be reduced to self-understanding. Additionally, I describe the 
existential context of our identity, which is particularly important in instances in which 
we question cultural goods and values, as happens in processes of integration. In 
Section 4, I claim we need to develop a humanism of the other, which expands 
identity beyond the limits of individuality and agency. Then I portray my definition of 
strong identity as being, as a whole, as a unity. Our identity is the organic 
articulation of attachments, decisions, feelings, projects and any other ‘part’ included 
in ourselves. Finally, in the fifth section, I describe the process of identity 
construction and I connect it to a general idea of history, allowing us to glimpse the 
formation and flux of collective identity. I claim that constructing our identity is 
constructing the world as a horizon. In more particular terms, I argue that we 
exercise agency from a determined context but simultaneously we slowly shape that 
context by exercising our agency. This dialectical relation is what I think is an 
essential part of how history develops. Then, I affirm that internal and external 
conflicts and not only the agreements between ourselves and the others provide the 
driving force of history.  
Keeping our identity, individually and as a community, is as important as 
securing our being. We can change parts of ourselves, sometimes because we want 
to, sometimes because we have to, and sometimes it just happens. However, we 
have to do it while always keeping our being whole. Just as with Theseus’ ship, we 
do both; we persist and we change because we are more than our parts, more than 





8.1 The philosophical context of identity: between modernity and post-
modernity, between humanism and anti-humanism 
 
In this section, I argue that to be able to grapple with the concept of identity 
in the sense I am concerned with is important to philosophically and historically 
contextualise certain modern and postmodern ideas. In the next sections, a critical 
examination of Charles Taylor’s works will help me to analyse the idea of modern 
identity but I consider it necessary to contextualise even Taylor’s work within a wider 
philosophical context. I apologise in advance for what might feel like a long 
digression before getting to the point. However, it is important for my argument to 
situate the assumptions about identity precisely in the philosophical context in which 
they make sense. Gaining clarity in this debate would help me to justify my own 
proposal. 
The philosophy of a certain period can disclose hegemonic interpretations of 
the world.96 In this sense, by looking to the philosophy of our time we can explain 
why and how we approach diversity and plurality the way we do. If we examine, for 
instance, the narrative of a novel cosmopolitan globalised world, where the main 
change consists in the ‘emancipation’ of individuals from the constraints of fixed 
collective identities, we can find it has roots in the philosophical ‘…new 
understanding of individual identity that emerges at the end of the eighteenth 
century. We might speak of an individualized identity, one that is particular to me, 
and that I discover in myself.’ (Taylor, 1994:28) In the same way, if we consider the 
alternative discourse on the importance of belonging to a group, we can spot 
philosophical assumptions about autonomy, freedom, individuality and identity that 
shape it. Yael Tamir affirms that our individual ability to make autonomous choices 
about our life relies on our cultural context, therefore, our individual liberty and the 
                                               
96 Contrary to Marx’s criticism on philosophers in his famous Theses on Feuerbach, 
philosophy does contribute in intervening in the world. Important philosophers have 
interpreted the world because they wanted to change it. The dynamics at the history of 
philosophy’s core, in which new proposals present themselves in opposition and criticising 
the former ones, denotes the aim of changing the immediate and contemporary. And more 
importantly, philosophical theories are not innocuous projects disconnected from reality, but 
part of critical stances looking at changing a current state of affairs. Arendt, in a very clear 
way, unveiled the strong link between the vita contemplativa and the transformation of the 
world. She said: ‘Thus it was not primarily the philosopher and philosophic speechless 
wonder that molded the concept and practice of contemplation and the vita contemplativa, 
but rather homo faber in disguise; it was man the maker and fabricator, whose job it is to do 
violence to nature in order to build a permanent home for himself, and who now was 
persuaded to renounce violence together with all activity, to leave things as they are, and to 




construction of our identity are attached to belonging to a cultural community (1993). 
In both approaches, we can perceive the importance of individual identity97. 
Consequently, we need to grasp individualised identity in its philosophical 
circumstance in order to understand how the continual process of liberalisation gave 
us the theories of plurality and diversity analysed above. 
In that regard, there is great merit in Charles Taylor’s work; he clearly 
identifies that theories of diversity and plurality cannot reach a deep comprehension 
of their proposals without a philosophical understanding of identity. In his influential 
work The Sources of the Self, Taylor faces the challenge of portraying the idea of 
modern identity through its historical development, from Descartes to Heidegger -
and even before in its proto-modern form, from Plato to Augustine-. He attempts 
‘…to show how understanding our society requires that we take a cut through time 
(…) only through adding a deep perspective of history one can bring out what is 
implicit but still at work in contemporary life’ (1989:497-98). Furthermore, several 
problems and criticisms faced by philosophers on their path to constructing the idea 
of an individualised identity are replicated in current debates on plurality and 
diversity, denoting the urgency of dealing with these issues. 
The theories dealing with plurality and diversity described in earlier chapters 
-multiculturalism, interculturalism, cosmopolitanism, communitarianism, civic 
conceptions of nationalism- share an uneasy relationship with our conflicting 
understandings of our self in the philosophical sense. They are more than 
philosophical concerns, they are manifestly political movements making specific 
demands. The connection becomes visible, however, when we realise that these 
theories draw heavily on identity -particularly national identity-, taking advantage of 
its weaknesses and strengths according to their own social and political 
engagements. Therefore, I analyse further some implications of handling a concept 
with such theoretical and historical importance.98  
The philosophical issues concerning identity can be identified using different 
terms because identity is usually conflated with other fundamental notions. As such, 
we often hear about ego, self, individuality, subjectivity, personality, belonging, and 
                                               
97 In former chapters, I have discussed extensively the apparent paradox of two opposed 
theories -nationalism and cosmopolitanism- claiming to be liberal. However, they are similar 
on the fundamental issue of the individual as the key unit of society. The debate is if 
collective identity is necessary, useful or desirable for the individual flourishment -using 
Nussbaum’s terms-, but the individual is still at the centre of the scheme. 
98 Clearly, there are important scholars, involved in the theories of pluralism I described 




the one I propose as principal: being.99 These concepts work on different levels of 
abstraction and hold important nuances, but all ultimately refer to our humanity and 
what makes us who we are in each individual instance. It is always the ego of a 
particular human being, the individuality of a specific human being, the personality of 
a distinctive human being, the belonging and self-understanding of a human being, 
and lastly the being of a human being. Effectively, gaining knowledge of these 
features is equivalent to understanding someone’s identity, which is basically 
knowing her being. ‘…[T]o say that people know their own identity is to say that they 
know “who they are”. Equally, to claim knowledge of the identity of others is to claim 
to know “who they are”.’ (R. Williams, 2000:3) 
I hope the reader may excuse my overemphasis of this particular point, but it 
makes a crucial contribution to the perspective I want to propose: it is not only the 
case that identity raises important philosophical questions, but they shape our 
understandings of and, in consequence, our dealings with the world. As Taylor puts 
it, exploring identity is exploring l’humaine condition. If we consider his idea of a 
process of internalisation -inwardness- at the core of modern identity as illustrative, 
we can perceive that any take on it has huge ‘human’ implications. 
Adopting the stance of disengagement towards oneself defines a new 
understanding of human agency and its characteristic powers. And along 
with this come new conceptions of the good and new locations of moral 
sources: an ideal of self-responsibility, with the new definitions of 
freedom and reason which accompany it, and the connected sense of 
dignity. To come to live by this definition -as we cannot fail to do, since it 
penetrates and rationalizes so many of the ways and practices of modern 
life- is to be transformed: to the point where we see this way of being as 
normal, as anchored in perennial human nature in the way our physical 
organs are. But the very idea that we have or are “a self”, that human 
agency is essentially defined as “the self”, is a linguistic reflection of our 
modern understanding and the radical reflexivity it involves. (Taylor, 
1989:177)  
If my arguments demonstrating the importance of considering the 
philosophical context have succeeded, we can focus on the debate surrounding 
issues of modern identity, that is, modern vs post-modern or humanist vs anti-
humanist. Therefore, it is worthwhile to say something about the connection 
between humanism and modern identity. 
Humanism is not a unified perspective; very different approaches could be 
qualified as humanist: they can go from Christian humanism to Marxian humanism, 
                                                                                                                                     
Parekh are prominent figures in philosophy. 
99 What I propose is to consider identity, individual and collective identity, simply as a word 
to denote what we are. Therefore, pushing for recognition in this context is not attempting to 
get political acknowledgment, but ontological one. 
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and from concrete social programs to metaphysical and epistemological systems. 
However, in order to keep it as simple as possible and to emphasise what is useful 
for my argument, I consider only its emphasis on some attributes of human beings.   
Humanism is a complex phenomenon, and, although it takes on many 
different, sometimes overlapping, often contradictory forms, the skeptical 
post-modernists have serious reservations about all of them because 
each requires a subject and attributes special attention to human beings, 
individuals. (Rosenau, 1992:48)  
Humanism for my purposes mostly denotes overemphasis on an 
individualised conception of human beings, but it also refers to the projects, 
aspirations and principles leading to anthropocentric precedence over other beings. 
The critiques that reach the core of modern subjectivity usually find their target by 
referring to the assumptions of humanism. 
Every humanism is either grounded in a metaphysics or is itself made to 
be the ground of one. (…) The result is that what is peculiar to all 
metaphysics, specifically with respect to the way the essence of the 
human being is determined, is that it is "humanistic." Accordingly, every 
humanism remains metaphysical.’ (Heidegger, 1998:245)  
The metaphysical assumptions of humanism portray human beings as 
distinctive in contrast to other beings; they particularly characterise a human 
individual as a rational, intellectual being able to grasp the world through reason and 
able to act in consequence of this understanding. Reason becomes the only way to 
communicate with the world.  
Understanding the world for a man is reducing it to the human, stamping 
it with his seal. (…) the mind that aims to understand reality can consider 
itself satisfied only by reducing it to terms of thought. If man realized that 
the universe like him can love and suffer, he would be reconciled.’ 
(Camus, 1991:17) 
At the other extreme of the philosophical universe from modern, liberal, 
individualised identity is the post-modern approach. This alternative perspective is a 
reaction to the philosophical principles behind modernity and, of particular interest to 
us, against modern identity and its consequences.  
The skeptical post-modernists oppose the modern subject for at least 
three reasons. First, s/he is an invention of modernity. Second, any focus 
on the subject assumes a humanist philosophy with which the post-
modernists disagree. Third, the subject automatically requires an object, 
and postmodernists renounce the object-subject dichotomy. (Rosenau, 
1992:46)  
Several times the critiques on the modern subject and humanism go from the 
consequences to the causes, from historical and political events such as Nazism, 
war, genocide, inequality or oppression to the criticism of an abstract idea of human 




Bauman, 1989). There is no need to emphasise that both aspects are related, and if 
post-modern stances are able to legitimately claim the crisis of humanism, it is 
because there is a crisis of humankind; the crisis of humanism is the crisis of the 
human condition. Philosophers, such as Abraham Edel, emphasise the historical 
and moral sides of the crisis:     
…the crisis in humanism today is not basically in its philosophical outlook 
which is far from outworn, not in its social program which becomes 
increasingly mandatory as other solutions to contemporary problems 
show their bankruptcy, but in the area of practical attitudes, in the 
turbulent uncertainties of our revolutionary age. (1968:295)  
Other thinkers pay more attention to the ontological features and 
consequences of the crisis. ‘Modern anti-humanism is no doubt right when it does 
not find in man understood as the individual of a genus or of an ontological region, 
an individual persevering in being like all substances, a privilege that would make of 
him the goal of reality.’ (Lévinas, 1986:138) And there are some others, such as 
Arendt, that have the lucidity to identify that there is no gap between the 
philosophical and the historical crisis of modernity, that is, there is no gap between 
humanism and the human condition. 
It would be folly indeed to overlook the almost too precise congruity of 
modern man's world alienation with the subjectivism of modern 
philosophy, from Descartes and Hobbes to English sensualism, 
empiricism, and pragmatism, as well as German idealism and 
materialism up to the recent phenomenological existentialism and logical 
or epistemological positivism. But it would be equally foolish to believe 
that what turned the philosopher's mind away from the old metaphysical 
questions toward a great variety of introspections (…) was an impetus 
that grew out of an autonomous development of ideas, or, in a variation 
of the same approach, to believe that our world would have become 
different if only philosophy had held fast to tradition. (Arendt, 1958:272-3)  
There are different ways to ‘measure’ the depth of the opposition100 to 
modern humanism and modernity in general. The criticism can be so wide that goes 
from the political and artistic dimensions of modernity to the moral and metaphysical 
ones; in most cases, the post-modern disapproval of the modern paradigms mixes 
critiques from different disciplines and viewpoints. In the metaphysical field, they 
reject the modern subject because it leads to an essentialisation of humankind. In 
other words, it postulates some sort of human nature expressed by the aims and 
                                               
100 Pauline Rosenau (1992) portrays a very useful way to understand the diversity within 
post-modernism. She proposes a distinction between sceptical and affirmative post-
modernists. Sceptics tend to a pessimistic overall perspective -the post-modernism of 
despair-, mainly influenced by Nietzsche and Heidegger. The affirmative strand agrees in the 
diagnosis of the modern flaws, but defend a more hopeful view and are more optimistic 
about political action, struggle and resistance. 
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goals of humanism. For instance, Taylor -who is an intermediate figure between the 
modern and post-modern- affirms that an important part of twentieth-century 
philosophy has refuted the disengaged subject; it rejects the idea of an abstract 
agent independent from social relations and the subsequent constitution of an 
instrumental society in which life is lacking the matrices for the meanings of life to 
flourish. He alleges that, ‘…the individual has taken out of a rich community life and 
now enters instead into a series of mobile, changing, revocable associations, often 
designed merely for highly specific ends. We end up relating to each other through a 
series of partial roles.’ (1989:502)   
As we can expect, some more radical post-modern criticism goes beyond 
this point and truly attempt to dissolve subjectivity, for example, Judith Butler finds in 
the internalisation of subjectivity nothing but disciplinary production (1999:183-188). 
Other proposals, such as structuralism and post-structuralism, push a notion of 
society in which individuals are not at the core of the social processes, especially by 
emphasising the structures forming the social tissue, the emptiness of subjectivity 
and the lack of individual agency in historical processes. 
In any case, if post-modern criticism still has any value, it is because the 
world it criticises remains quite modern. Despite all the legitimate particularities that 
we can find inherent in post-industrial societies, the values are quite modern -
rationality, efficiency, progress, etc. Modernity is at its apogee in this sense. We live 
more in the modern world than in a post-modern one; or if we want to be more 
accurate, we are in high modernity, as Anthony Giddens described it. 
Some have even presumed that such fragmentation marks the 
emergence of a novel phase of social development beyond modernity –a 
postmodern era. Yet the unifying features of modern institutions are just 
as central to modernity– especially in the phase of high modernity –as 
the disaggregating ones. (1991:27)  
Anti-humanist post-modernism is at the opposite side of liberal -humanist- 
modernism. However, the concept of identity is central for both approaches, 
delimiting the philosophical context I referred to the beginning of the section. 
Through their debates, they confine the spectrum in which we understand our 
current world. Now that we have an idea of how identity is understood from these 
two perspectives, the contrast with my proposal will be easier to spot. In the next 





8.2 Taylor’s dialogic identity: diversity and relativism 
   
Charles Taylor engaged in the detailed description of modern identity in his 
influential work, Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity (1989). 
However, his proposal of a renewed understanding of modernity extends through 
several books, particularly The Politics of Recognition (1994). He justifies this 
intellectual effort claiming that modern identity is at the core of the most important 
conflicts in our culture and society. He found that at these crucial disputes’ centre 
are disengaged and instrumental modes of thought and life, which are important 
consequences of modern identity. 
In essence, Taylor’s concerns are ethical and moral. His work on identity is 
driven by the moral concerns about instrumental forms of thought and behaviours. 
He says: ‘What emerges from the picture of the modern identity as it develops over 
time is not only the central place of constitutive goods in moral life, (…) but also the 
diversity of goods for which a valid claim can be made.’ (Taylor, 1989:502)101 
Nevertheless, his moral concerns go beyond the reduced sphere of the ethical and 
are treated conjointly with the ontological perspective. Because of this connection 
between identity and morality, Taylor is able to find the ways in which our 
understanding of identity leads to current moral issues and vice versa. To some 
extent, he agrees with the post-modern criticism, affirming that disengaged and 
instrumental modes of modernity empty our life of meaning, destroy public freedom 
and back ecological irresponsibility. 
To get to grips with Taylor’s account of identity, we need to look briefly at his 
account of morality and goods. I think this is the key to his proposal, in principle: he 
defends the diversity of the goods in the moral life, including those related to the 
instrumental society he criticises for other reasons. The fundamental problem is not 
instrumentalism or disengagement per se, but the reduction of the possible forms of 
life to a unique set of goods. In that respect, his position is close to Frankfurt School 
criticisms of Enlightenment and modern reason. (Horkheimer, 1985; Horkheimer & 
Adorno, 2002; Marcuse, 1991) He says: ‘…following one good to the end may be 
catastrophic, not because it isn’t a good, but because there are others which can’t 
                                               
101 Taylor believes that goods in general ‘…are measures, or institutions, or states of affairs 
which offer satisfactions…’ (1995:44). More specifically, he pays attention to irreducibly 
common goods, that is, ‘(1) the goods of a culture which makes actions, feelings, ways of life 
which are of value conceptually feasible; and (2) goods which essentially incorporate 
common understandings of their value.’ (1995:58). In this case constitutive goods are 
synonymous with irreducibly common goods. 
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be sacrificed without evil.’ (Taylor, 1989:503) This is important for the argument as it 
is a way to link plurality and identity. Identity is constructed from the goods we reject 
and embrace, that is, from the goods that are available to us, not only from the ones 
that are positive and we agree on. This leads to what I consider another of Taylor’s 
contributions. 
He demonstrates there is no rigid and strict causal relationship between the 
goods and their historical expressions, that is, there is an intrinsic relativism around 
the goods. In consequence, we are not entitled to completely deny the value of any 
specific good despite the negative consequences it might have produced 
historically. That reductionism would be descriptively possible, but normatively 
inaccurate; pursuit of a good may have led to negative consequences; but 
normatively, this does not show that it is intrinsically bad. Not all that has been a 
source of negative historical events must be vicious by definition. Taylor tries to 
preserve and reflect the tension and complexity of reality itself, its dialectic nature, to 
put it in philosophical terms. This is the same tone that I have adopted in my own 
proposal.  
I do not affirm that liberal projects regarding diversity and plurality are wrong 
and should be abandoned. What I have claimed through this text is that the liberal 
perspective provides an important but incomplete picture of current diversity 
problems; it is right in some contexts, makes fair points in others, and we should 
definitely pursue it. However, this is not enough. We have to go beyond the 
simplistic criticism that tries to sweep aside modernity and all of its expressions; but 
we also need to engage, as Taylor did, in understanding its origin and assumptions. 
Otherwise, the complexity of matters will remain out of sight.  
…those who condemn the fruits of disengaged reason in technological 
society or political atomism make the world simpler than it is when they 
see their opponents as motivated by a drive to “dominate nature” or to 
deny all dependence on others, and in fact conveniently occlude the 
complex connections in the modern understanding of the self between 
disengagement and self-responsible freedom and individual rights, or 
those between instrumental reason and the affirmation of ordinary life. 
Those who flaunt the most radical denials and repudiations of selective 
facets of the modern identity generally go on living by variants of what 
they deny. (Taylor, 1989:504)     
Moving on in this line of reasoning, according to Taylor, identity refers to our 
understanding of who we are. Identity ‘…designates something like a person’s 
understanding of who they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as a 
human being.’ (1994:25) This definition sets the tone for his overall project. He is 




ourselves are the foundations for human agency. The connexion between identity 
and agency is perhaps not so clear and so far, I have not emphasised it enough, 
although agency has been a constant topic in the text. I saved the proper discussion 
of agency until now because it makes sense for my argument in the ontological 
sphere. For instance, the link between identity and agency is present when Kymlicka 
proposes group-differentiated rights protecting culture as a way to provide minorities 
with a context of choice or in the intercultural tension between cultural preservation 
and individual agency. In the context we are moving in now, it is traditionally 
believed that an important part of that individuality relies on the possibility of agency. 
In different terms: 
To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand. My identity is 
defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame 
or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is 
good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or 
oppose. In other words, it is the horizon within which I am capable of 
taking a stand. (Taylor, 1989:27)  
From Taylor’s definition of identity, we can derive two ideas. First, there is 
great merit in Taylor’s fastening identity to the deeper ontological ground. Contrary 
to more pragmatic and utilitarian views of identity, he believes it cannot be reduced 
to the fragmentation of the different attachments that individuals and/or groups 
might, legitimately or not, develop. Instead, identity is the ground providing the 
meaningful basis upon which we can exercise our agency. In other words, the 
attachments we might have, and that are usually thought to constitute the different 
faces of our complex identity -nationality, ethnicity, race, gender, ideology, class and 
any other category allowing a feeling of belonging or existential attachment- are not 
exactly chosen freely, instead, they are the background providing meaning to our 
choices. 
The second consequence of the definition is that it allows us to directly link 
identity and recognition. Part of our identity is shaped by the recognition or 
misrecognition of others, which is Taylor’s main argument in the Politics of 
Recognition (1994). If our identity is what allows us to understand who we are, how 
we are and where we stand, then it is completely plausible that recognition, or the 
lack thereof, plays an important part in the way we understand ourselves. The self-
image we adopt does not come entirely from us; it is importantly shaped by others. 
In more particular terms, as a result of this relationship, we can affirm that the 
modern understanding of individual identity and recognition mutually condition one 
another, not just ontologically, but also historically. In the case of modernity, the 
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inward, individualised subject pre-configures the dominant ways in which recognition 
could happen; in modern times, we are driven to believe that identification and 
recognition are inwardly generated because the dominant notion of our ‘true’ self is 
condensed in the notion of authenticity -everyone has a very original way of being-
.102 Finally, we can affirm that in terms of content, our identity is complex and 
unfathomable. 
We are all framed by what we see as universally valid commitments (…) 
and also by what we understand as particular identifications. We often 
declare our identity as defined by only one of these, because this is what 
is salient in our lives, or what is put in question. But in fact our identity is 
deeper and more many-sided than any of our possible articulations of it.’ 
(Taylor, 1989:29)  
I mention one more notion developed by Taylor before moving on to a more 
detailed assessment of his theory: his notion of dialogue. Without a doubt, one of 
Taylor’s best-known ideas is the dialogic construction of identity.103 Despite the 
radical individuality present in modern ways of life and behaviour, Taylor points out 
that in reference to identity its construction is dialogical. ‘This crucial feature of 
human life is its fundamentally dialogical character. We become full human agents, 
capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, through our 
acquisition of rich human languages of expression.’ (Taylor, 1994:32) Here is 
another of Taylor’s brilliant distinctions: he would claim that opinions, reflections, 
and basically agency is individual indeed. He does not deny the quality of 
individuality in those processes. However, as long as identity is not our agency but 
what sustains it, it is possible that agency remains individual while identity is 
dialogically constructed. There is no need to go further and say that our agency is 
dialogic, which could be a difficult thesis to support. There is not even a need to say 
that our identity is only dialogically constructed to fight harder against radical 
individual identity. Parts of our identity can be only accessed individually and other 
parts are dialogic. Put simply, the construction of our identity is a dialogical process, 
but as far as Taylor defines identity in terms of self-understanding, part of it is 
secured in the individual sphere. Our identity is both, individual and collective, 
without further contradiction. 
From my perspective, here is where some liberal thinkers are caught in the 
                                               
102 Taylor traces back the modern notion of authenticity to a shift of the moral goods 
proposed by Rousseau and Herder. I do not discuss this in detail. For my argument, 
highlighting the relation between identity and recognition suffices. 
103 According to Frans Meijers and Hubert Hermans (2018) The tradition of Dialogical Self 
Theory can be traced to George Herbert Mead (2015 [1934]) and Williams James (1890). A 




trap and believe this dialogic nature of identity construction goes against individual 
freedom.104 This is the same reason why communitarianism is also a liberal theory. 
Communitarians can sustain the liberal principle of individual freedom -agency- and 
embrace the dialogic character of our determinations. Our understanding of what is 
good or bad, valuable or worthless is shaped importantly by dialogue and interaction 
with others. In the process of constructing something as personal as understanding 
and situating ourselves in the world, we can perceive the presence of the significant 
other. Contrary to what we usually expect, Taylor is suggesting that the inwardly 
individualised identity needs the other to be reaffirmed,105 that is, it needs the 
recognition given by the significant other to find its place in the world, so to speak. 
We do not become recluses outside of the world by turning to our self-
consciousness, even then the other is there, at least in these ontological terms. Our 
‘dependence’ on the other reaches our individual self without nullifying it. 
We are of course expected to develop our own opinions, outlook, stances 
toward things, and to a considerable degree through solitary reflection. 
But this is not how things work with important issues, like the definition of 
our identity. We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in 
struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us. 
(Taylor, 1994:32-33) 
Taylor’s effort to go beyond the individualised identity has great merit. 
Amongst others like Levinas or Benjamin, he helped to pave the way for the rest of 
us who believe there must be a new form of humanism, a humanism of the other. 
However, I will argue in the next section that some of his ideas fall short. 
 
8.3 Assessing goods: the existential dimension of identity 
 
The complexity of the relation between identity and agency would be 
particularly evident in one limit case: when someone wants to revise and question 
why she should follow an end or to accept a value embraced by the group, 
especially if those values and ends are so fundamental they denote the specificity of 
the community. In consequence, the debate revolves around questions of how it is 
possible for someone to criticise her deepest assumptions, mostly because those 
                                               
104 Particularly cosmopolitan liberals tend to find it difficult to accept this. 
105 The significance of this is affirmation can be perceived by contrasting it with the radical 
individualised self and the way it has shaped modernity. Robin Williams in his analysis of 
modern identity affirms:  ‘The Cartesian self is independent of social relations, which are of 
secondary significance as objects to which attention may be given. It is also independent of 
material relations since, while the body functions as a necessary container for mind and its 
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assumptions help her to shape and make sense of the criticism in the first place. In 
fact, this is another expression of the debate I presented in Chapter 7, that of 
cosmopolitan versus communitarian. Nevertheless, in this case, the tone is different 
because we know that our agency is safe despite our identity being shaped by those 
attachments we try to question. In general terms, I believe liberal thinkers like 
Kymlicka are right when they claim that no matter the particular culture to which we 
belong, we always should be able to assess our conceptions of the good and ends. 
However, I disagree with their tendency to overemphasis agency over identity.  
If we consider the big picture, it is clear that for every culture its 
understanding of the good changes over time, that is, it is historical. Consequently, 
we have good reasons to believe that we are somehow able to effectively criticise 
our assumptions, otherwise, it would be very difficult to explain how they change 
with the passage of time, which is a matter of fact. It is unlikely that changing from 
one idea of the good to others or modifying it could be result of random variation or 
drift. However, other explanations fit with the fact we are able to criticise our 
assumptions. The dialectical structure that would allow us to explain there is no 
priority of agency over identity is more complex than we might think. I will try to 
describe a possible solution to this later in the chapter. Meanwhile, I simply focus on 
the way liberal scholars explain this change, first and foremost because it is a key 
issue in liberal theories of plurality.  
The argument works on two different levels not always clearly differentiated. 
When we claim that our perception of the good changes over time, we mostly refer 
to the collective understanding. On the contrary, when liberal scholars think about 
the basic ability to question particular goods, no matter how fundamental they are, 
they usually frame this concern from the individual perspective. Due to this, they find 
the criticism’s origin in unpredictable circumstances or experiences leading us to 
reconsider our assumptions, but not necessarily in the structure of historical change. 
It is clear that in all cases, any historical change of our ‘collective’ perception of the 
good requires individuals expressing particular concerns. However, I want to argue 
that this does not mean that individuals are somehow independent of those values 
they want to scrutinise, even when they go against them! 
No matter how radical the experience leading us to revise our assumptions, 
we cannot break entirely with the framework in which they are rooted, which would 
                                                                                                                                     




be like asking to judge from nowhere or to jump from one framework to another.106 
As individuals, we can openly deny something and simultaneously be shaped by it, 
we can deny the religion in which we were raised and nevertheless be shaped by it. 
Of course, this goes beyond the limits of our agency, which is the main issue for 
liberal theories. But it does not go beyond the limits of our identity. The belief that we 
deny several times is still part of our being, shaping us in different ways. Our 
freedom is attached to the context in which we exercise it, and even if we can 
question and change important parts of that horizon, there are some other parts that 
escape our direct influence. For this reason, we have to expand the concept of 
identity not just to the ends, values or goods that we willingly accept, but to all the 
things shaping our being, including the internalisation of external things. Identity 
includes our understanding of who we are, how we are and where we stand, but it 
cannot be reduced to it. This is where I think Taylor’s effort to find its limit. I explain 
this hereinafter. 
I mentioned above that, in my opinion, one of the virtues of Taylor’s 
approach corresponds to the way he makes space for the plurality of goods, 
underlining the complexity of the human situation. He is particularly interested in 
goods related to religion and secularism but his notion can be expanded to other 
                                               
106 A recurrent criticism of some forms of liberalism, particularly cosmopolitanism, refers to 
its aspiration of judging from nowhere. I have already discussed this idea and its flaws. 
Nevertheless, this is not the perspective of the liberal thinkers I am referring to here. 
However, it is worth pointing out a parallel problem which has attracted a significant amount 
of attention in the apparently distant discipline of philosophy of science: incommensurability 
of paradigms. If we concede, mutatis mutandis, this is a similar case to the one I am 
presenting at least in structure; we can find a similar way to support what I argue here. In 
Kuhn’s understanding, a paradigm is what provides every scientist with the language and the 
view of the world to make sense of the phenomena she investigates. Without them, there is 
no possible way to do science. This notion of paradigm is quite close to what the other 
philosophical tradition calls horizon or being-in-the-world. Even those circumstances that in 
the liberal account might push us to question our conceptions of the good are similar to the 
ideas of anomaly and crisis in Kuhn’s account. In principle, there is nothing that might 
completely prevent a change of paradigm occurring and the fundamental assumptions can 
be questioned; history would confirm this is not just possible, but the case. If there are the 
conditions in which someone can experience a crisis, then the commitment to the principles 
can clearly decrease. However, it is hard to explain the switch from one paradigm to other 
without any middle ground. That would imply a lack of continuity between one paradigm and 
the next one, or what is known as the incommensurability problem. Derek Phillips identifies 
and proposes an alternative understanding to this problem. He says: ‘Kuhn makes too little 
of the possibility of someone being able to see something in one way and, at the same time, 
maintaining the capacity to see it "as" something else, the "something else" being the way he 
used to see it within the old paradigm. What I have tried to suggest above, in short, is that 
different paradigms need not be incommensurable, at least not for that individual who has 
moved from one to another and has the experience of both.’ (1975:55) The ability to see 
something as in the old paradigm denotes that something from the old framework remains 
even when the aim of the new paradigm is question it. This conclusion parallels my own 
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goods. The basic idea draws on the criticism of the instrumental and naturalist tone 
behind the modern -liberal- understanding of identity. Alternatively, he affirms that 
goods as a source of the modern self are meaningful in the rich sense of the term, 
that is, they have not just semantical but also existential significance. The meaning 
that we give to actions, particularly decision, go beyond the self-interested 
calculation between different options. In other words, our agency is embedded in a 
more complex existential device than the direct expression of will and reason. Taylor 
names the context in which our actions have existential implications for our self 
strong evaluation. 
The point of introducing the distinction between strong and weak 
evaluation is to contrast the different kinds of self that each involves. (…) 
The strong evaluator envisages his alternatives through a richer 
language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or 
what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by 
a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble and 
base, and so on. (…) In other words, the reflection of the simple weigher 
terminates in the inarticulate experience that A is more attractive than B 
(Taylor, 1985b:23-24). 
The particular case of being able to question our values and beliefs, which 
liberals find of great importance, becomes in Taylor’s perspective a matter of 
choosing between goods. He fights the delusion of self-sufficiency of the individual 
in atomist doctrines, showing that we develop our human capacities by belonging to 
a society. In consequence, Taylor advocates a form of strong identity, even if he 
does not call it such: ‘…the identity of the autonomous, self-determining individual 
requires a social matrix’ (Taylor, 1985a:209). The difference between his idea of 
identity and the one I propose here is not that mine is strong and his is weak; the 
difference is that he still considers identity primarily as our self-understanding, while 
I propose to extend it to our whole being. Nonetheless, emphasising strong 
evaluations and using them to unveil the nature of our freedom allows us to access 
identity’s existential dimension. 
I will not discuss Taylor’s concept of strong evaluation in detail.107  However, 
I follow his fundamental intuition. 
Taylor’s position implies, for example, that it is impossible to give an 
adequate account of human agency that excludes any description that 
bears on the significance of things for human beings. (…) agency cannot 
be made intelligible from a perspective that homogenizes human 
motivation.’ (Meijer, 2014:442-43)  
                                                                                                                                     
argument. 
107 Those interested in a detailed and critical account of the concept can consult Michiel 




For my purposes, this fundamental notion of the significance of things is 
enough to advance this line of reasoning. As we can expect, this particular case is 
embedded, if there were any possible hierarchy, within the deepest existential 
instances of human agency. To select or to question the fundamental assumptions 
are not matters in which is possible to have a weak evaluation. To choose between 
goods is not only an instance in which the strong evaluator is pushed to the deep108 
reflection described by Taylor, but it actually becomes a dilemma, an existential 
dilemma. And ‘…a dilemma does not invalidate the rival goods. On the contrary, it 
presupposes them.’ (1989:511)  
Therefore, for my argument, the first concern is to situate agency in the right 
perspective. Taylor’s distinction already prevents us from placing the evaluation of 
goods, values and ultimately important ‘parts’ of our identity in the realm of the weak 
evaluation pattern. But perhaps this is not enough, we should acknowledge the 
distinctiveness of the case. 
Every time we truly, critically appraise our cultural goods, we jeopardise 
something deeper than our freedom to choose, we risk our being.109  This is where 
liberal approaches fall somewhat short in their account, even Taylor. He takes a 
step further with the distinction between strong and weak evaluations, endorsing a 
stronger idea of identity than pragmatic -atomistic- liberal stands. His argument 
centres on society’s necessity for developing human potentials, including rationality, 
morality and autonomy. In consequence, ‘…freedom requires a certain 
understanding of self, one in which the aspirations to autonomy and self-direction 
become conceivable; and (…) our identity is always partly defined in conversation 
with others or through the common understanding which underlies the practices of 
                                               
108 ‘A strong evaluator, by which, we mean a subject who strongly evaluates desires, goes 
deeper, because he characterizes his motivation at greater depth.’  (Taylor, 1985b:25) 
109 There is a long existential tradition that focuses on this particular case. In the opinion of 
important existentialist philosophers, the foundations of freedom are better perceived in the 
breakdown of our known world. Different existential states are proposed as the context for 
this breakdown: anxiety (Heidegger, 1962), absurdity (Camus, 1991), or even nothingness 
(Sartre, 1957). The idea that freedom emerges from an existential situation in which I do not 
know who I am or I lose my known place in the world, is recurrent. However, even if this 
supports the relation between an existential state, agency and identity, it implies other kind of 
assumptions that I cannot explicate here, such as the idea that you have to lose yourself 
completely, instead of partially. When it comes to questioning your deepest assumptions, I 
make the case for a partial existential crisis.  
To keep the ideas on the same track, it is enough to mention that Taylor also recognises this 
existential arrangement and its relations to identity. Close to this perspective, amongst the 
existentialist philosophers, Gabriel Marcel’s concepts of mystery and secondary reflection 
(1950) better support our effort to acknowledge an exceptional significance for the existential 
place in the case we described, without compromising other ontological assumptions. 
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our society.’ (Taylor, 1985a:209) However, the existential context of identity can be 
pushed further than what Taylor did, beyond strong evaluation, even beyond 
agency. But this argument must pay homage to its predecessors who paved the way 
before ploughing forward.   
Multiculturalism’s advocates are aware of the importance of cultural 
attachments for the members of a community. They recognise how meaningful 
those attachments are and consider them as objects of strong evaluations.  
People make choices about the social practices around them, based on 
their beliefs about the value of these practices (beliefs which, I have 
noted, may be wrong). And to have a belief about the value of a practice 
is, in the first instance, a matter of understanding the meanings attached 
to it by our culture.’(Kymlicka, 1995:83)110  
However, the kind of special case we are dealing with here, in which bits of 
our identity can be questioned, demands a special place within strong evaluations. 
To say it differently, there is a qualitative leap between having a belief about the 
value of a practice on the grounds of the cultural meanings attached, and seriously 
questioning and revising those values and beliefs.  
That being said, someone might question why this particular case is so 
important and why we do not simply focus on the norm rather than the exception. 
The answer is because this particular case is the key to explaining historical 
changes in the conception of goods. It also help us to understand how we question 
our cultural values, and exercise agency. ‘…individuals have an autonomy interest 
in protecting the “structure” of their culture from potential external threats, but the 
same autonomy interest permits, and indeed requires, allowing that the “character” 
of their culture change in accordance with the choices of members.’  (Kymlicka, 
2016:69) And we are caught once again embroiled in the same issue: the 
fundamental relation between agency and identity. 
In more particular terms, Kymlicka’s concept of societal culture (1989, 1995), 
which defines culture mainly as a context of choice, denotes the usual relation 
between agency and identity from the liberal perspective. In essence, the notion 
affirms that the culture of groups should be protected because it provides options 
and meanings for the choices through which we express our individual freedom. ‘For 
                                               
110 There is an interesting finding to share here. Kymlicka has demonstrated successfully, at 
least in my opinion, that liberalism is not necessarily a form of cosmopolitanism (Kymlicka, 
1989, 2016). In other words, liberalism is compatible with the social thesis, and it is not 
individualistic. This corresponds to the confirmation of strong attachments to culture. 
However, when he engages with issues of individual agency in the context of cultural 




meaningful individual choice to be possible, individuals need not only access to 
information, the capacity to reflectively evaluate it, and freedom of expression and 
association. They also need access to a societal culture.’ (Kymlicka, 1995:84) 
However, despite the refinement this represents in the understanding of culture’s 
importance in the liberal tradition, two relevant comments must be voiced.  
First, there is a functional consideration whereby culture is a condition 
without which agency cannot happen, but without any phenomenological, factual 
account of culture as a shaper of our identity. In other words, without a culture, there 
would not be ground on which choosing meaningfully, but this is slightly different 
than affirming every individual is already determined by her culture; in a way, she 
always mediates the meanings through it.111 Second, in the concept of societal 
culture, there is a little distance between culture as a context of choice and the 
factual agency of individuals. Such distance does not exist in culture as a horizon, 
because every individual is already unavoidably in-the-world. In Kymlicka’s 
definition, culture is considered a condition of possibility in the same sense Kant 
intended, that is, a priori.  
From my standpoint, this distance results from liberal theories’ legitimate 
concerns to secure the possibility of accepting or denying our own societal culture 
Simply put, it is the consequence of preventing an essentialist -fixed- culture in 
which agency would have no say.112 Either way, the difficulties of explaining agency 
in relation to the cultural context move away from focusing on agency and its 
relations, to examining the conditions that are necessary for its appearance. 
Perhaps an example would help clarify the matter. Kymlicka affirms: 
A liberal society not only allows individuals the freedom to pursue their 
existing faith, but it also allows them to seek new adherents for their faith 
(proselytization is allowed), or to question the doctrine of their church 
(heresy is allowed), or to renounce their faith entirely and convert to 
another faith or to atheism (apostasy is allowed). It is quite conceivable to 
have the freedom to pursue one's current faith without having any of 
                                               
111 If I am allowed to draw an analogy, we can think about language itself. There is a 
difference between saying that we cannot express anything without a language, which is its 
material and contextual condition, and saying language is actually shaping the possible 
outcomes of our expressions. 
112 I think there is some utility in stepping back to more fundamental grounds. It is 
interesting to see how an attempt to move beyond essentialism and secure agency -revising 
our ends and goods- has become a target of the same claim of being essentialist. Kymlicka’s 
concept of societal culture has been criticised for promoting essentialism: ‘It is my concept of 
societal culture, Benhabib claims, that “potentially legitimises repressive demands for cultural 
conformity”, that puts cultures “beyond the reach of critical analysis”, and that entails 
“acceptance of the need to "police" [group] boundaries to regulate internal membership and 
"authentic" life forms'” Similarly, Appiah argues that my concept of societal culture “may 
entail imposing uniformity” within groups…’ (Kymlicka, 2015:221-22) 
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these latter freedoms. (…) A liberal society, by contrast, not only allows 
people to pursue their current way of life, but also gives them access to 
information about other ways of life (through freedom of expression), and 
indeed requires children to learn about other ways of life (through 
mandatory education), and makes it possible for people to engage in 
radical revision of their ends (including apostasy) without legal penalty. 
These aspects of a liberal society only make sense on the assumption 
that revising one's ends is possible, and sometimes desirable, because 
one's current ends are not always worthy of allegiance. A liberal society 
does not compel such questioning and revision, but it does make it a 
genuine possibility. (1995:82)113 
Although it is clear in what sense liberal societies provide the conditions for 
individuals to express their religious freedom, there is no further reflection on the 
existential context in which this actually happens. This is the core of the second 
comment I made: the idea of societal culture as a context of choice can be 
complemented by culture as the existential ground of our identity. It is not one or the 
other, but both. Kymlicka accepts that we can pursue our goods and ends even 
without securing the political -almost material- conditions provided by the liberal 
context. To affirm the opposite would be extremely difficult to support: in that case, 
we might be saying that only in the liberal situation we can legitimately pursue goods 
and ends. There are important nuances we must take into account. Pursuing goods 
and ideals entails a historical struggle that may not succeed.  
In that sense, efforts to secure the political conditions for the largest amount 
of goods and ends are without a doubt laudable. Political recognition is indeed a 
way to foster diversity and plurality, but it just secures the conditions in one 
dimension of a more complex phenomenon. We would get into a deep and probably 
worthless predicament if we try to discern what a genuine possibility is, one that has 
secured the political and social conditions or the one that has facilitated the 
existential ones. The point is that these aims are not contradictory, but 
complementary. 
My criticism refers not to the notion of societal culture itself, but in the last 
instance, to the lack of emphasis on the existential dimension of identity and 
agency. The conditions that Kymlicka mentions as those facilitating the radical114 
revision of our ends -access to information, education and so on- work perfectly fine 
where there is a choice to be made on everyday issues, but not in the radical 
criticism of our ends and goods. To say it another way, these are not matters of 
                                               
113 Emphasis supplied 




informed decision, but of existential crisis.115 To question our ends and goods is 
always a dilemma in which we struggle to find our place in the world and where 
things do not make much sense anymore. ‘It’s what we call an ”identity crisis”, an 
acute form of disorientation, which people often express in terms of not knowing 
who they are, but which can also be seen as a radical uncertainty of where they 
stand. They lack a frame or horizon within which things can take on a stable 
significance,’ (Taylor, 1989:27) In these instances, having all the information and 
conditions to choose at hand is of secondary importance.  
We have to insist on the existential context of our agency and individuality, 
especially in those instances in which we question our goods and ends. Even if 
liberals might accept that matters as important as our faith or the lack thereof are 
linked to strong evaluations, there is something missing in the picture of a societal 
culture as simply a context of choice.116 We have to complete the puzzle. 
 
8.4 Towards a humanism of the other: expanding the limits of modern 
identity 
 
Beyond the over-individualised subjectivity, beyond the inward identity, there 
is a door to a new kind of humanism: a humanism of the other and the related 
politics of difference-identity. As a way to make room for my own proposal, I have 
critically considered the notion of an individualised, self-contained human being and 
the modern humanist perspectives driving liberal theories of diversity. I cannot affirm 
                                               
115 Referring again to the parallel case of scientific revolution, I would say that a paradigm 
switch, which is the equivalent of questioning our end and goods in our case, is not a matter 
of having different options available. Being aware of the information and choosing one 
paradigm over the other is not an exercise in rational evaluation. Instead, it comes from a 
crisis that pushes scientists to question the old paradigm. In other words, we do not question 
our assumptions in periods of normal science, but only in a critical state. ‘Paradigms are not 
corrigible by normal science at all. Instead, as we have already seen, normal science 
ultimately leads only to the recognition of anomalies and to crises. And these are terminated, 
not by deliberation and interpretation, but by a relatively sudden and unstructured event like 
the gestalt switch.’ (Kuhn, 2012:122) As with the scientific revolution, the criticism of our 
goods and values cannot come from any place other than an essential -existential- 
incompatibility in which phenomena stop making sense. 
116 Kymlicka affirms: ‘No matter how confident we are about our ends at a particular 
moment, new circumstances or experiences may arise, often in unpredictable ways, that 
cause us to re‐evaluate them. There is no way to predict in advance when the need for such 
a reconsideration will arise. As I noted earlier, a liberal society does not compel people to 
revise their commitments —and many people will go years without having any reason to 
question their basic commitments— but it does recognize that the freedom of choice is not a 
one‐shot affair, and that earlier choices sometimes need to be revisited.’ (Kymlicka, 1995:91-
92) What I can add to this idea, which I think is right, is the special existential tone of the 
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that modern humanism is the natural consequence of the inward individualised 
subject, nor can I assert that we are condemned to suffer the nihilist consequences 
of a post-modern world, but I can say that it cannot be the only humanism possible. 
For instance, Taylor himself engaged in such an important endeavour (1989, 1994). 
Unfortunately, despite his immense efforts and contributions to building such a 
project, his proposal falls short in the sense that even his alternative fails to reach 
the core of the individualised modern identity he described in such detail.117 His 
proposal on how the other dialogically helps us to constitute our own self focuses 
more on the politics of difference than on the humanism of the other. The same 
happens to Parekh’s attempt to describe a three-dimensional identity and its 
dialectical interaction (2008), which very soon lands in the political sphere. They fix 
attention more on the political than the ontological consequences of modern identity, 
which is completely understandable because of the socio-political nature of their 
interests. 
My view is still a kind of humanism even if a ‘new kind’. It retains some 
aspects of the old humanisms while developing a new aspect. In order to clarify this, 
it is important to keep in mind the most criticised features of the modern subject are 
related to the overconfidence in individuality and its derived certitude about progress 
and rationality. Although the criticism of these features is accurate in many respects, 
I deny its most destructive conclusions. We should pursue a new humanism, an 
inclusive humanism not centred on the loneliness of the individual; at the same time, 
we cannot simply surrender to the temptation of dissolving any kind of subjectivity, 
instead, we must push towards a different kind of subjectivity. This divided 
consciousness is already present in the work of at least two prominent figures: 
Charles Taylor and Emmanuel Levinas. Taylor indicates that the consequences of 
modern identity cannot be fully realised: ‘A total and fully consistent subjectivism 
would tend towards emptiness: nothing would count as a self-fulfilment in a world in 
which literally nothing was important but self-fulfilment.’ (1989:507)  In the same 
way, Levinas asserts that   
As a setting into place of intelligible structures, subjectivity would have no 
internal finality. We are witnessing the ruin of the myth of man an end in 
himself, and the appearance of an order that is neither human nor 
inhuman, one that is, indeed, ordered across man and across the 
                                                                                                                                     
circumstances and experiences he mentions. 
117 I do not claim that my proposal is going to succeed where Taylor’s failed. It is more an 
effort sharing the same aim. As happened in the case of the modern self, a new form of 





civilizations he is said to have produced, but ordered in the last analysis 
by the properly rational force of the dialectical or logic—formal system.’ 
(1986:130) 
In former sections, I developed some comments on Taylor’s approach. By 
doing this, I began to make my own voice heard. My small contribution to the 
debates on plurality and diversity starts here, in the moment where I gain some 
distance from Taylor’s theory. As I said before, Taylor’s tone and general approach 
to modern identity are correct; he criticises reductionist -atomistic- notions of the 
modern self, opening the door for a definition of strong identity. My small 
contribution is more a matter of nuance and completion than fundamental 
disagreement. The argument is developed enough to affirm his definition of identity 
as useful in multiple ways, especially when we engage in the struggle for political 
recognition, his effort to set frameworks or horizons as the context in which we make 
sense of ourselves is even more profitable. However, it does not include other 
aspects outside the constructed dimension of our being that are, nevertheless, part 
of who we are. A definition of strong identity will allow us to further explain the 
organic unity in which agency and self-understanding take place. It is Taylor who 
unveiled that ‘…since the free individual can only maintain his identity within a 
society/culture of a certain kind, he has to be concerned about the shape of this 
society/culture as a whole.’ (Taylor, 1985a:207) As a complement, we have also to 
be concerned about the shape of the individual as a whole and not only in relation to 
agency and self-understanding. Hereinafter I develop some reasons to expand 
identity beyond the limits of agency and understanding, though their inclusion in the 
analysis of identity is Taylor’s major contribution.  
First, I think it is important to emphasise again the consequences of Taylor’s 
analysis and definition of identity, particularly in relation to the problem of agency. 
Clearly, for Taylor, there is no agent outside frameworks; these are needed to 
exercise any form of freedom of choice. ‘…it belongs to human agency to exist in a 
space of questions about strongly valued goods, prior to all choice or adventitious 
cultural change.’ (Taylor, 1989:31) A similar idea is expressed by philosophers close 
to phenomenology, from Heidegger (1962) to Merleau-Ponty (2013), whose notions 
of being-in-the-world, être au monde, or horizon support the idea that we are always 
in a context which is already meaningful. The world is the source of meaning. The 
same way Taylor’s concept of agency is anchored in moral frameworks, Merleau-
Ponty believes we find significance in the intuitive coherence of situations and 
events before we might find it in the semantic content; Heidegger shows the world 
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always opens up to the Dasein -human being- as meaningful because of her 
particular cultural heritage; and Gadamer affirms that our hermeneutical 
consciousness is nothing but the awareness of the historical structure of our 
understanding. Taylor names it framework, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Gadamer 
call it horizon, but it is the same fundamental intuition. If the horizon sets the limits of 
what shapes us, then the continued form of this shaping configures our particular 
biography.  
As one important aspect of our identity, our biography might help us to 
include events from our past that clearly shaped us in the particular way we are and, 
therefore, that are legitimately part of our being. For instance, we can mention 
Giddens’ influential idea of self-identity as the understanding each individual has in 
terms of her biography (1991). And although this widens identity in the temporal 
dimension, it is still not enough to cover all our being. Identity is not just about our 
understanding of the past, but also includes the things has happened to us and 
remain beyond our understanding. It is true that what happened to us in the past 
might be considered through the understanding of our current self, but we cannot try 
to pretend to cover all our past. With the concept of our biography, the notion of 
identity expands in time. Even more, those past events that shaped us can easily 
include things outside the sphere of our agency, acknowledging we are also shaped 
by what happens to us and we cannot but passively go through.   
Just to illustrate the kind of events I have in mind and that are usually 
included in our biography, we can think of the loss of someone who was an 
important part of our life.118 Clearly, I am moving away from the concerns of the 
liberal theories of securing agency and Taylor’s moral worries, which are also 
legitimate uses of identity that have to be included in a strong form. In this way, we 
can see that our identity includes more parts than just those freely and rationally 
chosen to construct our identity. Although writers like Taylor and Giddens attempt to 
expand the concept of identity, by binding it with our understanding they still place 
restrictions on it. 
While unveiling why understanding is considered to be such an important 
notion is beyond my present scope, I will share a plausible guess. Coupling our 
identity with our understanding is plausible in many ways but limiting. 
From the most general perspective, where identity refers to any possible 
                                               
118 This denotes that our identity is shaped by the dialogue and interaction with others, by 




object and not just to human identity, there has been a persistent effort to explain it 
through its core properties of continuity and unity. The identity of any possible object 
has been explained through qualitative and spatiotemporal continuity, persistence 
and unity (Hirsch, 1982). These features are crucial for the modern notion of identity, 
from Descartes to Hegel, and from there to more recent approaches, including 
Giddens’. Robin Williams expresses how the ontological features of identity are 
coupled with ideas such as coherence and understanding. 
The view of identity held in these kinds of theories, then, continues to 
resonate with Cartesian and Lockean accounts in so far as they 
understand identity ideally as both firmly located and unitary. These 
accounts direct us to find our identities through the realisation of 
coherence and continuity in our understandings of ourselves as subjects, 
albeit subjects who live in specific societies and in particular forms of 
relationships within social institutions. The mechanism that generates 
these identities remains a subjective one based on each individual’s 
concern with coherence and consistency within her or his actions and 
feelings over time and across social contexts. (2000:48)  
There are many reasons why understanding is so tightly linked to identity. I 
believe the connexion can be explained through the notions of consciousness and 
coherence, both at the core of modern subjectivity. What we know is that the 
conditions of continuity and unity were translated, through modern subjectivity, into 
consciousness and coherence as the means to secure access to our self and to 
hold it together. Then, our identity became inseparable from our understanding of it. 
In the context of the influential Cartesian self (Descartes, 1968), when Descartes 
suspends the world -ἐποχή- to find he is essentially a thinking thing -Cogito ergo 
sum-, self-knowledge becomes the only thing we can be sure of. ‘The self knows 
itself, it knows its own identity, in and through this set of essentially private cognitive 
operations. Personal identity is therefore essentially and only located “within” each 
person’s unique self — and the self and its identity can be known by us directly.’ (R. 
Williams, 2000:15)  
The criticism of this idea is vast. Taylor himself shows that our identity 
cannot be completely locked within each person, but is also dialogically constructed. 
Nonetheless, he holds the notion that understanding is the privileged way to access 
our self. There are some remnants of Cartesian intellectualism.119 Despite their 
rejection of this intellectualism, when analysing identity, most of the critics still 
believe we are mainly a thinking thing and there are no other ways to access our 
                                               
119 There are valuable efforts to expand the idea of understanding beyond what is strictly 
rational. Reasoning and evaluating can be emotional and dialogic. (Burkitt, 2010) However, 
my claim is not exactly that different ways to understand our selves exist, but that identity 
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being than rationality. This is the point where we have to stipulate identity as 
something more than just self-understanding; it is the point where constructing of a 
notion of strong identity starts.   Adapting Merleau-Ponty’s fundamental intuition that 
affirms ‘The world is not what I think, but what I live’ (2013:¦xxx) I can say that I am 
not what I understand of myself, but what I live as myself. The assumption that our 
agency is mainly attached to our reason also persists. In any case, even if our 
understanding were the main means we use to access our identity, we cannot 
conflate them. Even if we grant that we cannot access our being but through 
consciousness and this leads us immediately to the understanding of ourselves, the 
access and our identity are different. Otherwise, we will be supporting a strong 
idealist perspective of ourselves. It is in the ontological ground where we find basic 
assumptions that later become a claim for individualised, pragmatic and atomised 
views of identity.  
In the same way, identity does not only refer to what we are as the result of 
our agency, that is, to what we choose and embrace or to what we consciously 
deny. First and foremost, identity refers to our being, as a whole, as the unity that 
allows us to say we are identical to ourselves and as the continuity that explains 
what we are in each moment as a result of what we have been before. This means 
that our identity is indivisible, in the same way as the succession of episodes 
forming what we are in each particular time is indivisible. Our being is more than the 
sum of the attachments, decisions, feelings, projects and any other ‘part’ we might 
include, it is the articulation of all of them. By focusing on agency, Taylor placed the 
constructed character of our being centre stage. But as I said above, we are more 
than the decisions we constantly make. To say it directly: our being is larger than 
our agency; it includes more than our decisions, it includes more than our 
constructed character. Even though, as I show now, agency is very important to our 
being, we will also see that identity goes beyond this. 
It is true there are determinants or data -in the Latin sense of the term 
referring to what is directly given- we can try to navigate differently and modify, 
including our social class, economic status, religion, gender and many others; but 
there are other ones which are more difficult to deal with in terms of our agency, 
such as ethnicity/race, history or language. It seems that the first group allow us to 
move between different instances within the categories. In other words, we can 
imagine belonging to one social class at one time in our lives and to a different one 
                                                                                                                                     




in another time. However, in the second group, it seems this is not possible. It is not 
so easy to imagine how we could belong to one ethnicity one day and to another in 
a different time; it is hard to imagine not just what might need to happen, but how 
this could be even possible. We can imagine there is one person who has one 
parent who identifies with one ethnic group and another parent who identifies with 
another, she might change her sense of “allegiance” over time for personal or 
cultural reasons emphasising alternatively one or the other. However, despite 
having more choices from the beginning, including to consider herself mixed, it 
seems unlikely she can assume an ethnicity outside these default options. 
Nevertheless, all the cases can be legitimately considered social constructions.120 I 
would not claim any of those categories is natural. 
Additionally, our agency and consciousness can engage in diverse ways with 
them, to the extent that it seems there are no determinants agency cannot deal with. 
I already discussed above the issue of being able to criticise our deepest goods and 
ends, which is a more detailed expression of this philosophical intuition. This 
possibility of engagement also explains why belonging is so important as the 
correlative of identity. In other words, the world and our self are both constructed -
non-natural-, no doubt about it, which means that in principle we can change them 
as a result of our individual and collective agency. Besides we have good reasons to 
believe some matters that might seem the result of biological drivers, such as 
gender, are instead something constructed (Butler, 1999; De Beauvoir, 2015 
[1972]). However, our being is still larger than all our possible constructions. Even 
when our identity is clearly constructed there are ‘parts’ in this construction that 
remain untouched while we change others. Let me try to clarify this. 
Our being is constructed because we are able to shape ourselves, but it is 
also given because the construction is drawn from what is biologically, historically, 
existentially, intellectually, linguistically and morally available. It is not one or the 
other but both. Our identity is given and constructed at the same time. We can 
always be different, we can change, we can be better or worse people, we can 
follow certain practices or engage in different ones, we can believe in something and 
later change our mind. But all these possibilities are conditioned by the articulation 
of circumstances in which each event might happen. For this reason, I chose the 
term strong identity, mirroring Taylor’s idea of strong evaluation, to emphasise that 
                                               
120 A clear reference in the way I understand social construction is to Berg and Luckmann’s 
influential work The Social Construction of Reality (1979). My argument is very similar to 
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the construction of our self cannot be reduced to the pragmatic exercise of freedom. 
Taylor demonstrates that the notion of strong evaluation implies a kind of self 
provided with the depth of the context in which decisions become meaningful. 
‘Strong evaluation is not just a condition of articulacy about preferences, but also 
about the quality of life, the kind of beings we are or want to be. It is in this sense 
deeper.’ (Taylor, 1985b:26) I take the core of the strong evaluation intuition beyond 
the realm of agency, and I place it directly in the sphere of being; this is where 
strong evaluation opens the door for strong identity.  
Trying to name the conditions configuring the context would be trying to 
describe the world itself: class, gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, education, 
religion, family, character, psychological state, job, preferences and a very long 
etcetera. It is the summation of all these which in rigour configures our being 
because the unique articulation of all of them is what make us beings of flesh and 
bone.121  We construct ourselves from what we have been given, we can change 
ourselves and the world, but we cannot create them from scratch, nor we can 
construct them entirely at once. As philosophers are fond of saying, Ex nihilo nihil fit. 
And this leads me to say plainly what I think is our ontological character: our being 
and identity are always in process. We are never finished, we can always decide 
differently and change ourselves. In consequence, we have to pay attention to two 
concomitant events, the process of our construction and the context in which it takes 
place, including relations to others. 
 
8.5 The process of constructing ourselves: the articulation of the parts 
 
In detail, we construct ourselves in a context that is already full of 
intentionalities and directionalities, that is, in a meaningful world. This is the context. 
In the same way, our being is a complex articulation; the world is also a junction in 
which meaning and directionality are already present. ‘We must in fact understand in 
all of these ways at once; everything has a sense, and we uncover the same 
                                                                                                                                     
theirs. However, they still move within the limits of modern identity I try to overpass. 
121 Unamuno express this idea beautifully by saying: ‘For there is another thing which is 
also called man, and he is the subject of not a few lucubrations, more or less scientific. He is 
the legendary featherless biped, the ζῷον πολῑτῐκόν of Aristotle, the social contractor of 
Rousseau, the homo economicus of the Manchester school, the homo sapiens of Linnaeus, 
or, if you like, the vertical mammal. A man neither of here nor there, neither of this age nor of 
another, who has neither sex not country, who is, in brief, merely an idea. That is to say, a 




ontological structure beneath all of these relations. All of these views are true so 
long as they are not isolated,’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2013:¦xxxiii). The complex 
articulations of the world and ourselves imply that our agency and the subsequent 
construction of ourselves become an endless process. A process in which we 
continuously change ‘parts’ and leave others, but always remaining as a meaningful 
articulation. The real change and construction of ourselves are not decisions we 
make on particular matters, but the articulation of them as a meaningful whole. Our 
experience, our life, is nothing but a particular way of articulating the world. Perhaps 
this could be clearer in an example.  
A person living in this particular world can challenge the idea of biological 
determinism applied to gender, and she does it precisely because the world is 
configured in a way that allow us to believe this –there is a context in which it makes 
sense-, to perhaps assume it, and to act in consequence. It is not an isolated idea, 
but it works in a larger articulation on notions and contexts, from religion to biology. 
Then it is not so difficult to realise that engaging in such endeavours means that we 
have to change not just ourselves, but the world as well. Even more, it means that 
she has to adjust a lot of other things to make sense of her understanding of gender, 
from her religious beliefs -if any- to the political approaches. She can construct her 
identity by exercising agency in terms of gender and performing it differently. But 
she can do this only from the resources available, and in the way and to the extent it 
can be included in the larger articulation, that is, from the horizon in which this act of 
freedom ‘makes sense’ with the remaining determinants. A woman with different 
resources, with a different horizon, will construct her identity differently because the 
articulation would be different. In other words, she has a different experience. 
Our identity includes what we have managed to change, what we are in the 
process of changing, what we could -or would- not change and what we have not 
tried to change yet. We can only construct ourselves by changing and remaining at 
the same time. Sometimes we are still being what we choose not to be because the 
process is often a struggle not resolved yet, some other times we changed, but in 
such a way that we cannot be sure exactly when or why we became who we are 
now. In every case, and I apologise in advance for the tautological expressions, we 
are what we are, at the same time we are what we are to others. In other words, we 
are more than what we can construct of ourselves. Again, it is not a matter of 
denying our construction in favour of the given, we are both. We can claim that the 
                                                                                                                                     
the other man yonder, all of us who walk solidly on the earth.’ (1921:1) 
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important part of our identity is what we already have done with ourselves, and this 
is a legitimate claim. However, this is not all that we are, and at least for my 
argument, this is important because the other ‘parts’ also shape our being. ‘My 
voluntary and rational life thus knows itself to be entangled with another power that 
prevents it from being completed and that always gives it the air of a work in 
progress.’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2013:362) If so far I have succeeded in my aim, it would 
be a bit clearer that despite the inwardly individualised modern subject, there is 
more in our identity than just agency, consciousness and mind. 
Let me try to connect this reflection with some cultural consequences and an 
idea of history. So far, I argued that agency and identity construction cannot imply a 
reboot of the whole articulation of relationships, but the continual process of partial 
reconfiguration. We cannot achieve a state of affairs in which all articulations would 
make sense providing the definite unity of the parts as if we constructed our self 
completely. In consequence, we keep changing, step by step. I have also described 
in a former section the problem of trying to question our ends and goods when we 
use them for such a critique. In this moment of the argumentation, I find it useful to 
call to mind this last idea because the apparently infinite regress also shows the 
dialectical nature of identity construction. The possibilities from which we can 
choose and that constitute our identity are meaningful only because there are 
frameworks or horizons in which they make sense but, at the same time, those 
frameworks have been partially constructed from our previous choices. We can only 
exercise our agency from a determined context, but we historically shape that 
context by exercising our agency.122 These dynamics correspond to the movement 
of history.123  
                                               
122 The process I try to describe follows the usual form of a dialectic relationship in which 
the elements co-create mutually through a continuous tension. Just to mention an example 
better known because of its significance, we can refer to Marx’s idea of how the 
humanization of people happens by the mediation of work, that is, by transforming nature. 
‘…natural man transforms nature with the help of nature, and this transformation in turn 
transforms his nature.’ (Fetscher, 1973:451) More importantly, as Marx and Hegel bring to 
light, this structure explains history, change and human existence, which in my argument is 
very close to the notion of identity.  ‘Thus the social character is the general character of the 
whole movement: just as society itself produces man as man, so is society produced by him. 
(…) Thus society is the consummated oneness in substance of man and nature -the true 
resurrection of nature- the naturalism of man and the humanism of nature both brought to 
fulfilment.’ (Marx, 1988:104) 
123 It is a task for another project to go further on this relation between identity, diversity and 
history. But there are some perspectives pointing in this direction, Walter Benjamin’s idea of 
history for instance. He says in the 6th thesis on the concept of history: ‘Articulating the past 
historically does not mean recognizing it “the way it really was.” It means appropriating a 




We construct our self historically in the ontological sense, not just because 
history is a determination influencing our current understanding of the present, but 
because we construct that same history by being in the world. That is why no 
meaning is ever fixed or absolutely determined, we can change them historically, at 
the same time that we are determined by the very same historicity. ‘This amount to 
saying that we give history its sense, but not without history offering us that sense. 
The Sinn-gebung is not merely centrifugal, and this is why the individual is not the 
subject of history. There is an exchange between generalized existence and 
individual existence; both receive and both give.’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2013:475-76) And 
if we are able to link individual identity construction with the collective formation of 
history, we can also do so with culture. 
In cultural terms, I believe that a community can choose the same way an 
individual can. But more important is the adjustment of the articulations as a whole, 
the adaptations we have to assume to re-articulate the being of the community. In 
more specific terms, we can try another thought experiment and see that even if a 
non-liberal community chose to embrace particular liberal practices, there is more 
work in order to re-articulate those changes into the whole. To break with particular 
practices is not to break with the culture itself. In cultural terms, communities follow 
the same dynamics of endlessly adjusting in a unitary articulation of different parts 
that allow us to see it as a whole. Cultural communities do not act as a unity 
because their members follow or share values, goods or practices in the same way. 
Completely the opposite, members of a community can legitimately keep their 
membership despite the diverse -sometimes contradictory- interpretation of 
fundamental matters. They are part of a community because they live the same 
articulation of events from similar horizons. This other source of diversity, which we 
can call internal plurality, also configures the historical change at different scales.  
Plurality cannot be reduced to a diversity of goods, values and ends, not 
even ideologies or economies, therefore, even in the case of a unique system and 
contrary to Francis Fukuyama’s opinion (1992), there is no chance for the end of 
history, nor a last man. In their conflict and agreements, internal and external 
diversity provide the driving force for history. Within this larger picture of what a 
community is in historical terms, there are different ways to draw lines delimiting 
                                                                                                                                     
tradition away from the conformism that is working to overpower it.’ (Benjamin, 1996:391) In 
the context of diversity, I find particularly interesting Modood’s (2015) effort in widening 
national history beyond the history of the majority. In both cases history is something more 
than just traditional historiography. 
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communities and groups. That being said, there is no conflict between my account 
and the specific efforts to define communities focusing on particular features.  
As I described above, when I discussed the complexity of identity, the 
particular features can be the visible face of a community or an individual for many 
reasons, but they are always ‘part’ of a complex unitary being. In fact, when I affirm 
members of the same community can have dissimilar ends and goals, this is not 
different from the definition of civic nation I analysed in Chapter 3. A citizen of a civic 
nation is not forced to follow any particular good or end, which is the foundation for 
plurality and diversity at this level. If democratic mediation between distinct concepts 
of the good is the only way for the State to deal with plurality that is a different issue. 
If in order to secure the conditions for a functional diversity we have to embrace 
liberal principles, it is also something debatable, but these issues do not contradict 
the account I am presenting. The diverse approaches I included in this text are, in a 
way, a corroboration of it. All of them are different interpretations of plurality, social 
cohesion, belonging, democracy and other values in the liberal tradition. They all 
share the horizon in which their coincidences and discrepancies keep history 
moving. Moreover, bluntly critiques also belong to the same tradition they criticise. 
There is no chance of a purely external critique. For instance, the efforts of Critical 
Race Theory scholars to question the liberal principles of equality and neutrality 
belong to the same tradition they criticise; they are not something coming from an 
alien context but from the core of liberal institutions.  
Additionally, my criticism includes the liberal assumptions of my own 
formation and make sense as a critique only in relation to the liberal horizon. What 
we know as liberalism, in the inclusive sense of the term, is a political, ideological, 
and existential horizon as diverse as any other. Conflict and internal disagreement 




I would like to start this chapter’s conclusions by emphasising Taylor’s 
contributions to the discussion of identity and recognition. Following his work, we 
can affirm that modern identity is indeed an important assumption shaping conflicts 
in our culture and society. He shows that the connections between concepts and the 
world are real. Particularly, modern identity is a key idea behind our most mundane 




reason, analysing the philosophical context in which modern identity appeared lets 
us appreciate how we understand and deal with diversity and plurality, particularly in 
the liberal context. Taylor also criticises what he thinks are disengaged and 
instrumental modes of thought and life, which was a source of inspiration for my 
claim that identity is more than our values and practices. He is right in denying the 
pragmatic perspective that hides behind weak evaluations. In this context, he is a 
pioneer of strong identity; he unveils how an understanding of self is necessary to 
exercise our freedom and how we can only maintain identity within a society or 
culture. Along with other philosophers such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty or 
Gadamer, he emphasises that the cultural frameworks in which we make sense of 
ourselves and the world are the foundations for human agency. In other words, he 
allows us to contextualise the problems of identity in relation to agency. Moreover, 
he shows how there is always a moral and political content attached to or options 
and alternatives. Finally, we can mention his well-known idea that part of our identity 
is shaped by the recognition or misrecognition of others, which represents a 
complete paradigm shift regarding the Cartesian tradition of the self. 
Moving on to what I was able to articulate in the chapter, I argued the idea 
that our identity is both individual and collective, without further contradiction. There 
is certainly a tension between them, but they are equally present in our being. 
Having a strong attachment to the values, beliefs and behaviours of a community 
neither prevents our agency nor denies the constructed character of ourselves. We 
can question our values, practices and behaviours even if we are very attached to 
them. However, no matter how radical the experience leading us to their revision, 
we cannot judge them outside the framework in which they make sense. Our 
freedom is attached to the context in which we exercise it, and even if we can 
question and change important parts of that horizon, there are some other parts that 
escape our direct influence. Moreover, the ability to question our identity has 
existential implications, it is not simply a matter of pragmatic or even rational choice. 
This is what I called the existential context identity.  
Additionally, I endorsed the idea that in the process of constructing our 
identity there is already the significant other, as Levinas (and to a lesser extent, 
Taylor) affirms. This idea will allow developing a humanism of the other, which 
programmatic development should include the aims of expanding identity beyond 
the limits of agency and understanding, which implies accepting that our identity is 
given and constructed at the same time. In other words, a first step is to understand 
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identity as our being, but a being in a continuous process of change. Just like 
Theseus’ ship we are in a process in which we continuously change parts of 
ourselves and leave others intact. However, the ship remains, we always remain as 
a meaningful articulation that allows us to say we are the same, that our identity is 
secured. The real change and construction of ourselves are not decisions on the 
particular matters we take, but the articulation of them as a meaningful whole.  
Finally, I connected the individual with the collective construction of identity. 
We know that communities follow the same dynamics of endlessly adjusting in a 
unitary articulation of different parts. Therefore, I concluded that communities do not 
act in unity because their members follow or share values, goods or practices in the 
same way. Instead, they are part of a community because they live the same 
articulation of events from similar horizons. Some particular features can 
‘differentiate’ a community or an individual for many reasons. However, they are 
always ‘part’ of a complex unitary being, which is strictu sensu the identity of the 
group. Now that I portrayed strong identity, I can briefly come back to the idea that 
minorities are claiming strong recognition and point out some possible solutions, 











The thesis started with four objectives: 1) exploring how the liberal context 
might prevent stronger forms of recognition from developing; 2) assessing how 
ideas about social cohesion are intertwined with ideas about identity and 
recognition; 3) determining the consequences and limits of reformist approaches like 
the liberal ones on issues of identity and recognition; and 4) developing a notion of 
ontological identity and investigate its relationship with agency.  
To shed light on these topics, I critically reviewed what I believe are the 
prevailing liberal theories of diversity and plurality of our time: civic nationalism, 
multiculturalism and interculturalism, and when helpful, I contrasted them with 
communitarianism and cosmopolitanism. I investigated how these theories deal with 
identity and recognition and showed some of their limits. Particularly, I focused on 
the tendency to reduce cultural and other identarian conflicts to the political arena as 
a limit. Such a tendency prevents deeper forms of recognition from developing. It is 
clear that political recognition has positive effects in terms of diversity, plurality and 
equality, besides having shown itself effective in solving issues surrounding 
integration of minorities and social justice. My research never questioned this utility. 
Nevertheless, it was necessary to expand the limits of recognition outside the 
reliable political sphere, otherwise the price we have to pay for this secure but 
confined way of dealing with plurality are weak forms of recognition. 
The main suspicion that motivated this research was that claims for 
recognition are not always political demands, or not only; they are embedded in 
more complex existential situations. Therefore, political recognition, as valuable as it 
is, oftentimes is not the context in which these claims for recognition make sense. 
For this reason, I proposed a concept of strong identity and recognition as an 
alternative that is not opposed to political recognition, but is rather a more general 
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form that contains it. I drew mainly on Charles Taylor’s concept of identity and built 
my own work upon it. I pushed his idea of identity as self-understanding further to 
include our whole being in order to move further into what I call, following Emmanuel 
Levinas, a humanism of the other. Contextualising and refining this concept 
represent my thesis’ key contributions. The idea of identity must go beyond our self-
understanding and agency, without denying them, to address claims of recognition. 
Additionally, I incorporated critical race theory’s perspective to show how 
some of the criticism I developed has been voiced in a particular instance. It allowed 
me to exemplify how a reformist approach prevents radical changes, which is 
aligned with my general hypothesis. Finally, I examined some forms of systematic 
oppression that can be inflicted from liberal institutions, particularly to minorities, 
which put the spotlight on the limited benefits of political recognition. 
Future researchers might find these small contributions useful, especially 
considering there is a growing tendency to conceptualise diversity and plurality 
outside the limits of liberalism; still more, we can try to conceptualise them outside 
the limits of the political realm. As I showed, even multiculturalism can be 
understood as a project trying to expand the traditional liberal framework without 
breaking it. In consequence, besides criticising the limits of liberal theories of 
diversity and plurality, the notions of strong identity and recognition might contribute 
something to future investigations on plurality and diversity. The existing knowledge 
of modern diversity and plurality is enhanced by unveiling its ontological foundation, 
which to my knowledge has not been done since Taylor and Parekh. 
Unfortunately, I could not achieve all that I would have liked in this research. 
The clearest limitation is that my effort was not enough to develop a clear idea of 
strong recognition. In this text, I could only properly theorise strong identity. Strong 
recognition appears in the text only as a regulative idea in the Kantian sense. I hope 
future projects allow me to follow this path. I aspire to keep working in this line of a 
new humanism of the other, but I also hope this work shows to others this project’s 
intellectual worth.  
There are other kinds of limitations that must be considered as well. As with 
many investigations of this kind, mine has been largely critical, focusing on what I 
consider the problems of liberal pluralism and diversity but not offering much in the 
way of a positive alternative. The ontological construction of identity and recognition 
takes the issues of diversity and plurality in a different direction, but it is not clear 




the idea of ‘allowing’ some internal conflict and tension as a way of granting 
sufficient room for identity change. Nevertheless, I am unable to set limits or to know 
when those tensions might become too much, such that there is identity annihilation 
instead of identity change. I am convinced that the ontological perspective has much 
to say on particular issues, but more work has to be done. Finally, I wish I could 
delve further into the problem of essentialisation of identity and the qualitative 
difference between essentialising the identity of minorities and of majorities. 
As a result of the completion of my critical analysis, along with my proposal 
of strong forms of identity, I found some important results in relation to my research 
objectives. Next, I present 4 brief sections related to each objective, assembling 
what I think are the main results, and one final section suggesting a possible route 
for further research.  
 
9.1 Identity and Individuality in liberal theories 
 
Throughout the preceding chapters, I mentioned some assumptions and 
consequences of various forms of cosmopolitanism. Particularly in the chapters on 
critical race theory and interculturalism, I described a cosmopolitan assumption 
which affirms that any sort of ethnic, racial, religious or national consciousness 
should be avoided because it contradicts the liberal principles of equality and 
neutrality. Additionally, cosmopolitanism claims that there is a considerable risk in 
attachments to collective identity, namely that tying individuals to fixed structures 
restricts individual freedom. These conditions were enough for Chapter 7 to suggest 
that interculturalism in particular, and cosmopolitanism in general, do not suit our 
effort of pushing notions of strong identity and recognition. Overall, most 
cosmopolitan perspectives cannot perceive that we can secure individual agency at 
the same time as we recognise the ontological weight of cultural attachments. 
The idea of a universal cosmopolitan community draws on the assumption of 
the inwardly individualised modern identity. Chapter 4 presented the ways in which 
multicultural attempts at expanding the liberal framework work to disprove this 
assumption. Taylor in particular shows there are always specific moral frameworks 
which provide individuals with meaning and orientation. There is no such thing as a 
universal framework devoid of particular purposes and, at the same time, able to 
provide meaning to individuals. In other words, the cosmopolitan perspective is not 
free from attachments, but the one in which the particular horizon of an over-
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individualised self allows us to make sense of that belief, that is, the feeling we can 
function perfectly without attachments. 
In Chapter 8 I showed that features shared by every individual, particularly 
reason and agency reside within the self, but at the same time are shaped by 
something external: the historical context and cultural horizon. Even if the cultural 
context and other collective attachments are historically constructed, this fact does 
not mean they are not crucial for the individuals within the time in which they take 
place. Completely the opposite, collective ‘determinations’ are truly necessary 
because, like any other genuine historical determination, they shape the horizon 
from which we -in every particular place and time- understand the world in the way 
we do. The historicity of our self has important consequences for our human being. 
In consequence, I argued that individuals are sufficient to carry their own life 
in pragmatic terms, but not necessarily in ontological ones; we are self-sufficient but 
not complete. In relation to this aspect, I am referring to the impossibility of finding or 
constructing the meaning of what is human or her personal identity just by herself.124 
When it comes to liberal theories of plurality, such as multiculturalism, they 
understand the complexity of individuality and attachments to collective values. 
However, the basic tension between individuality and the bonds to culture, religion 
or ethnicity is not considered in its full philosophical dimension. The relation between 
individuality, identity and agency are analysed on a different level, mostly political. 
Multiculturalists know people’s attachments to their culture are something that 
comes from the core of the human condition (Kymlicka, 1995:90), and they 
represent the main mechanism for making sense of the world. Culture is more than 
just a skin-deep attachment coming from practical judgement. However, I argued 
that multiculturalists miss the existential implications of our agency, treating agency 
as if it is independent of identity and can fully reshape it. In other words, it 
overemphasises agency in a way that makes us believe that questioning and 
choosing values, practices and behaviours lead us to a direct construction of our 
identity. By contrast, I argued in Chapter 8 that our freedom is attached to the 
context in which we exercise it. Our agency is embedded in a more complex 
existential device than the direct expression of will and reason. Every time we 
engage in real critical thought about cultural goods, we engage in something deeper 
than just a choice, we risk our being.  
                                               
124 This is a more general and positive way of framing Pirandello’s story about finding 




Allow me a thought experiment just to exemplify multiculturalism’s position 
halfway between liberalism and a strong idea of identity, as it is very important to me 
that the reader has a concrete image of what I have argued. At some point in our 
lives, we can deny the religion in which we were brought up, and nonetheless catch 
ourselves judging different events from that religious mindset; we can consciously 
advocate liberal principles, only to later find ourselves adopting conservative 
attitudes; we can support feminist demands and, at the same time, surreptitiously 
engage in patriarchal practices. Then we can question: Are we the secular, liberal, 
feminist individuals that we chose to be or the religious, conservative, patriarchal 
individuals represented by our actions? The answer is both; we are what we 
construct of ourselves but also what is beyond our agency.  
Multiculturalists and other liberal thinkers would accept the above without 
reservation. They know very well that we cannot, for instance, go beyond our history 
and language, and in that sense, we cannot go beyond our culture. However, and 
this is the main problem, I emphasised in Chapters 4 and 5 they insist that the civic 
national culture is a sort of exception in which detached criticism is not only possible 
but easier. Kymlicka says: 
…at the national level, the very fact which makes national identity so 
inappropriate for communitarian politics -namely, that it does not rest on 
shared values- is precisely what makes it an appropriate basis for liberal 
politics. The national culture provides a meaningful context of choice for 
people, without limiting their ability to question and revise particular 
values or beliefs. (Kymlicka, 1995:92-93) 
However, I described that civic nations are not just political but also ethical 
communities. Even more, national culture, even if it tries not to foster a particular 
idea of the good, shapes the members’ understandings, their identities, in the same 
ontological way the goods do in subnational communities. Therefore, there is no 
qualitative difference in the way individuality and identity function in liberal states 
and in other contexts, at least not on a fundamental level.  
We can conclude that multiculturalists are right: liberal societies provide a 
space to politically assist individuals to assess their moral values and traditional 
ways of life. They are also right that within non-liberal contexts individuals might 
struggle more to express their doubts about the dominant values of the community 
(Kymlicka, 2001a:53). Nonetheless, even if it is more difficult, members of non-
liberal communities are able to remain strongly attached to collective values and 
maintain their agency. Groups outside the liberal perspective are usually 




conceptualised in a way that overemphasises shared ‘features’, including a common 
understanding of the good and other values. Notwithstanding, there is diversity, 
internal movement and struggles within the communities, which denote that in non-
liberal societies, members can push, despite several limitations, alternative 
understandings of values and themselves. In the last instance this internal conflict is 
something we should acknowledge as a legitimate source of diversity, not only the 
direct choice of one good over others but the different interpretations of the same 
good. This complexity also provides richness to our life; it makes it diverse.  
 
9.2 Social cohesion and ontological community 
 
In the text, I explored how liberal theories of diversity conceive of social 
cohesion and related issues such as solidarity. I described that social cohesion 
entails knowing how and why individuals are held together within a community, but 
also finding who the people are in each case and accordingly who can or cannot be 
a member of the group. I argued that both ideas of social cohesion are condensed in 
the notion of shared identity. In liberal theories of plurality and diversity, a shared 
identity is what simultaneously keeps the members of a community together, defines 
their membership and fosters solidarity. In the text, I called this the recognition-
allegiance dialectic.  
I dealt with the problem of social cohesion in several chapters. Now I can 
affirm that in liberal societies, we can pinpoint two forms of social cohesion and 
membership, that is, two forms of identity: cultural -what might hold together 
members of minorities- and civic -what might hold together members of the larger 
community-. The allegiances we can develop to the community and fellow members 
are separately or simultaneously built on the basis of these attitudes. I showed that 
from the ontological perspective, what holds people together in the same community 
is the fact they share the same horizon, the same context, without necessarily 
implying they share the same Weltanschauung. This means they do not necessarily 
need to endorse the same values -cultural or civic-, but to participate in the complex 
articulation in which those values make sense, either to endorse, adjust or deny 
them. In this respect, those individuals sharing the same world share a collective 
identity. From this perspective, the community is a fact; it is the particular 
sociocultural context through which every single individual comes to the world and in 




some others are fragile. Positive social cohesion and loyalty are always fragile and 
perhaps it should be this way, otherwise there would not be enough room for 
change and criticism.  
In Chapter 8 I argued that, sharing the same identity is the source of social 
cohesion but also of social dispute. The articulation of identity as a whole is what 
provides unity and cohesion in an ontological sense. I also emphasised that this 
cohesion does not erase internal tensions and disputes. A person can legitimately 
be member of a community and alternatively endorse its values, try to change them 
or openly deny them, that is, foster the particular content of social cohesion in the 
liberal sense, try to change that content or simply challenge it; she can feel 
constrained, represented or misrepresented by the values, practices, behaviours 
and beliefs without losing her place in the community. In consequence, we were 
able to say that issues of positive social cohesion and solidarity are valuable and 
worthy of pursuit, but they are also part of a more complex structure including the 
internal tension of the communities. Let me say it in a different way, there is 
collective cohesion, ontological cohesion, even in the middle of disputes.  
In Chapter 7 I proposed a distinction between community as togetherness 
and community as likeness. As I argued, living together means building, making 
sense of, and sometimes rejecting the beliefs and values shaping our being. These 
two ideas might help to show that the social cohesion of a community can be 
sustained or changed because its members truly live together, and because they 
share experiences in a meaningful way. Alternatively stated, social cohesion is a 
result of people dialectically constructing their beings in a shared meaningful way, 
that is, making sense of -endorsing or rejecting- beliefs and values in the same 
world. However, in another sense it is already there when people engage in 
meaningful interactions because it is exactly part of what provides them with 
meaning. Social cohesion can change its content but, in a way, it is always 
ontologically secured.  
In Chapter 5 I described how liberal theories supporting notions of collective 
identity are often accused of essentialising their members in their search for 
securing social cohesion and solidarity. I argued that some sort of formal 
essentialisation is unavoidable when referring to a collectivity. However, the claim of 
essentialism does not occur in the ontological dimension. On this level, what 
provides solidarity amongst members of a community is that they have similar 
experiences in the phenomenological sense, that is, similar articulations of the 
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world. There is not a proper essence of the group, only a shared horizon that by 
definition has not limits. 
If articulations are more similar amongst like-minded individuals or 
cohabitating individuals is something I cannot answer. I do not have evidence to 
demonstrate that if we live under the same determinants we are predisposed to 
develop stronger ties, or if we are like-minded, even if it seems plausible. 
Consequently, members of a group are part of the same community, not exactly 
because they are like-minded, nor because they plainly share material and historical 
conditions, but because they deal with the same articulation of issues and events. 
Perhaps if they make sense of this articulation in a similar way they are more likely 
to secure solidarity, but this possibility does not condition the existence of the 
community. A thought experiment might illustrate this.  
Let us consider two members of the same family who share ‘the same’ 
horizon, two siblings that grew up together in ‘the same world’. No matter how 
different their personalities might be, and how differently they construct their sense 
of self, it would be very difficult to argue that they do not belong to the same 
communities. From their nuclear family to the extended family, their neighbourhood, 
the nation. The same narratives of historical and cultural heritage, the same 
language, religious education -or lack thereof-, values, class, ethnicity, etc shaped 
them. Notwithstanding, as usually happens, they might be significantly different. 
They might have constructed their selves, their identity, in very different ways; they 
can disagree on fundamental issues and, nevertheless, be members of the same 
communities. 
What my argument suggests is that communities do not appear only when 
positive social cohesion has been secured, but there is always an ontological 
community to which we belong. We are always part of processes of belonging, 
endorsing and rejecting parts of a complex articulation of issues. 
 
9.3 Liberal reformism 
 
It is useful to bring back an idea behind the notion of political recognition’s 
limits: reformist vs. radicalism. I mainly developed this idea in Chapter 2, although I 
did so in the very particular terms of the African-American situation and American 
institutions. The notion of ‘radical’ or in our case ‘strong’ is always a relative matter. 




changes allows the peaceful coexistence of individuals and groups. The liberal 
opinion is that radical change, one that brings great changes, is the one pushed 
through the structures and institutions. What could be more radical than a structural 
change? Therefore, fundamental change is one that finds final expression in laws 
and policies such as group-differentiated rights, citizenship or anti-discrimination 
laws. This is what I considered the reformist path. Liberalism might push an idea to 
its last consequences and, in that sense, be radical, but it does so within the same 
paradigm.125 Other ideas of radical change would affirm exactly the opposite: it is a 
change of paradigm that would bring radical change. The benefit of the liberal 
reformist approach is that it is more likely to keep peace and reduce conflict. The 
downside of the reformist perspective is that it prevents some important changes 
from happening. 
This distinction between reform and radical change allowed me to argue that 
stronger -more radical- forms of recognition can only be found outside the liberal, 
reformist framework. However, there are problems that remain open for further 
debate: following CRT, I wondered whether liberal institutions can serve the 
purposes of minorities, as liberals say, or if institutions will, as before, keep 
supporting the interests of specific groups. Although the second viewpoint appeals 
to me, I did not find a good answer, which is a task for political philosophers. What I 
could conclude is that a strong form of recognition need not be institutional. In fact, I 
argued that we need deeper forms of recognition exactly because the institutional 
ones are incapable of addressing what is behind some claims. At least on an 
ontological level, identity’s recognition does not come from institutions nor does it 
need to be mediated by them.  
Another consequence I found derived from the reformist approach, if we 
agree on its limits, is that deep issues of diversity and plurality are not resolved 
assuming a particular methodological approach. The root of the problems does not 
disappear by using a bottom-up perspective, like that proposed by interculturalism, 
instead of a top-down approach, like that of liberal multiculturalism. In none of these 
cases is the root of the problem touched: CRT would say that root is white, male, 
                                               
125 A particularly interesting example is the one provided by Charles Mills in his idea of 
black radical liberalism, which ‘…fully adheres to the standard liberal ideals—if more often 
betrayed than realized—of universalism and egalitarianism. It seeks to correct the (anti-
universalist, anti-egalitarian) distortions in mainstream white liberalism, whether de jure or de 
facto, introduced by the complicity of that iteration of liberalism with white supremacy, both 
nationally and globally.’ (Mills, 2017:201) For most of us, including the black radical traditions 
we analysed, radicalism would require moving away from liberalism. 
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bourgeois privilege, and I argued that on a fundamental level the problem is modern 
identity. Liberal recognition is a form of recognition without the other, ontologically 
and politically. 
 
9.4 Strong identity 
 
First and foremost, strong identity refers to our being, as a whole, as the 
unity that allows us to say we are identical to ourselves and as the continuity that 
explains what we are in each moment is connected with what we have been before. 
After saying that our agency is always secured at the ontological level, I argued that 
our identity goes beyond our agency. This means that our identity is more than the 
sum of attachments, decisions, feelings, projects, etcetera. It is the articulation of all 
these in an organic unit. Even when our identity is clearly constructed -because 
agency is secured- there are ‘parts’ of the construction that remain untouched while 
others change. Our identity is given and constructed at the same time. We construct 
ourselves from what we have been given.   
In contrast to other concepts of identity, which I do not reject, strong identity 
is not a matter of affinity or preference, nor of emotional attachment. It is more than 
a feeling of belonging. In the strict sense of the term, strong identity is not something 
open to negotiation or adjustment in a pragmatic way; to affirm that would be the 
same that saying we can manipulate our whole being at once. On the other hand, I 
argued that to deny negotiations and pragmatic adjustments is not equivalent to 
denying that our identity can change, is socially constructed, or dialogically shaped. 
In more technical terms, strong identity is not a resource, property or relation. 
Following Merleau-Ponty, I expressed that at this fundamental level: it is misleading 
to say we have an identity, even worse to say we have multiple identities. It is better 
to say that our identity is our complex but unitary being. 
I showed that if our identity is our whole being there is no contradiction in 
saying that it is at the same time individual and collective. In contrast to what some 
liberal thinkers believe, the dialectical nature of identity does not prevent the 
exercise of our agency. We develop strong attachments to collective values, 
practices and behaviours because they shape us. It is impossible to exist without a 
context that shapes us. I demonstrated, following philosophers as Heidegger, 
Gadamer and Merleau-Ponty that the horizon is more than just a scenography that 




agency. Therefore, our being is embedded in more complex existential 
circumstances than the simple exercise of our agency; likewise, some of our claims 
of identity recognition have an existential context that is not considered by political 
recognition, leading me to the last conclusion. 
In the process of constructing identity, we can be sure that a significant other 
is always there. Our ‘dependence’ on others, on the external in general, reaches our 
individual self without nullifying it. Then, taking into account the external, the 
complex articulations of the world and ourselves imply that the construction of our 
identity become an endless process, a process in which we continuously change 
‘parts’ and leave others, but always remaining as a meaningful articulation. Our 
experience, our life, is nothing but a particular way of articulating the world. Our 
identity includes what we have managed to change, what we are in the process of 
changing, what we could not change and what we have not yet tried to change. 
Ultimately, what I tried to do in this research was to follow an intuition that 
has been around for a long time, which is expressed in the following way: referring 
to our identity is referring to who and what we are, no more, but no less.  
And if we ask about a person’s identity we are seldom today asking 
about their ‘soul or their ‘hidden self’. Instead, we are usually asking one 
of two things about a person. First, we might be asking about a person’s 
‘overall identity’ and what this person is as a whole (Parekh, 2008, p. 9). 
This is difficult to know, as self-reflection can entail questions that may be 
too painful, time consuming or complex to answer and it seldom prevents 
us surprising ourselves and others. Likewise, what a person is changes 
over time – hence old philosophical debates about whether a person’s 
identity remains the same over their life despite the ways in which they 
change during it (Parfit, 1987; Sorabji, 2006). Of course we know parts of 
what we are, and thus a person might say that being a Muslim, a man or 
an artist are all part of his identity. But it still remains unclear how to 
interpret and relate these parts of what we are so as to discern what we 
are as a whole. Thus, what we are as a whole usually remains unclear to 
us. (Uberoi, 2018:49)126 
What I tried to do was to shed light on our overall identity, which usually 
remains unclear to us and escapes from our hands, changing the very moment we 
thought we had it, because is still one of the most fundamental questions we have to 
face as human beings. 
 
 
                                               
126 The references in the quotation correspond to A New Politics of Identity (Parekh, 2008),  
Reasons and Persons  (Parfit, 1984) and Self-Ancient and Modern Insights about 
Individuality, Life and Death (Sorabji, 2006) 
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9.5 What is coming next: strong recognition and history 
 
I will conclude by briefly indicating future lines of research. These begin from 
one of my conclusions: that in modern states political identity is not enough to 
provide a strong form of recognition. It helps the practical integration of minority 
groups into the mainstream society but it does not necessarily lead to a deep and 
genuine recognition of the value of minorities. In other words, the form of recognition 
that we need has to go beyond plurality within a unique liberal framework, it has to 
allow a diversity of frameworks. From here we can delineate what we should look for 
in a notion of strong recognition. Strong recognition is not institutional, although not 
necessarily opposed to it. It has to address collectivities and individuals equally, that 
is, not be restricted to only one. It also should go beyond everyday interactions. But 
mainly, strong recognition should imply a direct recognition of the value of diverse 
minorities and their difference.  
In the text, I assessed the idea of dialogue and argued that we should 
seriously consider a pre-dialogic form of recognition. At least in the way we 
understand dialogue in the liberal context, there is a gap between the real and 
formal conditions of dialogue. Moreover, this pre-dialogical engagement should not 
be conditioned to a previous adaptation of behaviours or practices; it should not 
imply any kind of pragmatic negotiation of identities. Strong recognition is an 
unconditional recognition of the other as different. It should foster the aim of 
recognising the value of specific forms of diversity, despite the fact that the value 
only makes sense in the context in which appears. I want to further explore a set of 
questions including: Does relativism really have no upside? Does relativism always 
lead to incommensurability and miscommunication? And then again, is sharing a 
unique core of values the only way to secure social cohesion? I think that despite 
these unanswered questions there is one conviction: we should recognise people as 
different without devaluing them. 
As is well established, by Taylor for instance, part of our identity is shaped by 
the recognition or misrecognition of others. If our identity is what allows us to 
understand who we are, how we are and where we stand, then it is completely 
plausible that recognition, or the lack of it, plays an important part in the way we 
understand ourselves. However, it seems equally important that the other recognise 
in us an equal value, but recognise us directly as different.  




process goes the other way round than we usually believe: understanding the other 
is more likely to happen when we already have a strong form of recognition. It is not 
true that to recognise the other we have to understand them first. Strong recognition 
would allow the suspension of judgement on something that is outside our 
existential framework. As Levinas’ concept of vulnerability (1972), strong recognition 
is a notion that starts from realising that getting closer to the other is not 
representing her, nor even the consciousness of the proximity to it, but something 
deeper. 
Along with recognition, we also could develop a notion of history that can 
clearly explain changes in individual and collective identity. In other words, we 
cannot forget the other main problem of identity: explaining how what changes also 
remains. It is clear that every individual and culture change over time, that is, they 
are historical. The dialectical structure that allows us to explain how in the case of 
our identity there is no priority between context and agency should be expanded to 
come with an idea of history. We have done part of the work. We know that we 
exercise our agency from a determined context, and at the same time we historically 
shape that context by exercising our agency. I believe that these reveal something 
about the movement of history. Conflict and internal disagreement are a matter of 
fact and it becomes a source of political diversity and the motor of history.  
Parallel to Rimbaud’s formula Je est un autre –I is another- in which my 
identity is the reflection of others, in which the individual is at risk of being defined by 
the others; there is also the chance to approach the other, to put ourselves in 
another’s place. My efforts have been directed to push this notion further, to 
emphasise that we have a relationship with the other in which, as Levinas would 
say, we are responsible for the other, to support her, to be in her place, and in last 
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